Figure 1.--This was Berlin at the end of the War. This photograph was taken by a Canadian soldier somewhere in Berlin during Summer 1945. The damae in Berlin was caused primarily by the Allied bombardment, but apocalyptic Battle of Berlin also caused a great deal of damage.

The narrator of Dr. Faustus looks around at the pulverized cities with anguish. "But I can not allow myself to forget that as terrible though German defeat is, it is nothing compared to the horror of German victory."

-- Thomas Mann, author

Military historians still debate the effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign. Here the debates concerns the earlier phases of the campaign. There is little doubt that in the later phases of the campaign that German industrial production was affected and the mobility and effectiveness of the German war machine shattered. Any assessment of the Allied bombing campaign has to ask the question of how much more the Germans could have expanded production had it not been for the bombing. The bombing significantly clearly disrupted the economy and the ability of the NAZIs to pursue their development of new weapons. There is no doubt that German civilians paid a heavy price for Hitler's war. The cost to civilians was very extraordinarily high. Over 130 German cities were literally flattened. There is no exact accounting. Estimates range from 0.3-0.6 million killed. Countless others were injured and 7.5 million people were left homeless. Even these losses, however, were a fraction of the approximately 12 million people who the NAZIs murdered in concentration camps and death camps and even a smaller proportion of those the NAZIs had slated for death or a life of slave labor. Luftwaffe Chief Göring is reported to have said that he first realized that the War was lost when he first saw the American P-51s over Berlin. The strategic bombing campaign was a major force in the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Berlin and other major cities by 1945 were wastelands of rubble. German war production was finally affected, not only because of the damage to industrial cities, but because the Allies targeted Germany's production of fuel and the transportation system. The Romanian Ploesti oil field were targeted as well as synthetic fuel plants in Germany itself. About one-third of Germany industry depended on these plants. Most of the Luftwaffe's fuel came from them. 【Hillgruber, p. 420ff.】 The transportation system, another major target, was destroyed. By the end of the War many German units were reduced to using horse drawn carts. Germany quite simply could no longer wage war. Some historians motivated by ideology more than facts claim that the strategic bombing campaign did not work. This is simply inaccurate. It did work. The cost in men and material was enormous and it took until late-1944 to mortally wound the NAZI war economy. The morality can be questioned, In the end, however, the strategic bombing campaign did work. Germany by the end of the War was also no longer a modern industrial nation. The future of the country was now in the hands of the Soviets and Western Allies.

Allied Forces

The two Allied countries that conducted the Allied strategic bombing campaign in Europe were the Americans and the British. The Royal Air Force at the time of World War War was dominated by Bomber Command. Much of the limited finding available was poured into Bomber Command. The thinking was that this would be a detergent to he Germans, especially after Hitler and the NAZIs seized control of Germany (1933). The British built several different types of bombers, all two-engine medium bombers The only exception was a single engine light bomber which was a complete disaster. Part of the RAF's thinking was that long-range heavy bombers were not needed because easier to manufacture medium bombers could be operated from French air fields. This was, however, not coordinated with the French who wanted no part of bombing--knowing that the Germans would retaliate. Now while Bomber Command had a substantial bombing force, no real attention was given to navigation. When day-light runs proved suicidal, the RAF turned to night bomb using celestial navigation. This was largely untested and proved unreliable if not impossible. British bombers had trouble finding cities, let alone real targets. After the fall of France (June 1940), two matters became clear. First, he only way of striking back at NAZI Germany for the foreseeable future would be strategic bombing. Second, because of German fighter defenses. Half of the British war economy would be devoted to the Air War. And because if the Blitz, it would be a no-hold bared campaign targeting Germany's industrial cities. The primary instrument would be the Avro-Lancaster which became available, albeit in small numbers (mid-1942). There was also the Handley-Page Halifax which Air Marshall Harris detested. The British did not think day-light raids were possible and warned the Americans. German night fighters became increasing effective. In fact Bomber Command with mostly night-time raids suffered heavier casualties than the Americans bombing during the day. The Army Air Corps (AAC) was organizationally part of the Army. Despite this the AAC, like the RAF, was dominated by the Bomber Boys. And even though there were severe budgetary restrictions, at the start of the War (September 1939), the Americans were the only country with a long range, heavy (four engine) bomber--the B-17 Flying Fortress. Congressional spending limitations meant only a small number had actually been built. When the War erupted in Europe, America declared itself neutral -- sort of. The United States even before the entering the War provided vast quantities of supplies and equipment, including aviation fuel and military aircraft to Britain, most notably the long range reconnaissance Catalina, used in the Battle of he Atlantic, but no bombers. (It was a Catalina with an American trainer co-pilot that found Bismarck (May 1941). After Pearl Harbor all this changed. There were no longer spending limitations. The spending tap was full on. Production of all aircraft rapidly increased. The Eighth Air Force, the Mighty Eighth, was established only weeks after Pearl Harbor in Britain (January 1942) and began to build up its force. A new heavy bomber, the B-24 Liberator, was added to the American inventory. At the Casablanca Conference, President Roosevelt and Prime-Minister Churchill issued the Casablanca Directive -- Allied Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) around the clock bombing of Germany (January 1943). British Bomber Command was already bombing he Reich, but now the Americans joined in the campaign. American factories were just beginning to build bombers in numbers and trained crews were just beginning to flow from training camp operate and it would take about a year before the Americans began to actually strike at the Reich, let alone match RAF tonnage dropped. The 8thAir Force in Britain was the principal force, but after the Allies invaded Italy (September 1943), the 15th Ar Force moved into already existing bases in southern Italy and joined the campaign. France had multiple bomber types, including medium bombers like the LeO 451 and Amiot 143, although their numbers and operational impact were limited after France fell to the Germans. . French commanders had little interest in bombers, knowing that if they bombed Germany, Germany would bomb them. Their chief interest was in limiting the war, and they paid for it. The Sovets had a large air force, but built few bombers. Their primary interest was fighters and ground attack aircraft. ,

