Figure 1.-- |
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The NAZIs on the Eastern Front did have allies. NAZI propaganda sought to depict the invasion of the Soviet Union as a modern European crusade against Bolshevism. Unsaid of course was that the invasion was not only against the Bolsheviks, but an imperialistic war to seize German Lebensraum and pilage resources as well as a genocidal campaign to murder millons of Slavs. Hitler did have allies or his campaign. The most important were Italy, Hungary, and Romania. The Romanians to curry Hitler's favor provided the largest contingent. All of these forces proved unreliable in combat, in part because the Germans did not properly equip them. The Spanish volunter Blue Division proved effective but was only one division. There were other allies. The Germans recruited men from the occuoied countries. Most were members of local Fascist parties or youths who were recruited from Fascist youth groups. At the time of Barbarossa the NAZI victory looked assured. As the war progressed that victory proved increasingly unlikely and volunteers more difficult to recruit. The Germans also recruited anti-Bolchevick Soviets, but here were limited because of their genocidal policies.
NAZI propaganda sought to depict the invasion of the Soviet Union as a modern European crusade against Bolshevism. Unsaid of course was that the invasion was not only against the Bolsheviks, but an imperialistic war to seize German Lebensraum and pilage resources as well as a genocidal campaign to murder millons of Slavs. The anti-Bolshevick appeal did have some resonance among European Fascists.
Unlike the Allies, there was no real attempt by the Axis to coordinate strategy and planning. Essentially Hitler decided on the strategy and his European Axis allies were expected to contribute men and support the NAZI war effort with raw material, industrial products, and labor.
The NAZIs on the Eastern Front did have allies. Hitler did have allies or his campaign. The most important were its Axis allies, especially Italy, Hungary, and Romania. They were also able to recruit individuals from occupied countries. These allies proved generally unreliable in combat, in part because the Germans did not properly equip them. The Finns were quite different. They were effective fighters, but were not Fascists. They cooperated with the Germans because of the Soviert attacks in the Winter War and the annexation of an important part of the country.
The NAZI's launched Operation Barbarossa (June 22, 1941). Finland joined the Germans only 3 days later (June 26). Actually the Finns claim that the Soviets initiated hostilities with air attacks on Finnish cities. Prime minister Rangell then declared in a sppech to Parliament that Finland was at war with Soviet Union. I'm not sure if any historian has fully accessed the motives of the Finnish Government. Surely the desire to recover the lost territory was the primary factor. There may have been other factors such as the view at the time that the Stalin and the Skviet Union was a mortal threat to Finnland. Finland joined the Germans as a co-beligerent but not an ally or member of the Axis. The Finns refer to this as the Coninuation War. The Finnish Army innitiated an offensive om the cease-fire line (June 30). The Finns refused, however, to go significantly beyond the lost territory, much to Hitler's despleasure. This was a major reason that the NAZIs failed to capture Lenningrad.
Although Hitler and Mussolini were partners in the War, Hitler never planned any of his campaigns with Mussolini. And Mussolini returned the favor with his invasion of Greece (1940). After Hitler launched Barbarossa, Mussolini did contribute a substantial number of Italian troops to the campaign.
Mussolini rushed the Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia (CSIR-Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia)
to participate in Barbarossa (July 1941). This was a unit consisting of 62,000 troops. They were deployed with Army Group South in the Ukraine. The Russian winter proved to a great shock to the Italians who were accustomed to a mild Mediterranean climate. The Italian Army substantially expanded its commitment to a full army group--the Armata Italiana in Russia (ARMIR--Italian Army in Russia). It was commonly referred to as the Italian 8th Army. It totaled pver 200,000 men (July 1942). The 8th Army was committed to the German Stalingrad offensive as part of German Army Group B (Heeresgruppen B) commanded by General Maximilian von Weichs. It was deployed south of Stalingrad to help protect the German flank as the German 6th Army drove into Stalingrad itself (August 1942). The Soviet counter offensive Operation Uranus drove through the realitive weak German allies (Hungarian and Romanian forces) deployed north and south of the city (November 19). The Italians deployed along the lower Don were not immediately affected. A new Soviet offensive Operation Saturn smashed into the Italian positions. The Italians suffered terrible losses. The debacle was in part because they were not equipped with modern armor, mostly the light tanks they used in North Africa. About 20,000 Italians were killefd and 64,000 captured. About 45,000 men the Soviets ha]d surrounded managed to dight theur way out. The despirited Italians who were also suffering losses in North Africa withdrew the remanents of the shattered 8th Army back to Italy. They arrived home with little fanfare. Mussolini was ot anxious to publicize another debacle. Most of the Italian POWs captured by the Soviets perished in camps because of the apauling conditions.
