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The two opposing armies prepared for a massive battle at El Alamein. Here after the British stopped the Afrika Korps, the iniative of battle gradually shifted from the Germans to the British as massive quantities of American supplies surged toward Egypt and the 8th Army. The same geography that helped the British stop the Germans, helped the Germans prepare for an attack by the building British force. Although the geography of the battlefield assisted the Germans, the location of the battle created enormous problems for Rommel. The British 8th Army in Egypt under its new commander Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery methodically prepared a final offensive against Rommel and the Afrika Korps. El Alamaine was the last defensible point before Alexandria and the Suez Canal. To the north of this desolste railway station was the Mediterranean Sea and to the south was the Qattara Depression through which even tracked vehickes could not pass. El Alamein was thus a physical bottleneck that had ensured that Rommel could not use manuer to defeat the British. Now it restricted the movement of the large armored force Montgomery was assembling. For Rommel there was no more defensible position to the West. It was hold the British at El Alamein or be destroyed. The British had stopped the Afrika Korps here in a desperate battle after a string of defeats. They also stopped a second German attack. The the two sides settled down. The 8th Army's supply lines were long, but the they were sea lanes and secure. Men and supplies thus flowed into Egypt in vast quantity. Most of the supplies came from America, including the new M-4 Sherman tank in large numbers. Oil was available from Iraq. The situation was very different for Rommel. OKW had instructed him not to pursue the British into Egypt, in parr because of the supply situation. Men and supplies were limited to begin with. The primary German focus was on the desperate struggle in the East. But not only were supplies limited, but the suoply lines very vulnerable, more vulnerable than the Germans realized. The Germans had to transport th supplies on Italian cargo ships crossing the Mediterranen, prmarily to Tripoli. Here with help of Ultra, the British destroyed large quantities by suinking the Italian transprts. Here Malta was a major factor. Oil was a particular problem for Rommel. As Bengazi was within range of British ar attack, most of the fuel had to be trucked over 1,200 miles from Tripoli. Thus the Germans used up much of the fuel landed, just trucking it east to Egypt. Water also had to be trucked. And the land route was also nor secure, savaged daily by the British Desert Air Force. We are not sure just how much of the supply trucks wre destroyed, but the portion was substantial.
The British had stopped the Afrika Korps here in a desperate battle after a string of defeats. They also stopped a second German attack. Thus the British twarted Rommel's best opportunity to seize Cairo and the Suez Canal. The battles were enensely importnt because after a long series of defeats, the British were finally learning how to fight at armored battlke ith the Germans, esorcilly the effectivecuse of anti-tank guns.
El Alamein was the last defensible point before Alexandria and the Suez Canal. To the north of this desolste railway station was the Mediterranean Sea and to the south was the Qattara Depression through which even tracked vehickes could not pass. El Alamein was thus a physical bottleneck that had ensured that Rommel could not use his manuer to defeat the British. Now it restricted the movement of the large armored force Montgomery was assembling. For Rommel there was no more defensible position to the West. It was hold the British at El Alamein or be destroyed.
The two opposing armies prepared for a massive battle at El Alamein. Here after the British stopped the Afrika Korps (July 1942), the iniative of battle gradually shifted from the Germans to the British as massive quantities of American supplies
surged to the 8th Army. The same geography that helped the British stop the Germans, helped the Germans porepare for an attack by the building British force. Although the geography of the battlefield assisted the Germans, the location of the battle created enormous problems for Rommel. The the two sides settled down. The 8th Army's supply lines were long, but the supplies cane in vast quantities. Men and supplied flowed into Egypt. Most of the supplies came from America, including the new M-4 Sherman tank in large numbers. Oil was available from Iraq. The situation was very different for Rommel. OKW had instructed him not to pursue the British into Egypt. Men and supplies were limited. The primary German focus was on the desperate struggle in the East. But not only were supplies limited, but the supply lines very vulnerable, more vulnerable than the Germans realized. The Germans had to transport th supplies on Italian cargo ships crossing the Mediterranen, prmarily to Tripoli. Here with help of Ultra, the British destroyed large quantities by suinking the Italian transprts. Here Malta was a major factor. Oil was a particular problem for Rommel. As Bengazi was within range of British ar attack, most of the fuel had to be trucked over 1,200 miles from Tripoli. Thus the Germans used up much of the fuel landed, just trucking it east to Egypt. Water also had to be trucked. And the land route was also nor secure, savaged daily by the British Desert Air Force. We are not sure just how much of the supply trucks were destroyed, but the portion was substantial.
