**
The Berlin Airlift was primarily conducted by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) supported by the British Royal Air Force (RAF). The French air force played only a minor role, flying less than 1 percent of the Airlift flights. Presumably this was becaue they had a smaller air force, but even so the French participation seems unusually limited. I do not know the details. The RAF like the USAF made a massive commitment to the airlift. The RAF deployed its Dakotas on June 25 from the U.K. to Germany and flew their its first missions into Berlin, 6.5 t for U.K. garrison. Many at the time had doubts that an entire city could be supported from the air. The USAF began planning a massive air lift as the only alternative to surrender. Supplies would be initially flown in through Templehoff Air Port and plans were rushed to build a second airport at Tegel. The USAF ordered its C-54s (four-engine military equivalent to a DC-4) from Alaska, Hawaii, and the Caribbean to Germany to reinforce the airlift. The C-54 largely replaced the C-47 during the Berlin Air Lift. The C-47 had been the work horse of the Army Air Coros during World War II. The first U.S. and British cargoes for civilian Berliners arrived June 28. The USAF July 7 delivered the first coal shipments on C-54s. First fatal U.S. crash occurred on July 8, A USAF C-47 crashed near Wiesbaden, killing all three American airmen aboard. The first fatal RAF crash occurred September 19. A York crashed near Wunstorf killing 5 British airmen. The Combined Airlift Task Force (CALTF) merging the USAF and RAF operations was created October 15 at Wiesbaden. The level of supplies needed required a secind airport. CALTF flew the first supplies into the new Tegel Airfield on November 5. The U.S. Navy committed two R-5D (C-54 equivalent) squadrons to the airlift. The USAF effort reached its peak strength of 225 C-54s on January 10, 1949. The Airlift had by bnow proven that Berlin can be sustained by air even during the Winter with its bad weather and demand for increased coal supplies. Not only could West Berlin be adequately be supplied, but shops in West Berlin were better stocked than in Soviet East Berlin. CALTF on April 16 mounts a maximum effort which they called "Easter Parade". It was designed to demonstrate the capacity of the aitlift to the Soviets. CALTF in 1 day reported 1,398 sorties meaning nearly one landing in Berlin every minute. Deliveries totaled 12,940 tons. Overall American, British, and French airmen flew over 278,000 flights dlivering more than 2.3 million tons of supplies, nearly 70 percent of which was coal. The Soviets finally lifted their blockade May 12, but the CLTF does not offically end the Berlin Airlift until September 30.
General Lucias Clay considered the options. One was to fight a convoy through to Berlin. Given the overwealming Soviet militarry superiority, this was a non-starter. British General Robertson tild Clay so. He also suggested Clay consider an airlift. Clay thought this was a posible option, at least until a diplomatic sollution was found. Robertson had already secured authority for the Royal Air Force to supplying the British Berlin garrison. The British government was also considering a larger air effort for civilians. [Shlaim, p. 202.] Clay was sleptical that a city the size of Berlin could be sustained by air. There were, however, no other options available.
Clay wanted to be sure as to what extent the Alloed presence in Berlin would be supported by the people of Berlin. He conferred with Ernst Reuter who had just been elected mayor. Reuter brought an aide with him--Willy Brandt. Clay's polititical asdviser Robert Murphy also attended the meeting. Clay told Reuter that he was considering an airlift. "Look, I am ready to try an airlift. I can't guarantee it will work. I am sure that even at its best, people are going to be cold and people are going to be hungry. And if the people of Berlin won't stand that, it will fail. And I don't want to go into this unless I have your assurance that the people will be heavily in approval." [Shlaim, p. 203.] Reuter was also unsure that an airlift could work. He assured Clay, however, that Berliners would be willing to make any sacrifice necessary to keep the Allies in (i.e. the Russians out) Berlin.
Clay decided on the airlift. He called General LeMay in Wiesbaden and ordered him to launch an airlift. He was to cease all uses of transport aircraft and the begin flying cargo to Berlin. He then called his deputy army commander in Frankfurt and ordered him to organize the transport of supplies to the Rhein-Main and Wiesbaden airport. The first planes with cargo reached Templehof on Saturday (June 26). The Airlift had begun. On the same day President Truman at a cabinet meeting ordered the Airlift be be made a full-scale operation and that every plane in the European Command be committed to the effort. Some of his advisers objected, but from the beginning the Airlift had the President''s full support. Truman also saw it as a temporary expedient until a diplmatic sollition could be dound. He explained, "In this way we hoped that we might be able to feed Berlin until the diplomatic deadlock could be broken." [Truman, Vol. 2, p. 123.]
