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Poison Gas in World War II: Germany


Figure 1.--These Hitler Youth boys are being shown how to use their gas masks in a drill. This image is undated. It is reportedly an original German printed cigarette photo tradecard from a 1930s. Thus it may come from just before the War.

Germany had chemical weapons. The weapons were outlawed by the Versailles Treaty following World War I (1919). The German military had a range of programs to evade the Versailles limitations. I am not sure to what extent they worked on gas weapons during the Weimar era. After the NAZIs seized power (1933) the Germans launched a chenical warfare program and by the start of the War (1939) had substantial stockpiles. Unlike other weapons system, however, Hitler who had been gassed during World War I did not look favorably on gas weapons. I have no information at this time on German policy discussions concerning gas weapons. One German source indicates that military and chemical experts discussed the possible usde of chemical weapons in great deail, especially the use of gas in aerial warfare. The Germans seemed to have concluded that it wa not a very effective military weapon. [Rumpf, p. 173.] The conventional wisdom is that Germany did not need them at the beginning of the War and was afaid to use r=them once the Allies gained air supremecy. The military in Germany was issued gas masks. The Luftwaffe's superority at the beginning of the War made bombing attacks of less concern to civilians. Goering assured the public that it was not possible for the Allies to bomb Berlin. I'm not sure about the extent to which German civilians were prepared for gas attacks. We note photographs of Hitler Youth boys training to use gas masks.

Inter-War Dipolmacy

Germany had chemical weapons. The Germans were not allowed to produce chemical weapons by the Versailles Treaty following World War I (1919). The revulsion with the enormous casualties during World War I signigicantly saffected public thinking after the War. And no where was the public more horrified thsn with chemical weapons. This led to the Geneva Protocol (1925). These negotiatioins were initiated by the United States. The resultng protocol forbade the use of poison gas and bacteriological weapons in warfare. It did not prohibit their production and stockpiling, but it did prohibit the use of the weapons. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France ratified the protocol with the reservations that it would not be binding if other countries violated the agreement. Italy and (Weimar) Germany ratified without reservations. The United States and Japan did not. [Tucker]

German Chemical Weapons Program

The German military had a range of programs to evade the Versailles limitations. I am not sure to what extent they worked on gas weapons during the Weimar era or to what extent civilians wew aware of the work. The Germans secretly worked on chemical weapons in the Soviet bUnion. IG Farben developed much more effective chenical agents, tauben and sarin--much more potent nerve agents. Hitler and the Gerrman High Commnd were not aware of their lead in chemical weapons. German intelligence believed that both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed similar weapons. [Tucker] IG Farben of course is the same corporatuin that produced the Zyklon-B used in the Holocaust.. After the NAZIs seized power (1933) the Germans launched a chenical warfare program and by the start of the War (1939) had substantial stockpiles, but larger than those helf by Britain and France.

Chemical Weapons Strategy

We have no information at this time on German policy discussions concerning gas weapons. One German source indicates that military and chemical experts discussed the possible usde of chemical weapons in great deail, especially the use of gas in aerial warfare. The Germans seemed to have concluded that it was not a very effective military weapon. [Rumpf, p. 173.] Another reseacher suggests that German intelligence incorrectly concluded tht the Americans nd Soviets had modern chemnical weapons and thus decided against using them. [Tucker] This is a little misleading. It sounds more like staff level discussions. We are sure such staff-level discussions occurred. But staff experts do not make decesions. In NAZI Germany such decesions were made by the F�hrer. As ald war I soldier he has a revulsio of chemical weapons, all the more so because they were developed by a Jewish scientist. This personal assessment probably explains in large measure why the Germans did not use chemical weapons. This might hve been different if staff work had suggested that the Germns had substantial advantage in such weapons. But the intelligence assessments did not show this. Thus while the Germans decided not to initiate the use of chemical weapons, they prepared for the possible use of chemical weapons by countries they faced.

