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Both the public and military circles after the War assessed the role of the Germany Navy in the War. Many as a result wondered if Germany should have a navy at all, even the small force allowed by the Versailles Treaty. The Navy survived in part because of the work of the austere Admiral Eric Raeder (1876-1960), a practicing Christian and apolitcal figure. He set about building a highly professional, non-political officer corps. This made a difference in the early Weimar years when the loyalty of the Reichwehr was highly qwuestioinable. Among the many cashiered figures was a young Reinhard Heydrich (1904-42)--one of the most evil figures in the NAZI heirarchy and World War II. Like pre-World War I naval figures, Grand Admiral Raeder wanted a Highseas Fleet of big-gun battleships. While he did not want to divert scarce resources to U-boats, it was Raeder who selected a reluctant Karl Dönitz to head the U-boat force. The Navy managed to do some research on submarines through foreign subsidiaries. There was also some cooperation with the Japanese. The British pursuing a policy of apeasement, signed a naval treaty with the NAZIs (1935). This permitted the Germans to build both battleships and u-boats. At the time the Royal Navy had concluded that ASDAC (SONAR) rendred u-boats obsolete. Hitler's primary interest was in the Wehrmacht. He had little interest or concept in naval warfare. His primary naval thought was that the Royal Navy had the ability to blockade Germany and deny it food and raw material imports. Thus he wrote about the need for Lebensraum in continental Europe (meaning the East) that would make Germany self sufficent in food production. His preferences for gigantism (large weapons) helped conform the German Admiralty's preference for large surface ships. Hitler approved Plan-Z, a secret plan to prepare the Kriegsmarine for war with Britain by 1944. It involved the construction of a massive fleet of capital ships. The launching of Bismarck (1939) was the beginning of what the Germans admirals hoped would be a major naval building program. U-boats were given second priority and thus Germany would enter World War II with a very small, although well trained U-boat fleet.
The Versailles Peace Treaty placed extensive restraints on the Germany Navy. Both the public and military circles after the War assessed the role of the Germany Navy in the War. Many as a result wondered if Germany should have a navy at all, even the small force allowed by the Versailles Treaty. Imperial Germany had devoted sizeable resources to naval construction, yet the Germany Navy did not assist significantly in the German war effort. In fact, it might be argued that the Imperial Navy's U-boats by bringing the United States into the war, sealed the fate of Imperial Germany. Naval mutinies (1917 and 18) help to precipitate revolution in Germany that hekped bring an end to the War. Sailors mutinied in Kiel at the end of the War, preventing a finally sally by the fleet. Sailors on board of three ships from the Third Navy Squadron refused to raise anchor (October 1918).
Under the terms of the Armistice, the High Seas fleet had to be turned over to the Allies. The Germans scuttled
many if the vessels at Scapa Flow rather than turn them over to the British (1919). The mutinies and support for left-wing groups did nothing to improve the Reich masrine's tarnished image. The much reduced Reichmarine under the terms of the Versailles Treaty was not only a skeleton force with a small number of obselete vessels, but it had little popular support. The Weimar Republic’s admirals, however, continued to accept the political thesis of Tirpitz’s belief in sea power and that a powerful navy was a needed instrument of power politics and a symbol of Germany’s position in the world. Admiral Adolf von Trotha support the right-wing Kapp Putsch to overthrow the Weimar Republic (March 1920). This strengthened attitudes at Weimar that Germany should simply do away with its navy. And the Reichmarine engaged in rearmament efforts that were even more blatent than what the Army's efforts. The problem for the Reich marine was that it was very difficult to hide naval construction, especially the construction of big ships. Much of their activities in violation of the Versailles Treaty emerged in the Lohmann scandal (1927). A controversy over the the Reichmarine's new 10,000-ton “pocket battleship” (Panzerschiff) caused further difficulties. The Reichmarine was a military force with little public support that essentially existed for its own national vision which had little support in the Weimar state. The German Navy survived in part because of the work of a new commander--Grand Admiral Raeder (1928). The austere Admiral Eric Raeder (1876-1960) was a practicing Christian and apolitcal figure. He set about building a highly professional, non-political officer corps. This made a difference in the Weimar years when the loyalty of both the Reichmarine and Reichwehr was highly questionable. Raeder did not diagree with the Tirpitz thesis, but he did insist that the Reichmrine stay out of plotics and maintain a pristine public image. Among the many cashiered figures was a young Reinhard Heydrich (1904-42)--one of the most evil figures in the NAZI heirarchy and World War II. Raeder set out creating public support for expanding the fleet beyond the very limited role in Germany’s coastal defense.
The NAZI takeover (1933) provided the resources to buld another sizeable Navy. The Navy was Hitler's third priority, but still substabntial resources were made available to the German Adminralty. The country's naval leadership soon committed itself to a leader it believed had both the desire and will to create a fleet that they had long dreemed of commanding. At first the resources were fairly limited. This was not only because the Kriegsmarine was Hitler's third priority, but because the NAZI rearmament effort was a first desguised and naval construction was the easiest for the British to monitor. Like pre-World War I naval figures, Grand Admiral Raeder wanted a Highseas Fleet of big-gun battleships. While he did not want to divert scarce resources to U-boats, it was Raeder who selected a reluctant Karl Dönitz to head the U-boat force. The Navy managed to do some research on submarines through foreign subsidiaries. There was also some cooperation with the Japanese. The British pursuing a policy of apeasement, signed a naval treaty with the NAZIs (1935). This permitted the Germans to build both battleships and u-boats. At the time the Royal Navy had concluded that ASDAC (SONAR) rendred u-boats obsolete.
The Kriegsmarine admirals until the Munich Crisis (1938) tended to believed that any future military confrontation would not initially be against the British Royal Navy, but more likely either Poland or France. Thus naval construction and planning was thus directed primarily at these two potential adversaries. This believed was partially based on conversations between Raeder and Hitler and the general belief that going to war withoutva major fleet would not make geo-political sense. Hitler's primary interest was in the Wehrmacht. He had little interest or concept in naval warfare. His primary naval thought was that the Royal Navy had the ability to blockade Germany and deny it food and raw material imports. Thus he wrote about the need for Lebensraum in continental Europe (meaning the East) that would make Germany self sufficent in food production. His preferences for gigantism (large weapons) helped conform the German Admiralty's preference for large surface ships. Hitler approved Plan-Z, a secret plan to prepare the Kriegsmarine for war with Britain by 1944. It involved the construction of a massive fleet of capital ships. A possible naval war with one of the major sea powers (America or Britain) was not believed likely before the mid- or late-1940s, by which time the Z-Plan should have been largely completed. The Kreiegsmarine ws put on a war footing during the Munich Crisis, It began to dawn on the German admirals that Hitler was prepared to go to war with Britain and France regardless of the status of naval rearmament. The launching of Bismarck (1939) was the beginning of what the Germans admirals hoped would be a major naval building program. The German Admiralty had to consider the stark realities of another conflict with the Royal Navy. The German admirals still largely believed that a war with Britain was several years away. U-boats were given second priority and thus Germany would enter World War II with a very small, although well trained U-boat fleet.
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