Figure 1.--Here we see Irish exchange students in the center and Hitler Youth boys in Berlin (1936). he HJ boys even had their drummers and other musicians for the occasion. Here they have a river barge ready for a tour. Exchanges took places wit the Germans. This exchange took place during the Berlin Olympics. There was also an Irish-German football match scheduled.at Dalymount Park, a vey small stadium in Dublin (October 1936).

Ireland was neutral during World War II even after the true nature of the NAZI regime was revealed. It was still technically a member of the British Empire. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) fought a vicious guerilla war against the British (early 1920s). The campaign was led by Michael Collins who was later assassinated when he negotiated a settlement with Britain. Eamon de Valera who opposed the settlement became president of the Irish Free State. At the time that war broke out, the Irish Free State was moving toward independence. There was considerable bitterness about continued British control of Ulster--the primary reason for Collin's assassination. The IRA conducted a bombing campaign in London (Summer 1939). The Irish government denied responsibility for IRA actions. With the outbreak of war (September 1939), there was no desire to join with Britain to fight the NAZIs. There was great anti-British sentiment combined with the memories of losses during the last war. There was even some sentiment for the Germans, primarily a artifact of the anti-British feeling. The Chamberlain Government considered offering Ireland Ulster and unification if Ireland joined the Allies. Ulster protestants were outraged. President Eamon de Valera at any rate rejected the offer. The Roosevelt Administration wanted to use Irish ports to ship war material to Britain as a way around the Neutrality Acts. President de Valera refused. He was also upset that the United States was shipping large quantity of arms to Britain and not providing arms to Ireland. De Valera decided to support anti-Roosevelt isolationist opinion in the November 1940 presidential election. De Valera made a Christmas radio broadcast to the United States supporting isolationism. He then attempted to influence Roosevelt's special emissary, Wendell Willkie on a visit to Great Britain and Ireland (January 1941). De Valera continued efforts to obtain American arms, strangely by taking on President Roosevelt. He dispatched Frank Aiken, a senior IRA leader and Irish defense minister. The American ambassador in Ireland, David Gray, supported the idea, but advised de Valera against choosing Aiken. He also explained to de Valera that America was only likely to provide arms if they cooperated with efforts to support Britain in the War and advised working with the the British Purchasing Commission. Aiken left for America (March 1941). De Valera claimed in his annual St. Patrick's Day address that Ireland was under blockade from both sides and that neutrality protected Ireland from 'the hazards of imperial adventure', hardly likely to build bridges with Churchill and Roosevelt. Aiken's visit was a much larger diplomatic disaster. He dramatically displayed the anti-British views that dominated his and President de Valera's policies. He thoroughly alienated President Roosevelt and other administration figures who had been struggling with the Isolationist. He declined to use the letters of introduction to senior Democrats, including Mrs. Roosevelt that Ambassador Gray had given him. Aiken spent the last 7 weeks of his visit rather than meeting with Administration figures to discuss arms, but conducting an anti-Administration speaking tour. The result was that the President Roosevelt would have nothing to do with him or Ireland. Relations between Ireland and the United States became frosty indeed. With the passage of Lend Lease (March 1941), vast quantities of arms were approved for Britain and eventually many other countries. The Irish Government submitted a note asking about the intentions of the United States regarding Northern Ireland (October 1941). The issue at stake was stationing of personnel there associated with Lend Lease. The U.S. State Department essentially slapped them in the face, suggesting that they inquire with the British government because Northern Ireland was a part of the United Kingdom. 【Girvin, p. 287.】 There would be no American arms for Ireland. The Irish government ignored reports of German atrocities. At the very end of the War de Valera even sent condolences to the Germany government upon Hitler's death. While the Irish Government remained, not all Irish citizens were neutral in the fight against Fascism. Approximately 10 percent of the Irish Army deserted to join up with the British to fight the Germans. They were with the British Army that entered the Reich and liberated the NAZI concentration camps. They were harshly treated by the Irish Government after the War when they returned home.

