*** World War II European air campaign secret weapons V-1 V1 usage








World War II German V-1 Program: Usage (June-August 1944)

German V-1s
Figure 1.--Here Air Raid Wardens are helping the survivors of a London school struck by a V-1 during July 1944. As in 1940, the attacks blew up homes and killed and wounded civilians, but had no impact on the British war effort. The V-1s had not impact on the massive Soviet and Allied armies closing in on the Reich from East and West.

The Führer had great hopes for the V-1. The V-1 was one of the unspecified secret weapons Goebbel's propaganda threatened to use. And there were plans for a massive assault. Left unchecked, the Germans could have devestated London and destroyed the British Channel ports from where the D-Day invasion force was assembling. The V-1s could have prevented the D-Day landings. The problem for the Germans is that the Luftwaffe was largely destroyed in the skies over German as part of the Allied strategic bombing campaign. Thus the launch sites had no protective air cover. The Allied Crossbow Opperation both delayed the German plans and significantly reduced the German capability to launch V-1s. The Germans were only able to mount the V-1 offensive after the D-Day landings and with a much smaller number of V-1s than planned. The Germans began to target London and other British cities (June 13). The Germans resorted to prefabricated launch pads that could be hidden in barns and farm houses and then quickly assembled to launch the V-1s. They could then be dissabmled and moved. The process was, however, far slower than the fixed launch facilities they had planned to use. The mobil sides were used from the Pas-de-Calais area which the Germans held for over 2 months after the D-Day invasion. The mobil sites were more cumbersome to use, but fired from the Pas-de-Calis the V-1 was within range of London. The Germans launched about 13,000 buzz bombs accross the Channel, about 9,500 at London. Only about 2,500 of these hit the intended targets, primarily London. The V-1 could not be accurately targeted. They were lucky to hit a city, but even this was difficult because the Luftwaffe at this stage of the War could not manage air reconisance over Britain. Had the V-1s been launched at the invasion embarcation ports they might have had some impact. The V-1s did cause civilian casualties and suffering to the people of London. Launched at the sprawling metropolis of London, they had no discernable military impact other than forcing the Allies to devote resources to supress it.

Hitler's Expetations

The Führer had great hopes for the V-1. Ever since the Battkle of Britain, destroying London was high on Hitler's agenda. The V-1 was one of the unspecified secret weapons Goebbel's propaganda threatened to use. And there were plans for a massive assault. Left unchecked, the Germans could have devestated London and destroyed the British Channel ports from where the D-Day invasion force was assembling. The V-1s could have prevented the D-Day landings.

Destruction of the Launch Sites

The problem for the Germans is that the Luftwaffe was largely destroyed in the skies over German by American escort aircraft as part of the Allied strategic bombing campaign (early-1944). The Luftwaffe still had some planes and air crews. They no longer had the capability of launching anything approsching a campsign. They could still mount raids, that could inflict casualties, but not affect the outcome of battles. In fact the last German offensive of the War, the Bulge, was launched to take advantage of inclement weather which limited air opertations. And the Luftwaffe was unable to opposed the D-Day landings or orotect the V-1 launch sites. Thus the all-important launch sites which could not be hidden had no protective air cover. The Allied Crossbow Opperation both delayed the German plans and significantly reduced the German capability to launch V-1s.

The Campaign

The Germans were only able to mount the V-1 offensive after the D-Day landings and with a much smaller number of V-1s than planned. The Germans began to target London and other British cities (June 13). The Germans as the Allies located and bombed the launch sites had to resort to prefabricated launch pads that could be hidden in barns and farm houses and then quickly assembled to launch the V-1s. They could then be dissabmled and moved. The process was, however, far slower than the fixed launch facilities they had planned to use. The mobil sites were used from the Pas-de-Calais area which the Germans held for over 2 months after the D-Day invasion. The mobil sites were more cumbersome to use, but fired from the Pas-de-Calis the V-1 was within range of London. The Germans launched about 13,000 buzz bombs accross the Channel, about 9,500 at London. Only about 2,500 of these hit the intended targets, primarily London.

Impact

This is an incredibly poor performance given the immense dimensions of London. The V-1 could not be accurately targeted. They were lucky to hit a city, but even this was difficult because the Luftwaffe at this stage of the War could not manage air reconisance over Britain. Had the V-1s been launched at the invasion embarcation ports they might have had some impact. The V-1s did cause civilian casualties and suffering to the people of London. Launched at the sprawling metropolis of London, they had no discernable military impact other than forcing the Allies to devote resources to supress it. Given the resources devoted to the project and Hitler's expectations, it wa a massive failure.

Christmas Surprise (December 1944)

While the baatle was raging in the Bulge, the Germans launched a final V-1 attack on northern England. The V-1 and V-2 attacks from remaining sites in NAZI-occupied Europe (basically the Netherlands north of the Rhine) could not reach the north of England. The Germans came up with a way unleachin these weapons on Manchester (December 1944). It was launched as a Christmas Eve attack for maximum psycholocical impact. The Germans launched 45 V-1s off the Yorkshire coast from beneath Heinkel He-111 bombers. The He-111 had been a major component of the Luftwaffe bombing campaign in the the 1940 Battle of Bruitain. By 1943 the He-111 was oibsolete for combat operations. It could be used here because the V-1s could be launched before reaching British air defenses. They V-1s were all aimed at Manchester, the largest industrial city in the north. Once released the planes returned to base. The RAF was unprepared for the attack so the planes made it back safely. Most of the V-1s missed Manchester entirely and landed harmlessly in the countryside, perhaps disturbing a few cows and sheep. One did hit Manchester, killing 27 civilians when it fell onto Abbey Hills Road. The attack was typical of the entire NAZI V-weapoon program, expending valuable and scarce military resources to destroy houses and kill civilians that had no part in the Allied military effort.







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Created: 4:03 AM 7/4/2005
Last updated: 6:40 AM 6/12/2023