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The Japanese military invaded China (1937) and despite military victories were frustrated that they were unable to force the Chinese to surrender. One option was to negotiate a peace. They rejected this option and after the outbreak of war in Europe studied how to benefit which is what they did in World War I. The militarists debated a northern strike against the Soviet Union or a southern strike against America and Britain. After the Germans seemingly abandoned them with the NAZI-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, the Strike South Faction became asendant. The primary Japanese objective became the British and Dutch resource rich colonies--the southern Resource Zone (SRC). Because the American-held Philippine Islands sat stride the sea lanes between the SRZ and the Home Island, the strike south option entailed war with the United States. As incredible as it may seem today, the Japanese answer to becoming embroiled to a seemingly endless war in China was to attack Britain and America. The primary military obstacle at the time was the United States which was not tied down by the War in Europe. An America's primary military strike force was the Pacific Fleet which President Roosevelt have moved forward to Pearl Harbor to dissuade the Japanese from war. Both America and Japan believed the coming war would be primarily a naval war. The growing capabilities of aircraft and the distances involved in the Pacific, however, meant that aircraft would play a much greater role than initially anticipated by either side. The Pacific War was notably begun and ended by aircraft. The limited range of aircraft during the 1920s and 30s affected military assessments. The Allies erred by significantly underestimating the capabilities of newly developed Japanese aircraft. Before the Japanese struck, it was widely thought in the West that Japan was not capable of making high-performance modern aircraft and that Japanese pilots were not particularly skilled. The Mitsubishi Zero shocked the Americans and British. The result was the virtual destruction of the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor and the loss of wide areas of Southeast Asia and the Pacific in 1942. The Japanese also badly miscalculated their ability to compete with American industrial strength, partly because they believed that the Americans, like Tsarist Russia in 1905, would sue for peace after Japan scored early victories and seized the SRZ. Japanese aircraft designers were competent, but their industry and associated research groups had a limited capacity. The U.S. Navy and Army Air Corps fought the first year of the Pacific War with inferior aircraft. The Japanese failure to fully capitalize on their initial advantage doomed their war effort. Not only was the U.S. Pacific Fleet not destroyed, but the Japanese were in no way able to impair American war industries. American air units were able to develop tactics which offset the Zero's superior performance. And after the first year of the War, American air units were receiving new aircraft that out performed the Zero and other Japanese aircraft. New types continually rolled off American assembly lines while the Japanese continued to use the same aircraft types with which they began the War. Not only were the Japanese unable to compete in industrial terms with the United States, but vthe Japanese pilot training program was an abject failure. Uncharastically for the Pacific War, the greatest naval battle of all time, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, was fought primarily by surface units with carriers playing only a minor role. But this was only because American naval aviation had so severely damaged the Imperial Navy's fleet arm. The Japanese in the final year of the War were reduced to using suicide tactics--the Kamikaze . And their aircraft were not capable of reaching sufficient altitudes to engage the American B-29s that reduced Japanese cities to cinders even before the two atomic bombs were dropped. Significantly, both B-29s carrying the atomic bombs flew without escorts and were not engaged by Japanese air defenses.
Japan seized the Chinese province of Manchuria (1931), commonly seen as the first aggressive action leading to World War II. The Chinese did not resist the seizure, but it resulted in intense anti-Japanese feeling throughout China. This lead to attacks on Japanese. Japan used its airforce to bomb Chinese cities like Shanghai resulting in extensive civilan casualties. The weak Chinese airforce was unable to protect the cities. Japan invaded China proper (1937) launching the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese insisted on calling it the China Incident. They encountered unexpectedly strong Chinese resistance. The Chinese were eventually forced to withdraw to the interior where the over-streached Imperial Army found it difficult to pursue in force. They used their air force, however, to bomb largely unprotected Chinese cities. China The Japanese dominated the skies over China, until the United States began supplying modern aircraft and trained pilots to China--the Flying Tigers (1942).