Atlantic Treaty Ports

Ireland was very important to the British war effort during World War I. Many Irish men served in the Army, both from the north and south. Even more important were the Irish Atlantic ports. A glance at the maps shows how vital they were. Royal Navy escorts operation from Irish ports had an effective range far out into the North Atlantic. Operating from English and Scottish ports, they could not provide protection as far out into the Atlantic as they could from Irish ports. The ports were an issue in the negotiations leading up to Anglo-Irish Treaty (December 6, 1921). Three were two deep water Atlantic ports (Berehaven and Queenstown/Cobh) and the naval base at Lough Swilly). As Colonial and Dominions Secretary, Winston Churchill had overseen the negotiations. He asked Admiral Beatty to the Colonial Office to brief IRA negotiator Michael Collin on the importance of the ports. Collins who was a key figure in the IRA replied, "Of course you must have the ports , they are necessary for your life." 【Churchill. Memoirs, pp. 124-125.】 All three remained under British control. The creation of the Irish Free State (1922) left four-fifths of Ireland in the hands of Republicans, but many constitution issues unresolved. Ireland continued to have constitutional ties to Britain. The Irish wanted full independence and union with Ulster in the north. Efforts to resolve the difficult issues proved intractable and were further complicated by the Depression (1929) and the accession of a new Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister), the hard-line Republican, Éamon de Valera. (De Valera had been president of the Irish Free State, but the position of Taoiseachv gave him greater authority.) The result was a costly Anglo-Irish Trade War. This developed when de Valera withheld money that Ireland had agreed to pay Britain. Britain responded with trade sanctions. This resulted in economic losses on both countries. Thus there were ample reasons for both countries to resolve the issues between them. De Valera had two primary goals: 1) true independence (removing the remaining ties with Britain) and 2) union with the North. Chamberlain, as Chancellor in the Baldwin Government, opposed concessions to the Irish. Eventually he changed his mind, believing that the impasse with Ireland was adversely affecting relations with the Dominions. 【Self, pp. 298-99.】 The British and Irish suspended talks. The talks had been suspended while Baldwin was still prime-minister (1936). Chamberlain became prime-minister soon after (May 1937). Chamberlain moved to resolve the impasse with Ireland. De Valera remained determined to achieve full independence and unification. He also wanted to regain control over the Treaty Ports, but some authors believe this at the time was more of a bargaining chip then a core demand. The British would not budge on Ulster, but were anxious to obtained the money owed them. They were willing to compromise on the Treaty Ports as long as a compromise could be worked out in time of War. The Irish offered few compromises. Chamberlain complained that one of de Valera's offers "presented United Kingdom ministers with a three-leafed shamrock, none of the leaves of which had any advantages for the UK". 【Self, pp. 298-99.】 Chamberlain to prevent a deadlock made a final offer, acceding to most of what de Valera was demanding (March 1938). De Valera was apparently shocked that Chamberlain gave in on the Treaty Ports. Chamberlain insisted that he had "only given up the small things." The agreements were signed (April 25, 1938). Partition of course remained unresolved/ The Irish agreed to pay the £10 million they owed the British. The Treaty ports were handed over to the Irish. And there was no provision in the treaties for British access in time of war. Chamberlain as he would do at Munich accepted personal assurances. De Valera gave him an oral assurance that in time of war, the British would have access to the ports. 【Self, pp. 298-99.】 Churchill, still a Conservative backbencher, sharply criticized Chamberlain for 'surrendering' the Treaty Ports. Churchill described the Treaty Ports as 'sentinel towers of the Western Approaches'. And When war came as was increasingly obvious by 1938, de Valera reneged on his assurances and denied the Royal Navy access to ports based on his government's proclaimed neutrality. Churchill spoke with some vehemence in his World War II history after the War. He wrote that he "never saw the House of Commons more completely misled" and that "members were made to feel very differently about it when our existence hung in the balance during the Battle of the Atlantic". 【Churchill, Gathering.】 Chamberlain's contention was that the Treaty Ports were worthless if Ireland was hostile and that a 'friendly' Ireland was more important than the ports. 【Taylor, p. 406.】 Chamberlain in only a few months would be negotiating for much higher stakes with Hitler. (The German embassies in Dublin and London would have reported on this in detail.) A logical conclusion by Hitlker would be if Chamberlain would give in to the Irish on the vital Treaty Ports, surely he would relent if pressed on the far away Sudetenland. Churchill wrote, " Personally I remain convinced that the gratuitous surrender of our rights to use the Irish ports in war was a major injury to British national life and safety. A more feckless act can hardly be imagined --and at such a time, 【Churchill, Memoirs, p. 125.】

