Figure 1.--. |
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For Truman the Japanese response to the Potsdam Declaration made up his mind. There have been many books and aticles published in both Japan and America about the atomic bomb. Japanese scholars have reserched the decission making process that led to the dropping of the atomic bombs. Almost always the focus is on Truman and Ameican military leaders. Many Japanese writers insist that Japan was a defeated country and would have surendered without the use of the bomb. Little real evidence is presented to substantiate the claim that Japan would have surendred. Rarely do Japanese authors address the role of Japanese political and military leaders. One American presidential adviser reports that Japanese reserchers and journlists have interviewed him a number of times during visits to Tokyo. They ask about when the decission was made to drop the bomb. He replies that it was the Japanese leaders who made the decission when they rejected the Potsdam Declaration. He says that this response is never included in either published articles or broadcasted television interviews. [Elsey] President Truman made the decession after a meeting with one of his most influential advisers, South Carolina Govenor Jimmy Byrnes (June 1). Byrnes told him that if he did not use the bomb that he would have to explain at his impeachment why he did not use a weapon that would have ended the War and saved tens if not hundreds of thousands of American lives. President Truman has never explained in detail why he decided to use te bomb. Certainly the military estimates of potential casualties from an invasion was a primary factor. Japanese resistance on Okinawa and Iwo Jima was strong evidence that American casualties woukd have been very substantial. Japanese brutality toward American POWs and civilians must have influenced the President, but to what degree it is difficult to tell. At the time, dealing with Stalin and the Soviets was very much on Truman's mind. Trouble with the Soviets in occupied Germany were increasing. It was at the Potsdam Conference that Truman told Stalin about the bomb. [Beschloss, p.66.] The possibility of the Soviet Union entering the War and claiming an occupation zone may have also been a factor. We are not sure just what intelligence briefings Truman received. One factor which would have been of concern was the Uranium shipments from Germany via U-boat. The only possible reason for such shipments was a Japanese nuclear project. One factor that does not seem to have influenced the President was limiting Japanese civilian casualties, but as horrible as the two bombs were, ending the War without an invasion probably save hundreds of thousands of Japanese lives, if not millions.
Senator Truman was not President Roosevelt's choice for vice president. He was the choice of the Democratic Convention meaning the Party leaders and the result of opposition to Vice President Wallace left-wing views. Roosevelt reportedly leaned toward James Byrnes, but liberal Democrats objected to a South Crolina segregationist. Truman and Roosevelt were not close and there were only a hand full of perfunctory meetings between the two. Roosevelt did not mention the bomb. Even after the election, Truman was not part of the President's inner circle. And he was not told of the Manhattan Project. This did not change until after President Roosevelt died (April 12). Vice President Truman thus did not learn about the Manhattan Project until after President Roosevelt died and he became president. Until that time Josef Stalin knew more about the Manhattan Project than Truman.
President Truman was informed about a poerful new weapon immediately fter he was swon in as president (April 12). Truman was immediately sworn in and soon after SEcretary of War Stimson told him of a new and terrible weapon being developed by physicists in New Mexico, but provided few details. The new president noted that he had been informed that the United States was perfecting an explosive great enough to destroy the whole world. Ironically, Truman had uncovered the secret while still a senator. He made his name as a senator by becoming a watch dog on wasteful military spending. And he uncovered the massive spending which was not accounted for that was the Manhattan {Project. Secretary of War Stimson had to go to him and ask him not to continue his inquiry because it was for a secret weapon. Senator Truman at the time deferred to the Secretary. The new president was finally told 2 weeks after becoming president of the details (April 24). (We have also seen references to April 25.) Secretary Stimson and Gen. Groves briefed Truman and provided a complete file with details on the Manhattan Project. They also told Truman that United States was the only country with the resources to develop the bomb during the War. The Germans were not even close. They also told him, however, that the Soviets might be able to develop one within four years -- a remarkavly accurate estimate as it turned out. They discussed if, and with which Allies, the United States should share the information. At the time onky the Brirish knew because they were involved in the Manhattan Project from the beginning. They also discussed how an atomic weapon would would affect the War and U.S. foreign-policy decisions. The President authorized the continuation of the project and agreed to form an interim committee that would advise him on how to use the weapon if necessary.