Japanese Aircraft Types
The Japanese also devloped a wide range of fighters, land-based bombers and carrier-capable fighters, bombers, and torpedo planes with which they launched the Pacific War. Most of the sme aircraft were still in use at the end of the War, in sharp contrast to the Americans who introduced many upgraded types.
The Mitsubishi A6M Zero (零式艦上戦闘機) was the most famed Japanese aircraft of the Pacific War. Ther were both land and carrier versions. The Zero was a fast, highly manuerable fighter armed with two 20 mm cannon and two 7.7 mm machine guns. It allowed the Japanese to achieve tactical air supperiority in the early battles of the Pacific War. The Allies had not relized that the Japanese had developed such an effective air capability. Much of the effectiveness of the Zero was its light weight making it extremely manuerable and extending its range. This was done primarily by not armoring the plane. This made it extremely vulnerable, but the planes available to the Americans at the start of the War like the Brewstwr Bufalo were two slow to get their sites on the Zero. The P-40 could be used, but only with tactics avoiding dog fights. Even the new Navy Wildcats which were beginning the reach the fleet were not competitive. This did not change until 1943 when the new Essex Class carriers and air groups with the F6F Hellcats reached the fleet (1943). American aircraft manufacturers knew basically what was needed, primarily a more powerful engine. They were assisted when the Americans discovered avirtually in tact Zero which crash landed on a boggy Aleutian Islnd. (This was during the Japanese Aleutian feint which was part of the Midway battle plan.)
The Nakajima B5N (中島 B5N) designated Kate by the Allies was the the standard torpedo bomber of the Imperial Japanese Navy when Japan lost launched the Pacific War. It outclassed comparable Allied types. The Kate was especially important because unlike the Americans who focused on dive bombing, the Japanese main strike force in naval engagements was the torpedo and unlike the Americans had an extremely effective one--the Long Lance Torpedo. The Kate was, however, soon relegated to obselence when improved Allied fighters like the F6F Hellcat arrived (1943). The Japanese failed, however, go bring its successor on line in significant numbers. The Japanese had developed at least two newer types of fighters during the Pacific War, but the Zero remained the main-line fighter. While there were some modifications, it was basically the same aircraft with which Japan began the Pacific War, in sharp contrast to the many more powerful aircraft the United States developed. The new types were built in limited numbers and used mostly in defense of the Home Islands from B-29 attacks and that was because they had a higher flight ceiling then the Zero. They had little success gainst the B-29s which had radar directed guns as well as P-51 escorts from Iwo Jima. The Japanese fter a while stopped coming up in force to meet the waves of B-29s. They had very limited fuel supplies and wanted to save their 'secret' air force hidden away in caves and other places for Kamakazee attacks on the expected American invasion fleet. This all ended up as a moot point when Gen. Curtiss LeMay took over he switched from high (30,000 feet) day time raids to night time raids at lower alditudes about 10,000 feet' and switched to mostly massive incendiary attacks on Japanese cities much like the British air offensive against Germany. Most Japanese cities were built with wood and paper and wre soon converted into rubble and cinders even before the atmic bombs were dropped.
The Japanese military invaded China (1937) and despite military victories were frustrated that they were unable to force the Chinese to surrender. One option was to negotiate a peace. They rejected this option and after the outbreak of war in Europe studied how to benefit which is what they did in World War I. The militarists debated a northern strike against the Soviet Union or a southern strike against America and Britain. After the Germans seemingly abandoned them with the NAZI-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, the Strike South Faction became asendant. The primary Japanese objective became the British and Dutch resource rich colonies--Southern Resource Zone (SRC). Because the American-held Philippine Islands sat stride the sea lanes between the SRZ and the Home Island, the strike south option entailed war with the United States. As incredible as it may seem today, the Japanese answer to becoming embroiled to a seemingly endless war in China was to attack Britain and America. ThevBritish Royal Navy was fully engaged in the Atlantic abd Mediterranean. The primary military obstacle at the time was the United States which was not tied down by the War in Europe. America's primary military strike force was the Pacific Fleet which President Roosevelt have moved forward to Pearl Harbor, until then a relatively small and little know known naval base, to dissuade the Japanese from war.
