World War II Wheeled Vehicles: Country Trends--Soviet Union

Soviet World War II vehicles
Figure 1.--Here we see two Soviet boys having their picture taken in front of an armored car monument in 1971. Unfortunately we can not read the commemorative plaque. But we know this is the British designed Russian Austin or Austin-Putilov -- it became the first Soviet armored vehicle. The beginning of the Red Army tank groups that would smash the NAZI panzers in World War II.

Our information on Soviet wheeled vehicles is limited. In contrast to the Germans we do not see many images of Soviet motorcycles. Nor do we see many armored cars. We see some armored cars. The first was the Russian Austin or Austin-Putilov. It was based on British designs. Production began in the later stage of World War I. They were mostly used by the Red Army during the Civil War (1919-21). More vadvanced versions were built during the inter-War era. The Soviet focus, however, from a very early stage, the focus of the Red Army was on tanks--tracked vehicles. The early use of arnored cars was in part becuse tracked vehicle technology was so primitive. The Tsarist Army did not use tanks in World War I and as a result it was new technology that needed to be developed. The primary wheeled vehicle of importance to the Red Army was the truck. Modern mobile warfare rquired trucks and in large numbers. Tanks might punch a hole in enemey lines, but unless trucks are availble to rapidly move men equipment through that hole and exploit before the ememy can plug the gap, it is of little value. Very few trucks were in use in Tsarist Russia at the time of World War I and as in Germany they were of minimal importance in military importance. Significant production only began after the Revolution. The Soviets began producing trucks after the Revolution. American automobile companies were important here. Production was, however, not adequate to meet the World War II needs of the Red Army. The Soviets even more than the Germans still relied heavily on draft animals for logistics support. This lack of mobility was a major factor in the devestaing losses suffered by the Red Army during the German Barbarossa offensive. The arrival of American Lend Lease trucks helped transform the capabilities of the Red Army on the eastern battlefield. The Soviets were unimpressed with American tanks, American trucks were a very different. Soviet production combined with Lend Lease deliveries gave the Soviets a level of mobility the Germans could have only dream of in 1941. The result was a series of crippling losses in 1944. Along with the production of motor vehicles, the availability of rubber for tires was imprtant. Soviet economic policy was autarky. Thus they were willing to spend more to produce needed raw materials than the cost of importing. The Soviets began producing polybutadiene using the Lebedev process (1932–33). They used potatoes and limestone as raw materials. The Soviets developed the largest synthetic rubber industry in the world, producing more than 50,000 tons per year (1940). as a result of the NAZI-Soviet Pact, they became NAZI Germany's largest supplier. After the NAZI invassion, American rubber tires became an important Lend Lease item.

Motorcycles

Our information on Soviet World War II wheeled vehicles is limited. In contrast to the Germans we do not see many images of Soviet motorcycles.

Armored Cars

Nor do we see many armored cars. We see some armored cars. The first was the Russian Austin or Austin-Putilov. It was based on British designs. Productuion began in the later stage of World War I. They were mostly used by the Red Army during the Civil War (1919-21). More vadvanced versions were built during the inter-War era. The Soviet focus, however, from a very early stage, the focus of the Red Army was on tanks--tracked vehicles. The early use of arnored cars was in part becuse tracked vehicle technology was so primitive. The Tsarist Army did not use tanks in World War I and as a result it was new technology that needed to be developed.

Trucks

The primary wheeled vehicle of importance to the Red Army was the truck. Modern mobile warfare rquired trucks and in large numbers. Tanks might punch a hole in enemey lines, but unless trucks are availble to rapidly move men equipment through that hole and exploit before the ememy can plug the gap, it is of little value. Very few trucks were in use in Tsarist Russia at the time of World War I and as in Germany they were of minimal importance in military importance. Significant production only began after the Revolution. The Soviets began producing trucks after the Revolution. American automobile companies were important here. Production was, however, not adequate to meet the World War II needs of the Red Army. The Soviets even more than the Germans still relied heavily on draft animals for logistics support. This lack of mobility was a major factor in the devestaing losses suffered by the Red Army during the German Barbarossa offensive. The Germans faced the same problem, but Soviet aid to the NAZIs as part of the NAZI-Soviet Pact helped them solve it. The Soviet deliveries of critical materials, including oil, (1939-40) were an important part of the German victory in the West (1940). This netted the Germans a huge supply of British and Fench military trucks as well as smaller sumbers from the Dutch and French. The total was much greater than the German automotive industry was capable of producing. The automtive industry in occupied France also produced trucks for the Germans until bombed by the Allies. The Whermacht also seized civilian vehicles. Without these cornucopia of vehicles, Barbarossa would not have been possible. The arrival of American Lend Lease trucks helped transform the capabilities of the Red Army on the eastern battlefield. The Soviets were unimpressed with American tanks, American trucks were a very different. Soviet production combined with Lend Lease deliveries gave the Soviets a level of mobility the Germans could have only dream of in 1941. The result was a series of crippling losses in 1944.

Rubber

Industry had turned rubber into a vital natural resource. Along with the production of motor vehicles, the availability of rubber for tires was vital. Obviouly rubber plants did not grow in the Soviet Union as large as it was. Soviet economic policy was autarky. Thus they were willing to spend more to produce needed raw materials than the cost of importing. The primary source of rubber was British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. This was seied by the Japanese at the onset nof the Pacific War (early-1942). The most obvious was rubber tires, but there were countless other military and indistrial uses. The Soviets began producing polybutadiene using the Lebedev process (1932–33). They used potatoes and limestone as raw materials. The Soviets developed the largest synthetic rubber industry in the world, producing more than 50,000 tons per year (1940), at the time much larger than the German synthetic rubber production. [Plumpe, p. 385.] As a result of the NAZI-Soviet Pact and the Royal Navy embargo, the Soviets became NAZI Germany's largest supplier. Ironically, the German stocks of rubber and other resources not only aided Hitler invade and conquer France (1940), but then launch the Barbarossa invasion of the Soviet Union (1941). German stockpiles of rubber and other critical mmaterials would have been insufficient to support the German offensives after Poland (1939) had the Soviets had not exported massive quantities of raw materials to the NAZIs. [Ericson, pp. 202–05.] Even after the brief Polish campaign (September 1939), NAZI stockpiles of munitions and critical materials were badly depleted. [Tooze, pp. 339ff.] After the NAZI Barbarossa invassion of the Soviet Union (1941), American rubber tires became an important Lend Lease item. The United States devloped rubber production in tropical frica and latin America and rapidly created its own stnthetic rubber industry.

The Sources

Ericson, Edward E. Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933-1941 (Greenwood Publishing Group: 1999).

Plumpe, G. Die IG Farbenindustrie AG (Berlin: 1990).







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Created: 8:14 PM 4/19/2019
Last updated: 9:26 AM 4/20/2019