Figure 1.--Before the War, the British Royal Air Force was focused primarily on DETERRENCE (bombing), but RAF bombers proved unable to to strike at the Germans in force (1939-41). Britain's 'salvation' as Churchill termed it proved to be DEFENSE (modern fighters and the Chain Home Network). Not well understood is that it was not Churchill that was largely responsible for authorizing both, but arch-appeaser Prime-Minister Stanley Baldwin. Of course the real genius was Air Chief Marshall Hugh Dowding who the Air Ministry put in charge of Fighter Command basically so they could get on with what they saw as the primary task of building bombers. Here we see a Christmas scene in an Anderson Shelter (December 1940). In the end it was the bombers that that helped win the War, but it was Britain's air defense system that miraculously saved the country in 1940.
Appeasement involved a wide range of issues, but none were so important in the public mind and would prove to be actually so important than war came than air power. And it would be with air power that Winston Churchill would focus his challenges to Prime-Minister Stanley Baldwin. Today, Neville Chamberlain is most associated with Appeasement, but it was Baldwin that was the real author. And here the story becomes muddled because in a weird way Baldwin was actually right and Churchill was wrong. Fortunately for Britain, this was not how the public remembered it. Now Baldwin was the very man who enunciated the oft-repeated dictum, "The bomber will always get through." Now when he said that, he was right because until 1935, bombers were actually faster than fighters. The concept of the 'fast bomber' (Schnellbombr) was much in vogue. It is at this time, the NAZIs had a stroke of immense good luck. Advances in aviation resulted in the Me-109 and other advanced aircraft, rendering all existing air forces obsolete. This occurred at the precise time Hitler was throwing immense amounts of money at aircraft construction. This was not fully understood at the time. Military planners, both army and naval were using World War I weaponry which were not obsolete, much of which would be used to fight World War II. Thus the idea that aircraft could become obsolete overnight had really not dawned on the military establishment or public and this included Churchill. Now while British politicians slept, MI-6 was not sleeping and was delivering reasonably accurate reports to the Government of what Hitler and Göring were doing in Germany. Now the Germans were building aircraft at an alarming rate and Göring was creating a very capable air force, but the one things that this force was not capable of doing was to effectively bomb London without sustaining unsustainable casualties. There were two reasons for this. First, the German fast bombers had small bomb loads. (One the Do-11 was even called the 'flying pencil'.) Second, the Me-109 did not have the range to protect the bombers over London. This was, however something neither Hitler, Göring, Baldwin, or Churchill understood. Understandably, politicians would not realize this. The fact that Hitler put a man in charge of the Luftwaffe that did not understand this essentially cost the Germans the War. As the debate on appeasement unfolded, it became a numbers game. Göring famously told his commanders, "The Führer only asked him how many bombers he had, not how big they were or how far they could fly." But curiously Churchill was also mostly fixed on numbers. It was not Churchill that demanded fighters for the RAF or the Chain Home Network, Churchill also constantly talked about numbers--meaning mostly bombers. And bombers that would prove to have very little striking power when war came. Who then was responsible for the Hurricanes and Spitfires Fighter Command had when war came? It was none other than arch-appealing Stanley Baldwin, albeit rather by accident. But when the Battle of Britain broke over Britain (1940), all the public remembered was Churchill demanding more aircraft for the RAF with Baldwin and Chamberlain insisting that they were not needed.