Both America and Japan believed the coming war would be primarily a naval war. Japanese and American planning both forsaw a climatic massive leet action that would decide the War. The American war plan was Plan Orange. Carrier aircraft was primarily een as scout planes to be used to find and located the enemy fleet. The growing capabilities of aircraft and the distances involved in the Pacific, however, meant that aircraft would play a much greater role than initially anticipated by either side. Both sides had air power advocates. While big gun admirals dominated naval staffs on both sides of the Pacific, Admiral Yamamoto who saw the importance of the carrier more clearly than many others had much more influence in the Imperial Navy than carrier proponents in the U.S. Navy. The primacy of the carrier was thrust on the U,S, Navy both by the carnage at Pearl Harbor and th fact that the Pacific Fleet battle ships were all sunk or destroyed.
The Pacific War was notably begun and ended by aircraft. The limited range of aircraft during the 1920s and 30s affected military assessments. The Japanese believed at the time they launched the Pacific War that the Home Islands were invulnerable to aerial attack. That assumption was based on the range and capabilities of the American B-17 Flying Fortress and the assumption that itbwould be a short war and thus military weaponry would not change during the fighting. They were of course correct about the first assumption, but fatally flawed about the second. The Japanese badly miscalculated their ability to compete with American industrial strength, partly because they believed that the Americans, like Tsarist Russia in 1905, would sue for peace after Japan scored early victories and seized the SRZ. The Japanese thus discounted the mamouth difference between the industrial capacity of Japan and the United States. Some of thge militarists planning the War were not fully aware of it. Others thought that the Axis alliance would aid Japan by forcing the United States to focus primarily on Europe and the Germans.
American planners had primarily focused on Europe rather than Asia. But Army Air Corps planners from an early point focused on strategic bombing. And American planners after Pearl Harbor after stopping the Japanese at Midway, primarily focuse on how to getbaur vases cloe enough to the Home Iskands ti begin the stratehic bombing campaign. At first the focus was on Chin, but with the success of the Navy's Cenbtralacific campaign, the Marianas took on a critical impotance. Army Air Corps planners and to the extent they thought about the Pacific and commanders in the Pacific, tragically underestimated the quality of Japanesevaircraft and capabilities of their pilots.
The Allies erred by significantly underestimating the capabilities of newly developed Japanese aircraft. Before the Japanese struck, it was widely thought in the West that Japan was not capable of making high-performance modern aircraft and that Japanese pilots were not particularly skilled. The Mitsubishi Zero shocked the Americans and British. This led not only to the Japanese success at Pearl Harbor and he destrucion of American air power in the Philippines.
The result was the virtual destruction of the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor and the loss of wide areas of Southeast Asia and the Pacific in 1942.
Japanese aircraft designers were competent, but their industry and associated research groups had a limited capacity. The fact that the United States during the inter-War era cut military spending to the bone allowed the Japanese by massive military spending to gain a military advantage in the Pacific. As the War unfolded, the Japanese were shocked by he spped with which American industrial might reversed the miklitary balance in the Pacific. The Japanese were correct that the Axis Alliance did firce the Amerucans to focus on Europe. They were shocked, however, to find that even with the priorty on Europe, the United States still had the industrul capacity to launch an offensive only 9 months after Pearl Harbor.
The U.S. Navy and Army Air Corps fought the first year of the Pacific War with inferior aircraft. The Japanese failure to fully capitalize on their initial advantage doomed their war effort. Not only was the U.S. Pacific Fleet not destroyed, but the Japanese were in no way able to impair American war industries. American air units were able to develop tactics which offset the Zero's superior performance. And American code breakers enable cairrier air units to scoreca victory over a superior Japanese force at Midway (June 1942). This with one stroke restored the naval balnce in the Pacific and made it impoosible for the Japanese to utilize their temporary superiority in the air. The Japanese built two bastions in the South and Central Pacific--Rabaul and Truk. Both were not only naval bases, but air bases with bith dfensivecand offensiuve capabilities. They had to rely on these bases to project air power. And with the loss of four fleet carriers, the Japanese decided to build an airfeld on Guadalcanal so they could project their air power on the vital sealanes between America and Australia. After seizing Midway this is how they had planned to use their now lost carriers. Despite the supperority of the Japanese Zero, the Americans were able to seize Guadalcana. The airfield there and the Cactus Air Force would play a key role in the Guadalcanal Campaign. The American and Australians also launched the beginning of the New Guiena Campaign.