The Abwehr

The Abwehr was interested in Ireland. The level of anti-British feeling was common knowledge. And a cursory glance of a map shows that Ireland would be of great assistance in a Battle of the Atlantic. They assigned Oskar Karl Pfaus to work with the IRA. Pfaus was a German-born journalist who spoke perfect English. He was born in Illingen, Germany (1901). He emigrated to the United States after World War I. Pfaus at first traveled as a hobo on rail cars. He claimed to have worked as a prospector, a forester, and even a cowboy. He became a nationalized American citizenship after service in the U.S. Army. He subsequently settled in Chicago and became a policeman, most notably fighting the Al Capone mob. Through all of this he remained a fervent German patriot. He launched the Germanischer Bund, the key Midwest distribution center for NAZI propaganda printed by the Fichte-Bund in Germany. He then became the editor of the Chicago edition of the Weckruf und Beobachter the paper of the German American Bund. Desiring to be part of the New Germany, Pfaus returned to the Reich (December 1938). He became director in the English section of the Fichte-Bund in Hamburg. Partly as a result of his English skills, he soon began working with the Abwehr. The Abwehr decided to use him in their Irish operations. His cover was that he was a Frankfurter Zeitungreporter. His assignment as to gain the support of anti-British elements in the coming war. Ffaus knew next to nothing about Irisg politics. He met with Irish Fascist leader Eoin O'Duffy who had previously broken with the IRA. O'Duffy was hostile to the idea of IRA cooperation. His deputy Captain Liam D. Walsh proved more forthcoming. Pfaus met with the newly appointed IRA Chief of Staff, Sean Russell. Russel was impressed with the nationalist fervor of the NAZIs and their willingness to help drive the British out of Ireland. They agreed to send Shamous (James) O'Donovan to Germany to discuss possible IRA/Abwehr cooperation. Pfaus then made three trips to Ireland (February and August 1939). He also managed to obtain leads on the IRA underground in Boston and New York City which resulted in the Abwehr sending an agent to America.

Status: Irish Free State (1922)

Ireland was still technically a part of the British Empire. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) fought a vicious guerilla war against the British (early 1920s). The British answered with the also brutal Black and Tans. The IRA campaign was led by Michael Collins who was later assassinated when he negotiated a settlement with Britain. Eamon de Valera who opposed the settlement became president of the Irish Free State. At the time that war broke out, the Irish Free State was moving toward independence. The Irish wanted to differentiate themselves from the British as much as possible and even had German-looking uniforms for their small army. Ireland after centuries of British domination had what was essentially an independent state, but to get that they had to leave accept the Protestant desire to become separate. This was all done in a era of peace in Europe. World War I had ended with a German defeat. No one in Britain or Ireland imagined that another war was coming and what a independent Ireland wold mean in another war. From the creation of the Irish Free State, de Valera's primary goal was German unification.

NAZI Germany (1933)

With the NAZI seizure of power (January 1933), De Valera saw the opportunity to leverage the Irish unification effort. He chose the blatantly pro-NAZI Charles Bewley to be the Irish minister (ambassador). Bewley arrived in Berlin (July 1933). He immediately made his anti-Semitism and anti-British views apparent. He initiated a charm offensive to impress NAZI officials. His first official step was the accreditation ceremony with President von Hindenburg, He talked about the 'national rebirth of Germany' -- clear embrace of Hitler and the NAZIs. While in Berlin he justified the NAZIs bulwark against Communism and the Soviet Union. This in itself was not unreasonable, it was the assessment of Baldwin and Chamberlain in Britain as well, before the existential threat of Hitler and the NAZIs became apparent. But Bewley did not just ignore NAZI brutality, he basically justified the NAZIs brutal reprehensible persecution of Jews, the suppression of Christianity and eventually its aggressive expansionism. Bewley was not acting alone. Joseph P Walshe, the Irish Free State Secretary of External Affairs, was basically supporting the same policies. He was impressed an intoxicating atmosphere of national 'reinvigoration' that he sensed when he visited Cologne. He was enthralled by the NAZIs 'great experiment'. He was not alone. Conservative elements in America and Britain convinced themselves that Hitler was the justifiable reaction for the alleged mistreatment of he country at the end of the War (1919). A wide cross section of Britain believed that a policy of appeasement was justified. Even World War I leaders like David Lloyd George and King Edward VIII who fortunately abdicated. Walshe, de Valera and many in Dublin soon fond that the NAZIs were not easy to get along with. A NAZI newspaper referred to De Valera as a 'half-caste Jew' apparently picking up comments made by political opponents (July 1933). There were also charges that Irish republicanism was part of a Jewish world conspiracy. In he early years, journalists could write anything they wanted critical of Jews some of which was not helpful in German foreign policy. Irish officials protested to the German Foreign Office. Bewley surprisingly downplayed evidence of NAZI hostility towards Catholicism but the Irish government, press and public were not misled by NAZI propaganda in this and several other respects. It is understandable that many NAZI policies could be ignored. The NAZI campaign against Christians, especially Catholics. It seems harder to understand why officials of a strongly Catholic country like Ireland could ignore.