Hitler

Unlike other weapon system, Hitler who had been gassed during World War I decuided against the use of chemical weapons. We are not entirely sue why, as gthe Germans were way ahead in cvhemical weapon technology, althiough they may mot have fully understood huis. Sonme argue tghat because of his Workd War Ib experience, he did not cobsider them an 'honorable' weaon. We see no evidence of gthis or any other weapon system he subjected to an honorability test. Gor some one who authorized the mass murder of chilfren and woomen, hionorability seems a strange test. The fact that gas weapns had been invented by a Jewish scientist may have been a factor, but again there is no evidence of gthis. As the German military fortunes turned, the NAZIs considered using their chemical stockpile. The issue, appears to have been decided in a meeting with Hitler (May 1943). IG Farben's top expert attending the meeting warned the Führer that the Allies could easily replicate the German work in chemical agents. [Tucker] In fact, while the Allies had large stockpiles of World War I gases (mustard gas and phosgene), they did not have the more potent nerve agents. Hitler and his commannders did not know this. Another factor which must have been discussed was how the weapons could be delivered. Delivery is a major problem with chemical weapons. With Germany being heavily bombed and unable to respond, it must have seemed a mistake to begin employing poison gas. Of course at the time,a massive V-1 campaihn was being planned for 1944, but the Allies in early 1944 finally achieved air superiority over the Reich. One historian propses another explantion. As a result of the Rapllo Treary, many German offucers were aware that the Soviets has=d a massive chemical warfare stickpile that woulf be unleashed if the Germans intriduved chemical warfare again. A number of top NAZIS like Tobert Ley head of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF; German Labor Front) pleaded with Hitler to use chenical weapons. Hitler is know yo have consuidered them. An unlike what is odtenn oortrayed, Hitler did not turn down military requests, it was the military that persuaded him o to use them. What seens to have been ar oplay is tgat Because of the Rapallo Cooperation, mabny senior miklitary figures were aware of the massice Soviet capabiity in chenical warfare. [Johnson] But all that is known for cerain is that Hitler decided against using chemical weaoons. No one knows precisely how he reached his desision..

German Chemical Weapons

The German research program was designed to create a stockpile of gas which could be used to retaliate if Germany was attacked. They also had a research program designed to be sure that Germany was not surprised with a new kind of gas and to be sure countermeasures existed for any gas weapons that the Allies might employ. The Wehrmacht had specialized chemical units--the Nebeltruppe. After the War the Allies discovered stockpiles of known types of poison gas as well as the new nerve gas--Sarin. This was totaly unknown to the Allies and would have penetrated the existing gas masks issued to both soldiers and civilians. [Rumpf, p. 175.]

Civil Defense

The "Luftabwehrdienst" (Air Protection League) was the finest civil defense organization in World War II. Due to its effectiveness, German deaths in Allied air raids were limited to 0.3-0.5 million people despite the destruction of nearly all German cities. German civilian were thoroughly trained in civil defense measures. We are not sure about the extent to which German civilians were prepared for gas attacks. Some bomb shlelters were constructed to be gas proof, but we are not sure how common this was. We note photographs of Hitler Youth boys training to use gas masks. We do not know hoe common this was. They may have been propaganda photographs. We have noted family snapshots of HJ boys carrying gas mask bags slung over their shoulders. The Germans as far as we can determine did not proceed with the mass production and isuance of gas masks to civilians as did the British. They do seem to have collected the gas masks in occupied countries (Czechoslovakia and France), but we are not sure if they were distributed to civilians or military personnel. We know that the Germans made gas masks for civilians, both adults and children, and advertized them. We do not, however, have any details as to destribution or access. One source reports that the Germans did initiate any extensive program to prepare civilians for anti-gas measures. [Rumpf, p. 177.]