West Berlin required a bare minimun of about 4,000 tons of supplies daily just to survive. Food and coal were given the priority. Coal was needed in particular to maintain the electrical generators. Food was one thing, but flying in coal seemed like a major obstcle. Clay initially estimated the most the U.S. Air Force could deliver was about 700 tons. This was based on American aircraft immediately available in Europe. Clay and his advisors assmed that the diplomats would sort out the problem in a few weeks. When this did not happen the Allies had to begin thinking about a more longer term effort. Before the Air Lift, the food situation in East and West Berlin was not greatly different. With the land lines closed, the people of West Berlin had no way of obtaining food. The Allies named the effort to supply West Berlin, 'Operation Vittles'. Supplying food to the more tghan 2 million people of West Berlin was a daunting undertaking and it had to begin with no prior planning. Fortunately for Berliners, the Soviets began restricting access a few months earlier and Gen. Clay had begun taking counter measures as part of a secret plan to force the Western Allies out of Berlin. As a result. Gen. Clay began stockpiling food and working on air dlivery before thesoviets tirally shut off land routes, This became known as the 'Little Air Lift'. This gave Gen. Clay and the U.S. Air Force a precicious few weeks to organize what became the Berlin Air Lift. Gen. Clays staff estimted that the city's daily food ration would be 646 tons of flour and wheat; 125 tons of cereal; 64 tons of fat; 109 tons of meat and fish; 180 tons of dehydrated potatoes; 180 tons of sugar; 11 tons of coffee; 19 tons of powdered milk; 5 tons of whole milk for children; 3 tons of fresh yeast for baking; 144 tons of dehydrated vegetables; 38 tons of salt; and 10 tons of cheese. This meant something over 1,500 tons were needed daily to supply West Berlin with just a basic food ration. Fuel primarily coal would ultimately be the biggest problem because of the quantity required-some 2,000 tons daily. But there there were larger stockpiles of coal on hand as it was not a perhisable commodity. It would be food thazt was the most immedite problem. What the Soviets considered to be impossible ultimately not only matetialized, but food thanks to the air lift and despitre the blockade would be more abilble in West Berlin than Sovit controlled East Berlin. West Berlin would become the only beseiged city in history in which food became more available during the seige than before it. It would be the Soviets bczuse of the ineffifencies inherent in Communism that would have difficulty suppying their sector with food.
The Allies gave priorities to food and coal. Thus there was little space for raw materials needed for industry. Normally this amounted to less than 100 tons daily. An effort was made, however, to keep the Berlin economy alive. The Berlin Economic Emergency Society coordinated this effort. Berlin companies flew out 2,500 t of items marked "Made in blockaded Berlin" during March 1949.
The Berlin Airlift was an Allied effort, but the American role was central to the success of the effort. This was because it was the Americans who had the air lift capability. The Airlift was primarily conducted by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) supported by the British Royal Air Force (RAF). The French participated, but their capability was limited. What was needed was planes and pilots. The Berliners themselves played an important part in Air Lift, providing the labor needed on the ground. This was a profound shift, not fully appreciated at the time. It would prove to be the first German action in the developing Cold War. Stalin assumed that supplying an entire city by air was impossible. ThevLuftwaffe failure at Stalingrad no doubt played into his thinking. Here he did not fully appreciate the industrial capacity of the United States and the capabilities of the U.S. Air Force. This was, however, a mamoth task even for the United States.
Luckily for the Allies the winter of 1948-49 was a relatively mild one. This meant that the need for coal, by far the greatest part of the cargo, was more limited than had it been a severe winter.
Many at the time had doubts that an entire city could be supported from the air. Clearly the Soviets did not think it was possible. The Germans tried an airlift at Stalingrad and it was dismal failure. The USAF began planning a massive air lift as the only alternative to surrender.
Tempelhof as it was located in Belin was Germany's most important air port. It was a karge open area used by the army for a paradefielld beginning in the 18th century. Because it was a large field in Berlin early aviarors used it to land (Frenchman Armand Zipfel and Orville Wright in 1909).