Prime-Minister Baldwin
Stanley Baldwin was born in Bewdley, Worcestershire (1867) into a wealthy industrial family. Stanley was the son of Alfred Baldwin, elected a Conservative MP for West Worcestershire (Bewdley) (1892. He helped run the concern which became one of Britain’s most important iron and steel corporations, Baldwins Ltd. His mother’s family had more artistic and literary backgrounds. His uncles included Sir Edward Burne-Jones and Sir Edward Poynter, notable artists. Rudyard Kipling was a cousin.When his father died, Stanley succeeded him as MP (1906). Politics soon became his principal concern. His business background led to his appointment as Financial Secretary of the Treasury as part of David Lloyd George’s wartime coalition government (1917). Having to deal with enormous costs of the War, he published an editorial in The Times under the pseudo name 'FST’. He advocated that the rich make voluntary donations to help pay off the war debt (1919). He donated 20 percent of his personal wealth. He entered Loyd-George's Cabinet as President of the Board of Trade (1921). He then played a very important part in the Conservative rebellion that overthrew the coalition government and the premiership of Lloyd George (1922). The new prime-minister, Andrew Bonar Law, rewarded him with the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer--the traditional stepping stone to be prime-minister. Bonar Law retired due to illness (1923). Baldwin replaced him as prime-minister (1923). His focus was on unemployment. He called a general election to seek a larger majority to pursue his programs, especially higher protective tariffs. He failed to retain a majority and resigned (1924). His replacement was Ramsey MacDonald and the first Labour government needed Liberal support and was defeated in the next general election (1924), Baldwin returned as Prime Minister. He served three times as prime0minister and dominated British politics during the late 1920s until 1937. He was prime-minister during the General Strike (1926), the Ethiopian crisis (1935), and the abdication crisis (1936). He had no interest in foreign affairs which bored him. His interest as in business and the economy. Of course with Hitler seizing power in Germany (1933), foreign policy was of upmost concern. Baldwin, did, however, have a well-honed political scene which enabled the Conservatives to dominate British politics in the inter-War era. This included the 1935 General Election. MI-6 was accurately reporting the massive German rearmament, but Baldwin understood that the public was in no mood to support massive military spending to match the Germans. 【Young】 So his answer was appeasement--basically give the Germans what they wanted so hey would have no reason to launch another war.
Aviation Technology
Prime-Minister Stanley Baldwin was the very man who enunciated the oft-repeated dictum, "The bomber will always get through." This was not an original idea, it was the accepted thinking of the military experts of the day. And when he made that statement in the House of Commons, he as absolutely correct. It was true said that because until 1935 when the all-metal Me-109 mono-plane appeared, bombers were actually considerably faster than fighters. (And were still faster than British fighters until 1938). Thankfully there was one man that did not agree--Air Chief Marshall Dowding. The confidence in strategic bombing was the case despite the lack of any navigational system to lead bomber to their targets. The Luftwaffe was working on a system, Bomber Command was not. Britain built a substantial bomber force, incredibly without any real thinking about how the bombers were going to navigate to their targets. As long as the bombers were faster than the fighters, they could bomb by day. The Air Ministry expected that bombing by night, they could use celestial navigation--but incredibly did not bother test it out. 【Richards, p. ??.】 (Once the War began, Bomber Command quickly found celestial navigation was hopeless.) As a result, Bomber Command soon found it was difficult to find German cities at night, let alone actual targets.
Authors of Appeasement: Prime-Ministers MacDonald and Baldwin
Prime-Minister Neville Chamberlain is today the leader most associated with Appeasement, but it was Prime-Minister Ramsey McDonald and Stanley Baldwin that were the real author. The British governments under Labour Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald (1929–1935) was in power when Hitler seized power (1933). MacDonald was unsure how to deal with Hitler. There was a general unwillingness to believe that anyone could actually believes all the things he was saying and writing. It was thought that actually assuming power would have a moderating impact on Hitler. Hitler did pursue an initial moderate foreign policy, primarily because until he could build up the German military he was concerned over possible Allied intervention. Gradually he realized that MacDonald had adopted an appeasement policy and that there would be no such intervention. MacDonald appointed a new ambassador who accurately reported what was happening in Germany including his assessment of Hitler--Eric Phipps (1933-37). MacDonald also received accurate MI-6 reports. MacDonald's primary concern was avoiding another war and thus there was no appetite fir challenging Hitler on anything. Britain negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement with Hitler which basically removed naval building limitations (June 1935). There were theoretical limits but they were set so high that Germany did not have the industrial capacity to approach them. There were limits on ship size, but there was no system in place to monitor it. MacDonald hoped that this agreement would prevent a naval arms race between Britain and Germany. In the same year. Hitler announced the resumption of conscription. This was a huge step because it meant the Germans could begin building a sizeable army. Göring announced the creation of the new Luftwaffe (1935) These were both violations of the Versailles Treaty and Britain's and France's failure to meaningfully respond meant the end of any restrictions on German rearmament. The General Election brought Stanley Baldwin back to power for the third time (November 1935). A new ambassador was appointed--Neville Henderson (1937). He reported even more effectively on Hitler and was roundly disliked by Hitler and the NAZIs. Henderson would remain in Berlin until war was declared. It is important to understand that both ambassadors were supported by Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office (1930-38). He is noted for his opposition to appeasement and his strong stance against NAZI Germany. Given his position, he could not enter the public debate. But it mean that MacDonald and Baldwin were getting very accurate and penetrating advise about Hitler, the NAZIs, and the German military build up. Both Labour Prime-Minister Ramsay MacDonald (1929-35) and Conservative Prime-Minister Stanley Baldwin (1935–1937) chose not to sanction or punish NAZI violations of international agreements. Rather, they sought to negotiate with the Germans. Notably, one of he first steps Chamberlain took as relations with Hitler came to a crisis stage was to get rid of Vansittart. Baldwin had little interest in foreign affairs. Chamberlain was interested and saw himself as very good at it. He convinced himself that he was the only person capable of preventing another war.
