Figure 1.--
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Figure 1.-- |
The air war changed dramatically in 1944. The Luftwaffe had bled Blomber Command and the 8th airforce in 1943. Neither fotced had achieved the results expected by Round-the-Clock bombing. Considerable damage had been done but the Luftwaffe had not been broken and the German war effort had not been severely impaired. In fact German war production was inccreasing. A series of devlopments in lte 1943 radically changed the situation in the skies over Germmany. First and most importantly, the Allies had solved the fighter escort problem. P-51s by December 1943 were beginning to reach the 8th Air Force in numbers. Second, the Allies had invaded southern Italy (September 1943). The new 15th Air Force was established at Foggia. This brought outhern Germany within in range, complicating the Luftwaffe's problems in defending the Reich. Third was the scale of the Allied build up in England. The 8th Air Force was beginning to reach parity with Bomber Command. The 8th Air Firce by the end of the year had the capability of staging raids composed of over 700 bombers on a sustained basis. The full extent of the change was not completely apparent because the Allies shifted priorities from Germany to France in preparation for the cross-Channel invasion. Here the Luftwaffe was so devestated that they were a non-factor. Once the invasion had succeeded and the liberation of France in Progress, the Allied renewed the strategic bombing campaign with a unimaginable ferocity.
The Luftwaffe had bleed Blomber Command and the 8th Air Force in 1943. Neither force had achieved the results expected by Round-the-Clock bombing. Considerable damage had been done but the Luftwaffe had not been broken and the German war effort had not been severely impaired. In fact German war production was increasing. After Hamburg, refined German tactic wreaked a terrible toll on attacking Allied airmen.
The air war changed dramatically in 1944. A series of developments in late 1943 radically changed the situation in the skies over Germmany. First and most importantly, the Allies had solved the fighter escort problem. The Allies deceloped improved techniques for extending the ranges of exusting fighters, the P-38s and P-47s. Especially important were the P-47s which constittuted the bulk of the American fighter force at the beginning of 1944. At first a belly tank under the fuselage was added. Eventually wing tanks were found to be more effective. Even more important, P-51s by December 1943 were beginning to reach the 8th Air Force in numbers.
Second, the Allies had invaded southern Italy (September 1943). The new 15th Air Force was established at Foggia. This brought southern Germany within in range, complicating the Luftwaffe's problems in defending the Reich. It also meant that attacks on the vital Ploesti oil fields would be much shorter range attacks that tghe 9th Air Force operating from North africa had been forced to conduct. Ira Eaker who had commanded the 8th Air Force was given command of the new 15th Air Force.
President chose General Dwight D. Eisenhower to lead the long-awaited cross-Channel invasion from England. Eisenhower arrived in England (January 1944). He had overseen the invasion of North Africa--Operation Torch (November 1942), the invasion of Sicily (July 1943), and finlly the invasion of Italy (September 1943). He was designated Supreme Commander if the Allied Expeitionary Force (SCAEF). His air commander for Torch had been General Spaatz who was the original commandder of the 8th Air Force. Eisenhower wanted Spaatz in his command for the invasion. Spaatz chose Lieut. General James H. Doolittle as the new commander for the 8th Air Force. Doolitte was of course the commander of the strike force that bombed Japan from carriers (April 1942). Doolittle had commanded the 12th Air Force in the Mediterranean.
One of the key reasons for the shift in the air war over Germany was the scale of the Allied build up in England. Doolittle inherited a massively expanded and growing force. The 8th Air Force was beginning to reach parity with Bomber Command. The 8th Air Firce by the end of the year had the capability of staging raids composed of over 700 bombers on a sustained basis.
