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After World War I, it was widely assumed that the next war if it ever came would include a strategic bombing campaign. Such a campaign was being planned in World War I, but the War ended before it could be launched. It was also widely believed that such a campaign would include the use of poison gas. It was not wideky understood at the time that incediaries were the most devestating munitions. Thus far more consideration was given to poison gas than fire. Because of the fear, the major European powers engaged in a range of civil defence programs. The most intensive steps were taken in Britain, probably because of the German bombing raids during World war I. The British gave more attention to poson gas and evacuation than bomb shelters before the War. They also built the Chain Home radar network that played such an important role in the Battle of Britain. The Germans also engaged in civil defense planning. This began before the NAZIs seized power, but was instensified as the the War approached. The NAZIS, however, did not fully appreciate the value of radar at the beginning of the War, apparently thinking that the strength of the Luftwaffe would protect German cities. Göring personally assured the German public than the Reich's cities could not be bombed. From the NAZI point of view this was to be the fate of other peoples. NAZI newsreels showed the German people what the Luftwaffe was doing. The most effective way of protecting German cities was to defeat of Britain and France. The Soviets did not have a strategic bomber force and the Atlantic Ocean put the Americans and their B-17 Flying Fortresses out of rnge. The fall of France effectively delayed attacks on German cities. The failure to defeat Britain, however. meant that the attacks were delayed not prevented. The British set about developing a large long-range bomber force. Britain also provided bases for the American 8th Air Force. The delay gave the Germans the time to build not only a formidable air defence lin, but also a first-class Civil Defense system. The Germans also evacuated the children from the cities. About 0.3 million German civilans were killed in the strategic bombing campaign, some estimates are as high as 0.5 million. While apauling in human terms, these losses given the intensity of the Allied bombing campaign are a testimony to the success of the German civil defense effort.
After World War I, it was widely assumed that the next war if it ever came would include a strategic bombing campaign. Such a campaign was being planned in World War I, but the War ended before it could be launched. Civilians looked on the possibility with dread. Military planners saw strategic bombing as a way of shortening wars by destoying the ability of the enemy to wage war, destroying armaments plants and other critical facilities. This meant that civilians and rear-area cities would be on the front line of any future war. Attacking industry meant attacking cities and this meant civilian casualties. And a maxim of war planning became "the bomber will always get through". The best expression of this was a statementb of British Primeminister Stanley Baldwin in the House of Commons, "I think it is well for the man in the street to realize that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through. The only defense is in offense, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves." (November 10, 1932). Unfortunately for Britain, Baldwin did not favor the level of military spending that would have provide Braitain air superority. Curiously the idea of focusing on petoleum industies did not occur to pre-World War II air planners. It was also widely believed that such a campaign would include the use of poison gas, reflection of the horror of poison gas during the War. It was not widey understood at the time that incediaries were the most devestating munitions. Thus far more consideration was given to poison gas than fire. Analysts had no idea how civilians would react to aerial bombardment. Many though the impact would be pamic and chaos. No one speculated that it might harden a civilian population's desire to wage war. The use of bombing by the Japanese in Manchuria and China and by the Germans and Italians in Spain intensified public aprehension about boming.
Because of the fear, the major European powers engaged in a range of civil defence programs. The most intensive steps were taken in Britain, probably because of the German bombing raids during World War I. The German raids had little real impact, but terrified civilians. Many air planners were heavily influenced by the British experience. The British gave more attention to poson gas and evacuation than bomb shelters before the War. When war broke out, every British subject was issued a gas mask, including infants. British civilians including school children were required to carry them at all times and those who failed to do so were fined. The British also built the Chain Home radar network that played such an important role in the Battle of Britain.
The Germans also engaged in civil defense planning. This began before the NAZIs seized power. Gere the Versailles Treaty posed restrictions. Germany was not allowed to have an airforce. Air defense equipment and arms (search lights and anti-aitcraft guns were also prohibited. The Ministry of the Interior issued civil defense guidelines (1931). [Stahl, p. 11.] The first issue of Vorläufige Ortsanweisung für den Luftschutz der Zivilbevölkerung was published (1932). The provisions would eventually have 12 chapters with numerous detailed attachments. [Stahl, p. 12.]
The German civil defense was instensified as the military was expanded and got more detailed as the War approached. Hitler and Göring announced the creation of the Luftwaffe (1935). The Luftwaffe was given responsibility for the Reich's air defense. The Luftwaffe's plans divided the cities of Germany into Civil Defense Areas (Luftschutzorten) of three different classes--I-III. [Stahl, p. 14.] The difference in the three classes affected the degree of local control, inspection, and preparedness. Responsibility for executing the civil defense effort was given to the Luftschutzleiter (civil defense leader). This was normally the city mayor or local NAZI gauleiter. The Luftwaffe classified 104 cities as Class I. These were all of the largest cities (Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, and Dresden) as well as some smaller cities with important war industries or military facilities. Thus a city as small as Siegen (population 60,000) was classified as class I because it was located near the Ruhr, a garrison city, and had war important industries. [Stahl, p. 16.] There were two principal documents providing the basis for the German civil defense program. The first was the "The Code of Practice for Building Shelters" ("Bestimmungen für den Bau von Luftschutz Bunkern". The second were the orders pertaining to the "Fuhrer's Emergency Air Raid Program" ("Luftschutz Führer Sofort Programm"/"LS-Führerprogramm"). Surely none of the individuals preparing these documents in the 1930s had any idea of the fate that awited the Reich's cities. American Air Force analysts who studies these plans after the War were impressed with the detail and thoroughness. [USAF, pp. 152 ff.]