The British 8th Army in Egypt under its new commander Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery methodically prepared a final offensive against Rommel and the Afrika Korps. Montgomery was known for his nmethodical planning. He is one of the most controverial generals of the War. He became the Brirish celeberity geneal, just as Rommel had become in Germsny. Montgomery's fame was that before El Alamein, Britain had not won an important land battle aginst the Germans. Montgomery merits considerable credit for turning a defeated, demoralized force into a vital instrument of British power. This was critical for British morale, possibly even more important tht the strategic achievements. It was vital for the British war effort hd Churchill's leadership. [hammond] Montgomery can also be credited for preparing a battle winning campaign. Montgomery's ego convinced himself that he was a military genius. In fact much of Montgomery's success was due to the massive quantities of American supplies flowing into Egypt. Military historians while crediting Montgomery for winning the Battle of El Alamein, generally criticize him for failing to press the defeated Afrika Korps closely. Rommel discusses this in great detail in his dicussion of the evacuatin of Cyrenaica (eastern Libya). [Rommel, pp. 348-58.] This was a failure that would lead to the prolonged battle for Tunisia.
The Second Battle of El Alamein would prove to be one of the decisive battles of the War and one of the three shocks that rocked the Third Reich to its core, the others being Torch and Stalingrad. Montgomery launched his carefully orcestrated offensive at El Alamein (October 23). The Afrika Korps was protected by the 'DEvil's Garden'. This was a extensive entanglemet of barbed wire and mine field laid by the Germans which was 5 miles wideand streached from the Mediterranean to the Qatarra Depression. Over 3 million mines were laid, amy of which are still there. The area was littered with a huge number of both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. This meant that the British would suffere terrible causalties in any massive headon assault. Going through the Devil's Garden would prove to be a nightmare for the British. To confuse the Germans, Montgomery launched 'Operation Bertram'. This objective was to convince the Germans that the British attack was coming in the south. Montgomery sinalled his men, "Everyone must be imbued with the desire kill Germans, even the padres 'one for weekdays and two on Sundays' The Eighth Army had deployed dummy tanks were set up in the south as well as a dummy pipeline. his was done slowly to convince the Germans that the British were in no hurry to attack. Meanwhile the main Eighth Army force was in the north and doing its best to 'disappear'. Tanks were camoflauged and made to look like not so dangerous trucks. Bertram effectively drew the German atten\tion to the south. As would be the case on D-Day in Europe. Rommel was absent. He was on mecical leave, demoralized by supply problems and British ai attacks. He had a serious liver infection and low blood pressure. General Georg Stumme was left in command in Rommel's absence. [Douglas-Home, p. 171.] The British offensive began (October 23). Stumme died of an apparent heart attack while examining the front (October 24). Rommel immediately flew back, arriving the next day (October 25).
The main attack was code-named Operation Lightfoot. A diversionary attack in the south where Bertram had attracted te Germans aattention was hoped to draw 50 percent of the Afrika Korps Germans mobile forces. Montgomery believed the principal attack in the north would suceed in just one night. The infantry attack first. The idea was that the the anti-tank mines would not be tripped by just soldiers advancing over them. The triger mecanism was calibrated for the weight of a heavy tank. (This is why the attack was code named Lightfoot. As the infantry advanced, engineers began clearing a path for the tanks ready to move forward. The British began clearing a narrow stretch though the mdeadly minefield. This only had to be 24 feet wide whch would permit tanks to pas in single file. It was adaunting task that essentially failed. Mongomery sent a simple message as the battle began, "All that is necessary is that each and every officer and men should enter this battle with the determination to see it through, to fight and kill, and finally to win. If we do this, there can be only one result 'together, we will hit the enemy for six out of Africa'. The attack began with a massed artilleery barage (over 800 artillery guns).
The British plan to get the tanks through in one night failed. The infantry had also not penetrated deeply into German lines and ad to not got as far as Montgomery had planned. They had to dig in.
The second night of the attack also did not achieve breakthrough. Montgomery did not think it was te faultbof his plan. He blamed his tank commander--Lumsden. Montgomery demanded that he advance or be replaced with a more offensive spirit. The high rate of tank losses, however, could ot be sustained. Montgomery called off Operation Lightfoot and pulled the tanks back. Churchill was apauled.
