Figure 1.-- |
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The 8th Air Force during last week of February 1944 staged Operation Argument which has become to be called "Big Week". The primary target was Germany's aircraft industry. The 8th Air Force attacks were coordinated with 15th Air Force strikes from the south. Despite the losses in January, the Americans were determined to strike in force again. Plans were made for the 8th Air Force's massive force of 3,800 B-17 and B-24 heavy bomber, but had to be delayed by the clouds and snowy Winter weather. When the weather broke February 19 offering clear skies over Germany. Spaatz ordered "Let 'em go." The Eighth Air Force smashed at NAZI Germany with more than 1,000 bombers on the first day of the operation (January 20). There were 12 major targets in Germany and western Poland, areas annxed to the Reich. More escort groups were available.The bombers were accompanied by almost equal numbers of escorts (American P-38s, P-47s, P-5a as well as British Spitfires). The P-47s this time had dual wing tanks rather than a single fuselage tanks and were more effective than with earlier attempts to extend its range. American commanders were under no illusions about the potential cost. Estimates were as high as 200 bombers for the first day. The Luftwaffe contested the raids as hotly as they had in January. Surprisingly only 21 bombers were lost on the first day. During the operation the Americans flew 3,800 sorties whuch included 500 by the 15th Air Force. There were 10,000 tons of bombs deopped which was about the same as the 8th Air Force had dropped in its entire first year of operations. The bombers destroyed or damaged about of Germany's aircradft plants. About a third of the Luftwaffe's ME-109s were built at Leipzig. Strikes there destroyed 350 planes on the ground as well as hundrededs of others still on the assembly line. Also hard hit was the ME-110 plant at Gotha. JU-88 plants at Aschersleben and Bernburg were also severely damaged. The cost was high, 226 bombers and 28 fighters. This was, however, what some American analysts thought might be lost on just the first day. The Germans were able to rebuild damaged plants and more importantly disperse production more quickly than anticipated. Even so, Big Week was the turning point of the war in the air. The Luftwaffe was severely damaged. The bombers and escorts shot down large numbers of Luftwaffe planes. One source indicated 225 pilots and aircrew killed or missing and 141 wounded. Another source reports nearly 600 Luftwaffe fighters were shot down and almost 1,000 pilots and air crew were killed or wounded. The American losses were much higher--2,600 killed, wounded, or missing aircrews. The difference was that most of the German losses were highly trained pilot, and unlike the Americans, the Germans did not have a massive program underway to rapidly train pilots. The German losses were about 10 percent of the pilot force available to the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe was never to recover. Not only did American bomber losses decline after Big Week, but the Luftwaffe was no longer able to maintain a credible preence at its forward airbases in France. When D-Day came in June, there was virtually no Luftwaffe opposition to the invasion armada. [Goodwin, p. 488.]
The popular conception of the air war in Europe, especially the strategic bombing campaign, was that it was all about destroying German war industries or in the case of the British, German morale. That was certainly part of it. But the larger issue was air superority over Europe and the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Just as the Germans could not invade Bitain in 1940 without first gaining air superority, the Allies could not cross the Channel in 1944 without gaining air superority. This is why such a high priority in targeting were the aircraft plants and factories associated with the aircraft industry. The simple fact was that without smashing the Luftwaffe and achieving air superiority, the D-Day invasion and the liberation of Europe was impossible. This is a simple fact that those who want to assess the effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign and rhe moral issues as well need to consider. Attacking German industry meant attacking the cities because this was where industry was located. (German workers did not have cars and thus needed to live near the factories.) Attacking the cities and indudstry meant that the Luftwaffe had to come up and once the Allies escorts (primarily American P-51s) were with the bomber streams, the Luftwaffe had a fight for its life.
The 8th Air Force during last week of February 1944 staged Operation Argument which has become to be called "Big Week". Despite the losses in January, the Americans were determined to strike in force again. Plans were made for the 8th Air Force's massive force of 3,800 B-17 and B-24 heavy bomber. Thenumbers were significant. The Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain launched raid that commonly were less than 100 planes, and these were meiym bombers with small bomb loads. The air armada launched against the Reich was unprcedente in the World ar II air war. The 8th Air Force attacks were coordinated with 15th Air Force strikes from the south.
THe Americans were attacking the mosy heavily defended air space in theworld in broad day light.
