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France was one of the pioneers in aviation. There were several imprtant aviation companies, but the industrywas dominated by several small companies emphazsizing cradtmanship rather than industrial methods. The companies included Latécoère, Morane-Saulnier Amiot, several smaller concerns. The most imprtant was the Société des Avions Marcel Bloch, founded by Marcel Bloch who had invented a type of aircraft propeller used by the French Army during World War I. Bloch with the rise of Hitler began to see the coming crisis. He joined with Henry Potez to purchase the Société Aérienne Bordelaise (SAB), subsequently renamed Société Aéronautique du Sud-Ouest (1935). The French Government nationalized the arms industry, including the aviation industry, before World War II (1936). Pierre Cot, Secretary of the French Air Force, decided that national security was too important for the production of war planes to be left in the hands of private companies. (This argument is often used by those critical of socialism and not just in national security circumstances, but compare the history of Government controlled French avaiation to privtely operated American or German aviation from 1936-40). The Government was authorized to seize any firm they thought important. France's nationalized aviation industry became the Société Nationale de Constructions Aéronautiques du Sud Ouest (SNCASO). The Government asked Marcel Bloch serve as the Minister for Air. The nationalization did not significantly improve production and some observers suggest it actually set back production schedules. The Government set up six large state-owned aircraft manufacturing companies. Budgets were, however, no where near what Hitler was pouring into the Luftwaffe. One limitation was the huge amounts of funds devoted to the Maginot Line. In addition France was a democratic Government with its financing open to public scrutiny. Hitler with his brilliant financeer, Hjalmar Schacht, managed to hide the huge sums being borowed and spent for rearmament. The French Armée de l’ Air (FAA) entered World War II with high standards of training and some good aircraft, but a glaring weakness in communications. It would not be the quality and number of French planes that would lead to disaster. It would the incompetence of French military commanders. The FAA's effectiveness was limited by illconceived tactical support doctrine and was in the middle of an expansion and requipment program when the Germans launched their Western Offensive (May 1940). The French air commanders had dispersed their forces so that they were not vulnerable to a surprise Luftwaffe attack. This also meant that the French could not bring their considerable air assetts to bear on the battle front to attack the German forces concentrated in the Ardennes and driving toward the Meuse. The result was a German break through and within days they had reached the Channel. France never recovered. During the German occupation France's aviation industry was virtually disbanded. The Germans made some attempt to use the French aviation industry, but the results were unproductive. Rather the Germans decided to deport French workers to the Reich, but rarely were skills used effectively. This was one example of why productivity declined in the NAZI Großraum . The issue of deportation was an ongong conflict between Speer and Saukel. The French aviation factories, and many others, lay idle for most of the War. Vichy officials arrested former Air Minister Marcel Bloch and jailed him (October 1940). Bloch not only was Jewish, but refused to collaborate with the German aviation industry of Bordeaux-Aéronautique. His wife, also Jewish, was interned near Paris. The Germans subsequently deported him to the Buchenwald concentration camp (1944). He was liberated when the Allies liberated the Camp (April 1945).
France was one of the pioneers in aviation. The French in their military aviation exercises (1911, 1912, and 1913) worked out techniques of using aircraft to supplement cavalry in reconnaissance) and artillery (spotting). It was the French aircraft that supplied most of the aircraft used by the Allies at the onset of the War. Very quickly it became obvious that that cavalry could no longer provide the reconnaissance needed by commanders. Although reconnaissance methods were primitive, the value of aerial reconnaissance was quickly realized. Although the small size of the air units and primitive air craft were unable to supply the level of air reconnaissance demanded. French pilots did supply important information. It was aerial reconnaissance that led to the Battle of the Marne which stopped the German advance short of Paris. The French air arm was not like the French Army itself devastated and was throughout the War capable of offensive operations. The French air force throughout the war continued to be a unit of the French Army. It developed, however, a prestige esprit d'corps as a result of its achievement and performance during the War. The French air force was in fact largest and most powerful in the world at the end of the War.
There were several important French aviation companies, but the industry was dominated by several small companies emphazsizing cradtmanship rather than industrial methods. The companies included Latécoère, Morane-Saulnier Amiot, several smaller concerns. The most imprtant was the Société des Avions Marcel Bloch, founded by Marcel Bloch who had invented a type of aircraft propeller used by the French Army during World War I. Bloch with the rise of Hitler began to see the coming crisis. He joined with Henry Potez to purchase the Société Aérienne Bordelaise (SAB), subsequently renamed Société Aéronautique du Sud-Ouest (1935). The French Government nationalized the arms industry, including the aviation industry, before World War II (1936). Pierre Cot, Secretary of the French Air Force, decided that national security was too important for the production of war planes to be left in the hands of private companies. (This argument is often used by those critical of socialism and not just in national security circumstances, but compare the history of Government controlled French avaiation to privtely operated American or German aviation from 1936-40). The Government was authorized to seize any firm they thought important. France's nationalized aviation industry became the Société Nationale de Constructions Aéronautiques du Sud Ouest (SNCASO). The Government asked Marcel Bloch serve as the Minister for Air. The nationalization did not significantly improve production and some observers suggest it actually set back production schedules. The Government set up six large state-owned aircraft manufacturing companies. Budgets were, however, no where near what Hitler was pouring into the Luftwaffe. One limitation was the huge amounts of funds devoted to the Maginot Line. In addition France was a democratic Government with its financing open to public scrutiny. Hitler with his brilliant financeer, Hjalmar Schacht, managed to hide the huge sums being borowed and spent for rearmament.