With Hitler's appointment as Chancellor a series of former and present British prime-minsters adopted a policy of appeasement. Their primary interest was to above all else avoiding another war. The horrors of World War I made this a top policy concern. The idea was to make concessions to Hitler and the NAZIs that would remove any desire for Germany to start another war. Prime-minister Neville Chamberlain man most associated with the policy, largely because of his giving in to Hitler at the Munich Conference (1938). Chamberlain flew back to London and wave a piece of paper signed by Herr Hitler that he claimed guaranteed 'peace in our times'. The policy was widely endorsed by other prime ministers and the great majority of the British political establishment and media. Serving prime-ministers included Ramsay MacDonald and Stanley Baldwin. World War I leader Lloyd George also became a major proponent of appeasement, visiting Germany and calling him the 'greatest living German'. The list of appeasers is long indeed. In comparison the number of men who wanted to confront Hitler, men like Churchill and Aden, is very short. Also notable is not only how few they were, but the vitriol with which they were attacked by the appeasers. The number of appeasers and the strength of their popular support is astonishing given the fact that these men and women very nearly ushered in the demise of Western Civilization.
Revolution in Aviation Technology
The concept of the 'fast bomber' (Schnellbombr) was much in vogue. It is at this time, the NAZIs had a stroke of immense good luck. Advances in aviation resulted in the Me-109 and other advanced aircraft, rendering all existing air forces obsolete. This occurred at the precise time Hitler was throwing immense amounts of money at aircraft construction. This was not fully understood at the time. Military planners, both army and naval were using World War I weaponry which were not obsolete, much of which would be used to fight World War II. Thus the idea that aircraft could become obsolete overnight had really not dawned on the military establishment or public and this included Churchill.
Air Power
Appeasement involved a wide range of issues, but none were so important in the public mind and would prove to be actually so important than war came than air power. And it would be with air power that Winston Churchill would focus his challenges to Prime-Minister Stanley Baldwin. And here the story becomes muddled because in a weird way Baldwin was actually right and Churchill was wrong. Fortunately for Britain, this was not how the public remembered it.
British Intelligence
Now while British politicians slept, MI-6 was not sleeping and was delivering reasonably accurate reports to the Government of what Hitler and Göring were doing in Germany. Mi6 and the the Air Ministry were providing both Labour and the Tories very accurate assessments of German military spending both before and after Hitler seized power. Many MPs just reignited them. Labour has bee described as having a pacifist 'fringe' We would say that it was more than a fringe. Baldwin has been described as essentially indolent. Even his admiring biographer did not disagree. 【Young】 Baldwin go it in his head that the RAF was far superior to the Germans because of the Versailles prohibitions. But he did not follow the reporting closely as Hitler and Göring very rapidly ramped up German production. There were other issues he saw as much more important.
Hitler and Göring came out in the open about the Luftwaffe (1935). This was when Hitler also announced a renewal conscription, meaning that he was building an army capable of waging another war. Now the Germans were building aircraft at an alarming rate and Göring was creating a very capable air force, which it notably demonstrated in the first 2-years of the War. The one things that this force was not capable of doing, however, was what Hitler and Göring ordered it to do--destroy London. The Luftwaffe bombers could reach London a, but not destroy it,. And they could no bomb the city without sustaining unsustainable casualties. There were two reasons for this. First, the German fast bombers had small bomb loads. (One the Do-11 was even called the 'flying pencil'.) The He-111 had a capacity of about 4,000 lbs of bombs. In comparison the Lanc by the end of the War could carry 22,000 lns of bombs/ And of course the Americans and the British had the capacity to build far more bombers than the Germans. Second, the Me-109 did not have the range to protect the bombers over London. This was, however, something neither Hitler, Göring, Baldwin, or Churchill understood. Understandably, politicians would not realize this. The fact that Hitler put a man in charge of the Luftwaffe that did not understand this essentially cost the Germans the War.