Republican Orientation

Irish Republicans believed that the Germans, especially the NAZIs were predisposed to sympathize, even support, Ireland’s struggle for national unity. Both Germany and Ireland . had experienced imposed post-conflict settlements (the Versailles Treaty of 1919 and the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921). Of course there was a difference. Irish Protestants did not want to be part of Catholic Ireland. Irish Republican convinmced themselves that the NAZIs had a moral commitment to address the so called wrongs of the inter-war order. This was not new. Irish rebels had looked to France earlier and now Germany as a potential ally. It is this reasoning that had inspired Roger Casement’s doomed efforts to solicit German aid for the 1916 Easter Rising. This interest with the Germans continued after Irish independence. Ireland was a small country with very limited power. They saw Germany as the only real military and economic counter part to British power. The British victory in World War I closed that possibility. The ruse of the NAZIs revived that possibility. America was a support, but was never going to challenge the British Empire.

Dual Track Policy

De Valera’s developed a dual-track policy. On one hand there was a policy of non-interference in or ignoring German domestic affairs but then de Valera sympathized with Germans’ nationalist aspirations and grievances with the Versailles Treaty. De Valera offered an arrangement with Germany to divide Irish foreign trade evenly between Germany, Britain and the United States (1934) De Valera accepted Hitler's successive faits accomplis, including withdrawal from the League of Nations (1933), rearmament including announcing conscription and Luftwaffe (1935), the Remilitarization of the Rhineland (1936), and the Austria Anschluss (1938). He supported British Prime-minister's Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement policies, including the Munich Agreement (1938) which Hitler violated after only 6 months.

Youth Exchanges

We see youth exchanges with the NAZIs during the 1930s. This is interesting because it occurred at a time that international travel was not common. What international travel that did occur was the province of rich and very affluent families. This obviously was the case in America because here was an ocean to cross. But even in Europe where countries were smaller and packed closer together, international travel was not common. We see Hitler Youth (HJ) groups going to Britain and we think other European counties. We note HJ groups in Britain and Italy. There wee presumably other countries visited that we do not know about. We see youth groups visiting Germany. This usually was Scout groups. Ireland was a little different because Scouting had a Britrish taint to it--the same reason that Scouting was not as popular in Germany as in many other European countries. We don't see Irish Scouting groups visiting NAZI Germany. We do see a contingent of Irish secondary school students, Catholic teenagers participating in an exchange, organized through Irish-German cultural groups. We do not have a lot of details, but there seem ti have been about 15 students--all boys. They seem to have selected boys with favorable attitudes toward the NAZIs. It was described as an educational experience to promote goodwill and learn about German (NAZI) youth culture. It was timed to coincided with the Berlin Olympic Games (1936). his permitted the boys to experience the Olympic spectacle. This included the opening ceremony at the Olympic Stadium with Hitler famously opening the Games with swastika banners flying. The now standard torch relays were introduced by the NAZI planners. The boys engaged in group activities with the Hitler Youth (figure 1). We are not sure how language was handled. Perhaps the boys were studying German. One source suggests that there were discussions on topics like 'sports, nationalism, and anti-colonialism'. Here the focus was on British colonialism, not the German colonialism described in Mein Kampf. We are not sure if anti-semitism entered the discussions. Interestingly, Ireland did not participate in the Berlin Olympics. The e International Olympic Committee (IOC) insisted that there be a unfed Irish team, which did not go down well in Dublin and Belfast.

