It is absolutely correct that that the bulk of German military manpower was committed in the Ostkrieg beginniung with the invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941). It should not be assumed that because 75-80 percent of German manpower was deployed in the Ostkrieg that this automatically meant that 75-80 percent of German industrial output was devoted to the Ostkrieg. It was not. Something like 75 percent of the Ostheer was unmotorized infantry moving East on foot with supplies being carried by horse-drawn carts. Their artilery was also oftn moved by horses. Now industry was needed to equip the Panzer Divisions and motorized infantry that accompanied the Panzers--but this was a small part of the Ostkrieg, only about 20-25 percent. And yhis declineds the War trabspired and oil becamean increasing issue. And it takes very little industry to produce horse carts and shoe leather unmotorized infntry needed. In sharp contrast it took a great deal of industry to produce the planes and ships which were primarily used to fight the war in the West (table). This can be seen of the importance of aircraft in German industrual output. And the air war was primarily fought in the West. This alone shows the degree to which Gernany's industrial output was used to support th war in the Werst. This diversion of industrial output was diverted away from the Ostheer is a major factor in the Germany's defeat in World War II. ven ordinance (Amnunition) did not equate with troop disposition. Enormous quantities of amunition were expended by the anti-aircraft batteries that surroundd and defended Berlin and other German cities. Something like 3,300 shells were fired for every bomber brought down. This was an enormous price for the amunition expediture and the valuable 88 mm guns that were diverted from the Ostkrieg where the war was being decided. In fact the two largest industrial expendiutures for the Germans were aircraft and and ships (including U-boats). German priorities changed. We do not have complere data, but the 1939-41 data here shows the extent of the focus on airpower and the substantial commitment to ships (table 1). This did mot change appreciably as the war progressed. We do have some 1944 data showing the continued focus on air power. Notice that after the U-boats proved themselves in 1939. naval (ship) constructuiion was the second greatest priority by 1941 (table 1). And most of the German planes and virtually all ships were committed to the War in the West. Most notable is how much of the German indudtrial ouuput was focused on aircraft. Aircraft alone accounted for something like half of German industrial production for the military. And ship building was also very important. Both of these two major efforts primarily supported the war in the West. Also important to note is that the air component of German industrial output was relatively constant at about 50 percent or over, the composition changed hugely. Output was a mix of fighters and bombers (1939-41). The British RAF began acquiring the AVRO Lancaster (mid-1942) and the American Eighth Air Force began bombing the Reich (1943). As a result, the Luftwaffe responded with two major changes. First, they brought back squadrons from the East to protect German cities from the Allied bombers. Secondly, they shifted production to primarily fighters. This is important because bombers meant ground support -- a primary component of Blitzkrieg. As a result, without the bombers, for the last 3 years of the War, the German Army had to do without air support -- substantially reducing their effectiveness. Of course the larger numbers and improved quality of Allied and Soviet fighters was also important. Not generally recognized is that this focus on airpwer was the same industrial pattern of the major beligerants. [O'Brien] The only major exception was the Soviet Union. And this was the country the Germans had to face in the Ostkrieg. And for the Ostkrieg they would need armor (tanks), weapons (artillerty), an vehicles in massive numbers--the various material they were not producing because of the focus on the aircrasft and ships needed for the war in the West. Instead the Ostheer had to fight in out on foot using horse-drawn carts in the titantic struggle with the Red Army. Deploying your manpower in the decisive campaign of the Wr and then not adequately equipping and suppoting it is recipie for military failure. And that is exactly what happened in World War II.

Sources

O'Brien, Phillips. "What was US grand strategy in World War II?" Columbia SIPA presentation (March 17, 2022).

Overy, R.J. "Hitler's war and the German economy: A reinterpretation," The Economic History Review New Series, Vol. 35, No. 2 (May, 1982), pp. 272-91.

Wagenführ, Rolf. Die Deutsche Industrie Im Kriege, 1939-1945 (Duncker and Humblot: 1954).

Created: 3:28 AM 1/25/2021
Last updated: 6:43 PM 7/16/2022