Figure 1.--When NAZI Germany invaded Poland, Britain reluctntly declared war (September 1939). There was not must good news For the first 3 years of the War. Here Bruiains from their backgarden (back yard). cheer the returning BEF troops on a rail line returning home from Dunkirk. But as Churchill explined wars are not won by evacuations. Largely unknown at the time was the the role of Bomber Command in making thec evacuation possible. Maintaining morale during 3 years of mostly defeats as well as the Blitzbombing was a major problem. Some of the limited good news to help maintain morale was the operations of Bomber Command. What the Brutish people were not told was that bombing raids until 1942 had little impact on the NAZI war machine. That did not begin to change until the asrrivl of the Avro Lancaster (mid-1942).

The strategic bombing campaign is commonly discussed as a combined Allied effort, but it is important to point out the important distinctive contribution of Bomber Command. This is especially important for American readers as our knowledge of the Strategic Bombing Campaign is of en based largely on the operations of the U.S. Eighth Air Force and our knowledge of Bomber Command is much more limited. We have discussed the impact of the overall Allied strategic bombing in detail. Bomber Command was of course an imprtant part of the Allied effort. Too often ignored are the many specific contributions of Bomber Command throughout the War. Notice how many of these were before the United States began actively particiopating in the strategic bombing campaign (1943). Americans view the B-17 Flying Fortress as the core of the SBC. Actually the Avro Lancaster and B-17 arrived in the theater at about the same time abnd dropped dropped comparable quantuties of bombs. But Bombr Commabnd had many unique accomplihments beyond competing in the SBC.

First: Dunkirk (May 1940)

Bomber Command played an imprtant role in the Evcuation of the BEF at Dunkirk. They helped slow the German advance and was a major factor in the BEF managing to seize the port before the Germans who were at first closer to Dunkirk than much of the BEF. The RAF in France operating from improvised air strips and without any early warning system gve a very poor accounting of itself. Around Dunkirk, however, both Fighter Command and Bomber Command operating from home bases closer to Dunkirk than the German bases gave a much better acounting for themselves, surprising the Germans and delayed the Panzers as they advanced toward Dunkirk. 【Richards, p. 50.】

Second: Battle of Britain (July-September 1940)

Bomber Command attacked Luftwaffe bases in France during the Battle of Britain. Here the impact was minor given the massive German buildup. What became important was raids on Berlin. An errant German bomber dropped bombs on London, in error and violating orders. Hitler was still dreamed of having the British an ally had ordered the Luftwaffe not to bomn London and other British cities except port cities. More imortant were raids on Berlin which caused the Germans to change Luftwaffe straegy from Fighter Command bases to the terror bombing of London, commonly seen as a huge mistake on the part of Hitler abd Göring. Churchill order the raid which were cinductedcat great cost by Bomber Command. Hitler was furious. He saw himelf as beuing generous with the British and now he felt his generosity was being flaunted. So he ordered the destruction of London--the beginning of the Blitz. Londoners would pay a terrible price, but Fighter Command was able to repair their forward bases in Group 11 and bringing the squadrons back to full strength. This was the turning point in the Battle of Britain with untold consequences affecting the entire war.

Third: Operation Sea Lion (September 1940)

Hitler planned to invade Britain as part of Operation Sea Lion (September 1940). As part of that plan, ships and barges from all over Western Europe were assembled in the Channel ports opposite Kent and Sussex. This of course where before shifting to Londion, the Luftwaff attacks had been concentrated. Thus by September the Channel ports were filled with these vessels. Hustoians debate whether Hitler was really serious about invading. Many of the vessels, especially the Rhine river barges werev not sitable for the conditiions associated with Channel crossings. The British at the time were convinced that Hitler was serious. And the British were bracing for it. Bomber Command and Coastal Command struck at the assemblahe lighting up the Channel Ports (September 5-8). Given the carnage that ensued, it seems that the vessels were laden with equipment and munitions. The airmjen called it 'barge busting'. 【Richards, pp. 66-67.】 This suggests that Hitler was serious, but the questiion has never been answered. With these strikes and the nexpectedly Luftwaffe losses in a masive attack on London (September 15), Hitler decided to postpone the invasion.

Fourth: British Morale (1939-41)

This is a difficult matter to assess. But it is true that for the first 2-3 years of the War, Bomber Command was the only Allied force having any impact on the Germans. And the British had to endurce the months of German bombing during the Blitz (September 1940-April 1941). And during this long period there was severe rationing After nearly 2-years of war, Britiish morale ws suffering. and a stready stream of bad war news. Ambassador Winant wrote, "The fatigue and the monotony ... the interupted transportation ... the dust ... the shabby and worn out lothes ... the drabness that coms from want of things ... no glass for the replacement of windows... stumbling home in the blackout ... the shortahe of lightb and fuel --all made a dreary picture for even the brave-hearted." 【Winant, in Olson, p. 85.】

Fifth: German Planning (1940-41)

More important than British mirale and actual damage inflicted was the impact on the German war planning. Bomber Command was a factor in German war planning and part of the reason that the Germans gave so much priority to the War in the West even though the War would be in large measure decided by the Ostkrieg.

Sixth: Battle of the Atlantic (1939-45)

The air component of the Battle of the Atlantic was an effort primarily conducted by Coastal Command before America entered the War (December 1941). This neant support for the convoys in the Western Approaches. There was intense competition for aircraft between Bomber and Coastal Command. The British attacked German and neutral shipping operating from German ports. Bomber Command also laid mines. The attacks on German shipyards costructing U-boats were conducted by Bomber Command. The British failed to disrupt the construction of U-boat pens in the French Atlantic ports. Until 1942, the airctaftv available was primarily planes with limited range. Coastal Commnd could use aircraft that could not be used by Bomber Command because in the Western Appropches because they did not face German fighter defenses. By 1942, Bomber Command began to get the aircraft like the Lancaster that could have a real impact on U-boat construction.

Seventh: Italy (1940-43)

Bomber Command brioght the cost of entering the War home to the Ialian people. Bomber Command began attacks on Italian cities soon after Italy enteres the War (June 1940). The first attacks were targets in northern Italian cities. 【Richards, pp. 42-43.】 The Americans would join this campaign, but not until 1943.

Eighth: American Navigation (1942-45)

The Americans would reply primarily on celestial navigation. Bomber Command would share their increasingly significant eleconic navifation echnology, but the Americans continued to rely primarily on celestial navigation.

Ninth: V-Weapns (August 1943)

It was Btitish inteligence that detected the German V-wepon program and Bomber Command launched the Attack on Penemunde that set back the project for months. The first attack was carried out by Bomber Command. The americans would join in on the attak. Crucially the V-weapon attacks did not begin until after D-Day. 【Richards, p. 201.】

Tenth: The Bulge (December 1944)

The Germans struck for a second time in the Ardennes (December 16, 1944). They chose a time in which Alied air power would be socked in an unable to support ground forces. The exceotion was Bomber Commnd whuch used elctronic directional systems. Bomber Command could not assist front-line troops., but they could target German supply lines and transportation hubs behind the front and rear area staging centers despite overcast conditions. This significantly impacted German's ability to supply its offensive operations in the front. 【Richards, pp. 261-62.】

Sources

Richards, Denis. The Hardest Victory: RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War (London: W W Norton & Co Inc, 1994), 393p.

Winant, John Gilbert. In Lynne Olson. Ctizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain un in Its Darkestm Finest Hour (Random House: New York, 2017), 482p.

Created: 12:00 AM 1/26/2024
Last updated: 2:59 AM 1/27/2024