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"The Navy can lose us the war, but only the Air Force can win it. Therefore our supreme effort must be to gain overwhelming mastery of the air. The Fighters are our salvation, but the Bombers alone provide the means of victory. We must therefore develop the power to carry an ever-increasing volume of explosives to Germany, so as to pulverize the entire industry and scientific structure on which the war effort and economic life of the enemy depend, while holding him at arms' length from our island ...."
-- Winston Churchill, Memo to the Cabinet, September 3, 1940
The largest and most important component of the Royal Air Force was was Bomber Command. This was the case because of Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard's focus on strategic bombing. Trenchard led the British air forces during World War I and was central in creating an independent air service after the War focused on strategic bombing. Fighter Command was vital in saving Britain during the Battle of Britain, but it was Bomber Command that was the major component of the RAF. Churchill explained it best. While Fighter Command was vital in saving Britain in 1940, the only way of getting at the NAZI war machine for most of the War was Bomber Command. The bulk the RAF's limited resources throughout the 1920s and early-30s were put into bombers. There was a crash program to build fighters in the lead up to World War II, but bombers absorbed the lion's share of RAF resources during the War. Something like half of the British war economy was devoted to aviation. (This was also the case for America and Germany.) The commitment to the air war was due to Trenchard's influence before the war and the importance Churchill assigned to strategic bombing during the War. Despite the expenditures in the 1920s and 30s, Bomber Commend did not have a single aircraft capable of strategic bombing when the War broke out (1939). This was because of major technological advances in aviation that occurred in the mid-1930s--just at the time that the Luftwaffe began to build up the force available when World War II commenced. Bomber Command did not have an effective strategic bomber until the Avro Lancaster arrived (1942). Then the combat statistics were phenomenal. There were 64,514 operational sorties flown, 1.0 million tons of bombs dropped. The cost was high. Some 8,300 aircraft lost in action. Bomber Command crews also suffered an extraordinarily high casualty rate: 55,600 men were killed out of a total of 125,000 aircrew, nearly 45 percent. The strategic bombing campaign is commonly discussed as a combined Allied effort, but it is important to point out the important distinctive contribution of Bomber Command.
The largest and most important component of the Royal Air Force was was Bomber Command. This was the case in part because of Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard's focus on strategic bombing. The Gernmans bombed Britain during World War I with both Zephlins and the Gotha Bomber. It did no signiicant damage, but had a huge impact on the British public. Trenchard led the British air forces during World War I. Trenchard was preparing for a mssive strategic bombing campaign against Germany in 1919. It never occurred because the Germans asked for an armistice (November 1918). He was central in creating an independent air service at the end of the War focused primarily on strategic bombing. He believed that the principal impact was on morale more than the actual physical damage, but of course this was based on the potential of the aircraft available during the War and immediate post-war era.
Fighter Command was vital in saving Britain during the Battle of Britain, but it was Bomber Command that was the major component of the RAF. Churchill explained it best. While Fighter Command was vital in saving Britain in 1940, the only way of getting at the NAZI war machine for most of the War was Bomber Command. The bulk the RAF's limited resources throughout the 1920s and early-30s were put into bombers. There was a crash program to build fighters in the lead up to World War II, but bombers absorbed the lion's share of RAF resources during the War. Something like half of the British war economy was devoted to aviation. (This was also the case for America and Germany.) The commitment to the air war was due to Trenchard's influence before the war and the importance Churchill assigned to strategic bombing during the War.