The earliest priority objective of the stategic bombing campaign was U-boat facililities. Gradually the priority targets shifted to German aircraft production--especially fighter aircraft. When the campaign against the U-boats begn to turn the tide in the North Atlantic (Mid-1943), increasing emphasis was given on strickes at plants associated with aircraft production. This had been spelled out in the Pointblank Directive (June 1943). American Air Commander Hap Arnold issued a directive to his commanders for 1944, "This is a must. Destroy the Enemy Air Forcewhereever you find them, in the air, on the ground and in the factories." This objective in 1943 was directed at a general goal of destroying the German ability to wage war. Air commanders in 1944 had to think about a more specific goal, supporting the cross-Channel invasion. Of course this required achieving air superority. The Wehrmacht had powerfl, mobile Panzer divisions in France. The Panzers could fall upon the realitively weak forces landed on the first few days of invasion. Only air power could prevent this. Thus air superority over the invasion beaches and rear areas was essential for the success of the invasion. Thus the campaign against the Luftwaffe took on a level of urgency. The initial projection was May 1, 1944 and given the Winter weather conditions over northern Europe, there was not a great deal of time for the Allied air forces to achieve this objective.
The 8th Air Force after the costly raids on Schweinfurt and other heavily defended German targets and shifted to targets in France and the Lowlands which were less heavily defended and could be escorted with fighters. The first major targets in Germany were towns west of Berlin with aircraft plants. A factory at Oscherleben produced most of the Luftwaffe's FW-190s. A factory at Halberstadt built wings for Ju-88s. Three plants in the Brunswick area made parts for Me-110s and assembled them. This time there was a huge difference. It was the first 8th Air Force deep-penetration raid with fighter escorts. There were limitations to the escorts on this an other early 1944 raids. There were 14 escort groups. All but 1 of these groups were made up of P-38s and P-47s. They covered the bombers most, but not all of the way. the one group of P-51 Mustangs went all of the way. The attacking force was made up of 663 B-17s and 24s. The bad weather forced most the force to turn back. The bombers that had gone to far to turn around scored impressive hits on the FW-190 plant at Oschersleben and on one of te plants nears Brunswick. The cost was highm 60 bombers lost, comparable to the Scheeinfurt losses in October. Even so the performance of the P-51s was astonishing. The single P-51 escort group made up of 49 planes shot down about 15 Luftwaffe fighters without suffering a single loss. The appearance of the P-51s deep in Germany was a shock to the Luftwaffe. And more P-51s were on the way so that more escort groups could be formed.
The 8th Air Force during last week of February 1944 staged Operation Argument which has become to be called "Big Week". The primary target was Germany's aircraft industry. The 8th Air Force attacks were coordinated with 15th Air Force strikes from the south. Despite the losses in January, the Americans were determined to strike in force again. Plans were made for the 8th Air Force's massive force of 3,800 B-17 and B-24 heavy bomber, but had to be delayed by the clouds anf snowy Winter weather. When the weather broke February 19 offering clear skies over Germany. Spaatz ordered "Let 'em go." The Eighth Air Force smashed at NAZI Germany with more than 1,000 bombers on the first day of the operation (January 20). Ther were 12 major targets in Germany and western Poland, areas annxed to the Reich. More escort groups were available.The bombers were accompanied by almost equal numbers of escorts (American P-38s, P-47s, P-5a as well as British Spitfires). The P-47s this time had dual wing tanks rather than a single fuselage tanks and were more effective than with earlier attempts to extend its range. American commanders were under no illusions about the potential cost. Estimates were as high as 200 bombers for the first day. The Luftwaffe contested the raids as hotly as they had in January. Surprisingly only 21 bombers were lost on the first day. During the operation the Americans flew 3,800 sorties whuch included 500 by the 15th Air Force. There were 10,000 tons of bombs deopped which was about the same as the 8th Air Force had dropped in its entire first year of operations. The bombers destroyed or damaged about of Germany's aircradft plants. About a third of the Luftwaffe's ME-109s were built at Leipzig. Strikes there destroyed 350 planes on the ground as well as hundrededs of others still on the assembly line. Also hard hit was the ME-110 plant at Gotha. JU-88 plants at Aschersleben and Bernburg were also severely damaged. The cost was high, 226 bombers and 28 fighters. This was, however, was some American analysts thought might be lost on just the first day. The Germans were able to rebuild damaged plants and more importantly disperse production more quickly than anticipated. Even so, Big Week was the turning point of the war un the air. The Luftwaffe was severely damaged. The bombers and escorts shot down large numbers of Luftwaffe planes. One source indicated 225 pilots and aircrew killed or missing and 141 wounded. Another source reports nearly 600 Luftwaffe fighters were shot down and almost 1,000 pilots and air crew were killed or wounded.