The air war in the Pacific during the first year of the War was primarily carrier warfare. The Japanese desroyed American and British air units in the Philippines, Singapore, and Burma eaely in the War. The one bright spot was the Flying vTigers which withdrew its Burma contingent to China. The Flying Tigers were, however, too small to materially affect the War except to reduce the Japanese air superiority in China. The first significant air combat occurred when the Allies began contesting New Guinea and the Solonons. Here with the loss of four fleet carriets, the Japanese had to fight air war largely from Rabaul and Truk. Here the Americans had an advatage in that the Marines held on to Hendeson Field on Guadalcanal. While the Catctus Air force was small it was at the center of the battle and did not have to fly 200 miles to engage the eneny. Int could thus support the Marines and engage Japane surface units. This forced the Japanese to condust supply runs and attack the Marines at night, limiting the effectiness of these operatiions. As a result of Midway and other opeations, both sides had only a few carries left. As a result, the fleet engagements around Guadalcanal were largely fought by surface units, especially after he few remaining carriers were lost or damaged. By the end of the capaign, almost all of the pre-War carriers were gone and to the Japanese huge diadvantage, almot all of the highly competent aviators with which they launched the War. The American and Japanese surface fleets slugged it out. Both sides lost large numbers of ships and sailors. Finally the Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal and withdrew the Imperial Fleet to safe harbors at Singapore or the Home Islands. The Japanese hoped that the massive air capability at Rabaul even without the Imperial Fleet would be the ahchor that would hold the South Pacific.
Histories of the Pacific War as regards aviation focus on the Japanese First Air Fleet, the nagnificently trained carrier pilots and crews and the flasing Mitsubishi Zero. Much less is written about the Army's air operations. And we are not entirely sure about the Army's air operations. Unlike the war in China, there were few cities to be attacked, although the Japanese did bomb Manila, Singapore, Rangoon, and other cities, kincluding cities in northern Australlia. We do not know to what extent they employed close air support to ground operations. We do not knpw if there were forward air controllers (FACs). Unlike China, there were more lmoyed opprtunitoes to use close air operations. This would have been possible in Malaya, Sinaporte, and Burma, the Phillipines and finally New Guinea and perhaps Guadalcanal. Army air forces played an important role in several of these campaigns, but the extent to which close air support was developed we do not yet know. Air strilkes from Rabaul were important on Guadalcanal, but seem to have primarily focused on interdicting supplie and attacking Hendserson Field and the Cactus Air Force, initially equipped with obsolete aircraft. The Japanese were operating on the outer limits of their range and thus little time was avilable to provide close air support. And as far as we know, there was little or no radio contact with the ground forces when the Japanese plans reached Guadalcanal. After Guadalcanal (August-December 1942), advanced American akircraft in large quanity beggan reaching the theater. And the Japanese became hard pressed to even defend gtheir air bases, losing air superiority in the Pacific and the ability to support ground forces. Another problem the Japanese Amy faced was transporting and supplying troops in th Pacific. This became an especially serious problem as the Americvan Pavcific fleet began to recover and American air power grew. As relations between the Imperial Army and Navy were notoriously poor, the Japanese Army commisioned a number of escort carriers to protect thir troop convoys. Beginning with the American invasion of the Philippines (October 1944), American air power was so overwealmin tjat the Japanese began shifting almost entirely to Kamikazee attacks. Any thought of close air support was abandones.