Despite the expenditures in the 1920s and 30s, Bomber Command did not have a single aircraft capable of strategic bombing when the War broke out (1939). This was because of major technological advances in aviation that occurred in the mid-1930s--just at the time that the Luftwaffe began to build up the force available when World War II commenced. Thus high speed fighters appear, first in the Lufwaffe wih the Me-109. Until this, bombers were actually faster than the fighters. Despite the huge concern about the Luftwaffe which began bombing in Spain (1936), the RAF had a larger bombing force that the Luftwaff when war broke out. In fact the RAF had three twin-engined, front line bombers. At the time they were considerrd heavy bombers, but with the arrival of four engine heavies, they became medium bombers. These three Bomber Command bombers at the outbreak of the World War II were the Armstrong Whitworth A.W.38 Whitley, the Vickers Wellington or Whimpy and the Handley Page Hampden, the flying suitcase. The Wellington with its inovative geodesic constructionn would be the British bomber produced in the largest numbers, over 11,000. Considerable resources were waisted on the light bomber Fairey Battle. Grmany's industrial hearland, the Ruhr, was wellwithin the range of these bombers from Frencvh bases. The Frenc refused to authiorize sych raids, fearing attacks on thir cities.
Given that the United States created the B-17 Flying Fortres four engine heavy in 1935, it is somewhat surprising that the British created three medium bombers and no four engine heavies until the war broke out. The first British bomber to breach German air space was the Whitley, but as part of Operation Nickel, dropped leaflets rather than bombs. Neither the British or the French yet understood just how serious the new war would be. While these bombers could reach Germany, it proved to be suiside in daylight given German fighter defenses and Bomber Command had no effective way of navigating at night. Other uses would be found for these aircraft, but Bomber Command would not have an effective strategic bomber in any numbers until the mid-point iof the War (1942). The Whitley was developed during the mid-1930s according to Air Ministry Specification B.3/34 which still was influenced by the dissarmament efforts of the early-30s. With the rise of NAZI Germany, Britain began to take the RAF more seriously. The Whitley entered into RAF squadron service (1937). it was the first of the three medium bombers to be introduced. With the fall of France, the Luftwaffearrived on the Channel coast abnd Hitler had no reservations about authorizing raids, although at first focusing on Figher Commad;s forward bases.
The first Bomber command raid on Berlin was conducted with the Vickers Wellington and the Handley Page Hampdens during the Battle of Britain (August 1940), although given the distance only a part of the attacking force managed to reach the Gernan capital. While the three medium bombers would not see service as effective strategic bombers they had to do until the effective heavies with their larger bomb loads and greater ranges arrived. Harris had to use some of the mediums to make up his first thousand bomber raid (May 1942). The mediums would also see service as maritime reconnaissance with Coastal Command and the second-line roles of glider-tug, trainer and transport aircraft--activities beyond the rech of Luftwaffe fighters. They also meant that when the heavies arrived, Bomber Command had well trained and experienced crews ready to fly them. Other bombers of importance were the Short Strilings and the the Bristol Beaufort based on the earlier Blenheim. The Beufort was mostly used by Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm. Bomber Command also used many American aircraft. Bomber Command is best known for its two heavy bombers used as part of the Strtegic Bombing Command (SBC). The best known and most important was the Avro Lancaster. The other was the Handley Page Halifax, based largely on the Avro two engine Manchester. The Lanc and Halifax were built in comparable numbers, 7,000-6,000 planes, although the Lanc played a larger role in the SBC. Interestigly it was the Halifax that was heavily used for pathfinders. Many Halifaxes were used by Coastal Command reflecting the priority given to the U-boat campaign until well into 1943. While the Halifax was available first, Harris was scathing in his assessment of the Halifax, greatly prefering the Lanc with its larger bomb load. This is why the Lanc was the British bomber most heavily used in the SBC. The other important British bomber was the multi-purpose two engine plywood de Havilland Mosquito. The Wooden Wonder or Mossie when first introdced was one of the fastest operational aircraft in the world, despite being a bomber. Its speed and range carved out an amazing operational history during World War II. There are many critics of the SBC who often ignore the fact that Bomber Command did not have an effecive heavy bomber in real numbers until 1942 and even then in still very small numbers. Thus the SBC did actually begin in any meaningful until 1943. But the fact that the Germans took it seriously well before which impacted German industrial priorities and had a significan impact on the War.