Genocide

It is seems surprising for a country comnitted to genocide not to have employed poison gas for its operations in the East. While the German military rejected gas as an effective military weapon, gas would have been an effective weapn in killing large numbers of people. The Germans and other beligerants made considerable advances in developing deadly new chemical weapns which would have more effectively killed civilians than high explosion bombs and have the added bonus of not destroying property. [Lusar] Here we do not know why they were not deployed. The fact that much of the killing was done by the SS which did not have an airforce may have been a factor. We do not know if the SS considered this. The SS attempted to keep the killing a secret. The methods for killing large numbers of people were so refined, that the SS may have preferred killing within camps where the killing could be done in relative secrecy. There would be no way thst killing by aerial attacks could be kept secret. Aerial gas attacks would have had to involved the Luftwaffe. And the attacks would have been widely reported. Growing Allied air power including expanding raids on the Reich, must have given the Germans further pause.

Military Potential

The question hs to be asked as to the military potential for Germany of using chemical weapons. It potentially was of considerable military significance. The German military, however, never wiorked out an effective delivery system. This was much more simple in World war I with the two armies hunkered diwn in trench systems. World War II was, however, a more mobil war with units more dispersed. Also while Germany had command of the aur, gas was not needed. By the time that the fortunes of war turned against the Germans, they were losing command of the auir. This not only complicated Germany's ability to use chemical weapons, but it increased vulnerability to Allied reprisals. Here the time line is significant. Tabun was developed first (1938). This got the Wehrmacht's attention, They seet up a research laboratory where another nerve gas--isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (Sarin) (1942) Tests showed that Sarin was ten times more lethal than Tabun. [Tschanz, p. 55.] German scientists continued to work on additional compounds. They were working on Soman when the NAZIs surrendeed. Soman was a compound similar to Tabun, but estimated to be 200 times more leathal. Thus the Germans had a substantial lead on the Soviets and Allies, in effect an actual secret weapon. Tauban was available even before Hitler launched the War, The more lethal Sarin, however, was not available until after Barbarossa had failed. The war in the East was a massive undertaking, but it seems that it could have affected the fighting at critical points of the front, such as Lenningrad and Stalingrad. The battlefield in the west was on a much smaller scale. And in 1942 when Sarin was developed, the air war was still at issue. The Allies had not yet devdeloped air superiority. If the Germans had struck Allied air bases it woukd at the very least delayed the strategic bombing campaign. The use of sarin becomes more problemtical as the Allies gained air superority. It could have, however, been used to reduce the Noirmandy bridgehead. The German scientists were probably correct that the Allies could have devdloped tauban and sarin themselves, but how long it would have taken is an open question. And how British civilians would have held up under sarin attacks is another unanswerable question. It surely would have brought the Germans some time, perhaps even allowed them to retain possession of France. It might have been enough time for the Germans to bring a new generation of jet aircraft under construction into service. This would have restored control of the air ovdr the Reich as well as permitted strikes at Soviet and Allied cities, perhaps even with Soman. It might have even forced b=negitiatiins, depending on how rapidly Allied scientists developed sarin themselves. Of course the Allies had the atomic bomb (July 1945).