Anglo-Irish Treaty (1938)

De Valera and the Republican supporters seemed convinced Britain's appeasement of the NAZIs was helpful to Ireland. One actual benefit was the Treaty of Anglo-Irtish Treaty of 1938. This ended the economic conflict and returned the treaty ports (Queenstown/Cobh, Lough Swilly and Castletown Berehaven) to Ireland. A major factor here was Chamberlain desire to permanently secure Britain’s western flank. If appeasement failed and Britain had to fight another war, Britain wanted a friendly Ireland to the west. Hitler and the NAZIs thus proved helpful in improving Ireland's bargaining power. And Hitler's demand to unify all Germans seems to validate de Valera's primary goal--uniting the Irish. Of course there was a big difference--the Protestants in the northern counties did not want to be iustified in a majority Catholic Ireland.

IRA S Plan (August 1939)

De Valera was passionately commited to uniting Ireland, but through a political process. He and Michael Collins had been members of the IRA at the time of the Easter Rebellion (1916), but now saw there was more to be lost than gained by attacking the British. The IRA had survived as a small, weakened force. They had no confidence in the political process. Sean Russel was made IRA Chief (1938). He was assisted by the chief chemist bomb maker, Shamous O'Donovan. They devised the "S" (Sabatoge) Plan. The idea was to conduct terror bomb attacks to bring the Irish issue to the attention of the British public and to convince the British that retaing Northern Ireland would be a costly proposition. A one time De Valera confident in America, Joseph McGarrity (1874-1940), helped finance the Plan. The Abwehr supplied a radio transmitter, but the IRA men could never get it to work. Irish inteligence, however, did pick up the signal. Thev IRA struck Coventry, setting off bombs wwich killed 5 people and injured some 100 civiliand (August 25).

World War II

Munich was a turning point. Pressuring the British was one thing. War was very different. And de Valera drew the line after Munich. The Irish Government refused to to recognize the German annexation of what was left Czechoslovakia (March 1939). This involved th use of force and the annexation of a non-German population. Up until this point, de Valera's seems to have thought Bewley's pro-NAZI efforts efforts in Berlin useful. But now that Hitler was headed toward war an annexing non-German population, de Valera seems to have begun having second thoughts, especially after getting control over the Treaty Ports. Bewley's uncritical support for Hitler no matter what now was beckoning a liability. And if that was not bad enough, Bewley began criticizing de Valera. Ambassadors are not supposed to criticize the governments they represent and defend the county to which they are posted. Bewley criticized de Valera’s foreign policy as pro-British, anti-Irish, and anti-German. This ended his diplomatic career. De Valera would adopt a neutral foreign policy. Ireland at the outbreak of World War II declared its neutrality (September 1939). The country remained neutral throughout the War. The German and Japanese embassies were allowed to continue to operate. It remained neutral even after the true nature of the NAZI regime was revealed. There was no desire to join with Britain to fight the NAZIs. There was great anti-British sentiment combined with the memories of losses during the last war. There was even some sentiment for the Germans, but primarily an artifact of the anti-British feeling. De Valera pursued a strictly neutral policy, but this benefited the Germans. Denied Irish ports, British convoys were confined to the northern approaches, making it easier for the U-boats to find them. It also meant German ships could pass through Irish waters. The one exception to Irish neutrality was the decision for Irish intelligence to work with MI-5 in its hunt for IRA operatives and terrorists. This was, however, a matter for de Valera to protect himself and his Government because the IRA believed that they were cooperating with the British.