Bomber Command operated under the illussion during the pre-War era that celestial navigation was an effective way of operating. There was no real test of this assumption, which seems incredible as so much depended on it. Bomber crews were rained on celestial navigastion, but not sctuslly using it test operations. Instead there was a general belief that as Prime-Minister Baldwin insisted, 'the bomber will always get through'. This illusion was quickly revealed to be a total illusion when Hitler and Stalin lunched the World War IIn (September 1939). Attempts at daylight bombing proved to be virtual suiside because of the German fighter defenses. And at night Bomber Command squadrons soon found that using celestial navigation that they were not only unable to find targets, but often even whole cities. The Grmans in contrast had developed electronic naviagtional systems. When discovered during the Blitz (1940-41), the Battle of the Beams began. It was clar that bombing at night that electonic navigational sysyems would be need, The lack of long-range aircraft and without effect navigation, meant that Bomber Command for nearly 3-years had no real abilkity to conduct the strategic bombardment of Germany. It is oftenaid gat the Strategic Bombing camoaign was ineffective. This is not correct. It was not even attemopted in any significant way for nerly 3 years andthen only with 3 yeras. And a major reason forv that was navigation.
The British built up a substantial bomber force in the inter-war era (1930s-30s). After Hitler and the NAZIs seized power in Germany (1933). The bombers were seen as fotce that discouraged German aggression. It proved to a hollow threat. As it soon became apparent when the war began that Bomber Commsnd's were incapable of actually bombing Germany. There were multiple issues. The bomberrs were developed at a time that fighters were actually not faster than bombers. Major advances in aviation began in the mid-1030s, just at thde time Hitler and Göring were building the Luftwaffe. The new Me-190 had capabilityies that Bomber Command's planes could not deal with. The French refused to permit bombing of German cities during the Phoney War (1939-40) out of fear of German bombing of French cities. The result was a disaster for the RAF. The various RAF Commands lost 950 aircraft, valuable equiopment, 321 pilots, 359 other air crews, and 115 piiots and other air crews taken prisoner. 【Richards, p.56.】 Bomber Command completely failed the disrupt the Gernman breakthrough in the Ardennes even when the Germans were locked into a hige traffic jam. After the fall of France daylight missions from Britain were suiside because of German fighrer defenses. Nighttime missions were inefectve, in part because using ceslestical navigation, attacking squadrons away from the coast were often unable to find whole cities. The Germans in contrast developed elctronic navigation systems which they used during the Blitz (1940-41). Only after discovering this did Bomber Command begin to develop their own electronic navigational sytems-- launbching the Battle of the Beams. .
Britain began increasing aircraft production even before war broke out. Little of this increase led toincreases in Bomber Command's operational strength. This was because so much of Bomber Command's pre-War strength was composed of obslete aircraft kile the Battle. In addition there weee diversions to other commands, escpecially Coastal Command. Bomber Command would niot begin tomsignificantly increase its effective strength until 1842. .