And after the first year of the War, American air units were receiving new aircraft that out performed the Zero and other Japanese aircraft. New types continually rolled off American assembly lines while the Japanese continued to use the same aircraft types with which they began the War. Not only were new aircraft arriving, but also the new Essex class carriers to carry the new air groups. ThecEssex clas carriers were the fleet carriers which had become the capital ships of the Pacific War. In addition to the Essex-class carriers, a much larger number of escort or jeep carriers also began reaching the flet.
Not only were the Japanese unable to compete in industrial terms with the United States, but the Japanese pilot training program was an abject failure. The Japanese Navy had perhaps the best polot training programs in the world. The Japanese carrier pilots werre superb aviators as demonstrated by their performance in te early months of the Ware. The pilot training program, however, was geared to producing a relatively small number of aviators to man the air units of the Imperial Fleet at a time that the United States was significantly limiting military spending. The Japanese pilot training was adequate for a peace time Navy, it was, however, totally inadequate for the Pacific War once the United States threw massive resources at rapidly expanding the U.S. Navy and naval aviation. The United States created a marvelous pilot training program aimed at training a large number of well trained aviators. The existing Japanese training program was so ontensive that it could not be expanded to train large numbers of meerly competent naval aviators. The Japanee did not respond after losing most of their pre-War avitors with a comprable training program. Not only did they fail to create an effective training program, but fel shortages limited training time in the air. As axresult when the Imperial Navy finallyvenerged to give battle in the Philippines Sea (June 1944), its poorly trained aviators were slaughtered in the Marianas Turkey Shoot.
We note various comments about Japanese parashutes during Workd war II. Some authors claim that the Japanese pilots did not have parchutes. This is not the case. The photographic record clearly shows air crews wearingb parachutes. Every Japanese pilot, except Kamikaze pilots, were issued parachutes. And the Japanese had access to silk, unlike American, British, and German pilots. After all, a trained and experienced pilot was a valuable assett. Many of the pilots, however, decided not to use them. This was an individual choice. Many complained that they restricted movement in the cockpit. Also the polots often operating over enemy territory did not want to be captuted. Most commanders allowed the pilots to decide. Some base commanders insisted that parachutes be used. In this case, the pilots often put them on. but just used them as aseat cushion. Therec is some indication that usage increased as air combst shifted to the Home Islands in the final months of the War.
President Roosevelt at the onset of th Pacific War saw China as a major ally against the Japanese. Churchill was less sanguine. American planners at an early point saw China as providing bases needed for launching a strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese. Unfortunalley unlike northern urope, therewas no safe island base off Japan from which to launch a stratehic bombing campaign. After the Japanese closed the Burma Road, most of the supplies flown over the Hump were for air operations. The AVG was terminated and the 10h/14th activated to oversea these operations. The Chinese cooperated by beginning to build and expand air fields where the new B-29 Supertforts could be based. The bombing ws to be conducted by the new 20th Air Force. There were many problems associated with this, including the enormous logistical struggl of getting the needed supplies over The Hump. The Japanese were aware of the effort and the new B-29 Superforts. And they were aware of the damage Alloed bombing was doing to their NAZI allies in Europe. This was a major factor in Ichi-Go. Operation Ichi-Go (一号作戦 ) was the last major Japanese offensive of the War (April-December 1944). Other terms were used for the offensive. The Japanese also call it Tairiku Datsū Sakusen (大陸打通作戦) meaning Continent Cross-Through Operation. The Chinese call it the Battle of Henan-Hunan-Guangxi (豫湘桂会战). Ichi-Go consisted of three separate battles fought in the Henan, Hunan and Guangxi provinces. The three seoarate battles conducted by the Japanese: Oeration Kogo (Battle of Central Henan), Operation Togo 1 (Battle of Changheng), and Operation Togo 2 and Togo 3 (Battle of Guilin-Liuzhou). The Japanese objectives were 1) connect occupied Indochina to occupied China , and 2) capture the air bases the Chinese were building in southeast China from which American bombers could launch a strategic bombing campaign. The first objective shows how badly out of touch the Japanese high command was with the shifting strategic balance. They were still focused on completing their conquest of China. The second objective shows that they not unaware of the developing disaster wrought by launching the Pacific War. Ichi-Go was a major victory for the Japanese. They took huge ares of China and did enormous damage to the Nationalist Army. The Japanese conquest of agricultural land also was a disaster for the Chinese people, substantially reducing the rice harvest that was available to feed local populations and refugees. It was for the Japanese, a phyric victory. While Tchi-Go was in process, the Americans seized the Marianas Islands in the Central Pacific. The Marianas not only provided the bases needed for the strategic bombing campaign, but could be easily supplied with the cast quantities of men and equiment needed, in sharp contrast to the logistical nightmare faced by the 20th Air Force in China.
