Führer Directive 24: Co-operation with Japan (March 5, 1941)


Figure 1.-- Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka who had been a mahot proponent of Japan joining the Axis arrived in Germany soon after the Führer Directive 24 was issued. The issues in the Directive wre discussed with Matsuoka who had been a major proponent of the Strike North Faction and of Japan joining the Axis. The ensuing talks have an aura trality. Matsuoka did not tell Hitler tha hi government had already concluded that they could not launch a Pacific offenive without attacking America. And Hitler did not mntion that he wa about to laubch the greatet offensive in all history.

Führer Directive 24 is a fascinating document because it tells us just how Hitler is thinking about Japan and the dichotomy in Japanese and German thinking. The Dirctive appears to have been issued in prparation for a visit by Japamese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka. For the Japanese the primary concern was the United States, the only country with imprtant naval and air forces in the Pacific. The Germans on the other hand were primary interested in additional pressure on Britain which they naively assumed could be applied without brining America into the War. The two countries were not openly dissussing the war plans with each other. The Japanese did not share their focus on the Americans and the Germans the fact that they were only 2 months away from launching Barbarosa--what was at the time the greatest military assailt in history. Even a glance at the map would tell any one that what should have been dicussed with Japan and a Japanese attack in the Far East. This discussion never took place, incredibly what was discussed was Singapore. This borders on insanity. Incredably, Hitler believed it would be the another short summer campaign. Hitler explains "It is important to defeat England quickly and so keep the United States out of the war, that is our joint object." This is expressed the essential logic needed for a German victory, focusing on one enemy at a time. Yet his actual behaviot was muddled. At the time he was rushing forward with plans for Barbarossa without defeating Britain first. He specifically mentions Singapore. The British bastion was seen as the fulcrum of the British position in Asia. "The capture of Singapore, which is the key position of England in the Far East, would be a decisive achievement in the war effort of the three powers. "Beyond that, attacks on other bases of British sea power - and of American only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented - will serve to shatter the war system of the enemy." Here a basic flaw is revealed in German and Japanese thinking. Hitler saw the Japanese as instrumental in undermining the British Empire. Further Japanese aggression in Asia, however, was likely to bring America in the War, something Hitler had hoped to avoid until first the British and then later the Soviets were defeated. The Japanese in signing the Tripartate Treaty (September 1940) had hoped to disuade America from unfrienfly acts. In fact in hardenened the Roosevelt Administration's policies toward Japan by linking them with the NAZIs. Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka was in Germany at the time Hitler issued this directive. On his way back to Japan through the Soviet Union, he signed a Russo-Japanese Non-aggression Treaty (April 1941). Japan honored the Treaty during the War. But coming as it did just before Barbarossa, the Soviets in declaring War on Japan (August 1945), cited it as an act of treachery.

Hitler Strategic Thinking

Führer Directive 24 is a fascinating document because it tells us just how Hitler is thinking about the strategic situation just as he was about to order the Panzers into the Soviet Union. It also shows the dichotomy in Japanese and German thinking. The Dirctive appears to have been issued in prparation for a visit by Japamese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka. For the Japanese the primary concern was the United States, the only country with imprtant naval and air forces in the Pacific. The Germans on the other hand were primary interested in additional pressure on Britain which they naively assumed could be applied without brining America into the War. The two countries were not openly dissussing the war plans with each other. The Japanese did not share their focus on the Americans and the Germans the fact that they were only 2 months away from launching Barbarosa--what was at the time the greatest military assailt in history. Even a glance at the map would tell any one that what should have been dicussed with Japan and a Japanese attack in the Far East. This discussion never took place, incredibly what was discussed was Singapore. This borders on insanity.

Barbarossa

Incredably, Hitler believed Barbarossa would be the another short summer campaign. Hitler explains "It is important to defeat England quickly and so keep the United States out of the war, that is our joint object." This is expressed the essential logic needed for a German victory, focusing on one enemy at a time. Yet his actual behaviot was muddled. At the time he was rushing forward with plans for Barbarossa without defeating Britain first.

Singapore

He specifically mentions Singapore. The British bastion was seen as the fulcrum of the British position in Asia. "The capture of Singapore, which is the key position of England in the Far East, would be a decisive achievement in the war effort of the three powers. Can you imagine, preparing to plunge into the Soviet Union with the largest military campaign in all of hostory and Hitler was thining about Sinapore, but about as far away from the Eastern Print as you can get.

