Figure 1.--Austria after World War II received food aid from UNRAA and UNICEF (meaning largely American food aid) as well as directly from the United States. This little boy is impatient for his mlk ration. The U.M. caption read, "A tiny Austrian school boy thrusts his empty cup forward to ask for the hot milk he receives every day, thanks to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). His cup is only one of the many millions throughout the world which UNICEF helps fill with milk and other protective foods."

During the War, NAZI Germany mintained food supplies by seizung food in occupied countries and shipping it to the Reich. This of course ended as NAZI Germany (which included Austria) collapsed. Austrians faced starvation. Another problem for post-War Austria was that some 65 percent Austrian agricultural output and nearly all of its oil field were locatef in the Soviet zone and the Soviets were not motivted to share. This meant that food was simply not available within the Western zones to feed the population. Austrians survived (1945 and 1946) on a near-starvation diet, and daily rations were still under 2,000 calories (until late 1947). [Lewis, p. 142.] And after the stunning failure of Communist candidates in elections, the Soviets set about using their control of domestic food production to take control of the country. Initially UNRRA provided most of the Austrian food relations. UNRRA was a United Nationa Agency, but at this earky stahe, irt mean mostly American food deliveries. UNRRA provided nearly 65 percent of Austrian food rations (March 1946 to June 1947). [Lewis 2000, p. 143.] A drought worsened the situation, reducing both farm harvests and hydroelectric electrical generation which was important in Austria (1946). Chancellor Leopold Figl, who the Soviets grugingly accepted managed to work out a compromise between the Chambers of Labor, Trade and Agriculture (CLTAF) and the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB). This managed to address the food crisis through strict regulation of both food and labor markets. The ÖGB agreed to limit wage increases were limited and the CLTAF limited food prices--beginning a price-wage agreements. This would be the basis for a consensus between elected and non-elected political elites that developed as part of post-war Austrian democracy--the Austrian Social Partnership and Austro-corporatism. [Bischof et al. 1996.] The food situation worsened as a result of the severe winter (1946–47) and a disastrous summer (1947). Potatoes were an important part of the Austrian diet. A relatively small area of agricultural land is suitable for grain farming. And the 1947 potato harvest was only 30 percent of the pre-war harvest. [Lewis, p. 143.] And to make matters worse: UNRRA ended aid shipments, inflation increased, and State Treaty talks failed because of Soviet intransigence. Food simply ran out (April 1947). The government was unable to find the food necessary to distribute needed rations. The result was inevitable. A violent food riot rocked Vienna (May 5). [Lewis, p. 47.] The Communists were responsible for the violent tyrn. After having filed miserabky at the balot box, they rurned to violence, seeing tht Austrians were turning to the West. Another food riot in Bad Ischl turned into a pogrom targeting Jews (August 1947). [Berg, p. 165.] Workers complaining of food shortages stagd strikes British-occupied far western Styria (Novemnber 1947). [Lewis, p. 148.] Chancellor Figl charged that the food riots were a failed communist effort to stage a coup. Historians debate this, but the Communists were clearly trying to stir up troble as Austrians look increasingly to the West. And staged riots were a common mechnisms the Soviets used in both Eastern Europe and Western Europe (France and Italy) to seize power. The differene with the rest of eastern nd cntrl Europe was that in Austria the Western Allies were present. Austria was devestated by the War. Farm production was impaired by labor shortages and the availablity of supllies needed by farmers. The damage to infrastructure meant that it was also difficult for farmers to get food into the cities. The NAZI war economy had operated by seizing food from occupied peoples. As the occupied countries were liberated this was no longer possible and in the last year of the War serious food shortages developed. Austrians survived on a 'near-starvation diet' with daily rations remaining below 2000 calories (1945-46). [Lewis, p. 142.] The division of Austria into occupation zones created problems because the Soviets and Western Allies as in Germany could not reach agreement on occupation policies. Fodd was a particular problem in the Westen occupation zones because some 65 percent of food production came from the Soviet sector. Almost all of the country's oil output was also located in the Soviet sector. Food was very scarce and the economy was shattered. Food had to be supplied to prevent starvation. All consumer goods were in short supply. Unlike the countries occupied by the NAZIS, the Allies did not allow people to starve. UNRAA food supplies and German coal shipments preventefd a total colapse. Adding to the economic problem was a very severe winter (1946–47). This was followed by a failure of the vital potato crop (summer 1947). The harvest was only 30 percent of pre-War levels. [Lewis, p. 143.] This was a disater because potatos were at the time supplying a substantial part of the overll caloric intake. After the very difficult immediate post-War years, the Austrian economy began to recover, albit slowly. The Austrian economy, including the Soviet Property in Austria (USIA enterprises) reached 60 percent of pre-war levels. There was, however, a serious shortage of consumer goods (1947). One assessment reports that production of consumer goods was only slightly over 40 percent of preduction at the time of the Anschluss or 1937. [Lewis 2000, pp. 141–42.] Food was the most serious problem. The Austrian economy by the early 1950s as in Germany was recovering in the Western sectors. Voralberg in the French sector, for example, benefitted from Swiss tourists. The same did not occur in the Soviet sector where economic conditions continued to be very poor. The school photo here is from Schwechat which was near Vienna in the Soviet sector (figure 1). These people couldn't go into Vienna without giving a reason to Soviet occupatiomn authorities and getting permission. Notice that most of the children didn't have shoes. In fact, children's shoes in the Soviet sector were rare. Children might wear them at school and during the class, but the afternoon being free, children often took them off for activities. The rural setting of the school may also be a factor. A reader writes, "In Vienna 1953-55 I never saw school children without shoes, even in Soviet sector. At this time, leather pants (Lederhosen) were rather expensive. Many of these boys are wearing lederhosen which were probably handed down from older brothers bought before the War."