The primary target on the ground were at first Germany's aircraft industry and U-boat facilities (1042-43). The ultimate target once escorts into the Reich became availavle (December 1943) was the Luftwaffe which would have to rise to confront the Allied bombers. Otherwise the aircraft industry that sustained them be destroyed. The Luftwaffe was also under enormous pressure from the Führer and the NAZI hierarchy to defeat the bombing campaign. Luftwaffee choef, Herman Göring, had lost much of his influence with the Führer, and with the Allied bombers turning German cities into vast piles of rubble, what ever remained of Hitler's respect was eroded. As the Allies gained the upperhand in the North Atlantic, the focus shifted more to the aircraft industry. And then as the Allies began to severely degrade the Luftwaffe, an increasing effort was directed at Germany's petroleum industry. As the Allies hammered Poloesti and the Red Army drove into the Balkans, the Whermacht, including the Luftwaff, experienced increasing problems with fuel shortages. Germny was becoming increasingly dependent on its domestic production, primarily from synthetic fuel plants. These plants became increasingly important targets.
The 8th Air Force had to delay its follow up raid by the clouds anf snowy Winter weather. When the weather broke February 19 offering clear skies over Germany. Spaatz ordered "Let 'em go." He was releasing the largest bombing campaign of the WAr.
The Eighth Air Force smashed at NAZI Germany with more than 1,000 bombers on the first day of the operation (January 20). There were 12 major targets in Germany and western Poland, areas annxed to the Reich. More escort groups were available.The bombers were accompanied by almost equal numbers of escorts (American P-38s, P-47s, P-5a as well as British Spitfires). The P-47s this time had dual wing tanks rather than a single fuselage tanks and were more effective than with earlier attempts to extend its range. American commanders were under no illusions about the potential cost. Estimates were as high as 200 bombers for the first day. The Luftwaffe contested the raids as hotly as they had in January. Surprisingly only 21 bombers were lost on the first day.
The German resitance gradually declined day by day. By the final day of Big Week the Germam fighter defense were ineffucual The air crews who had battle the Lufwaffe for more than a year were amazzed. One author writes, "'We kept watching and gradually it became clear to us that if an air battle was taking olace, it mist be an extremely compressed affairf, because few aircraft ever burst through the top of the cloud and those dew were friendly,' Kuter lter recalled. 'Not only that, the radio prouced none of the usual German air controller's battle directions. E knew then that we were right. The air was full of American and British fighters. Columns of Flying Fortresses stretched back to Engkand as far as the eyecould follow. We had over 1,800 "heavis" over France that morning. The Hun never showed up. He couldn't because he had nothing left.His bluff ha been called.'" [Yenne]
During the operation the Americans flew 3,800 sorties whuch included 500 by the 15th Air Force. There were 10,000 tons of bombs deopped which was about the same as the 8th Air Force had dropped in its entire first year of operations.
The bombers destroyed or damaged about ???? of Germany's aircraft plants. About a third of the Luftwaffe's ME-109s were built at Leipzig. Strikes there destroyed 350 planes on the ground as well as hundrededs of others still on the assembly line. Also hard hit was the ME-110 plant at Gotha. JU-88 plants at Aschersleben and Bernburg were also severely damaged.
The cost to the Americans was high, 226 bombers and 28 fighters. This was, however, what some American analysts thought might be lost on just the first day.
The Luftwaffe was severely damaged. The bombers and escorts shot down large numbers of Luftwaffe planes. One source indicated 225 pilots and aircrew killed or missing and 141 wounded. Another source reports nearly 600 Luftwaffe fighters were shot down and almost 1,000 pilots and air crew were killed or wounded. The American losses were much higher--2,600 killed, wounded, or missing aircrews. The difference was that most of the German losses were highly trained pilot, and unlike the Americans, the Germans did not have a massive program underway to rapidly train pilots. The German losses were about 10 percent of the pilot force available to the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe was never to recover.
The Germans were able to rebuild damaged plants and more importantly disperse production more quickly than anticipated. Even so, Big Week was the turning point of the war un the air. Not only did American bomber losses decline after Big Week, but the Luftwaffe was no longer able to maintain a credible preence at its forward airbases in France. When D-Day came in June, there was virtually no Luftwaffe opposition to the invasion armada. [Goodwin, p. 488.]
Goowwin, Dorris Kearns. No Ordinary Time. Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1994), 759p.
Yenne, Bill. Big Week: Six Days that Changed the Course of World War II (2012).
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