**
The initial German anti-aircraft defenses when the RAF Bomber offensive began (May 1940) was primarily anti-aircraft aryillery and searchlights for night defense organized by the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe also created the Nightfighter Command or Nachtjagd. Initially there was initially one experimental Squadron which was
equipped with ME-109s. Disatisfied with their initial perfomance, the ME-109s were replaced with twin-engine ME-110s. General Josef Kammhuber took command of Nachtjagd. Kammhuber began building a defensive line of belt of searchlights and sound-locators across Northern Germany and the Low Countries (October 1940). The first efforts did not yet use radar, the Germans still not fully understand how effective the Chain Home Network had been in the Battle of
Britain. German radar production was also still limited. Kammhuber saw the initial efforts as the best that could be accomplished until more sophisticated equipment was availane. Kammhuber oversaw the construction of a new and much more deadly Himmelbett system. This was a chain of radar-guided fighter 'boxes' from Belgium to northern Germany and around important German Cities (Spring 1942). This became nown as the Kammhuber line. Kammhuber at first faced Bomber
Command night raids and thus organized defensive efforts to stop nihjt raids. Each individual nightfighter "box" overlapping the adjascent boxes. Each box had a ground freya radar set. This provided early warning of Allied Bombers and their course, although not their height. Then as the Luftwaffe fighters were scrambled, the
incoming bombers were picked up by short-range W�rzberg radar. Each box had short range radars covering an area of about 20 miles. Each "box" had two short range radars, one to track the Allied bombers and the other to track the Luftwaffe fighters. Ground controllers plotted the positions of Luftwaffe fighters and Allied
bombers with green and red dots projected on to the Seeburg evaluation screen. Controllers radioed the vector information to the fighters so they could close with the bombers. The improved Lichtenstein airborne radar was fitted on the night-fighters. Ground controllers guideed the night fighters to within 2 miles of the RAF bombers at which point the Lichtenstein radars could acquire the bombers. The German system had limitations. Each "box" could direct only one interception at anygiven time. Bomber Command developed a tactic of "streaming" which took a raiding force through a single "box" to saturate the German defenses. Then in 1943 Kammhuber also had to face the American 8th Air Force and daylight raids many around the clock bombing.
The initial German anti-aircraft defenses when the RAF Bomber offensive began (May 1940) was primarily anti-aircraft artillery--Fliegerabwehrkanone (Flak). Searchlights for night defense organized by the Luftwaffe. The Flak was the primary defense because Luftwaffe pilots were at first unable to find the British bombers at night.
The Luftwaffe also created the Nightfighter Command or Nachtjagd. Initially there was initially one experimental Squadron which was equipped with ME-109s. Disatisfied with their initial perfomance, the ME-109s were replaced with twin-engine ME-110s. General Josef Kammhuber took command of Nachtjagd.
Kammhuber began building a defensive line of belt of searchlights and sound-locators across Northern Germany and the Low Countries (October 1940). The Germans were still focused on the offensuive use of the Luftwaffe and Bomber Command's resources were still very limited. The first efforts did not yet use radar, the Germans still not fully understand how effective the Chain Home Network had been in the Battle of Britain. German radar production was also still limited. Kammhuber saw the initial efforts as the best that could be accomplished until more sophisticated equipment was available.
The British unlike the Germans had the industrial capacity to produce both a tactical and strategic air force. Even during the Battle of Britain, British industry was outproducing the Germans in aircraft. And with Lend Lease the British set about building Bomber Command into a force far greater than what the German Luftwaffe trew against Britain. The British produced one of the great bombers of the war--the Avro Lancaster. Royal Air Force Bomber Command played a major role in the Strategic Air Campign against Germany. The British not only expanded production, but developed one of the iconic aircraft of World War II. The Avro Lancaster or 'Lanc' as it was known during the War was a British heavy (four-engined) bomber developed by the by the Avro company for RAF Bomber Command. It replaced the venerable Manchester. The RAF began introducung the Lanc (early 1942). The first squadron was No. 44. Throughout 1942 Bomber Command steadily increaded the number of Lanc squadrons. Along with the Handley Page Halifax, it was the main plane with which Bomber Command would begin the Strategic Bombing Campaign, a year before the American 8th Air Force enteed the fight. Lancs were also used by the RCAF, and squadrons from other Commonwealth and European countries making up Bomber Command. The Lanc was primarily used as a night bomber. RAF Bomber Command began bombing before long-range fighter escorts were available. The Lanc forced the Luftwaffe to radically improve its air defenses.
Kammhuber oversaw the construction of a new and much more deadly Himmelbett system. This was a chain of radar-guided fighter 'boxes' from Belgium to northern Germany and around important German Cities (Spring 1942). This became nown as the Kammhuber line. Kammhuber at first faced Bomber Command night raids and thus organized defensive efforts to stop nihjt raids. Each individual nightfighter "box" overlapping the adjascent boxes. Each box had a ground freya radar set. This provided early warning of Allied Bombers and their course, although not their height. Then as the Luftwaffe fighters were scrambled, the incoming bombers were picked up by short-range W�rzberg radar. Each box had short range radars covering an area of about 20 miles. Each "box" had two short range radars, one to track the Allied bombers and the other to track the Luftwaffe fighters. Ground controllers plotted the positions of Luftwaffe fighters and Allied bombers with green and red dots projected on to the Seeburg evaluation screen. Controllers radioed the vector information to the fighters so they could close with the bombers. The improved Lichtenstein airborne radar was fitted on the night-fighters. Ground controllers guideed the night fighters to within 2 miles of the RAF bombers at which point the Lichtenstein radars could acquire the bombers. The German system had limitations. Each "box" could direct only one interception atanygiven time. Bomber Command developed a tactic of "streaming" which took a raiding force through a single "box" to saturate the German defenses. Then in 1943 Kammhuber also had to face the American 8th Air Force and daylight raids many around the clock bombing.
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