Montgomery after the battle saw the battle a a great tactical triumph. In fact it was a massive battle of spply and attrition. And here The Royal navy and Air Force was savaging Rommels supply lines. An not only were British supplies reaching the eiht rmy, but vast quantities of American supplies. And the Eighth Army got Americans M-4 Sherman tanks which the American forces embarking for Torch only had the M-2 Stuarts and M-3 Grants.
The Germans were uffering losses as well. Rommel when he rejoined the Afrika Korps was also apauled. He rushed back only to find the Afrika Korps desintegrating under the relentless British assault. He found he only had 300 tanks left while the British had more than 900 tanks. Mongomery orrdered a n attack in the nort along the Mediterranean coat. This was led by the Australians. Rommel had to move his precious tanks north to counter this. The Australians suufered heavy casulaties, but the attack had an impact.
Rommel intition convinced him that this would be what the Germans call the skewerpunt--the decisive point on which the battle would turn. He much much of his mobile force there. The Australians fought firecely. Rommel describes 'rivers of blood'. The Australian advance opened up the battlefiels, giving Montgomery room to manuer with his larger force.
It is at this point that he launched Operation Supercharge. The British and New Zealander infantry attacked south of the Australians. Rommel was surpriseed. And the 9th Armoured Brigade with 123 tanks attacked the German lines. A sandstorm came up and saved the Germamns. Many of the British tanks got lost and were destoyed by the German 88mm anti-tank gun defenses. Nearly 75 percent of the Brigade was lost. But Montomery had reserves which he ordered forward. And they enggaged the Germans in a furious tank battle. And the British had ovewealing numbers.
The British had assembled superior forces and there was no way to rescue the situation. The entenched Germans and the carefully position 88s caused enormous casualties and slowed the British. The British lost more than 500 tanks, but they had them to lose. The Germans did not. Rommel despite the strenous efforts of his men knew that the Afrika Korps was beaten (November 2). There wa no way of recovering. Hitler ordered the Afrika Korps to fight to the death. Rommel refused carry out he order and defied Hitlker. to carry out this order. Rommel began the retreat back into Libya, passing ovr hard fought ground (November 4).
Rommel defied Hitler's orders to stand and fight at El Alamein and oversaw the retreat of his Panzer Army back into Libya (November 4, 1942). It would prove to be the longest retrat in military history and the most successful. Many of Rommel's Italian allies were left in the desert as the Germans comandered all available vehecles and dwindling supplies of fuel. Roomel vehemently rejected this charge, calling it a 'monstrous statement'. He pointed out that the Italians, including Mussolini agreed with him. [Rommel, p. 367.] Typically, Göring suggested this in front of the Italians and not when only germans were present. We think his point was that the Italians left behind were in unmotorized infantry divisions. If they were to be saved, they had to be evacuated before the British broke through. [Rommel, p.356 and 360.] And Hitler of course ordered the Afrika Korps to stand and fight. the Afrika Korps lost most of its stores and heavy equiment euipment in the retreat from Alamein. Most of the men were saved, accoding to Rommel because of the cautious tactics of Gen, Montgomery. [Rommel, pp. 360-61.] Rommel reports that out of the approximately 90,000 Germans at El Alamein, some 70,000 escaped. [Rommel, p. 358.] Many would participate in the battle for Tunisia. The retreat from Alamein was in sharo contrast to the Stalingrad disaster wher Gen. Paulis has refused to defy Hitler's orders to stand and fight.
El Alamein was important, but it was not the battle that turned the tide of World war II as suggested by some authors. [Hammond] The forces deployed were a fraction of those deployed on the Eastern Front. It was in the East in the titanic battles between the Germans and the Soviets that the outcome of the War was detrermined. And even if Montgomery had failed at El Alamein, Rommel would have been forced to turn west as a result of the Torch landings. The British to maintain their morale needed a victory. They had been fighrung for 3 years and had not yet achieved a battlfield victpry against the Germans. What El Alamein did achieve was a badly needed British victory, vital for a continuation of the British war effort.
Douglas-Home, Charles (1973). Rommel: The Great Commanders. (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1973).
Hammolnd, Bryn. El Alamein: The Battle that Turned the Tide of the Second World War (2012).
Rommel, Erwin. B.H. Liddell-Hart, ed. The Rommel Papers (New York: DeCappo Press, 1953), 545p.
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