NAZI Food Policy

Germany was a highly industrial country highly dependent on fopd imports. Germany had a large, but inefficent almost totlly non-mechnized farm sector. This affected living standards in rural areas. Hitler was determined to avoid the mistakes of World War I in which food shortages resulting from the Allid naval blockade undermined civilan morale. The farm vote was crucial in being the NAZIs to power. Once appointed Chancellor, Hitler showed no interest in addressing the farm problems and ignored his Minister of Agriculture wwho had helped to create a firm block of support in rural areas for the NAZIs. Hitler's solution of the farm proble was simple--remilitrize and seize the agricultural lands of the East to make the country self suffient in food production. The NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact guaranteed access to Soviet grain before Hitler launched the War. At first mild rartioning system was introduced. POWs, especially French POWs, were used to replace the agricultural work force conscripted for military service. And as Deutsche Whermacht and Blitzkrieg overwealmed one country after another, the Germans exploited those countries to supply the German miitary and civilian population. Little regard was given to the effect on the occupied population even in countries where the Germans were not intent on mass killing. The Germans from the beginning of the War used as a weapon, targeting millions of people with the Hunger Plan as part of their overall plan to change the ethnic map of Europe. German policy was in part designed to ensure food supplies to the German domestic market and in part to kill millions of unwanted people. Rations in the ghettoes were set a starvation levels. Children were among the most vulnerable and began dieing in large numbers. This was not fast enough for Hitler and his SS killing machine. Jews were hunted down relentlessly throughout NAZI occupied Europe and often killed first because they were non-workers. For most children it was just a matter of surviving until the war ended. They could do without many things, but food was not one of them. Many combatant countries ration food. Both Germany and Japan needed to import food to supply their populations. Hitler was molded by Germany's World War I experience. The U-boats again threatened to force Britain out of the War. Hitler was determined that food shortages not be allowed to undermine German home front morale. As a result, the economies of occupied countries were plundered to supply the Reich. Food was rationed in the occupied countries, often at low levels. Commonly workers got higer allocations. In the occuped East, only workers received ration allocations. The Germans denied food to 'non-producers' and populations in intendedto eliminate. Hitler envisioned the East as supplying the Reich with food it needed to procedute the War. As the War progressed, the East barely supplied the needs of the Wehermact fighting there. It proved to be food from the occupied West that supplied the Reich. Adequate food was availble to the German people until Allied Armies had driven the Wehrmacht out of the occupied countries (especially France) and were at the borders of the Reich (fall 1944).

Austrian Food Situation (May 1945)

Exploiting food resources in occupied countries ended as NAZI Germany (which included Austria) collapsed. But that was only part of the problem. Austria was devestated by the War. Farm production was impaired by labor shortages and the availablity of supplies needed by farmers. The damage to infrastructure meant that it was also difficult for farmers to get their food harvest into the cities. In the last year of the War serious food shortages developed throughout the Reich. The Allied strategic bombing campaign distruvction of the transport system worsened the food situation. Austrians survived on a 'near-starvation diet' with daily rations remaining below 2000 calories (1945-46). [Lewis, p. 142.] Food was very scarce and the economy was shattered. Food had to be supplied to prevent starvation. All consumer goods were in short supply.

Soviet Occupation Zone

The division of Austria into occupation zones created problems because the Soviets and Western Allies could not reach agreement on occupation policies. Food was a particular problem in the Westen occupation zones because some 65 percent of food production came from the Soviet sector and the Soviets were not motivted to share. This meant that food was simply not available within the Western zones to feed the population. Almost all of the country's oil output was also located in the Soviet sector. Food was very scarce and the economy was shattered. Food had to be supplied to prevent starvation. All consumer goods were in short supply. Unlike the countries occupied by the NAZIs, the Allies did not allow people to starve. UNRAA food supplies and German coal shipments prevented a total colapse.