Air Marshall Sir Arthur Harris watched London burning during the Luftwaffe's Blitz of London (1940). He famesously said at the time. "The Garmans have sown the wind, and so they shall reap the whirlwind." At the time the RAF did not have the capability of retailiating in force. Harris and others seethed to bring the population centers and war industry of the Reih under the bomb bays of a modern force of four-engine heavy bombers. He did more than watch. He carefully studied the results of the Luftwaffe coperations and concluded that Bomber Command could do better. It should not be missed that ghe tatuics he is know for was derived from studying German tactics during the Blitz. Harris replaced J. E. Baldwin as head of RAF Bomber Command (February 1942). He would acquire the name of Bomber Harris. He was a fervent advocate of winning the war through air power. And he took command at the same time thatv the redoubtable Avro Lancaster squadrons began to be activated giving Bomber Command the capability of hirtting the Reich hard for the first time. Harris adopted a policy of area bombing which Propaganda Minister Goebbels called terror bombing. Goebbels of course did not mentined that German Führer Adolf Hitler had from an early pointed threatened and carried out terror bombing. Goebbels and the NAZIs did not so much object to the concept, their complaint was that German cities were being subjected to it. Harris is perhaps the most controversial major Allied military commanders of the War. He was a proponent of bombing German cities to disrupt the German war economy. He is often accused of targeting civilians. This is not entirely true. Most importsant German industrial targets were located in the cities. Harris became head of Bomber Command just as the famed Lancaster came into service giving the RAF the capacity to strike with foirce deep into Germany. And at a time when American had etered the War and was building up the 8th Air Force to join in the strageic bombing campaign. A British reader writes, "Air Marshall Harris was vilified not many years ago for his alleged indiscrimiate bombing of German cities, particularly Dresden. It seemed to be a bit harsh. The tone of the vilification was such that some people wanted to dub him a War Criminal. One of the difficults the RAF had was finding the target. This improved with the developed of more sophisticated radar and the 'Pathfinder' force. (Light bombers would fly ahead of the main bomber force, come in at low level and pin point the target with incendaries.) Harris' view was that carpet bombing achieved the desired result, but not only because the target would be 'down there somewhere', but it was total war. After all who started it! The contiuation of the destruction of the cities was becoming questionable later in the war. The Americans tended to bomb by day, sufferering higher casualties than the RAF, but finding the target was easier. Nonetheless they carried out 1,000 bomber raids and carpet bombed the cities." The morality and effectiveness of the strategic bombing campsaign are two open questions. It should be born in mind that the critiism of Air Marshal Harris are easy to make today with the NAZIs safely defeated.
For all intents and purposes, the Startegic Bombing Campaign (SBC) on Germany did not begin until mid-1942. Bombing up to that point was soporadic, ineffective, inaccuate, and at a very low level. Only in mid-1942 did Bomber Command get to gert the asircraft needed to ctuall wage a strastegic bombing campaign--most imprtantly the Avro Lancaster. The Lanc had the range and bomb load neded to have a real impact. and British manufctures were delivering it in numbers. At the same time Arthur Harris was give command who was convinced of the war-winning potentiasl of strategic bombing was given commsnd of Bomber Command. In addition the British were making real progress with electronic nsvigagtion. This is the real beginning of the SBC. Numbers of bombers were still limited. Harris organized the first 1,000 bomber raid (May 1942)), but it was more of a stunt and hard to repeat without more Lasncs. The Unites States Eighth Ait Forcer joined the campsighn, initisting day-light operations (1943). This was the beginning of "Aromd the Clock bombingh), but without fighter escort, a massive impact was impossible and losses were unsdustainable. Major successes were ahieved such as and the devestating raid on Hamburg (July-August 1943) and the raid on the Peenemunde Missle Center (August 1943). The final iexe of the puzzle was the arivalm of the long range P-51 Mustangb esorts. This led to the destructyion of the Luftaffe. Massive bombing did not follow, because Gen. Eisenhoer was given control of the bombefrs tompreapre and support the the D-Day landingd. He only reliquished control (Sepember 1944) And beginning in Sptember is whem most of the dfamahe w done to Gernay's war indstries tyhat would leave German cities mound of smoldering rubble. It tookmlonger than expected, but oftrn not recognized is even when Bomber Command was on its on and not doing real damage, it was enough to caue the Germans to direcvt massive industrial output ton the War in the West. This diversion of rsources from the Octkrieg where the War was decided was a major factor in the Allied World War II victory.