Hungary as a contiuent part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had fought with Germany in World War I. Hungary was willing to join the Axis. And it benfitted with the award of Transylvania which was transferred from Romania (1940). The Hungarians were, however, much less willing to commit troops to Barbarossa and the campaign in the East. Hungary's war aims were thus largely satisfied even before Hungary entered the War. Thus Hitler found Hungary an unentusiastic ally. Hitler after the failure of Barbarossa (December 1941) had to compel the Hungarians to make an important contribution to the 1942 campaign. The Hungarian forces were demployed in Ukraine and along with the Romanians were deployed to protect the German 6th Army's flanks at Stalingrad. The Soviet counter offensive, Operation Uranus, smashed both the Huingarians and Romanians (November 1942). After the German defeat at Kursk (1943), the Hungarian Government under Admiral Horthy began to try to get out of the War. Hitler refused to allow this. He eventually had to seize control of the Hungarian Army to keep them in the war (1944).
Romania was a key ally for NAZI Germany on the Eastern Front. Romania after Munich (September 1938)and the NAZI-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact found itself in an impossible situation, sandwiched between two totalitarian behomouths with expanionist designs. Stalin struck first, seizing large areas of northern an eastern Romania which had been part of the Tsarist Empire. Than as Hungary and Romania prepared for war, Hitler intervened. The Vienna Award further eviserated the country. Hitler awarded Transylvania to Hungary and a smaller region to Bulgaria. The country became a bone of contention between the Soviets and NAZIs and doscussed by Molotov and Hitler and their Berlin meeting. Hitler was not about to allow the Soviets further incursions in Romania and the Balkans. Romania was key to the German war economy. Ploesti was the principal source of oil for the German war effort. Romania had fought with the Allies during World War I. Now Romania was left dependant on Germany for its survival. And once Hitler forced Romania into the Axis and German forces entered the country, the Germans no longer had to pay for the oil and other resources. The Romanians to curry Hitler's favor provided the largest non-German contingent for Barbarossa and formed an important part of Army Group South in the Ukraine. Their goal was the provinces seized by the Soviet. The Romanians were also intent on recovering Transylvania which Hitler had awarded to Hungary (1940).
The front was huge and Army Group South faced a massive, well equipped Red Army. The Romanians were also used for actions behind the front line and the investment of cities like Odessa which the advancing Panzers passed around. They were commited terrible actions against Jews. The performance of the Romanian Army has generally been presented as poor. This is largely becuse most early accounts of Barbarossa which appeared in the West were books by German generals who were anxious to glorify their victories and blame failure variously on the weather, Hitler, and their allies. A good example was Field Marshall Manstein's account of the 1942 Crimean campaign in which he castigates the Romanian troops he commanded, calling them drones who were not capable of clear thought and were terrified of the Russians. [Manstein] More balanced modern works suggest that the Romanian performance was better than credited by the Germans. They actually played an important role in the Crimean campaign (1942). Rarely do German sources explain that the Romanians were not trained, equipped, or armed as well as German units or received the same Luftwaffe support as the Germans. The NAZI failure to arm their allies is in part a reflection of Germany's limited industrial capacity as well as their concern about having a well equipped ally that might prove difficult to control. When the German 6th Army plunged into Stalingrad, the Romanian and other Allied forces (Hungarians and Italians) were deployed on the flanks of the Germans. The first step of the Red Army's Operation Uranus to cut off the Germans was to smash through the Romanian and other allied armies (November 1942). Other Romanian units were lost in the Crimea largely as a result of Hitler's refusal to evacuate the Peninsula while there was still time (1943). As a result, when the Soviets moved into Romania, the Romanian Army was in no condition to resist (1944).
Spain never joined the Axis. It did provide considerable support to the German war effort, but refused to declare war on Britain, despite German pressure which escalated to thinly veiled threats. To placate the Germans, Franco offered a volunteer division. The Wehrmact at first had little respect for the Spanish and incredibly made them walk 1,000 km to the front, apparently to toughen them up. The Spanish Blue Division, however, proved effective and earned the Wehrmacht's respect in fighting around Leningrad. There was, however, only one division in a campaign where hundreds of divisions were deployed by both sides.