Food Situation (1945-46)

Austrians survived (1945 and 1946) on a near-starvation diet, and daily rations were still under 2,000 calories (until late 1947). [Lewis, p. 142.] And after the stunning failure of Communist candidates in elections, the Soviets set about using their control of domestic food production to take control of the country. Initially UNRRA provided most of the Austrian food relations. UNRRA was a United Nationa Agency, but at this early stage in the U.N.'s devlopment, it meant mostly American food deliveries. UNRRA provided nearly 65 percent of Austrian food rations (March 1946 to June 1947). [Lewis 2000, p. 143.] A drought worsened the situation, reducing both farm harvests and hydroelectric electrical generation which was important in Austria (1946). Chancellor Leopold Figl, who the Soviets grugingly accepted, managed to work out a compromise between the Chambers of Labor, Trade and Agriculture (CLTAF) and the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB). This managed to address the food crisis through strict regulation of both food and labor markets. The ÖGB agreed to limit wage increases were limited and the CLTAF limited food prices--beginning a price-wage agreements. This would be the basis for a consensus between elected and non-elected political elites that developed as part of post-war Austrian democracy--the Austrian Social Partnership and Austro-corporatism. [Bischof et al. 1996.]

Food Crisis (1947)

UNRRA played a major role in feeding the Austrians immedistely after the war. Nearly 65 percent of Austrian food rations were provided by UNRRA (March 1946-June 1947). [Lewis. p. 143.] The food situation worsened with adverse weather and the failure of the 1947 pototo crop. Potataos were the most important food crop in Austria and a mjor part of the Austrian diet. A relatively small area of agricultural land is suitable for grain farming. The harvest was only 30 percent of pre-War levels. [Lewis, p. 143.] This was a disater because potatos were at the time supplying a substantial part of the overll caloric intake. The failure of the crop meant real food problems -- the 1947-48 food shortages. And to make matters worse: UNRRA ended aid shipments, inflation increased, and State Treaty talks failed because of Soviet intransigence. [Lewis, p. 143.] The situation got so bad that the government was unable to distribute any rations at all (April 1947). Food simply ran out (April 1947). The government was unable to find the food necessary to distribute needed rations. The capital was badly shaken by a violent food riot (May 5). [Lewis, p. 147.] The Communists led the demonstration and despite the serious food situation, the demonsrators protested the westernization of Austrian politics--meaning democratic trends. [Lewis, p. 148.] Unlike terest of Aystrua, there was some Communist suooort n Vienna. The Communists were responsible for the violent turn. After having filed miserably at the balot box, they rurned to violence, seeing tht Austrians were turning to the West. Chancellor Figl charged that the food riots were a failed communist effort to stage a coup. Historians debate this, but the Communists were clearly trying to stir up troble as Austrians look increasingly to the West. And staged riots were a common mechanism the Soviets used in both Eastern Europe and Western Europe (France and Italy) to seize power. The differene with the rest of eastern nd central Europe was that in Austria the Western Allies were present. A food riot in Bad Ischl turned into a pogrom of local Jews (August). [Berg, p. 165.] Food shortage sparked workers' strikes in Styria in the British-occupatuon zone. [Lewis, p. 148.] Chncellor Figl charged that the food riots were an attempted Communist coup. Unlike Prague and other Eastern European capitals, the Communists did not have a monopily on the security forces. And large numbers of people felt free to express their oposition to both Communist and Soviet control. Several historians suggest that Figl was exagerating, but there seems little doubt that the Communists were active. [Bischof, p. 178 and Lewis, p.148.]

Allied Food Shipments

Unlike the countries occupied by the NAZIS, the Allies did not allow people to starve. UNRAA food supplies and German coal shipments preventefd a total collapse. The Uited States stepped in when UNRRA discontinued food aid (June 1947). The U.S. government provided $300 million in food aid. In the same month, U.S. diplomats invited the Austrians Governent to discuss participation in the Marshall Plan. [Lewis, p. 146.] American aid and subsidies helped Austrians to get through the terrible hunger of 1947. It also is aood example of the double-edged sword of food relief.

Sources

Bischof, Günter. "Allied plans and policies for the occupation of Austria, 1938–1955," in: Steininger, Rolf et al. Austria in the Twentieth Century (Transaction Publishers: 2009), pp. 162–189.

Gimbel, John. The Origins of the Marshall Plan (Stanford University Press: 1976).

Lewis, Jill. "Dancing on a Tight Rope: The Beginning of the Marshall Plan," in Gunther Bischof, et al. The Marshall Plan in Austria (Transaction Publishers: 2000), pp. 138–55.

Created: 4:22 AM 2/13/2014
Last updated: 8:17 PM 12/5/2018