Bomber Command is best known for area bombing meaning the widespread destructiion og German cities without any specific target in mind. This is most associated with Air marshal Harris, although the policy was initiated before Harris was appointed to command Bomber Command. It was not until Harris arrived (February 1942), however, that Bomber Command had the force to conduct area bombing in an effective way and as a result Harris will be forever associated with area bombing. We might mention that while the American Eighth Air Force proclaimed a commitment to precission bombing, the inaccuracy of World War II bombing meant that the result of American bombing was not much different than British area bombing. There are two issues which must be addressed in assessing area bombing. First was it effective. Second, was it moral. The first issue was of primary imprtance during he War. The second issue has risen in imprtance in modern times as the specter of a NAZI dominated world receeds from the public discusion. As to the effectiveness. Harris was probably wrong in his seemingly focus on strategic bombing as to winning the War. German morale did not apparently crack until Allied ground troops occupied the Reich. That said it bis difficult to assess civilian morale in a totalitarian state. Imprtant to understand is that the natiional ethos of both Germany and Japan was fundamentally altered, specifically as to the use of force as a element of national policy. Amd there is no doubt that the desruction of Germany's and Japan's industrial cities was a major factor in this transition. Now while Harris may have overstated te impact of strategic bombing there is no doubt that it was an imprtant factor in the defeat of NAZI Germany. This was not immediate, but it was only by 1943 that llied strategic bombing reachedmajor levels and only by 1944 that Herman air defenses began to collapse. Thereis much debate about the impact of stategic bobing on the German war effort, but two facts are undeniable. First German war prodyuction by 1943 was increasingly defensive in character. Second, the strategic bombing campaign forced Germany to divert war procutiion from the all imoprtant Ostkrieg to the War in the West. As to morality, this is the primary criticism level against British area bombing. And we think the bombing of civilians is a clear violatiion of international law and the rules of War. It is important to note, however, that the NAZIs began bombing Polish towns and cities and commiting atrocities on civilians on the first day of the War as well as launchinh a genocidal war. Here the Holocaust is best known, thatvalone would have been bad enough but Jews were hardly the only NAZI targets. The NAZIs killed over a25 million people in the Soviet Union alone, the vast majority civilians. Jews wee only a small part of tht carnage. The barabarity of NAZI Germany relieved the Allies of any duty to restrain their war effort. In fact the only war crime of any signifucance Britain and America could have commited would have been not to to marshal their formidable industrial power to destroy Hitler and the NAZI Third Reich. Here only the mathamatically challenged can deny the grim reality of World War II. Some 0.5 million German civilians perished because of the strategic bombing campaign. Compared to the 50 million people who were killed because of the War that Hitler launched and the German nation conducted with Teutonic vigor..
Bomber Command was conceived as a strategic strike force. It was involved in a number of important tactical operations. An especially imprtant action early in the War was strikes on the advancing Panzers, slowing their advance on the Dunkirk pocket (May 1940). Another action along with Coastal Command was a major attack on the occupied Channel ports where the Germans had assembled and loaded barges in preparation for invading Britain (September 1940). Bomber Command was heavily involved with mine laying and attacking German coastal shipping. The mine laying was conducted with minimal losses comopared to the bombing raids on the Reich. Two tactical operationd that became possible as Bomber Command began to acquire increasing capable aircrafft was Circus and Ramrod (1942). These were daylight raids over France and the Low Countruies. Circus involved using Bomber Command's aircraft as bait (1941). The idea was to bring up Luftwaffe fighters which were then attacked by British fighters. The ides was atrit the fighter force in occupied France abd firce the Germsns to wuth draw squadrons from the Ostkrieg. 【Richards, pp. 182-83.】 Ramrod swas similar to Circus (1941). It was a series of attacks with medium bombers on factory complexes or other stratehic targets, but like Circus with a dual objective. There were also fighter forces to take on German fighters which may come up. Especially with the earlier raids, the fighter forces often lost more than the Germans. An as a result, squadrons were not brought back from the Ostkrieg to renforce defenses in France. What brought the Luftwaffe suadrons back from the East was the intenifying strategic bombing of Reich cities (mid-1942).