The Imperial Government and even the most militant Japanese military commander by 1945 realised that Japan had lost the War. There was no longer any hope of winning the War. Japanese leaders realised that there would have to be a negotiated peace. The question was just what the ternms would be. There was the question of Japanesse possessions, just had to be given up. Japan even after the strategic bombing campaign began, refused to accept the Allied demand for unconditional surrender. The two developments that the Japanese in particular refused to accept was first an end to the monarchy and second the occuopation of the Home Island. Japan no longer had the military capscity to defeat the Allies. The military was forced to adopt the strategy of majing the Allied advance as costly as possible. Commanders on Iwo Jima and Okinawa adopted tactics to kill as many Americans as possible. The Kamikaze campaign ubleased on the U.S. Navy at Okinawa made it clear what the Japanese were preparing for the invasion of the Home Islands. And not only was the military preparing, but the civilian population, including children were being prepared to resist an American invasion.
President Truman was horrified at the casualty reports from Iwo-Jima (February-March 1945) and Okinawa (April 1945). As bad as the earlier campaigns had been, both of these two campaigns were worse. There were 6,000 casualties at Iwo and 70,000 on Okinawa. Advisors prepared assessments that 0.5-0.1 million Americans would be killed in an invasion of the Home Islands. There were differences, but assessnments by Masrshall, Leahy, and MacArtur were all in that general range.
President Truman made the preliminary decession to prepare to use the bomb after a meeting with one of his most influential advisers, South Carolina Govenor James 'Jimmy' Byrnes (June 1). Byrnes told him that if he did not use the bomb that he would have to explain at his impeachment why he did not use a weapon that would have ended the War and saved tens if not hundreds of thousands of American lives. This was a brutal, but accurate assessment. This was especially the case because the Japanese war straegy was to kill as many Americans as possible.
Governor Burns was correct. While authors today from safty of time have created a controversy about Truman's decesion, there was no such controversy at the time. The Japanese had started the War and few Americans saw it as even auestion that America might refrain from using a weapon that would save the lives of 0.5-1.0 million servicemen. This was aituation the Japanese had created. Given this level of casualties, no American president could have possibly refrained from using aeapon that could have saved those lives. The fireball of public outrage that would have followed would have led to the President's impeacement. [Miscamble]
The Potsdam Conference was unlike Yalta not a war conference. It was held in a suburb of a defeated and prostrate Germany. It was a post-War settlement conference to decide issues concerning primarily the occupation and Germany's future. President Truman left Washington heading for Potsdam (July 6). Some accounts described Truman as dreading the Conference. It was essentially was Truman's transition from a senator with only minor influence and experience to one of the central characters in 'high-takes' international diplomacy. And he brought to Potsdam none of the confidence that President Roosevelt had brought to Tehran and Yalta. [Bechloss in the Conquerors, pp. 252-53.] With Germany defeated, how to deal with the Soviets was one of President Truman's primary concerns. He was not favorably disposed toward the Communist Soviet Union while still a senator. And Soviet behavior before and after V-E Day had disturbed him. At the time, dealing with Stalin and the Soviets was very much on Truman's mind. Trouble with the Soviets in occupied Germany were increasing. It was at the Potsdam Conference that Truman told Stalin about the bomb. [Beschloss, p.66.] It was thought that an atomic bomb would greatly strengthen America's bargaining position. At the time the President left Washington, he knew that a test was being prepared at Alamogordo. Thus he anxiously awaited news as he traveled toward Potsdam. The Trinity Test was successfully conducted (July 16). The Conference opened the next day (July 17). In the middle of the discussions, Secretary Stimson brought the President an irgent cable informing him that that the Alamogordo Trinity test had been 'successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of everyone' (July 21)." [Beschloss, p. 258.] (We have noted some references to July 19.) This meant that the United States would be able to end the Pacific War without Soviet assistance and gave the President increased confidence in dealing with Stalin. Churchill noted a new 'boldness' in stanfing up to the Soviets on issues concerning the Germans. [Beschloss, p. 259.] Truman 3 days after learning of the Trinty test, quietly told Stalin about the bomb, but provided few details. [Beschloss, p. 266.] Stalin's reaction has been endlessly assessed by historians. Unknown to Truman was that because Soviet intelligence services had penetrated the Manhattan Project, Stalin already knew a great deal. America, Britain, and China issued the Potsdam Declaration demanding Japan's unconditional surrender and outlining the terms (July 26). For Truman the failure of the Japanese to respond made up his mind to go ahead with dropping the bomb. He hoped that one bomb would be enough to force a surrender. Truman gave Secretary Stimson a handwritten order to 'release when ready but not sooner than August 2' (July 31, 1945).