The French Armée de l’ Air (FAA) entered World War II with high standards of training and some good aircraft, but a glaring weakness in communications. It would not be the quality and number of French planes that would lead to disaster. It would be the incompetence of French military commanders. The FAA's effectiveness was limited by illconceived tactical support doctrine and was in the middle of an expansion and requipment program when the Germans launched their Western Offensive (May 1940). The French air commanders had dispersed their forces so that they were not vulnerable to a surprise Luftwaffe attack. This also meant that the French could not bring their considerable air assetts to bear on the battle front to attack the German forces concentrated in the Ardennes and driving toward the Meuse. The result was a German break through and within days they had reached the Channel. France never recovered.
Germany occupied most of Europe. Added to Germam imdustry, this gave them massive otential productive power eivaling even the United States. rance was especially important. France has one of the modst advanced aviation industries in the world and had more mass production capabilities than Germany. The French aciation industry was one of the largest in Europe, only after after the Soviet Union and Germany. So what happened here was of critical importance for the German war economy. The French aviation factories were virtually untouched by the War. They could have been used to great effect, producing the aircraft and engines badly needed for the Luftwaffe. It was not and we are not entirely sure why. During the German occupation France's aviation industry was virtually disbanded. The Germans did make some attempt to use the French aviation industry, but the results were rediculouly unproductive. Vichy officials arrested former Air Minister Marcel Bloch and jailed him (October 1940). Vichy officials attempted to blame France's defeat on 'cosmoplitans' (a codeword for Jews) and socialists, any one but where the blame lay--the French military commanders. Bloch not only was Jewish, but refused to collaborate with the German aviation industry of Bordeaux-Aéronautique. His wife, also Jewish, was interned near Paris. The Reich Air Ministry after it was clear that Britain would survive the Luftwaffe onslaught and with the reelection of President Roosevelt who had announced plans for huge increased in aircraft production began to plan for a coming air war. Some of the steps taken would result in substantial increases in future production. These steps were probably more important thn Speer's mnagement as Armaments Minister. One of the steps undertaken was to use the mnufacturing base of the conqueed territories, now prt of the NAZI Großraum . And in terms of avition industries, Frane was by far the most important country in German hands. The Germans placed orders for 2,500-3,000 aircraft. Actual production, however, stalled. The French were hesitant and the Germns demanded controlling interest in the companies involved. Göring intervened and dispached his negotiating team back to France, telling them, "You must undertstand that for us ... it is a matter of vital necesity and that is absolutely impossible for us to wait. England is doing all she can to put at her dispoal an entire continent [meaning America] .... We must do the same thing as much as our means permit." Finally Göring got his deal, but 8 months after the German victory (February 1941). The French agreed to produce 3,000 German planes under license and 13,500 aircraft engines. The Germans were so anxious to get the deal that they gave up their demand for majority ownership. Göring's thinking must have been that after the war was won he would be able to simply seize what ever he wanted. While tens of thousands of aircraft would flow from Americn factories, the Germns managed to squeeze a mere 2,500 aircraft out of France and the Nethelands during the entire occuoation. It is not enturely clear why. Several factirs were at play.
First, one source siggests the Germans seized and pilfered equipment un French factiories. We have no information on airtcraft factories.
Second, a major problem was raw materials. France had bauxite and could produce aluminum, but it needed coal to do so and coal was in short supply throughout the NAZI Großraum. And we do not know to what extent NAZI oddicils allocted the needed raw materials.
Third, tranport was a problem. Fuel was inadequte. And the NAZIs seuzed lovomotives and rail cars.
Fourth, labor productivity was another problem. Producing planes in France reuired four times more labor than in the Reich. And their Resiustance attacks rail lines and infastructure.
Fourth, French workers adopted all kinnds of delaying tacics as wellas sabotaging production. (Sabotage took place, althouh the extent is difficul to assess.) After the War, the French liked to 'ceatively' claim their degree of resistance to the NAZIs.
Fifth, managers also adopoted delaying tactics.
Sixth, as Allied air power grew, we begin to see attacks on French factories. The British and Americans attcked French factiries. France had some of the most efficent motor vehicle plants (Citroen, Pugeot, and Renault) in Europe. Truck plants were hit. We are not sure about aicraf plants. Given the paltry production, it hrdly seems worth the effort. Pugoet was given the task of producing parts for the V-1. It attravted RAF attention (1943).
Seventh, there was no investment to expand production. The NAZIs were Socialists. They distrusted Capitalism. viewing it as essentially Jewish and exploitive. And given the NAZI policy of expropriation and the absence of any rile of law. No Frenchman of any sence was going to invest in any effort to expand production. Compare this with what ws happening in America.
Faced with disasterouly low production, the Germans eventually decided to deport French workers to the Reich. [Tooze, pp. 409-10.] The issue of deportation was an ongong conflict between Speer and Saukel. The French aviation factories, and many others, lay idle for most of the War. The French disaster is one example of why productivity declined in the NAZI Großraum. But economic failure was repeated everywhere in occupied Europe. Only France was especially important because of its large, diversified economy, including a formerly vibrant avition indutry. In total this meant that despite controlling most of Europe, the Germns were unable to compete economically with the countries making war on them. They in shoirt absolutely lost the wr if the factories.
The Germans took custody of Bloch from the crumbling Vichy regime and deported him to the notorious Buchenwald concentration camp (1944). He survivd and was feed when the Allies liberated the Camp (April 1945). He would go on to play a central role in a revived French aviation industry after the War.
Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breking of the Nazi Ecnomy (Penguin: New York, 2006), 800p.
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