United States

The Directive read, "Beyond that, attacks on other bases of British sea power - and of American only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented - will serve to shatter the war system of the enemy." Here a basic flaw is revealed in German and Japanese thinking. Hitler saw the Japanese as instrumental in undermining the British Empire. Further Japanese aggression in Asia, however, was likely to bring America in the War, something Hitler had sought to avoid until first the British and then later the Soviets were defeated. The Japanese in signing the Tripartate Treaty (September 1940) had hoped to disuade America from unfrienfly acts. Ironically, Japan joining the Axis only hardened the Roosevelt Administration's policies toward Japan by linking them with the NAZIs. And despite his best efforts, encouraging the Japanese in the Pacific did what bhe was attempting to do--kept the United States out of the War. There is atotal lack of understanding of the Pacific. The focus is on Singapore and no mention of Singapore. There is also no appreciation for the American Pacific Fleet. There is a belief that that the Japanese fleet was stronger, but no real understanding of real naval balance. And the United States had developoed parity bwith Japan after only 6 months of war. The major impact was to cause the United States to very rapidly fully mobukie its huge economy for war and substantial military shipment would soon be flowing to bith the British and Soviets as part of Lend Lease.

Text

Directive No. 24 -- Cooperation With JapanThe Leader has issued the following orders for cooperation with Japan:
1. The purpose of the cooperation based on the Three Power Pact must be to induce Japan to take action in the Far East as soon as possible. This will tie down strong English forces and will divert the main effort of the United States Of America to the Pacific Ocean. In view of the military unpreparedness of her enemies, the sooner Japan strikes, the greater her chances of success. Undertaking Barbarossa establishes particularly promising political and military conditions for this.
2. In preparing for such cooperation it is important to strengthen Japanese fighting spirit by every means. For this purpose Commanders In Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces will respond generously and comprehensively to Japanese requests for information about German experience in the war, and for economic and technical assistance. Reciprocity is desirable but should not impede negotiation. In this respect, priority will naturally be given to those Japanese requests which could have an early effect upon the conduct of the war. The Leader reserves to himself the right to take decisions in special cases.
3. The coordination of the operational plans of the two countries will be the task of the Naval High Command. The following principles will apply:
(a) The common aim of strategy must be represented as the swift conquest of England in order to keep America out of the war. Apart from this, Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which need in any way inhibit Japanese intentions.
(b) The great success attained by Germany in war on merchant shipping makes it appear particularly desirable that powerful Japanese forces should be devoted to the same end. Any possibility of support for the German war on merchant shipping is to be exploited. (c) The position of the three pact powers in respect of raw materials demands that Japan should secure for itself those territories which it needs for the prosecution of the war, particularly if the United States is engaged. Deliveries of rubber must continue even after Japan's entry into the war, since they are vital for Germany. (d) The seizure of Singapore, England's key position in the Far East, would represent a decisive success in the combined strategy of the three powers. Attacks on other English bases -- on American naval bases only if the United States Of America cannot be prevented from entering the war -- are capable of destroying the system of enemy strongpoints in the area and thereby, like attacks on sea communications, of tying down significant forces of all kinds (Australia). A deadline for the opening of operational discussions cannot yet be laid down.
4. The Military Commissions which will be constituted under the Three Power Pact will deal only with those matters which equally affect the three powers. This will apply in the first instance to war against the enemy economy. Details will be arranged by the Chief Commission in cooperation with the High Command Of The Armed Forces.
5. No mention whatever of Undertaking Barbarossa will be made to the Japanese.

The Chief Of The High Command Of The Armed Forces.

Keitel.

Axis Conference: Matsuoka Visit (March 1941)

Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka arrived in Germany soon after the Directive was issued. The issues in the Directive wre discussed with Matsuoka who had been a major proponent of the Strike North Faction and of Japan joining the Axis. The Germans pursued their Singapore idea, but had the idea that Japan could attack the British and Dutch colonies without involving America. The Japanese had already conclude with one look at the map, that they would have to fight the United States. The American Commonwealth of the Philippines wa stride the sea lanes between the Home Islands and the Southern Resource Zone (SRZ)(British and Dutch colonies). Neither the Japanese or the Germans were honest with each other. the Japanese did not let the Germans know that they had alreasy decided that to seize the SRZ they could not bypass the Philippines. And the Germans did not tell the Japanese that they were about to launch the most massive military campaign in history. Apparently keeping war plans secret was the major concern. The lack of trust tells one a great deal about the Axis alliance. Japan had been negotiating a Neutrality Pact with the Soviets. Hitler expressed no reservations. Given that he was about to attack the Soviet Union, he had no cernns about such an agreement. And at this stage he saw Barbarossa as a short summer campaign in which Japanese help was not needed. And German objections might have caused Soviet suspions, especially as the prepatation for Barbarossa had been impossible to hide. On his way back to Japan through the Soviet Union, Matsuoka stopped in Moscow to sign the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty (April 1941). Agter Hitker launched Barbaross, Stalin camme to the conclusion that Matsuoka knew about barbarossa and was part of the subterfuge. Japan honored the Treaty during the War. But coming as it did just before Barbarossa, the Soviets in declaring War on Japan (August 1945), cited it as an act of treachery.





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Created: 7:57 PM 11/9/2012
Last edited: 7:57 PM 11/9/2012