Figure 1.--These British children seek shelter in a trench from German bombs during the Battle of Britain (1940). Images like this helped to convince America that Britain had to be saved and the Germans defeated. British resources were streched to the limit and severe rationing was introduced for both food and clothing. A British reader writes, "This is quite a famous picture. It should be noted that some of those kids were less afraid than fascinated by the dogfight going on above them! Around the time of the 60th anniversary, a news paper tracked some of these people down for their recollections.

One of the countroversies surrounding World War II is the Allied bombing campaign of Germany. Of course it was the Germans who began bombing civilian populations as a terror tactict to destroy civilian morale. This began even before the World War II during the Spanish Civil War with the bombing of Guernica in 1937?. Once the World War II began the tactic was used on Warsaw (September 1939), Rotterdam (May 1940), and on numerous British cities (1940-41). Once America joined the War in December 1941, a much larger bombing campaign was launched on Germany which by 1943 began to inflict serious civilian casulties. After D-Day (June 1944), the Allied bombing campaign was significantly intensified. The Americans bombing by day, attempting to hit specific targets using the Nordon bomb sites. The British bombed by night and at best could hit specific cities. Large numbers of German civilians were killed, injured, or rendered homeless. Contrary to popular conceptions, the German economy was not effectively harnessed for war. Only when Albert Speer was put in charge did German industry begin to reach some of its potential. The Germans, as a result, despite the bombing were able to expand war production. Here the question that should be asked is how much more they could have expanded production had it not been for the bombing. The bombing significantly clearly disrupted the economy and the ability of the NAZIs to persue their development of new weapons.

Military Doctrine

World War I saw the first appearance of combat air craft in modern war (1914). The plane had only been invented 11 years early by the Wright Brothers in America. The War resulted in the rapid expanion in aviation technology. Air operations were mostly reconisance and tactical operations. The combatant countries were preparing a massive strategic bombing campaign. The War ended, however, before the strategic campaigns were launched. Military experts afer the War argued about the furure nature of war and the role of air power. One of the most influential thinkers was an Italian strategist, Giulio Doubet. He argued that a strategic bombing force could prevent another terrible land war which had caused millions of death. He argued that the heavily armed bomber would always get through fighter and other air defense systems. And thus a country before all else should buid a strategic bombing force because no country would dare invade a country with such a force. He argued that fighter defenses and close air support were wasted resources. [Doubet] It is difficult to assess the impact of Doubet's strategic thesis, but he did establish the basic alternatives avalable to military planners. The British pursued a dual track approach with both tactical and strategic arms. The United States at first gave great attention t building a strategic bomber, in part to avoid the casualties that would result from aland campaign. The result was thefamed B-19 Flying Fortress. NAZI Germany chose the other alternative and built a tactical force. This was not because some Luftwaffe planners did not want a strategic bombing force. It was because German industry did not have the capacity to build both a tactical and strategic force. And because Hitler and Göring formed the Luftwaffe by attracting Wehrmacht personnel, the Luftwaffe became a basically tactical force focused on close-air support of the Wehrmacht and its Panzers. This of course violated Doubet's thesis as he saw no need for close inter-service cooperation. The German Luftwaffe at the start of the War was the only national airforce that had engaged in this inter-service planning.

Aviation Industries

The airplane had been invented in America by two bicycle mechanics, the Wright Brothers (1903). At the time of World War I, however, the United States did not have modern combst aircraft. When America entered the War (1917), it had to use British and French planes. In the inter-war period, several countries developed important aircraft industries: America, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union. A key to building modern aircraft was aluminum. Thus a country's potential to build aircraft was the size of its aluminum industry. Aluminum production not only required bauxite, but vast quantities of electrical power. Some World War II planes were built with plywood (the British Mosquito and the German FW-190), but most were built with aluminum. Until the NAZI-take over in 1933, national aviation industries primarily depended on civilian demand. And here the largest civil aviation industry was in the United States. Pasenger aircraft were needed by a country the United States where as smaller countries had no great need for aircraft in domestic transport. Aircraft had played only a minor role in World war I. This was to be very different in World War II and the aviation industries of the beligerant countries had a major impact on the War.

Strategic Operations

World War II saw the advent of strategic air operations. Planes played an important role in World War I, but almost entirely as a part of tactical operations. This changed in World War II. Hitler in 1935 ordered the constuction of the Luftwaffe in violation of the Versailles Treaty. It was first used in Spain where the destruction of the Basque town of Guernica (1937). The new German Luftwaffe was the principal force that cowered the British and French at Munich (1938). With the outbreak of World War II, the NAZIs turned to terror bombing to subdue targeted nations (Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Coventry, Belgrade, and other cities). Japan it its invasion of China turned to bombing of Chinese cities. German and Japanese leaders seemed to assume that only foreign cities would be the target of air raids. What was not clearly understood at the time was during the heigth of the Blitz, the Bitish were building more planes than the Germans. With America's entry into the War, the initial German and Japanese superiority in the air was soon lost. The assumption that German and Japanese cities would never be bombed proved to be one of the great miscalculations in the history of war. The Luftwaffe was essentially a tactical force to support Wehrmacht ground operations. Both Britain and America built substantial forces dedicated specifically to strategic bombing. The results were devestating. Some air commanders believed that air power could be used alone to defeat the enemy. This proved to be unrealistic. The role of air power in winning the war, however, was critical.