German Decesion

The conventional wisdom is that Germany did not need them at the beginning of the War and was afaid to use them once the Allies gained air supremecy, especially air superority over the Reich. The military in Germany was issued gas masks. The Luftwaffe's superority at the beginning of the War made bombing attacks of less concern to civilians. G�ring assured the public that it was not possible for the Allies to bomb Berlin. Fear of reprisal is the reason most authors suggest that Germany did not employ chemical weapons. We do not disagree that this was an imprtant factor. But we do not think tht it was the only factor. Hitler was at the center of the German war effort. He made all impotyan decesions on strategy and resource allocation. Aithors who discuss why "Germany" did not use chemical weapons, misd the point. It was not a collective or entirely rathoonal decesion. Had it been so, Germany would hve never gone to war in the first place. The use of chemical weapons was one of many decesions thsat Hitler ad Hitler alone made. And Hitler decided not to use them. He received various assessments such as the leathality of the weapons and the capaity of the Soviets and Western Allies. The Abwehr appears to have incorecrly assessed the German lead and the capabilities of the Allies. This may have been a factor in the Hitler's decession. But we simply do not know why Hitler decided not to use them. We suspect thsat fear of rerisal was not the only reason. There is no proof, but we believe that Hitler because of his World War I experience and the fact that chemical weapons were developed by a Jewish scientist saw chemical weapons as an immoral weapon. They sullied whst Hitler saw as the supreme test of nationhood--war. While we have come to hate war, as Chanbelain found to Briain's misfortune, Hitler did not. He wanted a war in which he could demondtrate his great capacity as the greatest war lord in German history. And to Hitler gas weapons only sullied this great endevor. There is no way this can be proved, but we believed strongly that the decesion not to use chemical weapons can only be found it the inner reaches of Hitler's dark mind. We know, however, that chemical weapons never entirely disappeared from his thinking. And there were advocates for using them. Dr. Robert Ley, Reich Labor Leader, as the Soviers and Allies closed in on the Reich encouraged Hitler to use poison gas against the Soviets on the Eastern Front. Ley wa a chemist and had worked for I.G. Farben. He thus knew about the extremely lethal chemical weapons that had been developed. Speer who Ley worked closely with on labor issues relates, Ley "took me along in his special railroad car to a meeting in Sonthofen held in the autumn of 1944. As usual, our conversation took place over glasses of strong wine. His increased stammering betrayed his agitation. 'You know we have this new poison gas - I've heard about it. The Fuehrer must do it. He must use it. Now he has to do it!' Hitler, to be sure, had always rejected gas warfare; but now he hinted at a situation conference in headquarters that the use of gas might stop the advance of Soviet troops. He went on with vague speculations that the West would accept gas warfare against the East because at this stage of the war the British and American governments had an interest in stopping the Russian advance. When no one at the situation conference spoke up in agreement, Hitler did not return to the subject." [Speer, p. 417.]

U-530

After the War, Argentina with a Government sympsthetic to European Fascists and a substantial Germnan minority was seen as potential safe haven by NAZI war criminals attempting to escape Allied justice. Rumors of such an effort were fueled by two German U-boats which showed up off Argentina after the War. The first such U-boat was U-530. Oberleutnant Otto Wermuth did not surrender as ordered at the end of the War. Rather the boat headed for Argentina, a dangerous voyage at the time. Wemuth surrendered at Mar del Plata to the Argentine Navy (July 10, 1945). Wermuth jettisoned its deck gun, the crew carried no identification, and the ship's log disappeared. Wermuth did not explain his actions. U-530 was configured for transport rather than normal combat. There are rumors that it was part of a planned nerve gas attack on New York City, but there is no solid evidence. Transport of uranium or secret technology is another possibiliy.

Disposal

One report indicates that British troops just after VE-Day discovered a huge German stockpile of mustard gas and lewisite in northeastern Germany (May 1945). The area was designated to become part of the Soviet occupation zone. Reports vsary as to the presence of the more advanced (toxic) nerve gasses debeloped by the Germans (sarin, tabun, and Soman). The stockpile included weapnized gas ordinnce: canisters, aircraft bombs, and artillery shells. The British did not want the cashe to fall into Soviet hsnds. They shipped the gas ordinance to Antwerp. It was held there until a fleet of disposable ships could be found. The British used six ships to carry all the chemical ordinance. The ships included the heavily danmaged cruiser Leipzig, a navy supply/repair ship, and four merchant vessels. The vessels were sunk off the Norwegian coast (July 1946). Other German chemical weapons were also dumped in the more shallow Baltic Sea.

Sources

Johnson, Ian. Faustian Brgain: The Soviet-German Partnership and the Origins of the Second World (Oxford University Press: 2021), 384p.

Lusar, R. Die deutschen Waffen und Geheimwaffen im zweiten Weltkreig.

Rumpf, hans. The Bombing of Germany (Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York, 1962), 256p.

Speer. Albert. Insude the Third Reich: Memoirs (1970). Speer wrote his book after he was completed his sentence abd was released from Spandau Prison. The book is often self serving and where he ciomnents in his personal role has to be taken with considerable skepticism. His comments about others, however, we think are often very accurate.

Tucker, Jonathan B. War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda (Pantheon, 2006), 479p.






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Created: 6:58 AM 10/3/2004
Last updated: 5:43 AM 3/14/2023