Tempelhof was designated an airport after World War I (1923). Lufthansa was founded at Tempelhof (1926). Politicians and celebrities flews in and out of Templehof during the 1930s. Major facilities were built as part of Albert Speer's master plan to rebuild Berlin. It was one of the most admired airports in the world. Facilities for building Junkers Ju 87 "Stuka" dive bombers and later Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighter planes during the WAr. Soviet forces seized Tempelhof in the Battle of Berlin (April 1945). The Soviets then handed it over to the U.S. 2d Armored Division (July 1945).
When the Soviets cut road and rail links, the Allies began flying in supplies through Templehoff. Plans were rushed forward to build a second airport at Tegel. The Americans oversaw the Construction operations at Tegel. The Berliners provided the labor. Women were an important part of the work force. Conditions were still very difficult in 1948-49 and women were quite willing to do construction work. About 40 percent of the 19,000 civilian workers were women. These were the "rubble-women" who had first been used to clear out the rubble resulting from the War. The Allied bombing had turned Berlin into a vast ruin and the the Soviet invasion had done even more damage. Thus women had been employed to clean up the city. It was women in part because the Germans had employed all men of military age (as wll as boys and older men) in the defense of the city. Many were killed and those not killed were made POWs. The workers were paid DM 1.20 per hour, plus a decent meal every shift.
The workhorse cargo plane for the United States was the Douglas two-engine DC-3, given the military designation C-47. Photographs taken early in the Airkift show the C-47s. The USAF was in the process of replacing the C-47 with the much larger four-engine C-54, the military version of the Douglas DC-4. The C-54 became the most important plane used in the Airlift. As a result many photograophs of the Airlift show the C-54s. The large-capacity C-54 largely replaced the venerable C-47 during the Berlin Airlift. One of the major difficulties in the Airlift was finding the needed pilots. The USAF brought World War II pilots back to actibe duty. Many pilots flew with very little sleep, a factor in the accidents that occurred. Thus the large cpacity C-54s were critical as they increased the quanities that could be deliverd by a pilot.
The first U.S. and British cargos for civilian Berliners arrived June 28. Bringing in food was one thing, but for Berlin to survive it needed coal to fire the city power plants and for home fuel during the winter. This meant very sunstantial quantiities of a heavy commodity would have to be air lifted into the city. The USAF July 7 delivered the first coal shipments on C-54s. First fatal U.S. crash occurred on July 8, A USAF C-47 crashed near Wiesbaden, killing all three American airmen aboard. The first fatal RAF crash occurred September 19. A York crashed near Wunstorf killing 5 British airmen. The Combined Airlift Task Force (CALTF) merging the USAF and RAF operations was created October 15 at Wiesbaden. The level of supplies needed required a secind airport. CALTF flew the first supplies into the new Tegel Airfield on November 5. The U.S. Navy committed two R-5D (C-54 equivalent) squadrons to the airlift. The USAF effort reached its peak strength of 225 C-54s on January 10, 1949.
The Airlift had proven by late 1948 that Berlin can be sustained by air even during the Winter with its bad weather and demand for increased coal supplies. Not only could West Berlin be adequately be supplied, but shops in West Berlin were better stocked than in Soviet East Berlin. CALTF on April 16 mounted a maximum effort which they called "Easter Parade". It was designed to demonstrate the capacity of the aitlift to the Soviets. CALTF in 1 day reported 1,398 sorties meaning nearly one landing in Berlin every minute. Deliveries totaled 12,940 tons. Overall American, British, and French airmen flew over 278,000 flights dlivering more than 2.3 million tons of supplies, nearly 70 percent of which was coal.
The Soviets finally lifted their blockade May 12, 1949 but the CLTF does not offically end the Berlin Airlift until September 30.
Botting, Douglas. From the Ruins of the Reich: Germany 1945-1949 (New York: New American Library, 1985).
Miller, Roger Gene. To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949 (Texas A&M University Press: 2000).
Nash, Gary B. "The Next Steps: The Marshall Plan, NATO, and NSC-68," The American People: Creating a Nation and a Society (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008).
Shlaim, Avi. The United States and the Berlin Blockage 1948-49 (Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1983).
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs Volume II (Garden City, NY, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956).
U.S. Air Force, "50: Berlin Airlift, 1948/49/1998-99".
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