Slovakia seceeded from Czechoslovakia when the NAZIs invaded (March 1939). Slovakia became a slavishly-loyal NAZI puppet state. Slovakia was not a major part of the invading NAZI force. This was not because the Slovakian Goverment was unwilling, but reflects the small size of the country and the new Slovak Army. The Slovaks thus did not have a substantial or well equipped army when the NAZIs invaded the Soviet Union. Some Slovaks did participate in Operation Barbarossa The Germans launched Barbarossa (une 21, 1941). Slovakia ordered its Army to invade the Soviet Union 4 days later (June 25). The original Slovakia formation was the Slovakian Expeditionary Army Group (SEAG) commanded by the Slovak Minister of Defense, Ferdinand Catlos was composed of 45,000 men. The SEAG as the Wehrmact drove into the Soviet Union had trouble keeping up, primarily because it was not as well equiped as the Germans and lacked the vehicles need for mobility. The Germans themselves were not fully mobility and thus unwilling to divert equipmrnt deliveries from their own troops to their allies. The Slovaks decided to reorganize and all the mototized units of the Slovak Army Group were combined into a single formation named the Slovak Mobile Command (SMC) or the Brigade Pilfousek, commanded by Rudolf Pilfousek. He had formerly commanded 2nd Slovak Division. The SMC paeticipated in several major campaigns of Barbarossa.
It was pulled out of the lines and regrouped (August 1941). Two new units were formed: 1st Slovak (Mobile) Infantry Division and the 2nd Slovak (Security) Infantry Division. The 1st Slovak (Mobile) Infantry Division was also referred to as the Slovak Fast Division. The Slovak 1st Division after the great battle of Kiev were moved south. Thus they were not near Moscow when the Red Army Offensive smashed a size part of the attacking force. The Slovak 1st Division was emoloyed in the German summr offensive into the Ujraine (1942). They were with the prong that drove beyond Rostov into the Caucauses and thus not immediately affected by the Red Army Stalingrad offensive. They along with the German units were forced to with draw from the Caucauses to avoid entapment. The Division has to be airlifted, abandoning their equipment. The Division escaped, but later was caught in a Red Army offensive action near Melitopol. The Soviets broke through the Germans lines and smashed the Slovaks. The Division was neverthe same. The survivors were rehrouped and redeployed in an effort to save the Crima (1944). It proved unreliable and the Germans eventually disarmed them and used it as a construction batalion. The 2nd Slovak Infantry Division was used ad a security unit and for abti-partisan operations. After Stalingrad units wre transferred to the 1sy Division, but the @nd Division became increasingly unreliable and the Germans disarmed it (November 1943) and converted it into a construction brigade redeployed to Italy. The other Slovak unit deployed to Russia was rge 12th Engineeer Battalion which helped to maintain rail lines behinf Army Group South. It was combined with the 1st Division after it was reorganized as a construction brigade. We do not yet have details as to Slovak losses during the War One source estimates that about 10,000 Slovak soldiers were killed in the War.
There were other allies. The Germans recruited men from the occupied countries. Most were members of local Fascist parties or youths who were recruited from Fascist youth groups. At the time of Barbarossa the NAZI victory looked assured. Thus these European NAZIs were eager to join the fight. Hitler did not think much help would be needed. After the disaster before Moscow, the NAZIs began to recruit more aggressively. Joining the fight was one way for the European fascists to demostrate their loyalty to the NAZIs. Units were recruited throughout occupied Europe, including Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and other occupied countries. As they were colunteers, however, the number of men was relstively small given what was needed. As the war progressed that victory proved increasingly unlikely and volunteers more difficult to recruit. Oronically, Hitler rejected recruitment in the areas where the NAZIs could have obtained men in large numbers, Beylorussia, Russia, and the Ukraine.
The Germans also recruited anti-Bolchevick Soviets, but here were limited because of their genocidal policies.
The NAZI allies on the Eastern Front proved of only minimal assistance. They were either ineffective units or of such smll numbers that they did not provide the assistance needed. The one country which could have provided the decisive impact needed to defeat the Soviets was Japan. Hitler did not tghink initially that he would need Japan. After Barbarossa bogged wn he believed that his Axis ally which was strongly anti-Communist would join his campaign. They never did.
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