Numbers Game
As the debate on appeasement unfolded, it became a numbers game. Göring famously told his commanders, "The Führer only asked him how many bombers he had, not how big they were or how far they could fly." But curiously Churchill was also mostly fixed on numbers. The debate over defense did not get into what type of aircraft such as fighters or bombers or quality, but mostly on appropriations and numbers. Nor was their much of an argument over whether the RAF should have an offensive of defensive orientation. At the time the Air ministry was strongly focused on bombers and an offensive capability. .
Churchill's Challenge
Churchill and hos allies began challenging the Baldwin om national defense. It was Churchill ho focused on aviation. Churchill did not have the same political acumen as Baldwin. And when he began challenging Baldwin, it frightened a lot of British people, most of whom were primarily focused on avoiding not winning another war. Churchill's demand for more spending and more aircraft did not have the intended impact, in part because along with the numbers came a dark vision that frightened a public dead set on avoiding war. Churchill for example in the Common's said, " We may be confronted on some occasion with a visit from an ambassador , and may have to give an answer in a very few hours; and if that answer is not satisfactory; within the next few hours the crash of bombs exploding in London and the cataracts of masonry and fire and smoke will warn of any inadequacy which has been permitted in our aerial defense." 【Churchill, Never, p. 106. 】 This may have sounded overly dramatic at the time, but it is in fact what the NAZIs did. Hitler summoned the aging Czech president Hácha to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, threatening ed to destroy Prague if the Czechs did not submit (March 14-15, 1939). One historian writes, "The German ministers [Göring and Ribbentrop] were pitiless. They literally hunted Dr. Hácha and M. Chvalkovsky round the table on which the documents were lying, thrusting them continually before them, pushing pens into their hands, incessantly repeating that if they continued in their refusal, half of Prague would lie in ruins from bombing within two hours, and that this would be only the beginning. Hundreds of bombers were waiting the order to take off, and they would receive that order at six in the morning if the signatures were not forthcoming". 【Shirer, pp. 446–47.】 Churchill predicted an apocalyptic scene with "30,000 to 40,000 people killed or maimed." The commonly used estimate of British civilians deaths as a result of the German bombing is about 40,000. And about 3-4 million "driven out of London into the open country." Estimates vary, but some 3 million school children were eventually evacuated or reevaluated and the number of elderly and others unclear. But Churchill's warning were at the time seen as not only alarmist, but the talk of a 'mad man' or even a 'war mongerer'. IIt damaged his reputation. 【Korda, p.23.】 At least for a time. Soon after Munich (September 1938). more and more Brits began to understand that he was right.
Popular Culture
After Hitler seized power (1933), the British public began to get increasingly uneasy about the Germans. News reels of Hitler's speeches were disturbing enough. Then when Hitler announced renewed conscription and Gôring announced the creation of the Luftwaffe (1935), the public for good reason began to sense the real possibility of another War. And Churchill was beginning to ask pointed quesyions in the Commons. It is at this time a lightening bolt struck. H.G. Wells and Alex Korda produced a frightening film, 'Things to Come' (1936). It was about a devastating air attack on a major city that looked a lot about London.
British Air Policy
There wee two reproaches to air policy. The RAF favored deterrence, building a bomber force that could severely damage Germany. The other option was air defense, which most of the RAF commandeers did not think was feasible. Which is why Dowding got command of Fighter Command. It was seen as a demotion. It was not Churchill that demanded fighters for the RAF or the Chain Home Network, Churchill also constantly talked about numbers--meaning mostly bombers. Tragically for Britain, the bombers that the RAF had in service when war came would prove to have very little striking power. Who then was responsible for the Hurricanes and Spitfires Fighter Command had when war came? It was none other than arch-appeaser Stanley Baldwin, albeit rather by accident.
