Figure 1.--This photograph was taken in Yugoslavua toward the end of World War II, probably in early 1945. The Allies were still aiding the Partisans. Shortly after this photogrph was taken and the War ended. Tito and his Partisans created a hard-line Communist Government in Yugoslavia ad began shooting down American olsnes in the Adristic. Many people were shot or committed to brutal concentrarion camps. Ironically, Tito would be the first European Communist leader to resist Stalin's domintion.

The Allies would have preffered to work with both resistance groups, but it very quickly became clear that the two grouos would not work togeher and saw each other as enemies every bit as threatening as the Germans, if not more so. To be effective they needed arms. And only the Western Allies were in a posiution to supply arms. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill after the fall of France (June 1940) had few options available to fight the Germans. So he set out to 'set Europe ablaze' meaning to support resustabce grouos fighting the Axis, primarily the Germans. The British firmed the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to help organize and suoport the resistance throughout occupied Europe. The SOS sought to make trouble for the Germans wherever possible. The Americans joined the effort (December 1941). They inserted agents behind enemy lines and provided supplies to resistance groups and coordinated operatuions to fight the NAZIs. There were limittions as to what could be done. Western Europe was hravily urbsnized. Thus there were not large forrest.mounneous areas in which guerillas could operate. So in most countries, rather than setting Europe ablaze, the SOS primrily focused on intlligence gathering. Nor were most of the occupied countries willing to tolerate the savage reprisals the Germans threatened for open rebellion. Other than the Soviet Union, the only armned resistance occured in the Balkans (Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent Greece). The Mihaljlovic Royalist Chetnik partisans, however, gradually became reluctant to attack the GErmans, in part because of the horendous reprisals and also hostility to Tito's partisans. Because of this reluctance as well as open collaboration with the Germans and Italians, the Allies gradually lost faith in the Chetinks and began supporting Tito's partisans. The first Big Three Conference (Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin) was held at Teheran (1943). One of the decisions taken was to regognize the Partisans as the legitimate national liberation force. This was tatamount to hosing the post-War government of Yugoslasvia. The Allies established the RAF Balkan Air Force at the instigation of Brigadier-General Fitzroy MacLean. This played a role in expanding the delivery of supplies and even some tactical air support.

Resistance Groups

After the German Blitzkriueg invasion, the Yugoslav Army quickly collapsed (April 1941). Several organized militry and militia forces operated in Yugoslavia during the War. The Yugoslsav Army collspsed under the German Blitzkrieg onslaught (April 1941). The Bulgarians, Hungarins, Italians, and Romanians participsted in the German overseen occupation and partition of Yugosalvia. The Germans helped organize and arm colaborating Croat and Muslim units. Two resistance groupos emerged. The two main resitance forces orgnized to resit the Germans were the Royalist Chetniks loyal to the Yugoslav Governmennt in Exile in London and the Communist Partisans basically associated with the Soviet Union. Resistance groups formed throughout NAZI. The Chetnik leader was Dragoljub 'Draža' Mihailović. He was an ethnic Serb and a career soldier in the Yugoslavian army. Joseph Broz or Tito who led the Partisans was an already well-established revolutionary. The bulk of the population was shocked with the stunning NAZI victories. Most saw no choice but to collaborate, even France. Armed resistance was not possible in most of Europe because it was so highly developed without large forrests and mountaneous areas where armed resitance groupos could operate as in the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia was different. There were large ares where forest and mountain areas guerilla groups could operate and it would take a massive German deployment to root them out. And with the German invasion of the the Soviet Union the Germans and their Axis allies simply did not have the men and material to do this. They could control the cities and many areas of Yugoslavia. hy could not control the whole country. Yugoslavia was also different from the rest of the Europe in that it was so divided by ethnic and religious groups so bitterly opposed to each other. As a result, in Yugoslavia, it was not only the Germans doing the killing, but Yugoslavs were killing each other. It would become one of the most killing fiel of the War and the Partisans introduced an ideological component into the wiches brew that made Yugoslavia such a deadly part of World War II. He had spent time in postings in other countries as well as commanding troops within Yugoslavia. Shortly before the war broke out, he had run into trouble for criticizing his country’s preparedness for war. In his opinion, the focus should have been less on defending the borders and more on fighting from the mountainous highlands.

Mutual Oppoition

The Yugoslav oppositiuon was badly divided. The Allies would have preffered to work with both resistance groups, but it very quickly became clear that the two grouos would not work togeher and saw each other as enemies every bit as threatening as the Germans, if not more so.

Arms

To be effective they needed arms. And only the Western Allies were in a position to supply arms. The Yugoslav Army had given no thought to stash arms that could be used by resustabce fighters if the Germans invaded and occupied the country. Some limuied arms were carried by men who evaded being captured and went into th hillks, but almost the entuire armament of the Yugoslave Army was caotured by the Germans and other Axis invaders. You might think that given the alreadly long list of NAZI successes, tht some thought might have been given to this, but it was not. A fctor here was thst the Yugoslav Government has attemopted to accede to NAZI demands, but the Yugoslav public rejected in and the arrangent had to bevrescinded. This waswht prompted the NAZI invasion.