The American losses were much higher--2,600 killed, wounded, or missing aircrews.
The difference was that most of the German losses were highly trained pilot, and unlike the Americans, the Germans did not have a massive program underway to rapidly train pilots. The German losses were about 10 percent of the pilot force available to the Luftwaffe.
The Luftwaffe was never to recover. Not only did American bomber losses decline after Big Week, but the Luftwaffe was no longer able to maintain a credible preence at its forward airbases in France. When D-Day came in June, there was virtually no Luftwaffe opposition to the invasion armada. [Goodwin, p. 488.]
Spattz appointed a Special Planning Committee (February 1944). The Committe was to recommend what the 8th Air Force should target when Lufwaffe bases and construction facilities were destroyed. The Committe recomended against area bombing and suggested that if towns were bombed, the American AAF should only target industrial cites and in those cities the industrial plants. The Committe dismissed the idea of breaking civiliam morale. Here the Committe did not make a moral argument, but rather the pragmatic argument as to how to most effectively persue the war. The posed thar question of in NAZI Germany just how does one go about breaking the will to resist? Just whose will needed to be broken? TheCommitte persued a reasoned assessment and concluded that area bombing might even stregthen the influence of the NAZI Party. The Committe postulated that the only institution in Germany capable of overt throwing the NAZIs was the Wehrmact, but that it had been so penetrated by the NAZIs that this was unlikely until Wehrmacht commanders determined defeat was inevitable and threatened the destruction of the Wehrmacht itself. The Committee's conclusion was tht the AAF should maintain its focus on military and industrial focus. [Schaeffer, pp. 70-72.] An important participant on Special Planning Committee was Colonel Richard D. Hughes who oversaw the AAF Enemy Objectives Unit.
Big Week was the decisive turn in the air war. Air commanders made major changes in tactics on both sides. Luftwaffe commanders still controlled a powerful force. They concluded, however, that given the losses incurred during Big Week that they could not contest every American Day-light raid in force. Luftwaffe commanders became increasingly cautious. They began to avoid major confrontations and attempting to chose when it was most advantageous to respond. This of course exposed German cities to the Allied air attacks. And given the expanding Allied escort forces, there were fewer opportunities for the Luftwaffe to find lightly escorted bomber forces. The Americans in contrast adopted increasingly aggressive tactics. The escorts not only flew close-in esort missions, but escorts were incouraged t persue targets of opportunity, especially when the Liftwaffe did not actively oppose the bomber groups. Now the Americans actually had to goad the Luftwaffe to do battle.
Americans thought they knew how to bring the Luftwaffe to battle. This was of course by attacking Berlin. They were, however, wrong. RAF Bomber Command had since been hammering at Berlin with night raids. German night fightrs took a heavy toll and Air Marshal Harris ended the campaign in February. Now the 8th Air Force targeted Berlin for day-ight raids. The 8th Air Force sent 502 bombers (March 4). They were recalled because of cloudy weather. A small force of 30 bombers did not receive the recall order. They dropped their bombs on a Berlin suburb rather than return with them. The one notable event was that Reich Marshal Göring, who had assured the Föhrer that the Americans could not provide fighter escorts, saw the escorting P-51s. Later he told American interviwers after the War, "I knew the jig was up." A large attack did hit Berlin (March 6). This time there were 800 escorts, actually outnumbering the bombers. Various groups of P-38s and P-47s were employed, but again the P-51s were with the bombers over Berlin. The American losses were high--69 mombers. This was more than at Swinefuhrt. Most of the bombers were hit by Flak. American air crews claimed 82 German fighers shot down. I'm not sure of the actual number. The Americans lost 11 fighters. Rather than intensify, German fighter opposition weakened as the American attacks continued. American escorts would attack German fighter formations no matter what the disparities in numbers. A large force of 669 bombers attacked (March 22). The Luftwaffe contested the raid only weakly. There were 12 bombers shot down, but mostly by Flak. The raids on Berlin demonstrated that the Allies could now bomb any city in the Reich at will. The Luftwaffe not only could no longer prevent the raids, but would be heavily damaged if they attempted to oppose the Americans.
