Stalin's German Peace Offer (1952)


Figure 1.--This is what street looked like in East Berlin with the infamous Trabant. The photograph looks like it was taken in the 1960s. Conditions had improved from the 1950s, but were a far cry from life in bustling West Berlin. We do not know what Stalin thought of the economic success of capitalism, because he ordered that Red Army soldiers 'contaminaetd' by the West (even POWs) be closely watched. Even as capitalist scuccess became increasinly apparent, the Soviet leadership continued to believe in thir own prpagabda and the superiority of scintific socialism. Unlike the Chinese, there never was any thouught of capitalust market reforms.

Stalin has expected American forces to leave Western Europe after World War II as they had done in World War I. President Roosevelt has assumed that the American public would demnand this and told Stain so at Tehran (Novenber-December 1943) that this would be the case. But it did not happen. American public opoinion shifted. We are not sure why. We expect that it in part reflected the impact of Pearl Harbor on the American psyche. The Berlin Air Lift and the Korean War were also important. Worse still was that Germant and the Western countries were reporting economic miracles. while Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe was in economic doldrumns. We are not sure just what was affecting Stalin's thinking, but the Soviet dictator decided on a major policy initive--a peace plan. He may have began to realize that West Germany would eventually join NATO creating a real military deterent. These were all issues whirling around in 1952. There is no way of knowing, however, just whay was on Stalin's mind, but he made an offer to the West--unify AND neutralize Germany. He even offered to tolerate free elections--essentially Finlandization. Germany located in he heart of Europe was potentially the strongest economy in Europe and was already strongly recovering from the War in 1952. There could be no crediatable defense of Western Europe without Germany. And in essence the vCold War was a struggle for Germany. In the end the German peoples would have to decide their future. There was the appeal of unity in Stalin's offer. The East German people definitely would have supported it because it meant loosening the Soviet grip. The question was waht did the West German people want. And the politicans (less so the people) were divided. The Social Democrats wanted to accept the offer. The Christain Democrats wanted no part of it.

Stalin's Calculation

Stalin has expected American forces to leave Western Europe after World War II as they had done in World War I. President Roosevelt has assumed that the American public would demnand this and told Stain so at Tehran (Novenber-December 1943) that this would be the case. Now you an say a great deal about Stalin, but it is impossible to say that he was not calculatung. And the obvious impact of an American withdrawl would be Soviet domination of Europe. There was no European state or comnbinatiin of European states that had the capability of standing up to the Soviet Union -- with or without Britain.

America Stays

The American withdrawl, however, did not happen. American public opoinion shifted. We are not entirely sure why. We expect that it in part reflected the impact of Pearl Harbor on the American psyche. Itbwas clear that America was not safe in the world despite the protection of two oceans. The Berlin Air Lift and the Korean War were important inchanging attitudes toward the Soviets. As were relevatios about Soviet espoionage. This changed Stalin's calculation. America did have the capacity to protect Western Europe. The United States did not seek to match the Red Army man for man or tank for tank. The Ameriacan Army deployed a relavtively small force in Europe, but it was large enough to deter the Soviets because to attack mean war with the United States. In addiiton therevwas the NATO caaoltion forces, especially Britain and eventually West Germany, and the American nuclear umbrella. It proved potent enough to deter Soviet Agression. This was in part because Stalin and the Soviet ladership were convinced that Socialism was the key to the future and they possed it. And that Capitalism would eventually collapse of its own weight. SovietbPremier Nikita Khrushchev would latter famously say, "We will bury you." (1956) He was referring to the superority of Socialism, not to military action. In the aftermath of World War II, it is undersatnable that the Soviets and many others (like Fidel Castro and countless African and Asian leaders) thought that way. What is amazing is that many young Americans after the collapse of Communism, think that way today. Almost all ot the Communistbcountris with their scocialist economoes have failed and failed spectacularly. In contrast beginning with the asian Tigers, capitalist economies have suceeded apectacularly. The comparison od East and West Germany and North and South Korea were particularly instructive. And the obvious conclusion when Communist China fulled with Red Guards and Mao's Little Red Book went Communist.

Situation in 1952

America was mired in a seemingly endless war in Korea. By that time the Iron Curtain that Churchill described severing Eastern Europefrom Western Europe was well established and seemed all too permanent. News from Eastern Europe was hard tocome by as a resukt of thevNKVD controls, but what camne through was not encouraging, Stalinist repression was stunning. NKVD-controlled courts condenned the Secretary General of the Czech Communist Party, Rudolf Stlansky, to death. He was acused of being part itoist-Zionist conspiracy. Similar purges had ravaged the ranks of all the Soviet satellites. The East Germans approved an economic program--the 'Planned Construction of Socialism'. President Truman warned Congress of a 'terrible threat of agression'. The new NATO alliance was bracing itself for the Soviet threat. And its forces were not yet strengthened by a rearmed Germany. One author belieces that 1952 was the nost dangerous year for the Western Alliance. The West with its fragile coalition of liberal democracies opposing totalitarian Communism came very close to collapse, partly because of a peace plan offered by Stalin. [Appelbaum, p. 33.]