Phases of the Battle

It order to assess the effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign, one has to understand the phases of the battle. There was no heavy bombing of German cities for the first 2 years of the War. The British did not have the planes with range of reach the Reich in any numbers. Only when Bomber Command began receiving the heavy Avro Lancaster bomber did the bombing command begin in earnest (1942). The British only bombed at night because of German air defenses. The American 8th Air Force joined them with daylight raids (1943). But even with the around-the clock British and American bombing results were disappointing. The number of bombers were still limited and were not escorted. This meant bombing operations were affected and the bombers suffered terrible losses. The final phase of the strategic bombing campaign began with the arrival of the P-51 Mustang escorts (December 1943). The Luftwaffe fighters coming up to attack the bombers were shot out of the skies (early 1944). In only a few months the Luftwaffe was essentially destroyed. Before the weight of the increasing number of American and British bombers could be brought bear on German war industries, Ge. Eisenhower ordered the Bomber Boys to redirect their efforts to the Transportation Plan, cutting the German Atlantic Wall forces off from the war industries of the Reich in preparation for D-Day. They were not fully released until (September). But even before this increasingly heavy raidf began to tear the heart out of Geraman war industry and to destroy the German transportation system. and German arms production plummeted.

Early Phase (1939-41)

We now know a great deal about the capabilities and limits of air power. This is not information that was available to Axis and Allied air planners. World War II was the first major conflict in which strategic air forces made a significant contribution. Thus the many mistakes were made by commanders in how to employ air assets. Also information on NAZI Germany was not easy to come by. The fog of war and the desire to seek revenge were factors that clouded judgement. The inaccuracy of World War II bombing is another complicating factor. Thus many of the criticisms of the strategic bombing campaign can find plenty to criticize. It should be stressed, however, that the ineffectiveness of the early bombing campaign does not prove that the overall campaign was not effective. The French did not permit the British to bomb German targets during the Phony War (September 1939-April 1940). After the fall of France (June 1940), Bomber Command did not have aircraft capable pf reaching Germany in any numbers.

Second Phase (1942-43)

Only when Bomber Command began receiving the heavy Avro Lancaster bomber did the bombing campaign begin in earnest (1942). The British only bombed at might because of German air defenses. The American 8th Air Force joined them with daylight raids (1943). But even with the around-the clock British and American bombing results were disappointing. The number of bombers were still limited and were not escorted. In addition the American bomber defensive gunnery was not well conceived. This meant bombing operations were affected and the bombers suffered terrible losses. In addition the German night fighters were becoming increasingly effective.

