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Midway proved to be the turning point of the Pacific War. Admiral Yamamoto had gabled at Pearl Harbor that Japan could win a quick victory with a decisive blow. That gamble was lost at Midway. It is notable because it was the only major Allied victory in which the opposing forces were superior. Admiral Yamamoto was determined to bring the American Pacific fleet to battle before America's industrial might could redress the strategic ballance. Yamamoto reasoned that Midway was an assett of such importance that Nimitz would have to commit his remaining assetts to defend it. The Japanese had many advantages. Unknon to them, however, surprise was not one of the advantages. The same American code breaking operation that had learned of the Port Moresby operation also warned Admiral Nimitz that the next target was Midway. Admiral Yamamoto was convinced that the remaining American carriers could be brought to battle and destroyed at Midway. The Japanese plans were based on achieving an element of surprise and on the fact that two American carriers had been destoyed in the Coral Sea, in fact the Yorktown, although heavily damaged had not been sunk. American code breakers had alerted the Ameicans to the Jaspanese plans. Admiral Nimitz positioned Enterprise and Hornet, along with the hastily patched up Yorktown northwest of Midway to ambush he Japanese. The American carrier victory at Midway dealt a crippling blow to the Imperial Navy. The Americans sank four first-line Japnese carriers, killing most of the well-trained crews. The weakness of the Japanese in fire saftey and fire supression was notable. While the Imperial Navy still held an advantage, it was no longer an
overwealming one. Meanwhile American shipyards were turning out the new Essex class carriers that would engage the weakened Imperial Navy in 1943. The stunning American carrier victory at Midway, significantly reduced the strike capability of the Imperial Navy.
Midway proved to be the turning point of the Pacific War. Admiral Yamamoto had gabled at Pearl Harbor that Japan could win a quick victory with a decisive blow. That gamble was lost at Midway. The American victory at Midway is notable because it was the only major Allied victory in which the opposing forces were superior. The importance was the airbase. It would provide a stepping stone for the conquest of the Hawaian Islands. Most importabtly, Yamamoto reasons that Midway was of such strategic importance that Nimitz will be forced to commit the remaining carriers of the Pacific Fleet. Here Yamamoto believes that both Lexington and Concord were sunk in the Coral Sea. He believes that the Americans only have Enterprise and Hornet left.
Admiral Yamamoto for poorly understood reasons did not after Pearl Harbor press home the attack against the American carriers. Rather the Japanese engaged in azn orgy of grabbing territory. A more prudent approach would have been to finish off the American carriers, especilly after the oil fiekds in the Dust Wast Inies had been secured. Rather the Japnese carriers were dispersed in a far flung series of operations , including a foray into the Indian Ocean. The danger posed by the American carriers was brought back into focus by the Doolittle Raid launched by Hornet and Enterprise (April 1942). This embarassment caused Yamamoto to finally move ahead with the Midway operation. But he decided to first allow the already planned Coral Sea operation (May 1942) to go forward. Unfortunately for Yamamoto, two of this first-lline carriers that were targeted for the Midway operation were put out of operation as a result of the battle. Zuikaku's air crews had been desimated.
Shōkaku had been heavily damaged.
Admiral Yamamoto knew that time was not on Japan's side. He was determined to bring the American Pacific fleet to battle before America's industrial might could redress the strategic ballance. Yamamoto reasoned that Midway was an assett of such importance that Nimitz would have to commit his remaining assetts to defend it. The basic premice of the Japanese strategy was sound. The Imperial Navy's final plan for the battle wasflawed. Yamamoto consented to detailing three carriers to the Port Moresby operation. Battle damage meant one of these carriers were lost and the otherv two so depleted of planes and pilots or damaged that they were not available for the Midway Operation. Other carriers were detailed for a diversionary feint at the Aleutians. Thus only four carriers were committed to the Miday operation, but this seemed sufficent. From the Japanese pointb of view, Nimitz had only two carriers left. The Japanese were convinced that the engagement in the Coral Sea proved that the american carriers were no match for the Imperial Navy's carriers. The division of force was the weakness of the Japanese plan. The idea of the battle was to concentrate their forces to deal a death blow to the American Pacific fleet. The final plan of battle, significantly divided the key carrier forces.