Baldwin's Response
Baldwin whom had been avoiding any confrontation with Hitler realized he would have to do something, especially age the Italian Fascist dictator stirred the pot with his Ethiopian adventure in which he used poison gas.. Somehow given the differences between Baldwin and Churchill, it was Baldwin that amazingly got the issue of air defense right. According to one historian, Baldwin, who did not share Churchill's enthusiasm for military matters, seems to have stumbled on the idea of defense rathr than deterrence by some mysterious thought process of his own." 【Korda, p. 27.】 Baldwin had a two point argument, both moral and cost. It seems that Baldwin's moral sense was outraged by the thought of bombing German civilians and the realization that the Germans would retaliate. Leading to giving more attention to fighters even as defensive aircraft. That is all speculative. It is possibly that fighters were seen as a easier sell to the Labour which was resisting military spending. But what is even ore likely is cost. A fighter could be built for a fraction of the cost of a bomber and without the moral considerations of bombing. And Baldwin' speeches suggest that there was a moral dimension to his defense thinking and not just a cost-based assessment. Baldwin rejected the idea that "... two thousand years after our Lord was crucified, [we] should be spending our time thinking how we can get the mangled bodies of children to hospital and how we can keep gas from the throats of the people." He also expressed concern when 'the bomb no bigger than a walnut' might blow up whole cities. We think Balldwin was sincere about these sentiments, but as one historian points out, it was ' hardly a rousing call to arms staging the evil brewing in Germany. 【Korda, p. 28.】 In fairness to Baldwin, the British public would not have elected any politician or party issuing any such clarion call. Churchill would have lost the 1935 General Election disastrously. Of course it never occurred to Baldwin or chamberlain that the chap on the other side of the Channel might actually want a another war or desire to murder tens of millions of people. Baldwin also had practical concerns about bombers--they were expensive. A fighter could be built for £5,000-10,000. Bombers were much more expensive. At the time the RAF was building two-engine bombers, but the cost of a four engine bomber like the Americans decided to build (and the RAF would eventually require) was exponentially greater, perhaps £50,000-100,000. And the infrastructure needed was also much greater. Unlike the light-weight fighters, bombers required concrete runways and much larger hangers. Another huge increase in cost.
Chamberlain Replaces Baldwin
After domination British politics during the inter-War period, Baldwin resigned (1937). It was a forced resignation. He had lost confidence of the Commons. There was little interest in the military at the time the Wall Street collapsed bringing on the Great Depression (1929). This mean even less interest in military spending. Hitler's seizure of power in Germany, meant that some in Britain began asking about military spending (1933). Baldwin still out of office, pledged that a Conservative government would allow 'no inferiority to any power within striking distance' (1933). 【Korda, pp. 33-34.】 Apparently he was leaving the Americans and Soviets out of the equation. But upon becoming prime-minister Baldwin was faced with the task of explaining how he was wrong about air power. Hitler and Göring had announced the existence of the Luftwaffe shortly before Baldwin took office and that they had achieved parity withe RAF. And of course given the rapid rate of increase, his would soon mean superiority. Baldwin admitted that he was wrong, but that Britain would speed up aircraft production. This was, however, met with disapproval by Conservatives concerned about the NAZIs like Churchill who saw it as too little too-late. Labour was appalled by the the increased defense spending. The still loud pacifist movement was also appalled. The Army and Navy chiefs with very limited budgets were also critical, along with industrial leaders. They complained that throwing so much money and building aircraft so quickly would disrupt industry as well as creating production issues. But this was only one of Baldwin's problems. He also had to fave the abdication crisis, the Ethiopian crisis with allegations of Italy using poison gas worsened by Hoare-Laval crisis, capped by the Rhineland Crisis. Baldwin finally asked the King to send for his erst-while ally Neville Chamberlain. 【Korda, pp. 31.】
British Public Assessment
With their masonry crumbling all about them--the British public remembered how Churchill had warned them in 1935 about an ambassador calling. When the Battle of Britain broke over Britain (1940), all the public remembered was Churchill demanding more aircraft for the RAF with Baldwin and Chamberlain insisting that the situation was not threatening and that Hitler could be reasoned with to achieve 'peace in out time'.
Sources
Churchill, Winston, Never Give in! The Best of Winston Churchill's Speeches. Selected and Edited by his Grandson Winston S. Churchill.The Best of Winston Churchill's Speeches. (London: 2004).
Korda, Mchael. With Wings like Eagles The Untold Story of the Battle of Britain (New york: Harper Perenial, 2002), 319p. This is an excellent account of the Battle of Britain, especially what prepaced the Battle in the 1930s.
Richards, Denis. Hardest Victory: RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War (London: W W Norton & Co Inc, 1994), 393p.
Shirer, William. The Rise of and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960).
Young, Kenneth. Stanley Baldwin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976). 161p.