Final Phase

The final phase of the strategic bombing campaign began with the arrival of the P-51 Mustang escorts (December 1943). The Luftwaffe fighters coming up to attack the bombers were shot out of the skies (early 1944). In only a few months the Luftwaffe was essentially destroyed. Before the weight of the increasing number of American and British could be brought bear on German war industries, Ge. Eisenhower ordered the Bomber Boys to redirect their efforts to the Transportation Plan, cutting the Atlantic Wall forces off from the war industries of the Reich in preparation for D-Day. The bombers were not fully released until (September). Nut even before this increasingly heavy raid began to tear the heart out of German war industry and to destroy the German transportation system. German ar production plummeted. There is little doubt that in the later phases of the campaign that the strategic bombing campaign was ultimately very effective. The campaign shattered German industrial production, destroyed the German petroleum industry. This affected and the mobility and effectiveness of the German war machine. These achievements came late in the War. The most important and the first major achievement of the strategic air campaign destroyed the Luftwaffe. This accomplishment made D-Day possible. Without it D-Day could not have succeeded.

Results

Military historians still debate the effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign. Here the debates concerns the earlier phases of the campaign. Some critics have charged that the air war was not only costly, but largely ineffective. One analyst charges that the strategic bombing campaign was "the clumsiest, most brutal and most wasteful of all forms of warfare". 【Falls】 Other authors agree. One author with the perspective of time agrees with Falls. He focuses on the moral issues, but also claims that the strategic bombing campaign was ineffective. 【Grayling】 These authors reach this conclusion only by carefully selecting their facts and by a lack of understanding of the military campaigns of World War II. There is no doubt that the early phase of the strategic bombing campaign was ineffective. The accomplishments of Bomber Command and the U.S. army Air Forces in the later phase of the war is a very different matter.

Casualties

Aerial warfare was conceived in the inter-war period as a way to fight and win a war without the terrible losses experienced n World War I trench warfare. While it is true that battlefield casualties in World War II were less than those experienced in World War I, the air war was a major area of operations with very significant casualties. The RAF in World War II lost 79,000 men, more than half or 44,000 killed serving in Bomber Command. These losses were greater than experienced by the British Army landing in Normandy, liberating France and the Low countries, and invading Germany itself. They were, however, a fraction of the carnage on the Western Front during World War I when battles like the Somme and Verdun chewed up manpower at a horrifying rate. Some 150,000 Allied soldiers were killed at the Somme--jut one of the Western Front battles. Even more were Allied soldiers were killed at Verdun. There is no precise accounting of Germans civilians killed as a result of the Allied strategic bombing campaign. Estimates vary. We have seen estimates ranging from 0.3-0.7 million Germans. While huge numbers, when you look at the horrendous destruction of German cities, one can not help but wonder why more Germans were not killed. The reason of course is the efficiency of the German Civil Defense program. The bombing destroyed or seriously damaged some 6 million homes. German industry which was located almost entirely in the cities, was devastated.

Destruction of the Luftwaffe

from an assessment of the Strategic Bombing Campaign is the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Until 1944 the Luftwaffe was an important force. Much of the force was withdrawn to the Reich to defend German cities. And the Luftwaffe savaged Allied bombers throughout 1943 with relatively limited losses. This change in 1944 with the appearance of the P-51 to escort the bombers on raids into the Reich. The Luftwaffe had to raise to engage the bombers as German cities were being bombed into ruins. This included factories producing the Luftwaffe's planes. And the P-51 Pilots were ordered on their way home to come down to the low levels at hit Luftwaffe air fields to destroy the planes that did not rise to do battle. As a result of battles in early 1944 (January-May 1944), the Luftwaffe was essentially destroyed as an important military force. This is why the D-Day invasion went forward without German air opposition (June 1944).

Diversion of Resources

The Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign also forced the Germans to divert resources from the Ostkrieg, the decisive campaign of the War. The most obvious diversion is that Luftwaffe squadrons were withdrawn from the Eastern Front to protect German cities. A less obvious diversion is the huge amount of artillery and ammunition deployed and used around German cities in vast FLAK en placements. Massive numbers of 88s and other artillery pointed up at the Allied bombers and were not on the Eastern Front stopping Soviet tanks or along the Atlantic Wall preparing to block the Allied invasion. And this was at a time when German war production was a fraction of the production of the Allies.