British and American Secret Operatioins

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill after the fall of France (June 1940) had few options available to fight the Germans. So he set out to 'set Europe ablaze' meaning to support resustabce grouos fighting the Axis, primarily the Germans. The British firmed the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to help organize abd suoport the resusrabce throughout occupied Europe. The SOS sought to make trouble for the Germans wherever possible. The Americans joined the effort (December 1941). They inserted agents behind enemy lines and provided supplies to resistance groups and coordinated operatuions to fight the NAZIs.

Potential

There were limittions as to what could be done. Western Europe was heavily urbanized. Thus there were not large forrest.mounneous areas in which guerillas could operate. So in most countries, rather than setting Europe ablaze, the SOS primrily focused on intlligence gathering. Nor were most of the occupied countries willing to tolerate the savage reprisals the Germans threatened for open rebellion. Other than the Soviet Union, the only armned resistance occured in the Balkans (Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent Greece). The Mihaljlovic Royalist Chetnik partisans, however, gradually became reluctant to attack the GErmans, in part because of the horendous reprisals and also hostility to Tito's partisans.

Initial Support

At the time the Germans invaded Yugoislavia (April 1941), the only unoccupied country still at war with Germany was Britaian along with the Empire and Dominions. So the only country that the Yugoslavs coukd turn to for support was the British. The British effort to support Greece to the south quickly failed abd there was no effort to supoport Yugoslsavia. The fighting lasted only a few weeks. The British were willin to provide some support to the resistance fighters who began to orgnize. At first, this mean Mihailović's Chetniks rather than Tito's partisans. In fact while Tito began orgnizing, he did not begin attacks on the Germsns. This was because the NAZIs and Soviets were still allies as a result of the NAZI-Soviet Pact. Stalin ordered Communist Parties throiughout Europe to avoid proivoking he Germans, even while the Gestapo was actively riunding up known Communists. Communism was seen as a serious threat to the British. This was one reasoin that the British tried so hard to appeasr Hitler, they wanted a bulwarkd in Central Europe to the Communist Soviet Union. Churchill took a special interest in the SOE and supporting Resistance mobvements. The London-based Yugoslav-Government-in Exile led by King supported the royalists over the Communists. They influenced the British Foreign Office and Chiefs of Staff to back Mihailović. Thus as the Guerilla War in Yugoslavia began, the British began sending equipment to Mihailović and the Chetniks. Tito had the manpower, a better organizatioin, and the experience with resistance work, but Mihailović had begun receiving weapons.

Barbarossa (June 1941)

The need to secure the Wehrmacht's southrrn flank is what prompted the German invsion of Yugoslavia and Greece. Actually the military action in the Balkans forced Hitler to delay Barbarssa which may well hsve been the difference between success and failure. In turn the need to focus on Barbsrossa gave the Chetniks time and space to organize. It also changed the politicl situstion for Tito's Particans. Stalin now wanted any kind of diversion possible as the Red Army attemopted to stop the German drive East. Communist Parties in Europe and the United States had been stunned by the NAZU-Soviet POact and orders from Moscow not to confriont the NAZIs. Now they were no longer restriucted. Thgey were able to do what almost all ghought was vital--oppose the NAZIs.

SOE Assessment

The initial Brutish decision to aid the Chetniks was made by the British Foreign Office. It should be mentin that the impulse for Apeasement did not come the Foreign Office. Important elements in the Foreign Office was skeptical. Apoeasement was ghe brain child of Prime Minister Chamberlain and conducted as personal diplomscy. By the time of the Balkan camoaign, however, the Special Operations Execurive (SOE) created after the fall of France (July 1940) existed and had responsibily for resistsnce operations. The Fioreign Office had been respmsible for relations with the Yugoslav Government, but now that it was more of a matter of aiding resistance fighters, the SOE was involved. And the SOE was divided on the path forward in Yugoslavia. The SOE London headquarters was staffed by many of the same kind of men who staffed the Foreign Office. Men drawn from Britain’s mainstream leadership, conservatively-oriented businessmen and bankers, only a few had militry experience. The field offices were substantially different. And the SOE team based in Cairo, through whom much Balkan intelligence was directed, had a different mebtality and outlook. They were more likely to have politically liberal personnel as well as include career military. Sometimes both. They were less likely to be stridently snti-Communit snd mnore likely to focus almot exclusively ion the NAZI menace. This mean thst they did not autoimtically support for Mihailović. They were willing to cosider aiding the partisans if they were willing to take on the Germans.