Very little discussion of the moral dimensions of the Allied air campaign occurred during the War. Neither the British or the American public were told of the real nature of the strategic bombing campaign. The American Army Air Forces propagated the idea that they were conducting a precession bombing campaign. The British public having experienced Luftwaffe bombing were not that concerned about German civilian casualties. It was the British, however, that raised the first concerns just as the air war began to swing in the Allies favor. The concerns came from both clergymen and pacifists who questioned the morality of area bombing and the terrible toll on civilians. {Brittain] The article in a small circulation religious, pacifist journal had only limited impact, but the publication and endorsement by relgious leaders was noted in a front-page New York Times article. There was some resulting discussion im the American press and religious journals. This discussion, however, measurably impact the conduct of the air war.
The 8th Air Force staged five heavy raids on Berlin during April and May. While hoping to bring the Luftwaffe to battle, the American air commanders still clung to the illusion that Germany could be bombe out of the War before D-Day. Even if this failed, commanders believe that the resulting dislocation would help gto disrupt the German war effort.
With the Luftwaffe's failure to strongly oppose American day-light raids, even raids on Berlin, a new tactic was devised to bring the Luftwaffe to battle. If the Luftwaffe fighters would not rise to do batttle, the Americans would come down. Squadrons were formed to do so. An American force of 600 fighters weer ordered to strafe airfields all over Germany. The strikes began in early April 1944. Daily tolls of Luftwaffe planes sometimes exceeded 100 a day. These raids were dangerous and exposed the fightrs to ground fire. The American fighters were also ordered to hit transportation targets. Unlike similar raids in France, they were conducted without concern for civilian casualties. [Schaeffer, p. 68.]
The Allied had focused the strategic bombing campaign on aircraft production. Here they had destroyed manufacturing plants and aircraft. Speer's efforts as Armaments Minister had enabled German air craft production t recover from Big Week and other attacks and actually increase. In addition by dispersing production it became much more difficult to attack. Some argue that this proves the failire of strategic bombing. We believe a simple chart of fighter production is not a valid baromter of the sucess or failure of the strategic bombing cmpaign. Note for eamample that the Germans were not building bombers. We would concede that the Allies in 1942, 43, and early 44 could have better refined their targetting priorities. What the ability to maintain fighter production proves more than anything else was how inefficently the German war economy was run in the early years of the War--a mortal failure given Germany's limited industrial capacity compared to tjhat of the allies. Allied assessments of the Luftwaffe had proven faulty after earlier air campaigns. Now internal Luftwaffe reports indicate that the Allies were finally coming to grips with the Luftwaffe. Gen. Galamd dispatched an assessment to his superiors, "The time has come when our force is within sight of collapse" (late April 1944) The Allied success was not how they expected. Allied air commanders had focused on reducing fighter production. Here the Allies failed. In the end this was not a failure of German industry, rather the Luftwaffe ran out of competent pilots and this was the fault of the Luftwaffe itself. The Luftwaffe could not be blamed if German industry failed. Luftwaffe commandrs can be faulted for an inadequate trainong program. Here we are taking about a relatively small group of men, Candidates in 1943 and even 44 could have been easily recruited. The Luftwaffe failed to open new fighter training schools until 1944. Instructions at these schools was poor. Fighter aces were not pulled out of active service to share their skills. Instructors were thus of relatively low quality. The pilot shortage which reached crisis levels in 1944 forced the Luftwaffe to deloy pilots with 112 hours of training--less than half that of American pilots. Especially significant is that shortages of jet fuel severely limited air time.