There have been many books and aticles published in both Japan and America about the atomic bomb. Japanese scholars have reserched the decission making process that led to the dropping of the atomic bombs. Almost always the focus is on Truman and Ameican military leaders. Many Japanese writers insist that Japan was a defeated country and would have surendered without the use of the bomb. Little real evidence is presented to substantiate the claim that Japan would have surendred. Rarely do Japanese authors address the role of Japanese political and military leaders. One American presidential adviser reports that Japanese reserchers and journlists have interviewed him a number of times during visits to Tokyo. They ask about when the decission was made to drop the bomb. He replies that it was the Japanese leaders who made the decission when they rejected the Potsdam Declaration. He says that this response is never included in either published articles or broadcasted television interviews. [Elsey]
The United States did not include Hiroshima as a target in the Strategic Bombing Campaign, in part because the Air Force wanted to be able to determine the impact of an atomic bomb. Japan publicly rejected the Potsdam Declaration. President Truman ordered the Air Force to begin atomic attacks on Japan as soon as possible (July 25). The United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. The Enola Gay dropped the first bomb on Hiroshima (August 6). The results were catastrophic. Japanese scientists had already developed and used weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biolgical agents). And they were at the time working on an atomic bomb, but with out the resources and facilities available to the Americans. This was of course secret and only a small number of officials and scientists were aware of the work. Thus the Japanese were totally unprepared and had no idea at first what had occurred. The human tragedies are heart rending. There are many factual accounts. Many fiction writers have also addressed the cataclysm. One particularly moving account was about Emikio Amai age 6. "One morning toward the end of the summer they burned away by face. My little brother and I were playing on the bank of the river." [Bock] Most Americans believe that it was the atomic bombs that forced Japan to surrender. This comes from a basic inclination of most Americans to assume that all national leaderships are concerned about the welfare of their people. Of course this is not the case and the Axis leaders that took their countries to war are a prime example of this. The U.S. Air Force had already destroyed 66 Japanese cities before the attack on Hiroshima. One city more should not have been expected to dramatically change Japanese policy. The force of the weapon and the ease of destroying an entire city is another matter. One historian points out that the Japanese Supreme Council did not meet immediately after the Hiroshima attack. They did meet after the Soviet declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria. [Wilson]
When the fanatical Japanese Government refused to surrender after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshims, President Truman ordered the seconnd bomb to be dropped. The second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki (August 9). About 74,000 people perished. The following day, President Truman told his cabinet that '... the thought of wiping out anotger 100,000 people is horrible' abnd that 'he didn't like the idea of killing all those kids.' [Miscamble]
President Truman has never explained in detail why he decided to use te bomb. Certainly the military estimates of potential casualties from an invasion was a primary factor. Japanese resistance on Okinawa and Iwo Jima was strong evidence that American casualties woukd have been very substantial. Japanese brutality toward American POWs and civilians must have influenced the President, but to what degree it is difficult to tell. The possibility of the Soviet Union entering the War and claiming an occupation zone may have also been a factor. We are not sure just what intelligence briefings Truman received. One factor which would have been of concern was the Uranium shipments from Germany via U-boat. The only possible reason for such shipments was a Japanese nuclear project and there was no real intelligence about the Japanese atomic program. . One factor that does not seem to have influenced the President was limiting Japanese civilian casualties, but as horrible as the two bombs were, ending the War without an invasion probably save hundreds of thousands of Japanese lives, if not millions.
There was no questuoning of the President's decision in the aftermath of VJ Day. The first author to raise the wasn't necessary rgument published an article in the New Yorker (1946). It was much later when the debate began in earnest (1960s). The debate has since intenified. One of the most widely read critic charges that the bombs were unecessary abnd Trumans decesion was unjustified by myths. [Alperovitz] One reviewer charges that the author himself has constructed myths.
Often the ioprobrium for dropping the bomb is laid on President Truman. Japsnese authors tend to draw this conclusion as well as some American authors. More logically rsponsibility lies with the Japanese militarisys which launched the War and refused to end it. One author sucintly places the blame on '... the twisted neo-samuraiho led the Japanese miklitarygeared up with true banzai spirit to engage the whole populationin a kind of kamikze campign. Their stupidity and perfidy in perpetuating and prolonging the struggle should not be ignored.' [Miscamble]
Alperovitz, Gar. The Decesion to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth.
Beschloss, Michael. The Conquerors (Simon & Schuster: New York, 2002), 377p.
Bock, Dennis. The Ash Garden (Knopf, 2001), 281p.
Elsey, George. Panel discussion, Book-TV C-Span, November 14, 2002.
Miscamble, Wilson D. The Most Controversial Decesion: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, abd the Fefeat of Japan (Cambridge Universitty Press, 2011), 174p.
Wilson, Ward. International Security (2007).
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