IRA Bombing, Government Repression, and German Agents

The IRA responding to Government efforts to suppress it, set off bombs in Dublin (December 23, 1939). The Abwehr was impressed, but this resulted in an immediate Government crackdown. The Government approved legislation allowing arrests without warrants and holding suspects without trials. There were mass internment and some executions. IRA leader Sean Russel decides to flee to America. The new IRA leader is Stephen Hayes. He decides to escalate the S Plan bombing attacks in Britain. The Germans attempt to insert agents. The U-37 landing Weber-Drohl (February 9-10, 1940). He has cash and a better transmitter and orders to redirect the bombing campaign to military and industrial targets. The U-38 landed Willy Preetz (alias Paddy Mitchell) and Walter Simon (June 12-13, 1940). Simon was soon captured, Preetz made it to Dublin and for a time broadcast weather reports useful to the Luftwaffe. For the most part these agents achieve nothing and are arrested by the Irish police. The U-65 attempted to land Frank Ryann and Sean Russell who had gotten to Germany with funds collected in America. At the time Operation Sea Lion was still a possibility and Operation Green was to be the Irish part of it. Russel died enroute and Ryann decided not to land alone (August 1940). 【Mallmann Showell】 During the height of the Blitz (August 1940). The British who had tracked down German agents, had more trouble with the IRA because of the large number of Irish living in Britain. The IRA directed by Hayes sets off bombs in London, Birmingham, and Manchester. This is not, however, what the Abwehr wanted. They wanted attacks on military and industrial targets. Hayes is interested in pure civilian terror.

Operation Green/Plan Kathleen

Having achieved nothing and with Britain bracing for an expected invasion, IRA leader Hayes comes up with a new plan. Pfaus is interested. A Heinkel bomber inserts another Abwehr agent, Hermann Görtz wearing a German uniform (May 5, 1940). Görtz had already served a prison term for espionage in Britain. He now became known as the 'flying spy' Bad weather takes him off course. He lands in the Irish Free State and takes 5 days to reach former IRA leader Seamus (Jim) O'Donovan and a safe house in the North. As conceived, the Germans would land in the Southwest and Northern Ireland and be joined by IRA fighters. After the fall of France (June 1940) and planning began for Operation Sea Lion, it became more of a possibility. As it developed, the Germans would land 50,000 paratroops in Northern Ireland where they were to be joined by 30,000 IRA fighters. This was all a pipe dream. They had no idea how well Northern Ireland was defended and details like shore installations. There were perhaps 5,000 IRA loyalists who could be mobilized, but it all rested on the Battle of Britain and Operation Sea Lion. The Germans were not going to land in Ireland unless the RAF was defeated and the Operation Sea Lion Channel,landings begun. Irish police raid the safe house and find details on Plan Kathleen. O'Donovan is arrested, but Görtz slips away. But with the RAF victory in the Battle of Britain, Hitler delays, actually cancels, Sea Lion and with it Green. Görtz is finally arrested (November 27).

IRA in Disarray

With the Irish crackdown and the German cancellation of Sea Lion, the IRA is defeated and in disarray. Hayes takes to drinking even more heavily. Associates blame their failure on him. They kidnap him and beat him until he admits falsely that he is a British agent. Before they shoot him, he managed to escape and goes to the Irish police. All of this comes out in the newspapers, further discrediting the IRA.

Evacuee Children

Some British evacuee children during the Blitz were apparently evacuated to Ireland. We have not been able to find much information on this. We notice a home on Kilronan, one of the Aran Islands. This may have been primarily Belfast children, but we are not entirely sure.

Irish Ports and America

The Roosevelt Administration wanted to use Irish ports to ship war material to Britain as a way around the Neutrality Acts. President de Valera refused. He was also upset that the United States was shipping large quantity of arms to Britain and not providing arms to Ireland. De Valera decided to support anti-Roosevelt isolationist opinion in the November 1940 presidential election. De Valera made a Christmas radio broadcast to the United States supporting isolationism. He then attempted to influence Roosevelt's special emissary, Wendell Willkie on a visit to Britain and Ireland (January 1941). This proved unsuccessful and de Valera decided ion a new strategy for obtaining American arms, strangely by taking on President Roosevelt. One wonders what he was thinking. He dispatched Frank Aiken, a senior IRA leader and Irish defense minister. The American ambassador in Ireland, David Gray, supported the idea, but advised de Valera against choosing Aiken. He also explained to de Valera that America was only likely to provide arms if they cooperated with efforts to support Britain in the War and advised working with the the British Purchasing Commission. Aiken left for America (March 1941). De Valera claimed in his annual St. Patrick's Day address that Ireland was under blockade from both sides and that neutrality protected Ireland from 'the hazards of imperial adventure', hardly likely to build bridges with Churchill and Roosevelt. Aiken's visit was a much larger diplomatic disaster. He dramatically displayed the anti-British views that dominated his and President de Valera's policies. He thoroughly alienated President Roosevelt and other administration figures who had been struggling with the Isolationists. He declined to use the letters of introduction to senior Democrats, including Mrs. Roosevelt that Ambassador Gray had given him. Aiken spent the last 7 weeks of his visit rather than meeting with Administration figures to discuss arms, but conducting an anti-Administration speaking tour. The result was that President Roosevelt would have nothing to do with him or Ireland. Relations between Ireland and the United States became frosty indeed.