The full extent of the change was not completely apparent because the Allies shifted priorities from Germany to France in preparation for the cross-Channel invasion--Overlord. Eisenhower as the time for the invasion demanded personal control over both Brish and American air forces. Here the British objected, but when Ike threatened to resign, Churchill capitulted. Eisenhower also was confronted with resistanbce down the chain of command. Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force had taken a terrible drubbing from the Luftwaffe in 1942 and 43. Npw that they were gettng the upper hand, they wanted to persue athe attack over Germany. Harris and Spaatz both argued that they could best contribute to Overlord by continuing th strtegic bombing campaign over Germany. Spaatz in particular wanted to focus on the German petrolum industry. Not only would reducig petroleum production restruct the Wehrmact, bur the Luftwaffe would have to give battle affording the Allied fighter escorts to destroy the remaining fighter force. The Allied air commanders were opposed by a British civilian, a scirntist on the air plnning staff--Silly Zuckerman. He devised the Transportation Plan which sought to essentially destroy the French transpotation system leading to the invasion beaches. The idea was to target 80 railway marshelling and repair centers located in Belgium and northern France. (The targets included the transport system leading to the Pas de Calais as well as Normondy so as not to tip off the Germans as to the location of the invasion.) The Germans could not heavily defend the whole coast. Their ability to defeat the invasion would rest on their ability to rush powerful forces forward and gain control of the invasion beaches before the Allies could land sufficienr forces to exploit their manpower and resource superiority. Zuckerman had the support on one air commander--Air Marshal Tedder. Eisehower decided on the Transportation Plan and backed it even when Churchill expressed concern over possible French civilian casualties. In persuing the Trnsportation Plan the Allied bombers proved much more uccessful at hitting ground targets than one believed possible. Here the Allies improved their target marking techniques. The supression of Luftwaffe as another factor. Raids on Germany were not entirely ceased. The Luftwaffe by June was so devestated that they were a non-factor.
Sppatz also had control over the 15h Air Force. While a much smaller force than the 8th Air Force, it was not part of the forces preparing for Overlord. And Spaatz used the 15th Air Force to persue his new commitment to target Grmany's petroleum infrastructure. Te sprawling Ploesti oil complex in Romania continued to be Germany's principal source of ptroleum. American attacks had damaged Ploesti, but not seruiously disrupted production (August 1943). The 15th Air Force hit the refinery and rail yards (April 5). Considerable damage was done. Additional attacks followed which by August had destoyed Ploesti as a source of oil for the Germans. The 15 Air Force lost 223 planes in these attacks. A substantial cost for this reltiveky small force.
Eisenhower permitted Spaatz occassionakl forays into Germany to keep the Germans guessing as long as it did not detract from the Transportation Plan. Spaatz's targets for these raids were invariably associated with Germany's petroleum industry. The 8h Air Force began to hit German synthetic fuel plants (May 1944). These plants were in ddition to Ploesti the principal zsource of petroleum for the German war effort. The attacks on Germany's petroleum infrastrusture were to prove much more effective than the earlier attacks on the aircraft industry.
Once the invasion had succeeded and the liberation of France in Progress, the Allied renewed the strategic bombing campaign with a unimaginable ferrocity. Eisenhower in prearation for the D-Day Landings and to support the beach head had authority over both RAF Bomber Command and the American 8th Air Force. Neither Harris or Spaatz appreciated their limitations on their operations. They wsanted to as soon as possible resume the strategic aifr campaign against Germany which they both were convinced was the quickest way to end the War. German cities enjoyed a respite as the Allies prepared for D-Dayt and then the battle for France raged. After the liberation of France and with Allied armies moving through Belgium and approaching the bondary of the Reich, the fortified Western Wall, Eisenhower released them (September 14). The 8th Air Force now had twice the strength of Bomber Command, but both commanders possed massive air armadas, more than 5,000 bombers. In addition, the Luftwaffe defenses had been devestated. Harris and Spaatz had different strategies to persue. More than half of the bombs that fell on Germany would fall in the next 6 months. German cities would be devestated and the goals of the stratstegic bombing campaign woukld be realized--the German capacity to make war wpild be destroyed.
Brittain, Vera. Fellowship (March 1944).
Goodwin, Dorris Kearns. No Ordinary Time. Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1994), 759p.
Schaffer, Ronals. Wings of Judgement: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 272p.
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