National Air Forces

It was the Lufwaffe which dominated Europe for the first 3 years of the War. It looked for a time that the Luftwaffe would win the War for the NAZIs. It was the Royal Air Force, however, that delivered the force defeat to Hitler's military. Germany began the War with a strategic and industrial capability inferior to that of the countries Hitler planned to conquer. Part of the NAZI concept of war was to wage it with superior technology. The NAZI defeat so early in the War should have given Hitler pasuse. It did not. Air Marshall Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris when he was appointed to lead the RAF's Bomber Command stated that the Germans began the War with the unrealistic assumption that they would bomb enememy cities, but German cities would not be bombed. The British at the time were outproducing the Germans. The Luftwaffe destroyed the Red Air Force in the first few days of Barbarossa. It dod not, however, destroy the Soviet aircraft industry. Relocated Soviet began factories begun producing improved aircraft types in huge numbers. The Allies significantly underestimated the effectiveness of Japanese aircraft and the result was the loss od wide areas of Southeast Asia and the Paciic in 1942. More than any other country the United States decided to fight the War with a massive air force. About 25 percent of American war spending was devoted to the air war. Not only was this a greater share than Germany devoted to the Luftwaffe, the industrial capacity of America was much greater than that of Germany. The British focused on bombers. The Americans produced a wide range of aircraft for its various commands as well as for its allies. It took some time for the Allies to perfect tactics and production priorities, but by 1944 the Allies unleased a torrent of destruction, first on Germany and then on Japan that was in terms of destruction was unprecedented in modern warfare.

Campaigns

The air war was conducted in several different campaigns both to support naval and ground forces. Germany build a tactical airforce, primarily because it did not have the industrial capacity to also build a strategic air force as well. The use of tactical air power in close association with mechnized ground forces was in esence the birth of modern warfare--Blitzkrieg. This allowed the Germans to conquer most of Europe. German also used its airforce to bomb eneny cities, beginning with the campaign in Poland. Germany did not, however, conquer Britain, nor could it even reach the United States. These countries did have the industrial capacity to build strategic air forces. America's productive capability added to that of Britain ad the Sviet Union produced air craft for both tactical and strateic operaions as well as cargo airctaft to support operations around the world. America and Britain decied at the onset of their storied alliance that Hitler and the NAZIs were the major threat. Thus the predominance of air assetts were deployed in the European theater and resulted in epic struggles in the skies over northern Europe. Germany began the War with the assumption that only the cities of other countries would be bombed. Air Marshall Göring assured the German people that German cities would never be bombed. As Air Marshall Harris explained, "Germany has sewed the winds and now it will reep the whirlwind." America's huge industrial capability soon permitting aircraft in large numbers to be delivered for the struggle in Asia and the Pacific as well. And Japan which began the War by bombing undefended Chinese cities would also pay a terrible price. .

Morality

The morality of the air campaign is a still hotly debated question. At the time, none of the major combatant countries with bombing formations (Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States) questioned their own use of bombing on moral grounds. America and Britain accused NAZI Germany of war crimes when it conducted terror bombing of cities with that explicit goal. The Japanese did the same in China. After the the NAZIs began using this tactic, both America and Britain subsequently launched much more massive assaults on German and later Japanese cities. Although the goal was never described explicity as terror, the differences if you were a German civilian would be difficult to determine. The German foreign minister coming to Washington in November 2002 recalled cowering in a bomb shelter during the Allied bombing. A HBC reader remembers the glow in the night sky from raging firesc in a nearby city after Allied bombing runs. Much of the debate over the morality of the aerial campaign really or questins on the morality of ar itself. There are questions, however, tat pertain uniquely to the World War II aerial campaign itself. HBC does not seek to answer these questions. A thorough discussion would be a study in itself. We do believe, however, that it is important to pose some of the major questions.

Sources

Corum, James S. Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940" (University Press of Kansas, 2000).

Doubet, Giulio. Command of the Air.

Fest, Joachim C. Hitler (Vintage Books: New York, 1974), 844p.

Hillgruber, Andreas. Strategie=Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegführung 1940 bis 1941 (Frankfurk am Main, 1965).

Snyder, Louis L. Historical Guide to World War II (1982).

Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich (New York, 1970).

Created: August 20, 2002
Last updated: 5:50 AM 9/27/2008