Military Internees

Ireland set up an internment camp for the military personnel of belligerent nations that found themselves in Ireland. Most were airmen that crashed in Ireland. They had an internment camp that was a kind of POW camp even though Ireland was not a war. It was Curragh internment camp. The Irish detained 140 Germans (mostly Luftwaffe and U-boat crews), 100 Allied servicemen (British, Canadian, New Zealand, and Polish airmen). There was one American (Bud Wolfe) who flew in the RAF before America entered the War. There were also some 400 IRA internees at the camp. There were also survivors of ships torpedoed by U-boats, but if they were merchant seamen and not sailors, they were repatriated. It was not like any other World War II POW camp, but it was guarded by the Irish Army. Discipline was very informal. Apparently the Allies and the Germans were kept in what were essentially separate camps. Two Canadian airmen describe camp life a surreal honor system. The internees were allowed daily parole so they could leave the camp. They were free to golf, cycle, or enjoy other local diversions. This of course included the local pubs. All the drinks made in Ireland were on the Irish Government. We do not know if the Allied and German personnel met in pubs, but they must have in the streets. There was no supervision away from camp. Strangely, the system preventing them from escaping while away from the camp on parole, but they were honor bound as military men while in camp to try to escape. 【Keefer】 There was one marriage between a Canadian airman and a local lassie who then became a war bride after the war.

Lend Lease (March 1941)

With the passage of Lend Lease (March 1941), vast quantities of arms were approved for Britain and eventually many other countries. The Irish Government submitted a note asking about the intentions of the United States regarding Northern Ireland (October 1941). The issue at stake was stationing of personnel there associated with Lend Lease. The U.S. State Department essentially slapped them in the face, suggesting that they inquire with the British government because Northern Ireland was a part of the United Kingdom. 【Girvin, p. 287.】 There would be no American arms for Ireland. De Valera's earlier confrontation with President Roosevelt and refusal to allow Irish ports to be used by the Allies essentially prevented any American aid during the war. Ireland was a relatively poor country. Cutting themselves off from American aid as a very costly decision.

German Bombing (April-May 1941)

The Irish to prevent accidental German attacks during the Battle of Britain attempted to mark their territory with white 'Eire' postings visible from the air. After ensuring heavy casualties during daylight raids, the Germans began bombing at night (September 1940). The Luftwaffe in the final stage of the Blitz bombed Belfast which was on the outer limit of the range if their bombers (April 15, 1941). Belfast was an important port for the British in the Battle of Britain and thus a legitimate target. The German bombers were able to find it by following the Dublin-Belfast railway which was not blacked out. It was a devastating raid. The target was the port which was only slightly damaged, but half the city's housing was destroyed or damaged. De Valera was outraged and sends fire fighters and relief personnel north. Shortly after, the Luftwaffe bombs Dublin (May 31). It is unclear if this was a reprisal for aiding Belfast or errant off course bombers.

Army Desertions

While the Irish Government remained neutral in the face of NAZI aggression, not all Irish citizens were neutral in the fight against Fascism. Approximately 10 percent of the Irish Army actually deserted to join up with the British to fight the Germans. Thus there were both Ulster and southern Irish with the British Army that entered the Reich and liberated the NAZI concentration camps. They were, however, harshly treated by the Irish Government after the War when they returned home.

Ulster Uprising (August 1942)

America entered the War (December 1941). American troops arrived in Northern Ireland (May 1942). Some 30,000 Americans are stationed in Northern Ireland. With the Wehrmacht now bogged down in the Soviet Union, Britain is now impregnable. The IRA has, however, not given up. They smuggle weapons in secret cashes across the border to be used to attack British forces and Ulster police. The plan fails and most of the IRA gun men arrested.,