Capitalism

Unexpectedly for Stalin and other Soviet leaders, was that Germant and the Western countries were reporting economic miracles. The turning point seems to have been the Currency Reform in Western Zone of Germany whuch set off the German Economic Miracle with major boosts to the economy of all of Western Europe. Stalin's immediate reaction was to blockade West Berlin. President Truman countered with the Berlin Air Lift. When this did not work, Stalin was left with situation that West German was recovering and growing while Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe was in economic doldrumns. We are not sure to what extent Stalin was aware of what was happening. We would have not wanted to be the KGB officer that had to tell Beria or Stalin thate capitalism was working and that socialism was not.

Stalin's Note: Peace Plan (March 1952)

We are not sure just what was affecting Stalin's thinking. We know that Stalin was concerned about the remilitarization of West Germany. As the final terms of the Paris Agreements on the occuoation of Geramny were being worked out, the Soviet dictator decided on a major policy initive--a peace plan in thevmiddle of the Cold War. He forwarded a note to the three Western powers with a surprising proposal--the reunificatiin of Germany as a democratic country. The orice would be neutralization. He seems to have understood that West Germany would eventually join NATO creating a real military deterent. These were all issues whirling around in 1952. There is no way of knowing, however, just what Stalin envisionedd, but he made an offer to the West. He offered Ameica, Britain, and France a plan to unify AND neutralize Germany. He even offered to tolerate free elections--essentially Finlandization. Of course who knows what Stalin meant by democratic elections. He had promised democratic elections in Poland. And he followed up by offering to allow a neutral Germany its own army. Historians still do not agree as to what Stalin's intentionsw were with this note. Most Western hitorians believe that the proposal was simply intended to sew disensionninnthe West--especially among the Germans. He seems to have hoped to postpone or even prevent the Paris Agreement from being implemented. Analysts who argue Stalin's note did not represent a serious offer to reunify Germany. [Shulma. pp. 191-94 and and Taubman, p. 221.] There are historians who believe that there was something to the note. [Willging, p. 123-48. and Ulam, pp. 534-37.] Interestingly, Stalin apparentky did not discuss the proposal withnhis foreign minister, suggestungbthatbitwas notba very serious ptoposal. Molotov after Stalin's dath suggest that his boss was not serious and never would have abandoned the DDR while he was alive. [Chuyev, p. 33.]

Importance

Germany located in he heart of Europe was potentially the strongest economy in Europe and was already strongly recovering from the War in 1952. There could be no crediatable defense of Western Europe without Germany. And in essence the Cold War was a struggle for Germany.

The German People

In the end the German peoples would have to decide their future. There was the appeal of unity in Stalin's offer. The East German people definitely would have supported it because it meant loosening the Soviet grip. The question was waht did the West German people want. And the politicans (less so the people) were divided. The Social Democrats (SPD) wanted to accept the offer. Kurt Schumacher, the SPD leader, favored acceptung the deal. And other Germans agreed. The SPD had been the leading party in the inter-War era. Many German workers had voted fir the SPD or Communists. Konrad Adenauer, thev CDU leader, was opposed and was supported by the makority of Germans. The CDU wanted no part of what Stalin had to offer. ThevUnited States was giving Grmans a chance forvfreedom and the btook it. They had watched developments in the East and the charad of Communist elections as well reports of purges and concentration camps. Many knew about the wave of rape and arrests that had accompanied the rival of the Red Army. And perhaps of equal imporance, the German people had begun to expeience the benefits of the Gernan Economic Miracle. East Germas, despite the dangers, were constantly crossing the border into the West. Almost no one moving the other way, even though West Grmany placed no restrictions on movement. One historian writes, "The West Grman economy was also several years into a boom of historic importance, whike the East German economy was falling behind. The deep contrast between the two halves of Germany--was already vissible." [Appelbaum, p. 33.] Adenauer saw clarly that the future of democracy required binding Germany to the West. Another decision writes that it was not an easy decision. it was 'highly controversial since it had a direct corolarry: acceoting that for the indefinite future there could be no expectation of East and West Gemnany uniting.' [Kersahaw] Adenauer as part of tying Germany to the West took two vital steps. He agreed to the permanent pressence of U.S. troops. None other than Elvis Presely would join in that presence. And Adenauer committed to a fundamental integratiion with the rest of western Europe--especially its historic enemy France.

Sources

Applebaum, Anne. "The lure of Western Europe," The New York Review of Books (June 6, 2019), 33-34p.

Chuyev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovym (1991).

Kershaw, Ian. The Global Age: 1955-2017 (Viling: 2019), 670p.

Shulman, Marshall. Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (Cambridge, Massachusettes: Harvard University Press, 1963).

Taubman, William. Stalin's America Policy (New York: Norton, 1982).

Ulam, Adam. Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968).

Willging, Paul Raymond. "Soviet foreignpPolicy in the German question: 1950-1955" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1973).






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Created: 7:49 PM 8/20/2019
Last updated: 7:49 PM 8/20/2019