The Japanese Imperial Fleet after withdrawing from the South Pacific (Solomons) and Central Pacific (December 1942) began rebuilding for a climatic naval action with the American Pacific Fleet. Key to that effort was launching new carriers and training new air groups. The Americans used the more tha a year well, theJapanese did not. Japanese pilots stayed in the theater until they were lost in combat meaning all their hard won battle experience was lost. The Americans brought their ace pilots home to paricipate in pilot training. The Japanese plot training program was poor and impaired by the developing fuel shortages. Most of the Japanese pilots were now the 2nd and 3rd generation of war time trainees with little or no combat experience. Many of the American pilots had gained combat experiece in 143 nd even the bnew pilot wre well trained. The General Staff had hoped that a wellarmed and dug in island bastiions could repel American landing forces without the need or a fleet action. The United States Marines proved this not to be possible. As result, the Japnese decided to employ the Fleet to protect their inner ring of defense--the Mariana Islands which as afesult of the B-29 would bring the Home Islands within the range of aerial bombardment. The Japanese Combined Fleet commander in chief issued plans for Operation A-Go that would mass Japanese naval power, incluing aircraft carriers and land-based airpower to repel the aticipated Amnerican invasion force. Adm. Raymond Spruance commnded the American Fifth Fleet with its powerful carrier component--Vice Adm. Marc A. Mitscher’s Task Force 58. The Americans landed on Saipan (June 15), encontering aarge, well dug-in Japanese force. The Japanese commander, Adm. Jisaburō Ozawa received orders to execute A-Go and made for the Marianas to rlieve the defenders on Saipan. Te result was the Battkle of the Philippines Sea ad the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot (June 1944). This was the death nell for Japanese naval aviation. Uncharastically for the Pacific War, the greatest naval battle of all time, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, was fought primarily by surface units with carriers playing only a minor role. But this was only because American naval aviation had so severely damaged the Imperial Navy's fleet arm.
The Japanese in the final year of the War were reduced to using suicide tactics--the Kamikaze. Kamikaze means Divine Wind. It refers to the Mongol invasion of 1281. The Mongol Emperor of China was Kublan Kahn introduced to the West by Marco Polo. China at the time wa the most poweful country in the world Mongul armies had conquered China and then swept all opponents and pushed into the Middle East and Eastern Europe. When the Japanese Shoigun refused to pay homage to the Mongol Emperor, Kubla Khan launced a massice invassion in 1281. The invasion fleet was made up of 4,200 ships and 142,000 men--larger than the D-Day invasion at Normandy. It was, however, destroyed by a typhoon which the Japanese came to call the divine wind. This became the foundation of a holy myth, buttressed in the next century by a Samari General Kusunoke who launched the hopeless battle of Minatagowi at the order of the Japanese Emperor. As a result, his obedience and sacrifice came to be lionized in Japan and a holy natianal myth was built around him. His life was seen as the basis for the Kamikaze campaign. And inded the letters, diaries, and poems of the Kamikaze pilots wre filled with references to him. Interestingly, the Kamikaze was not conceived by the Japanese General Staff. Rather it was a tactic demanded by junior officers who saw that they could not match the rising power of American air and naval power. Only reluctantly did the Generl Staff adopt the tactic. Junior naval officers wrote to the General Staff in their own bold demanding that Kamikaze units and operations be employed. Admiral Onishi, a naval aviator, was the driving force behind the Kamikaze pilot attacks. Kamikaze attacks had resulted from individual acts of Japanese pilots. After the loss of the Philippines, however, it was adopted as a major defense policy. It was central to the Japanese effort to defend Okinawa and to fend off the impending American invasion.
