Figure 1.--Military analysts in the inter-war period debated the potential impact of strtegic bombing. Some thought that bombing a opponents' cities would quickly destroy the wiil to resist. Air power proved critical in the War, but its impact proved much more complicated. One development that surprised many proponents of strategic bombing was the recsiliancy of civilian populations in many countries and their determination to resist when properly prepared.

The air plane was first used in any significant way in warfare during World War I. It was used primarily used in tactical operations. The Germans launched small-scale bombing raids on British cities. Allied retaliatory plans were in place to begin the strategic bombing of Germamy in 1919, but the War ended before this began. After the War, military analysts theorized as to the possible military impact of strategic bombing. British Prime-Minister Baldwin popularized the idea that 'the bomber will always get through'. The idea terrified Europeans, but no one in fact knew about the actual military impact. Both the Axis and Allied powers believed that terror bombing campaigns would undermine civilian moral and destroy their will to fight. Air power in World War II proved to be critical, but the impact was much more complicated than some proponents of air power had theorized. During the World War II, terror bombing had mixed results. It proved effective in Poland (Warsaw), the Netherlands (Rotterdam), and Yugoslavia (Belgrade). In other countries such as England (London and Coventry) and Germany (Hamburg), it was not effective in undermining morale. In Britain ' London Can Take It' unified the civilian population and made them more determined than ever. This would seem to be the situation in Germany where the Allies not only returned tit for tat but bombed German cities to rubble. The difference appears to be whether the civilian population is prepared and perceives that it is possible to effectively resist. In the instances where terror bombing did force the country to surrender, it was accompanied with a land invasion which convinced civilians that resistance was futile. While the Allied strategic bombing campaign failed by itself to end the war, many assessments of civilian morale are flawed. It is commonly thought that it did not destroy the German will to resist. It did play a role in the destruction of the Luftwaffe and finally destroyed the German war economy, but the impact on civilian morale far greater than understood. It is true that the German and Japanese people did not demand an end to the War, but that is largely because they feared their own government far more than the Allied bombers. Note that after the War, there was no second thoughts about surrender to the Allies as had been the case in Germany after World War I. Churchill and the King and Queen regularly engaged in walk troughs of bomb danged neighborhoods, with very few security personnel accompanying them. We constantly hear today that bombing can not crack civilian morale. Notice that you never see images like this of Hitler, Göring, Mussolini, Emperor Hirohito, or the Japanese prime-ministers that replaced Tojo.

World War I

The air plane was first used in any significant way in warfare during World War I. It was used primarily used in tactical operations. The Germans launched small-scale bombing raids on British cities. Allied retaliatory plans were in place to begin the strategic bombing of Germamy in 1919, but the War ended before this began.

Theoretical Debate

After the War, military analysts theorized as to the possible military impact of strategic bombing. British Prime-Minister Baldwin popularized the idea that 'the bomber will always get through'. The idea terrified Europeans. An this fear only escalated when Hitler and Mussolini unleased their powerful new airforces on Spanish civilians during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). Te same was the case with Japanese bombing in China. No one in fact actually knew about the potential military impact. Both the Axis and Allied powers at the onset of World War II believed that terror bombing campaigns would undermine civilian moral and destroy their will to fight.

Terror Bombing

Terror bombing was not a new phenomenon to World War II. The Germans in World War I use Zephlin and Gotha Bomber raids to attack London and other British cities. They had no impact on the war, but after the War in an era of military budget cut, motivated the British to build the world's first air defense system, the Chain Home System which would be key to the British victory in the Battle of Britain. The first terror raids associated with World War II were conducted by the Japanese, most prominately bombing Shanghai after the Chinese there protested Japanese actions and attacked Japanese officials. The Germans would be the first to institute terror raids in Europe. Their first terror raid was in Spain (1936) and then Hitler threaten the Czechs with the destruction of Prague (1939). With the onst of the war there were multiple terror raids: Warsaw (1939), Rottersam (1940), London (1940), and Belgrade (1941). Terror bombing conformed perfectly with Hitler inclination for brutality. We are not sure about his peronal involvement in all of these raids, but we know he was involved with threantning the Czechs, bombing London, and Belgrade. Moscow and Stalingrad are other examples. A question arrises,was terrot bombing effective. The Allies (British and Americans) built strategic bombing forces far beyond the capacity of the Germansand Jpanese. And exponentially a far greater tonnage of bombs were dropped on German cities than the Germans dropped in the war. This raises the question as to what extent the Allied strategic bombing campaign can be called terror bombing. Does the fact that the Japanese and Germans began the War and began the indescriminate bombing of cities affect the legitimacy of the immense Allied use of force?. And do the Japanese and German goals in the War affect the legitimate use of force?

Civilian Morale

Air power in World War II proved to be critical, but the impact was much more complicated than the proponents of air power had theorized and the detrractirs of air power after the War wabnt to admit. During the World War II, terror bombing had mixed results. It proved effective in Poland (Warsaw), the Netherlands (Rotterdam), and Yugoslavia (Belgrade). In other countries such as England (London and Coventry) and Germany (Hamburg), it was not demed effective in undermining morale, or this is the conclusion tha many would have us believe. In Britain 'London Can Take It' unified the civilian population and made them more determined than ever. This would seem to be the situation in Germany where the Allies not only returned tit for tat but bombed German cities to rubble. The difference appears to be whether the civilian population is prepared and perceives that it is possible to effectively resist. In the instances where terror bombing did force the country to surrender, it was accompanied with a land invasion which convinced civilians that resistance was futile. While the Allied strategic bombing campaign failed by itself to end the war, many assessments of civilian morale are flawed. It is commonly thought that it did not destroy the German will to resist. It did play a role in the destruction of the Luftwaffe and finally destroyed the German war economy, but the impact on civilian morale far greater than understood. It is true that the German and Japanese people did not demand an end to the War, but that is largely because they feared their own government far more than the Allied bombers. Note that after the War, there was no second thoughts about surrender to the Allies as had been the case in Germany after World War I promoted by the German generals and the nationalists like the NAZis.

Leadership

There was quite a huge difference in how the leadership of Britain and Germany reacted to the bombing of their cities. The Germans heavily bombed Britain in the Blitz (1940-41) and then returned with the V-weapons (1944). The British were not sbe to heabily bomb Germany until RAF Bomber Command received modern bombers like the Lancaster. The American joined in the campaign (1943). Churchill and the King and Queen regularly engaged in walk troughs of bomb danged neighborhoods, with very few security personnel accompanying them. We constantly hear today that bombing can not crack civilian morale. Notice that you never see images like this of Hitler, Göring, Mussolini, Emperor Hirohito, or the Japanese prime-ministers that replaced Tojo comenserating with the people and vuisiting war damaged neigborgoods. There was nothing that enthused Hitler more than motorich around the Reich and seig heiling adoring crowds. There are countless images of him in his colkldction of big Mercedes doing just that. This was during the good days into the early war years. When German armies enconntered real resistance and the bombs began falling on German rather than other cities, Hitler suddenly was no where to be found. Propagabda Minister Goebbels commented on this. He enciouaged the Führer to visit the bomb danaged cities. Hitler flatly refused. The comparison with Churchill could not be more dranmatic--and revealing.

Created: August 20, 2002
Last updated: 2:09 PM 1/19/2023