Counter-measures

As the bombing intensified, the Germans adjusted. They took a range of counter measures. The Germans in addition to military measures to stop the Allied bombing, the Germans led by Armaments Minister Speer. There were three major efforts made to protect war plants, none of which in the end solved the problem. The first adjustment was to decentralize production. Instead of having one large plant as America developed to mass produce weapons, the Germans began breaking down production into modular parts. Creating a large number of small plants meant that the Allies were confronted with a much more difficult problem of finding and hitting many small targets instead of one big, easy to find target. There were, however, problem associated with this effort. The Germans lost the advantages of mass production. It also increased the reliance on a transport system that could be targeted, not to mention the problem of food shortages. And there were was the increased he problem of tolerances. The parts did not always fit together perfectly. This proved to be a major problem with the advanced Type 21 U-boat. The assemblers couldn't get the parts to fit together. The second adjustment was to go underground. This was a very difficult undertaking carving out underground tunnels. Thus it was only used for high priority weapons, like the V-weapons. But again there was the problem of transport. the V-weapons. And underground production did not solve the transport problem. The third adjustment was camouflage. This was used for large plants that could not be broken up into small steps, like the critically important synfuel plants. The Americans were the primary force to strike at the transport nodes because they bombed during the day when it was possible to acquire specific targets. With the defeat of the Luftwaffe, the bombers needed less cover. The P-51 escorts were given orders the come down to the deck they began to hit trains and barges and other smaller targets. By the end of the War, the once impressive German transport system essentially no longer existed.

Civilians

The air war brought the war home to Germany in a way that had not occurred in World War I. he Germans wreaked massive destruction in neighboring countries while Germany itself was little touched. There is no precise accounting of Germans killed as a result of the Allied strategic bombing campaign. Estimates vary. We have seen estimates ranging from about 0.3-0.7 million Germans. There are no exact numbers, in part because of the devastation of cities like Hamburg and Dresden was so horrific. In addition, German social services began to come apart when the bombing reached its peak levels (1944-45). One of the most creditable estimates was prepared by the German Government and estimated 370,000 Germans. 【German Armed Forces Military History Research Office, p. 460.】 While this is an estimate, it is unlikely to be off by more than 100,000 either way. This puts it square in the center of our 0.3-0.7 million estimate. We have seen higher numbers, but not well documented by respected historians. Most estimates used by historians fall within the 0.3-0.6 million range. While certainly huge numbers, when you look at the destruction of German cities, one can not help but wonder why more Germans were not killed. The reason of course is the efficiency of the German Civil Defense program. In addition to Germans killed in the bombing, an unknown numbers of foreign workers, including slave laborers. They were denied access to the German bomb shelters as were Jews. Readers should be careful when interpreting data on civilian casualties. German civilian casualties are not the same as bombing casualties. There were civilians killed in the fighting, both German civilians as well as ethnic Germans in occupied countries. In addition the NAZI Government killed large numbers of its own civilians, these included Jews, Roma, political opponents, and the handicapped killed as part of the T-4 program. The bombing destroyed or seriously damaged some 6 million homes.

German War Industries

German industry which was located almost entirely in the cities, was devastated. Luftwaffe Chief Göring is reported to have said that he first realized that the War was lost when he first saw the American P-51s over Berlin. The strategic bombing campaign was a major force in the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Berlin and other major cities by 1945 were wastelands of rubble. Often sited to prove that the strategic bombing campaign failed is that German war production increased in 1943 and 194 until about November. This is true. But it increased because Germany in 1941 was still not mobilized for War to the same extent as the Soviet Union, Britain, and America. Armament Minister Albert Speer rationalized German war industries and was able to increase production. The question that should be asked is to what extent could production be increased without the bombing. The Germans maintained production by decriminalizing production and moving underground, but this adversely affected both the quality and quantity of production as well as putting added strain on the transport system. Also rarely mentioned is what German industry was producing. It is important to assess mot only what the Germans were producing, but what they were NOT producing. They were not turning out the very effective Wonder Weapons that German propaganda was trumpeting. These weapons did exist, they had been developed, and they were highly effective, but the Germans just could not produce them, in large part because of the bombing. What came out of German aircraft plants, for example, were the obsolete Me-109s and FW-190s, not the marvelous jets, either the Me-262 jets and the second generation of German jets. Almost none of the new advanced Type 2 U-boats never entered combat. The bombing of Peenamünde set the German missile program back months. Assessments of German war production show that German industry did not begin to collapse until late 1944. And that production actually increased in 1943. This is because the NAZIs despite their image never fully mobilized the German economy for war. Hitler was concerned about the impact on German morale. There was a great deal of slack in the economy. Speer finally began to fully utilize the economy which is why production increased. Any assessment of the Allied bombing campaign has to ask the question of how much more the Germans could have expanded production had it not been for the bombing. The bombing significantly disrupted the economy and the ability of the NAZIs to pursue their development of new weapons. Some critics say that the Strategic Bombing Campaign failed because it did not absolutely destroy German war production. While this is true, it is also true that the Campaign disrupted the German war economy and without it that war production could have been much higher. 【Wells】