The Pacific War was fought on the largest battlefield in history. This would make the range of aircraft to be a critically important factor. The air war in the Pacific began, as in the European theater, with mastery of the skies over China by the Japanese. The Chinese air force was vitually non-existant. The Japanese conducted terror bombing raid, first on Shanghai and then on other Chinese cities. The Japanese began the Pacific War with air mastery. This surprised Allied military experts. The dazzling Mitusubishi A6M Zero was so effective that they were able to achieve air superority during land and sea battles against Britain and the United States beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Zero was fast and maneuverable and had an impressive range. This continued throughout much of 1942 and only with the arrival of new American 56L Hellcat in large numbers did the Allies begin to gain the upperhand in the sky. The gradual attrition of skilled Japanese pilots was another factor. New American aircraft brgan reaching the fleet (January 1943). The Gruman 56L Hellcat would be the mainstay of the U.S Navt during the Pacific War. Gradually American flyers had planes with capababilities well beyond those of the Zero. The seizure of the Marianas and the deployment of of the new long range B-29 bombers brought the Japanese homeland within range of strategic bombardment. The initial raids were inclonclusive. General Curtis LeMay devised a strategy of fire bombing which caused massive destruction in Japanese cities crammed with highly flameable wooden structures. When Japan refused to surender after the Yalta Conference, President Truman ordered the use of tha Atomic Bomb in August 1945. The Japanese surendered in September. Japanese aircraft were not capable of reaching sufficient altitudes to engage the American B-29s that reduced Japanese cities to cinders even before the two atomic bombs were dropped. Significantly, both B-29s carrying the atomic bombs flew without escorts and were not engaged by Japanese air defenses.
The Japanese secret airforce is much more than an trivial historical footnote. An appreciation of the existence of the force is important in fully understand the ending of the War. Japan is often described as a defeated country in 1945. This represents a failure to reasonably appreciate the strategic situation. Japan even after the fall of Okinawa still had a sizeable airforce. American intelligence at the time did not fully appreciate the strength of the Japanese air force. Japan is a very mountanous country. After it became clear that the Americans planned to initiate a strategic bombing campaign, the Japanese military began to move its aircraft production facilities into caves, abandoned mines, and railwat tunnels where they could not be hit by American bombers. Using these facilities Japan managed to amass a secret airforce of 12,000 combat planes that were to be used against an AZmerican invasion fleet. American intelligence had no idea of the dimensions of the force being prepared to oppose the landings. Not only was a large force being prepared, but the Japanese aided by NAZI technology were building planes that were mre advanced than anything in the American arsenal. Some of these planes include the Japanese Army's Kario (Fire Draggon) which was based on the Luftwaffe ME-262 jet fighter. The Japanese used plans for the jet engine to be used for the Henkel He-162 Volksyager (People's Fighter). It was a simplified engine that was quicker and easier to mass produce. The Japanese version was the NE-20. It was ot just a copy, but an improved version. The Japanese avy also developed a jet fighter, the Kika (Mandrin Orange Blosom). The Navy began flying an operatioinal version (August 7, 1945). The Japanese also produced a fighter to target the B-29 bombers that were desestating Japanese cities. The plane was the Suswi and was an improved version of the Luftwaffe ME-163 Komet. The Japanese Navy began operational flights (July 1945). There was also the Oka rocket suiside bomber. It was of limited use in Okinawa because it had to be brought into range by slow mombers, but might have proven effective in the defense of the Home Islands. The Japanese also developed the R2Y (Beautiful Cloud) jet bomber. A prototype was flown (April 1945), but with propellar engines as the engines were not yet ready. Many of these aircraft were very complicated and thus a challenge for the Japanese to produce in numbers. They were not ready in August 1945. Some of them, however, would have been available by Spring 1946 when the American invasion was schheduled. Combined with the hug number of conventional aircraft that had been built, the American invasion could have been a very costly undertaking.
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