Holocaust

Ireland can perhaps be excused for not taking up arms and remaining neutral in World War II. They paid a heavy price in World War I and as a result of the historical experience with Britain there was lingering ill-will against the British. Less clear is why the Irish strove to maintain correct relations with the Germans after they became aware of the nature of the NAZI regime and the horrendous atrocities they were perpetrating. Taoiseach (roughly prime minister) Éamon de Valera knew that the Germans were killing Jews in large numbers. Historians differ on precisely when de Valera learned. Some believe it was as early as 1942. There is no doubt that he knew by early-1943. 【Girvin, p.50.】 One source claims that Rabbi Herzog in Berlin informed de Valera that Jews were being systematically exterminated in German ghettos and camps. Other information reached the Irish Government. We now know that Ireland's 4,000 Jews were on SS SS-Obersturmbannführer Eichmann's kill, list. To their credit, de Valera and his government made some effort to rescue Jews. They were especially interested in helping children. The most intense effort was to rescue a group of German Jews held at Vittel in Vichy France. They already had obtained visas for different South American countries. De Valera and the Irish ambassadors in both Berlin and Vichy intervened on their behalf. The Vatican also attempted to help. There were subsequent efforts to help Dutch, Hungarian, Italian and Slovakian Jews. None of these efforts succeeded. German officials were unwilling to turn over any Jews to Irish custody. We do not know how the Irish entreaties were handled by the Germans. We do know that the German Foreign Ministry did intervene on the behalf of some neutral countries. Foreign Minister Ribbentrop wanted to maintain correct relations with neutral countries, especially as the War began to go against Germany. He even contacted some neutral countries to inquire about their Jews in German custody. We are unsure why the Irish entities were ignored. We suspect it may have been because the Jews the Irish tried to save were not Irish nationals. The Irish diplomats involved seem to have been under the mistaken impression that Jews with Irish visas would be imprisoned, but not sent to the death camps. The Vittel Jews, included the children, however, were transported to death camps. 【Tracy】 The only known Irish Jew killed by the Germans was Esther Steinberg and her son who was born in Paris. The father was Belgium. They were transported from Paris to Auschwitz (1942). Even after the War there was a failure to see the Allied cause as an honorable crusade against evil. An editorial was published in the Limerick Leader complaining that "The campaign against war criminals is strangely confined to those who happen to fight on the wrong side. Allied atrocities cannot excuse the monstrous barbarism of the Reich." Much worse appeared in other Irish newspapers. A letter to a Kilkenny newspaper in 1945 charged that newsreel footage after the British liberated Belsen was "all propaganda" and had been faked by the British using starving Indians. A account of a Kilkenny fancy dress ball recounts how the first prize went to 'the Beast of Belsen'. 【Fisk, pp. 430-31.】 Jewish groups, after the war, attempted to care for Jewish children in DP camps that had survived the Holocaust. A London Jewish charity in 1946 brought 100 Jewish children from Poland to Clonyn Castle in County Meath. 【Institute for Jewish Policy Research】 Another Jewish group encountered difficulty in getting the Irish Government to grant refugee status for displaced Jewish children that had survived the Holocaust. At the same time, the Government quickly approved a plan to admit more than 400 displaced Catholic children from the Rhineland encountered no difficulties. The Iish Department of Justice released an official statement in 1948 complaining that, "It has always been the policy of the Minister for Justice to restrict the admission of Jewish aliens, for the reason that any substantial increase in our Jewish population might give rise to an anti-Semitic problem." De Valera over-ruled the Justice Department and the 150 refugee Jewish children were allowed to enter Ireland.

German Atrocities

The Irish government ignored reports of German atrocities. At the very end of the War de Valera even sent condolences to the Germany government upon Hitler's death. He did not do the same when President Roosevelt died.

Sources

Churchill, Winston. The Gathering Storm.

Churchill, Winston. Memoirs of the Second World War (Bonanza: New York, 1959), 1065p. This is the abridged version of Churchill's monumental World War II history.

Girvin, Brian. The Emergency: Neutral Ireland 1939-45 (Macmillan: 2006).

Keefer, Ralph. Grounded in Eire: The Amazing Story of Two POWs in Ireland During World War II.

Mallmann Showell, Jak. U-Boats at War: Landings on Hostile Shores. (Ian Allen, 2000).

Self, Robert. Neville Chamberlain: A Biography (Ashgate, 2006).

Taylor, A.J.P. English History, 1914-1945 (Oxford University Press, 1965).

Created: 6:01 AM 12/31/2011
Last updated: 2:30 PM 3/31/2026