Historians now believe that Hirohito was closely involved in Japan's World War II decision-making, both military and diplomatic. his is well documentd. He was constantly briefed by his aides and military leaders, who could not have acted without his approval and permission. One historian writes that in 1941 "Hirohito's command prerogatives were changing quickly, and he was about to become a commander in chief in every sense of the word". [Bix, p. 387.] The Emperor was wary, always looking for ways to protect himself by diplomatic strategies in case the military operations failed, but he finally was in on the planning of the Pearl Harbor attack against the United States. "Between December 2 and December 8 .... while the Japanese people remained completely unaware, Emperor Hirohito met repeatedly with his chiefs of staff, questioned his aides about the country's air defenses, reviewed the organization of the fleet, examined war plans and maps, and received reports on the status of all the units moving into position on the various invasion fronts". [Bix, p. 433.] Of course, the Emperor hd to be very concerned about confronting the militarists who by he time he became emperor were seizing control of the Government. Prime-ministers and other officils who stood in their way were assasinated. It is very likely that if he would have resisted the steps toward war that he could have been removed. Probanly not assasinted. Even the militry probably would have stopped to ht. But he could hve ben rmoved and replced wiyh his younger brother. Takahito was much more involvd with politics and was in league with the miltarists sggrsssivly pushing toward war and colonial expnsion. Whether Hirohito had a desire to confront the militarists is unknown. He seems more cautious than the military, less willing to confont America, but as far as we can tell, only stagering military defeats changed the Emperor's view of the war and interest in peace.

Surrender Decision (August 10, 1945)

Toward the end of the war Hirohito sought peace, and in August 1945 he broadcast the unconditional surrender of Japan to the Allies. While there is considerable controversey concerning the Emperor's war-time role, there is general agreement that he acted with considerable courage to end the War. At the time not only was he endanger from units of the Japanese military determined to resist, but he had ever expectation that he would be arrested and tried for war crimes by the Americans. The Hiroshima Bomb (August 6) and the Soviet invasion (August 8) moved the Japanese Government to action. The War Cabinent met again at 10:30 in the morning (August 9). Foreign Minister Togo suggested offering peace terms with only one condition--the preservation of the Emperor. General Anami demanded other conditions, including no occupation, allowing the military to disarm itself, and to try its war criminals. Anami assured the Emperor that the Americans had only one atomic bomb. While the meeting was going on, news arrived that a second bomb had been dropped on Nagasaki. The Full Cabinet met, but they were also divided. Only the Emperor could dcide the issue. The Emperor resisted gicing up his authority. Figures like Hironumi, a Shinto Fundametalist, imsisted that this was not a constitutional question, that the imperial line existed before the 1871 constitutiob and could not be separated from the country';s very existeance. The Emperor broke the deadlock, approving an offer to surrender as long as it did not prejudice the perogatives of the Throne. The Japanese offer reached Washington (August 10). President Truman and his advisors were divided. Stimson wanted to accept, both to use the Emperor to assure compliance with the surrender and to avoid Soviet participation in the occupation. Byrne's advised against the accepatance, fearing public oposition to retaining the Emperor. Truman decided to side steo the Japanese language and send the Japanese a message making it claer that the occupation authority woyld be in charge.

Assessment

What we do not have a clear image of is whether the Emperor was a figurehead or was he in a position to influence policy? We know of no actions he disuaded the military from taking during the War. Nor do we know any actions he initiated until his well publicized actions to end the War. Nor do we fully understand whether the Emperor was in a position to influence the military or did he fear assasination if he attempted to impede military decessions? A HBC reader writes, "Hirohito does not seem to have struck out on his own independently very often, but he was nearly always in on the planning of various political and military policies. Even when he did not initiate a policy or an incident, he usually backed up those who did rather than confront or punish them." While he did not advocate the war or encourage the military in it drive toward war, he did resist the milirary in its steady march for war. It is difficult to judge him. The way Jpan's government worked ws tge Emperor was presented witgh a policy to either apprive or disapprive. In connection with World War II, he was never presented with a war policy policy for which there was any serious opposition. This only occurred after the Americans dropped the two atmomic bombs and the War Caninent was split.

Sources

Bergamini, David. Imperial Conspiracy (1971).

Bix, Herbert. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York, 2000). Bix wrote his book after ten years of study of Japanese internal politics and culture and after having had access to official documents never seen by any other American historian. His thesis is that although Hirohito claimed officially after World War II to have acted as a merely a constitutional monarch, approving formally decisions that were made by others as a figurehead, that he was, on the contrary, heavily involved in Japan's foreign policies and war policy. Bix goes heavily into the Emperor's involvement in the War. Bix had access to private official Japanese sources that no other foreign historian had ever seen. His conclusion is a very severe indictment of Hirohito as a man actively engaged in the aggressive foreign policies of his reign--in Manchuria and in WW II. After the war, Hirohito and his aids attempted to present him as a constitutional monarch who had been a mere figurehead. But this was not at all the case. Hirohito, for instance, was actively engaged in the war policies of WW II including the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Bix presents overwhelming evidence to show that Hirohito was an active leader in the policies of his regime and certainly no mere figurehead, although after the war he presented himself as a merely "constitutional monarch"--a posture which General MacArthur helped him to sustain as a way of resolving conflicts between the United States and Japan.