With the Arrival of the Lancaster and other effective aircraft, the combat statistics were phenomenal. There were 64,514 operational sorties flown, 1.0 million tons of bombs dropped. The cost was high. Some 8,300 aircraft lost in action. Bomber Command crews also suffered an extraordinarily high casualty rate: 55,600 men were killed out of a total of 125,000 aircrew, nearly 45 percent. Bomber Command proved to be the most dangerous combat assignment in the British military.
The strategic bombing campaign is commonly discussed as a combined Allied effort, but it is important to point out the important distinctive contribution of Bomber Command. This is especially important for American readers as our knowledge of the Strategic Bombing Campaign is of ten bsed largely on yje operations of the U.S. Eighth Air Force and our knowledge of Bomber Command is much more limited. We have discussed the impact of the overall Allied strategic bombing in detail. Bomber Command was of ciurse an imprtant part of the Allied effort. Too often ignored are the many specific contributions of Bomber Command thrughout the War. Notice how many ofthese were before thec United States began particiopating in the srategic bombing campaign (1943).
First Dunkirk (May 1940). Bomber Command slowed the German advance and was a major factor in the BEF seizing the port before the Germans.
Second Battle of Britain (July-September 1940). Bomber Command attacked Luftwaffe bases in Frances. Here the impact was minor given the massive German buildup. More imortant was raids on Berlin which caused the Germans to change Luftwaffe straegy from Fighter Command bases to the terror bombing of London, commonly seen as a huge mistake on the part of Hitler abd Göring.
Third Operation Sea Lion (September 1940). Afer the Germans had assembled barges and other shipping in Channel ports, Bomber Command strucjk at the assemblahe lighting up the Channel Ports, severly danmaging the assemblage.
Fourth British Morale (1939-41). This is a difficult matter to assess. But it is true that for the first 2-3 years of the War, Bomber Command was the only Allied force having any impact on the Germans.
Fifth German Planning (1940-41). More important than Brutish mirale and sctual damage inflicted was the impact on the German war planning. Bomber Command was a factor in German war planning and part of the reason that the Germans gave so much priority to the War in the West even though the War would be in large measure decided by the Ostkrieg.
Sixth Battle of the Atlantic (1939-43). This was an effort sharted with Ciastal Command. The Brutish attacked German and neutral shipping from German ports. Bomber Command alsom laid mines and attacked German shioyards costructing U-boats. There was also support for the convoys in the Western Approaches.
Seventh Italy (1940-43). Bomber Command brioght the cost of entering the War home to the Ialian people. Bomber Command began attacks on Italian cities soon after Italy enteres the War (June 1940). The first attacks were targets in northern Italian cities. 【Richards, pp. 42-43.】 The Americans would join this campaign, but not until 1943.
Eighth American navigation (1942-45). The Americans would reply primarily on celestial navigation. Bomber Command would share their increasingly significant eleconic navifation echnology, but the Americans continued to rely primarily on celestial navigation.
Tenth V-Weapns (August 1943). It was Btitish inteligence that detected the German V-wepon program and Bomber Command launched the Attack on Penemunde that set back the project for months. The first attack was carried out by Bomber Command. The americans would join in on the attak. Crucially the V-weapon attacks did not begin until after D-Day. 【Richards, p. 201.】
Ninth The Bulge (Decenber 1944). The Germans struck for a second time in the Ardennes (December 16, 1944). They chose a time in which Alied air power would be socked in an unable to support ground forces. The exceotion was Bomber Commnd whuch used elctronic directional systems. Bomber Command could not assist front-line troops., but they could target German supply lines and transportation hubs behind the front and rear area staging centers despite overcast conditions. This significantly impacted German's ability to supply its offensive operations in the front. 【Richards, pp. 261-62.】
Richards, Denis. The Hardest Victory: RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War (London: W W Norton & Co Inc, 1994), 393p.
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