The lore developed around the Battle of Midway has come to portray the American victory as preordained becuse of the cracking of the Japanese naval code. Nothing could be furthur from the truth. The Japanese had many advantages. in fact Admiral Nagumo's Mobile Force (sometimes called the First Air Fleet) had most of the advantages. They had a massive naval force, but the principal advantage was the superior carrier force. Here the Japanese superority was staggerig, in carrier numbers, aircraft types, pilot training, weaponery, and staff experience. 1) The Japanese had more carriers. Not only did the mobile force anout number the two American task forces (TF16 and 17), but they had small carriers as well. 2) The Japanese aircraft were superior. This was especially the case for the fighters which were important for both combat air patrol (CAP) and escort duties. The Mitshibishi Zero outclassed the American Wildcat. The Zero was a much higher performance airccraft. In addition the American torpedo aircraft were obsolete and proved to be death traps for the brave air crews that flew them. 3) The Japanese pilots were better trained and more effective. Had Admiral Nagumo got off a major strike on the American carriers, the outcome of the battle would hve been very different. 4) The Japanese torpedo planes were equipped with one of the most effective ship killing weapons of the War, the Type 91 aeral torpedo. In contrast, the America torpedo essentially did not work. The Americans had a small advantage in bombs, but it was much more difficult to sink a large ship with bombs (unless you manage to catch your opponent with decks and hangers full of armed and fueled aircraft). 5) The Japanese pilots were better trained. The American pilots were vastly improved from the beginning of the War, but they were still not up to the standards of the Japanese pilots of the Mobile Force. The American carrier pilots had gained considerable experience in the months since the Pearl Harbor attack. This had closed the gap in training and experience that had been held at the beginning of the War. 6) Another major advantage was that the Japanese carrier staff was experienced in large fleet operations such as the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Americans were not. Japanese carrier doctrine involved hgrouping their carriers together in a massive striking force and their officers were trained to do this. The Americans iperated their carriers in task forces composed of asingle carrier ad escorts or at the most two. The events as they developed showed this weakness. The American strike on the the Mobile force devolved into a series of uncoordinated attacks carried out by squadrons that had become separated. Only by accident did the bpmbing groups from Enterprise and Yorktown find and attack the Mobile force at the same time in uncoordinated attacks. Hornet's bombing group did not even find the Mobile Force. The Americans did have some advantages. The element of surprise was a factor but generally lost when Nagumo's search planes found the Americans. Radar was another advantage, but still had a relatively hort range. The major advantage that Nimitz had at Midway was the island itself which helped to distract Nagumo. Admiral Nagumo at the onset of the battle
thought that he held the element of suprise which had proven so important at Pearl. Unknown to them, however, surprise was not one of their advantages. Fighting the battle near Midway was. It effectively added an extra carrier to the American force. Although Midway did not have effective aircraft for the battle, the B-17s and other aircraft they did have would destract Nagumo. And because he had been criticized for not launching a third strike at Pearl, he almost certainly had a mindset fixed on Midway. Thus the Americans entered the battle wiith a significantly inferior force, but one major advantage--Midway. Yamamoto and Nagumo were under the impression that they had deployed a superior force and in fact they had. What they did not accurately calculate was the importance of Midway and the difficulty of crippling the air element on the island.
American code breakers alerted the Ameicans to the Jaspanese plans. Magic, The same American code breaking operation that had learned of the Port Moresby operation, also warned Admiral Nimitz that the next target was Midway.
Admiral Yamamoto was convinced that the remaining American carriers could be brought to battle and destroyed at Midway. The Japanese plans were based on achieving an element of surprise and on the fact that two American carriers had been destoyed in the Coral Sea, in fact the Yorktown, although heavily damaged had not been sunk. The most surprising Japanese failure seems to be the failure to ask why the American carriers had suddenly appeared in the Coral Sea to oppose the Port Moresby operation. The Americans tried to convince the Japanese that their carriers were in the southwest Pacific and this was the assessment tht Nagumo had when he sailed with the Mobile Force. Yamamoto received a revised assess,ent, but did not advise Nagumo because of asesire to maintain radio silence. Yamoto assumed that Nagumo received the same messages he received. In fact, Nagumo's flagship, Akagi had poor radio receiving wquipment.