Petroleum Industry

The greatest weakness in the German war economy was petroleum. Early in the War the Soviets delivered oil under the terms of the NAZI-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (1939). The Germans relied heavily on the Ploesti oil fields in Romania. The major domestic source was coal gassification plants. There is no doubt that more attention should have been directed at these plants. They were, however, hard, well protected targets,mostly in eastern Germany. Targeting these sites in force only became feasible with the introduction of P-51 escorts. Major bombing The destruction of these plants and the resulting fuel shortage greatly impaired Luftwaffe operations and even more importantly the Wehrmacht. The major factor in the German successes early in the War was the Wehrmacht's mobility. This was an advantage lot after America entered the War in both the East and West. German war production was finally affected, not only because of the damage to industrial cities, but because the Allies targeted Germany's petroleum sources. The Romanian Ploesti oil field were targeted as well as synthetic fuel plants in Germany itself. About one-third of Germany industry depended on these plants. Most of the Luftwaffe's fuel came from them. 【Hillgruber, p. 420ff.】 Without fuel, the Wehrmacht not only lost many of its advantages. but was essentially immobile. This was a major factor in the failure of the Bulge Offensive (December 1944). German troops were issued siphoning hoses in the hope that they could use the fuel from overrun American positions and seize important fuel dumps. 【Wells} Panzer units in a number of cases had to abandon their tanks when they ran out of fuel.

Transportation System

The transportation system, another major target, was destroyed. The bombers had destroyed cities and the transport hubs in the cities. With the Luftwaffe destroyed, the P-51 escorts came down to the desk and attacked everything thing that moved, including trains, barges, and trucks. The factories that still existed had no way of obtaining raw materials or the transport finished goods. By the end of the War many German units were reduced to using horse drawn carts. And Germany's impressive rail system was largely destroyed, brining the transport of goods, even food into the cities to a standstill.

Cost

Aerial warfare was conceived in the inter-war period as a way to fight and win a war without the terrible losses experienced n World War I trench warfare. While it is true that battlefield casualties in World War I were less than those experienced in World War II, the air war was a major area of operations with very significant casualties. The RAF in World War II lost 79,000 men, more than half or 44,000 killed serving in Bomber Command. These losses were greater than experienced by the British Army in the D-Day Normandy landings, liberating France and the Low countries, and invading Germany itself. They were, however, a fraction of the carnage on the Western Front during World War I when battles like the Somme and Verdun chewed up manpower at a horrifying rate. Some 150,000 Allied soldiers were killed at the Somme--jut one of the Western Front battles. Even more were Allied soldiers, mostly French, were killed at Verdun. The human cost of course is only part of the price paid. the major part of the war economy fir America, Britain, and Germany was air power. And for America and Britain, the principal expenditures was strategic bombing. You have to consider what the net impact was considering the massive cost. Could the resources have been better deployed. Here it is difficult to see how the resources could have been better deployed. America not only produced the material for war in epic quantities. The American Army was the best supplied force in the history of warfare. Bot only was the American soldier better fed and supplies than any other soldier, but America helped supply and equip its Allies, especially the British and Soviets. (Compare this with the disastrous way that Germany equipped its allies.) We simply do not know of any significant alternatives there were to air war. And expanded ground war not only would have increased casualties significantly, but it would have reduced production by taking trained workers out if the factories. This is why Gen. Marshal settled on the 90 Division Gamble, to maintain the industrial production levels of the Arsenal of Democracy.

Conclusion

Germany quite simply could no longer wage war. Some historians motivated by ideology more than facts claim that the strategic bombing campaign did not work. This is simply inaccurate. It did work. The cost in men and material was enormous and it took until late-1944 to mortally wound the NAZI war economy. The morality can be questioned, In the end, however, the strategic bombing campaign did work. Germany by the end of the War was also no longer a modern industrial nation. The future of the country was now in the hands of the Soviets and Western Allies.

Sources

Falls, J.F. Cyril. The Second World War 1939-45 (Duell, Sloan and Pearce: New York, 1949).

German Armed Forces Military History Research Office (an agency of the German government). Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Bd. 9/1.

Grayling, A.C. Among the Dead Cities.

Hillgruber, Andreas. Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegführung 1940 bis 1941 (Frankfurt am Main, 1965).

Wells, Mark. Lecture on the strategic bombing campaign. U.S. Air Force Academy. Broadcasted on C-Span (2015).

Created: 7:00 PM 1/9/2008
Last updated: 4:10 AM 10/4/2026