Resistance Orientation

There were real dufferences between the Partisans and Chetniks on how to fight the War. Tito and the Partisans wanted to take on the Germans when ever possible. And they ignored German reprisalls. In fact, Tito's calculations were that the vicious reprisals would sctually create more recruits to the Partisan ranks. Mihailović had a very different idea about how to fight the War. Mihailović’s assessment was that Yugoslavia could not effectively resist the Germans on its own. And that German reprisals made it to costly to attack the occupation forces. Rather the best policy was to avoid combat and build up forces to support an Allied invasion, like the okne thst had liberted Serbia in World War I. Thst was not what the Americans and British wanhted to hear, but it wa not known for some time that this was the Chetnik policy.

SOE Assessments

As reports begsn coming in from Yugoslavia The British Government was confused on the issue of Yugislavia. And after Hitler declared watr in America (December 1941), the United States began asking the same question. And the Americans had even less concern about the Communist orientation of the Partisans. So some assessment of what was happening in Yugoslsvia was needed. SOE sent Cpt. Hudson, a mining engineer fluent in Serbo-Croat, to Yugoslavia (Autumn 1941). He had considerable appearance in Yugoslavia. Cpt. Hudson met with both Chetnik and Partisan leaders. Hudson learned of th fihting activities of the Partisans leaders and discovered that there wa no way that that the two resistance firces were going to cooperte. Gudson submitted a radio report, but then lost radio contact for months (until August 1942). SOE had to look for other sources of information. The best evidence prived to be the Germans themselves. Bletchley Park had cravked the German Enigma Machine as was really some messages (as early as April 1940). By 1942 Bletchky parrk was regularly reading German trabsmissions except the Kreiegs Marine traffic. Thus German trabsmissions from Yugoslavia made it very clear who was fighting them, but securuty coincerns limmited distribution. It was clear that it was the the Partisabns doing most of he fighting. And the Chetniks were to some extent actually collaborating with the Germans to resist the Partisans. The German Supreme Commander Southeast told Hitler that “Tito is our most dangerous enemy.” The Briutish sent in other missions. Cpt. William Deakin parachuted into Yugoslavia on another fact-finding mission (May 1943). Huis detailed reoort is believed to have influenced a shift to supplying the Partisans. He confirmed that the Partisabs were fighting hard while the Chetniks were collaborating.

Shift of Support

The British had supported a Mediterranean strategy. It became a major bone of conrention between America and Britain at war planning conferences. The British even toyed with invading Greece ad Yugoslavia. The Americab went aloing wuith Totch, Sicily snbd Itly, but flsly rejcted the Balkans. They insisted in a cross-Chsnnl invasion. The British had no choice but go ahead with a cross -Channel invasion. So preparing for a Bslknbs invasion had no value. Anda at abny rate they had kist vfaith with the Chetniks. What they wanted was attacks in the Balkans that woud firce the Germans ti commit its dwindling reserves. No thought was given to the price the Yugoslav oeople would ply or about the poot-War impact on Yugoslavia. Everthing was being waged ion a successful cross-Channel invasion. Of coiurse iut us easy to criticise today. But what would beconme D-Day was no sure fire operation. There are plenty of miklitasry experts whoi brlieve thst the Germans had the capsbility of defeating the invasion. The Allies decided to shift supply deliveries from the Chetniks to the Partisans.

Teheran Conferebce

The first Big Three Conference (Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin) was held at Teheran (1943). One of the decisions taken was to regognize the Partisans as the legitimate national liberation force. This was tatamount to hosing the post-War government of Yugoslasvia.

Balkans Fighting

the Allies shifted supplies from the Chetniks to the Partisans the bslnce of power shifted dcidedly. Tito was able to intensify his resistance campaign. He becamne a national hero. Once the Germans withdrew (October 1944), the Partisans quickly seied control of the country.

Balkan Air Force

The Allies established the RAF Balkan Air Force at the instigation of Brigadier-General Fitzroy MacLean. This played a role in expanding the delivery of supplies and even some tactical air support.

Communist Yugoslavia

Dyurung the War, Tito presebted himself as a freedom fighter. He cooperted with the Allies, helping to get downed airmen back to Allied forces in Italy. After the War he etablished one of several Stalinist regimes in Eastern Eurooe. There were brutal concentration camps and mumerous drum head executions. He had Mihailović shot. Anmerican aircraft were shot down in the Adriatic. This all changed when Stalin tried to purge Tito. He failed and Tito broke from Moscow, but not Communism. The once hard-line Communism began to allow the first significant market reforns in a Communist country. He continued to be very strict about ethnic divisiveness. He did not allow it within the Partisan Movement or in Communist Yugosklavia. He sucessfully suoressed any exporession of etnic nationlism, but he did not change how people thought. It all came out in the indeoendence wars four decades later (1991-95). And with the same intensity thst had turned the country into a killing field dyrung the War.

Sources

Bennett, Ralph. Behind the Battle: Intelligence in the War with Germany 1939-1945 (1999).

Holmes, Richard. ed. The Oxford Companion to Military History (2001).

Created: 9:03 AM 6/30/2018
Last updated: 9:03 AM 6/30/2018