Admiral Nimitz positioned Enterprise and Hornet, along with the hastily patched up Yorktown northwest of Midway to ambush the Japanese. As the battle developed, Nagumo came very close to ambusing the Americans.
The Japanese deployed four of their first line heavy carriers in the Mobile Force. Anoard these carriers were the best Japanese pilots, in fact the best trained and most effective pilots in the world. The Mobile Force consisted of four of the six carriers that that had carried out the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nagumo's carriers were divided into two divsions. Sivision one was the Kaga and Akagi. Division 2 was the Hiryū and Sōryū. Smaller carriers were with the landing force. Midway had been planned to include six of the Imperial Fleet's first-line crriers. Coral Sea had changed this. Yamamoto decided that four carriers would be sufficent for the operation. There was also a powerful Japanese invasion force. But it was the four first-line carriers which would fight out and decide the battle.
Midway would prove yo be the decisive battle of the Pacific War. The Japanese if they were to win the War had to win in the first year of the War before the industrial might of the United States began to shift the strategic ballance. Midway is unique in World War II battles. It is the only important battle in which an Allied force defeated a numerically supperior, better equipped, and better trained Axis force. The outcome of the battle hinged on intelligemce and the lack of caution by the Japanese commanders. The Jpabese Midway battle plan was conceived as a trap for the remaining American carriers. It prove to be a catestrophic trap for the Japanese carriers. The Americans succeeded in part because the Japanese had not pressed the carrier war after Pearl Harbor. Instead of engaging the American carrirrs, the Japanese had engaged n far ranging operztions including attacks in Darwin and a musguided firay into the Indian Ocean.
This gave the Americans 7 months to hone their carrier force to a level that could compete with the Japanese.
Nagumo inexplicably as he approached Midway did not ensure a careful surveillance of the surrounding waters. The Japanese did send out reconisance scouting aircraft, but the screen was incomplete and the air crews inexplicably lax in accurately reporing what they found. A scout plane from the cruiser Tonw did find the Americans. They first reported only that they spotted American aircraft. Then they reorted destoyers and cruisers. Such a force was no threat to Nagumo, but an American force in that position should have caused greater concern on Nagumo's part. Only a third report from the scout plan an hour after the first report indicated "what appears to be a carrier". This was a theat. That one hour delay was all the Americans needed. The Americans with their long-range Catalinas found him before he was aware the American carriers were present. This added to the American knowledge of the Japanese plans obtained through Magic. This essentislly doomed the Japanese even before the first shots had been fired. In these early carrier battles, against relatively evenly matched forces, it was the side which managed to strike first that would prevail. Had Tone's Scout reported the American carrier on its first message, the outcome of the battle almost certainly would have been different. On such slender threads hung the fate of great nations.
The battle started with a strike by American B-17s from Midway. The Americans bombed from high altitude and had no impact on the Japanese force. Midway was in effect a fourth carrier for the Americans, but it was not equipped with effecive air craft for the battle. The Marines had obsolete fighters and the Army Air Corps B-17s were unlikely to hit the Japanese carriers from high altitudes. Even so, they provided a major distraction from the American carroer force lying in mbush to the northeas. Nagumo still unaware of the presence of American carriers launched a strike on Miday, prudently holding a sizeable force back in case the the American carriers appeared. Sprunance launched his attack, timed so as to catch Nagumo preparing for a second strike on Midway. The Japanese strike on Midway was effective, but because only a part of the Japanese force was used, they did not put the air strip out of action. As a result, a second strike was needed. Nagumo at this stage was concerned about the air strikes that had been launched from Midway. He thus ordered preparations for the second strike. Then two things happen. First,
Tone's scout reported an American carrier. Second, the American carrier strike forcec reached Nagumos's carriers.