The central concept of German civil defense planning was the collective nature of the effort. Each city plan had to cover the entire city. Each city's civil defense plan had to be integrated into the overall urban development plan. The civil defence code focused on above ground shelters. This was not because they were mist effective, but because they were cheaper. It was very expensive to build a subteranean bunker or shelter. This was not a feasible option for an entire city. And considerable attention was given to the possobility of poison gas attack. There were extensive details to be followed when designing shelters, such as the number of gas-locks for entry (planners wanted two), the width of entries, the size of the staircases, importance of washrooms, need for a first aid room, etc. and so on. [USAF, p. 153.]
The NAZIs launched World War II in Poland with a spectacularly effective and brutal demonstration of air power. The Luftwaffe was not, however, as powerful as it seemed. The Luftwaffe did not have a strageic bombing capability. It is not that the Luftwaffe did not want one, but German industry was not capable of building a tactical and strategic force. Luftwaffe planners can not be faulted for the limited capability of the Reich's industry. They did, however, make a serious error. They failed to fully appreciate the value of radar at the beginning of the War. The lack of a stratehic bombing force and the failure to appreciate the value of radar would result in the Reich's fitrst military failure--the Battle of Britain (1940). Hitler launched the War thinking that the strength of the Luftwaffe would protect German cities. Göring personally assured him and the German public than the Reich's cities could not be bombed. From the NAZI point of view this was to be the fate of other peoples. NAZI newsreels showed the German people what the Luftwaffe was doing. The most effective way of protecting German cities was to defeat of Britain and France. The Soviets did not have a strategic bomber force and the Atlantic Ocean put the Americans and their B-17 Flying Fortresses out of range. The fall of France (1940) effectively delayed large raids on German cities. The failure to defeat Britain, however. meant that the attacks were only delayed not prevented. The British set about developing a large long-range bomber force. Britain also provided bases for the American 8th Air Force. Britain became a huge air craft carrier from which the largest air campaign in history would be fought out in the skies over northern Europe.
Unlike many countries the Germsns attacked, they had air defenses. The delay in the Allied strategic bombing campaign gave the Germans the time to build not only a formidable air defence line, but also a first-class Civil Defense system. There was both Air Defenses and Air Protection (Luftschutz). The German air defenses were formidavle. The Kamhuber Line radars not only directed the German fighters, but alerted the cities of an coming boming raid. The British fought the campaign at first with obsolete aircraft. But by the end of 1942 the Lancaster was ready and tthe American 8th AirForce with its B-17s and B-24s were in place. President Roossevelt and Primeminisyer Churchill agreed to a round-the-clock bombing campaign (January 1943). The strength of the Kamhuber Line and the Luftwaffe took a deadly toll on Allied formations (1943). The arrival of the long-range P-51 escorts changed this and the Luftwaffe could no longer defend the Reich's cities. The basic defense becme the anti-aircraft Flak batteries. The Flak batteries could take a toll on the bomber formations, but could not stop them. The Germans called Civil Defense Luftschutz (Air Prorection). German civilians had to rely on the the bomb sheters and civilian defense facilities from the increasingly heavy Allied raids. In the end the Allies leved virtually every major German city. The civil defense program, however, proved very effective in protecting civiians.
A German documentary entitled "Firestorm" (directed by Michael Kloft in 2003) contains a lot of valuable historical footage about the bombing of German cities during the final years of World War II, especially Berlin and Dresden. There is an interesting section on air raid shelters in Berlin that helped save a lot of lives, especially those of women and children which as a result of military concription made up an abnormally large portion of the city population during the final years of the War. At the beginning of the bombing raids, before it was realized how devatasting the incendiary bombs would be or the intensity of the Allied effort, German families moved some of their furniture into the basements of houses with the idea that they could have some of the normal comforts. Many believed that basements would offer adequate protection. The families cut holes in the walls between party-wall houses so that people could move from one house to the other underground if their own
house was destroyed and they needed to move into the next door house to survive. Later, of course, there was no thought of such comforts--only the hope of staying alive.
Germany was the most heavily bombed country in Erope. The heart of virtually every major German city was burned out or leveled. Photographs after the War show mounds of rubble where thriving, modern cities had once stood. This could have meant millions of civilian deaths. Actual deaths will never be known with any accuracy, but historians generally estimate anout 0.3 million Germans were killed. some estimates are as high as 0.5 million. While apauling in human terms, these losses given the intensity of the Allied bombing campaign are a testimony to the success of the German civil defense effort.
Stahl, Joachim. Bunker und Stollen für den Luftschutz im Raum Siegen (Kreuztal: 1980).
U.S. Air Force--USAF. "Civilian Defense Division Final Report" United States Strategic Bombing Survey (2nd edition: 1947).
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