Figure 1.--
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Figure 1.-- |
The Luftwaffe, for whatever reason, began the War without a strategic bombing force and was unable to build one during the War. Air Marshal Harris writes, "They had, in fact, no strategic bombers at all, since their whole force of over a thousand bombers for army co-operation work, and was only used for attack on cities when not required to support the German Army. Even in daytime it was fitted only to carry out the work of a tactical air force, not strategic attack." [Harris, p. 86.] For a country intent upon a massive campaign of aggression, including other advanced industrial nations, this proved to be a disastrous miscalculation. Luftwaffe Commanders did not dismiss the long-rage heavy bombers out of hand. Rather the decession was to postpone the construction of a strategic bombing force. The strategic vission was that the German ground victories would succeed in extending the area of the Reich and occupied territories to such an extent that German cities would no longer be within the range of Allied bombers. [Rumpf, p. 38.]
The Luftwaffe, for whatever reason, began the War without a strategic bombing force and was unable to build one during the War. Air Marshal Harris writes, "They had, in fact, no strategic bombers at all, since their whole force of over a thousand bombers for army co-operation work, and was only used for attack on cities when not required to support the German Army. Even in daytime it was fitted only to carry out the work of a tactical air force, not strategic attack." [Harris, p. 86.]
For a country intent upon a massive campaign of aggression, including other advanced industrial nations, this proved to be a disastrous miscalculation. The strategic vission was that the German ground victories would succeed in extending the area of the Reich and occupied territories to such an extent that German cities would no longer be within the range of Allied bombers. [Rumpf, p. 38.] The quandry for the NAZIs was, that Germany did not have the industrial capacity at the onset of the War to build both a tactical and strategic bomber force. As one author explains, building strategic was not a viable option for the Luftwaffe. "... such a diversion would have been at the expense of the brilliantly effective co-operation between the German Army and Air Force; and on the other, it woud had led to no compensating advantage, as the campaign in Poland , France, the Netherlands, and Norway were far too quickly won for strategic to be necessary or useful." [Blackett, pp. 27-28.]
The problem for the Luftwaffe and inevitably the German people was that the NAZIs were intent on a war that would ieveitably involve other modern industrial countries with the capability of building modern military airceraft. Two of those countries (Britain and America) had the capability to develop much larger air forces, including both tactical and strategic forces. As a result of the swift GErman victories at the onset of the War, strategic bombing was one of the few ways that the Western Allies could come to grip with the NAZIs. Both countries also saw strategic bombing as a way to limit battlefield losses.
Luftwaffe Commanders did not dismiss the long-rage heavy bombers out of hand. Rather the decession was to postpone the construction of a strategic bombing force. Infact the Luftwffe built or attempted to build several different planes.
The JU-390 Urals Bomber project was cancelled in 1938.
The Focke-Wulff Condor was one such plane, but realtively few were built and it was used primarily used for reconisance in the Battle of the Atlantic and in the Soviet campasign, although I know less about its use in the East. The Blitz Bomber which Hitler promoted was to light and camr to late. The Heinkel 177 Greif was built durng the War (1942-44). One reports suggests 1,146 were built, before it was scrapped because of design faults. [Rumpf, pp. 44-45.] If these reports are true, it was an enormous scaundroning of scarce resources for the dwindling capability of the Reich. Ernst Heinkel in his autobiography describes the frustrtions he encontered in building the HE-177.
Luftwaffe planners conceived of the innovative ME-264 Amnerika bomber pushed by Göring late in the War. The Allied strategic bombing campaign, however, made construction impossible.
Blackett, P.M. The Military & Political Consequences of Atomic Energy (London: Turnstile Press, 1948).
Harris, Arthur T. Bomber Offensive (New York: Macmillan, 1947).
Heinkel, Ernst .
Rumpf, Hans. Trans. Edwrd Fitzgerald. The Bombing of Germany (Holt, Rinehart and Wilson: New York, 1962), 256p
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