Spruance had gambeled big--a dangerous gamble. He launched everything he had at Nagumo's carriers. There were no fighters left behind to provide an air umbrella over the American carriers. If Nagumo had been more careful with his surveillance and found the American carriers, the results would have been devestating. It was a calculated gamble. The realities of carrier warfare were that the side that found the opposing carriers and struck first had the greatest chance of success. The Americans planned a coordinated strike on the Japanese carriers. Coordinating attacks on a moving target from three different carriers with the communication gear available was not an easy undertaking. And the Americans had not yet perfected carrier fleet operations. The torpedo planes found the carriers, but attacked without the dive bombers or fighter cover and were decimated without scoring a hit. The dive bombers werevunable to locate the carriers and were ready to turn back. Then they saw a Japanese destroyer heading north at a high speed. That destroyer was part of the Japanese carruer escort. They had engaged an American submarine and was attempting to rejoin the carriers. On a hunge Commander McClosky proceeded north and ran directly into the Japanese carriers. Not only did he find the carriers, but their fighter cover was engaged on persuing the Amerucan torpedo planes. This the American dive bombers were able to attack unimpeded by Japanese fughters. The attack was launched justr as the Japanese having learned that American carriers were nearby were preparing to attack those carriers. There were bombs, torpedoes, and fuel all over the decks. The result was the destruction within minutes of three of Nagumo's carriers. They were the potent heavy carriers--the heart of the Imperial fleet. And along with them the irreplaceable, superbly trained air crews.
Nagumo who minutes before commanded the most powerful naval force in the world, was left with one carrier--Hiryū. It had been separated from the other three carriers as the Japanese avoided the American air strikes from Midway and the earlier torpedo attacks. Thus the American dive bombers did not spot it. The Hiryū launched its aircraft against the battered Yorktown
The weakness of the Japanese in fire saftey and fire supression was notable.
News of the battle immediately appeared in the American news media. The carrier losses were accurately reported, although many reports inaccurately attributed the success to Army Air Force strikes from Midway rather than to Navy carrier aviation. The situation was quite differebt in Japan. The Imperial Navy was deeply embarassed by the disaster at Midway. They did their best to cover up the disaster. The Navy staff did not inform Primeminister Tojo until a week after the battle. The public was told the battle was a Japanese victory with the Navy losing only one carrier while the American lost two carriers. The sailors who survived the sunk carriers were kept in quarantine after reaching Japan and shipped out to the South Pcific without bring allowed to see their families. [Thomas, p. 85.] More important, the Imperial Navy did not tell the Army what had occurred. The Army was thus unaware of the subsantial change in the naval balance as they planned their offensive in the South Pacific.
The American carrier victory at Midway dealt a crippling blow to the Imperial Navy. The four carriers were thechert of the Imperall fleet. They were four of front-line carriers that had attacked Pearl Harbor. They were their most powerful ships with their best planes and even more importantly the most experienced pilots. The stunning American carrier victory at Midway, significantly reduced the strike capability of the Imperial Navy. The Americans sank four front-line Japnese carriers, killing most of the well-trained crews. While the Imperial Navy still held an advantage, it was no longer an overwealming one. The resulting standoff gave American shipyards the time to turning out the new Essex class carriers that would engage the weakened Imperial Navy in 1943.
After Midway there was a lull in naval action. This ended with the American invasion of Guadacanal (August 1942). Midway had a profound impact on Admiral Yamamoto. He understood more than any one that Japan's success in the first 6 months of the War had been based in large measure on the striking force of the Imperial Navy's carrier division. And now he had lost four of Japan's six heavy carriers in ddition to the two put out of action earlier in the Coral Sea. The result was that Yamamoto became tenative. [Thomas, p. 85.] Even so, the performance of the uch weakened Japanese carrier foirce shows just how fortunate the Amerucans had been at Midway. Japan still held the ballance of naval power, but no longer the overwealming balance. In the upcoming naval battles in the South Pacific Yamamoto failed to act devisively and commit the Imperial Navy as he had at Midway, least the remaining force be lost. This was a fatal mistake. Given America's industrial power, the remainder of 1942 would be last time that Japan would have an edge or even rough parity with the U.S. Navy. The depletion of the Japanese carrier pilot force was a major factor impeding the Japanese. Yamamoto at first failed to unserstand the importance of Guadacanal and then fed units of the Imperial Navy into the battles piecemeal.
Isom, Dallas Woodbury. Midway Inquest: Why the Japanese Lost the Battle of Midway (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 2007), 408p.
Thomas, Evan. Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign, 1941-1945 (Simon & Schuster: New York, 2006), 414p.
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