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The failure to take Caen on D-Day set up a costly 2-month battle of attrition for the city stretching into August. Taking Caen was probably overly ambitious given the German strength before the Allies had landed adequate strength. The 12th Waffen-SS Hitler Youth Division with its heavy panzers played a key role in the German defense of Caen. The power of one SS Panzer Division show how critical the German decision to hold panzer divisions at the Pa de Calais rather than the fight fir Normandy was. The British hammered Caen with naval artillery and aerial bombardment. A massive raid leveled much of the city (July 7). Even so the Germans continued to control part of the city until (July 19-21). The fight continued in the ridges beyond Caen which the Germans heavily fortified. Large numbers of Allied tanks were lost in the battles to take Caen . A key factor was the German panzers which out-classed the American Shermans that the British were also using. Many of the Allied tankers were not aware when these battles began of how vulnerable they were to German fire. It was largely up to the tankers themselves to devise tactics suitable for their tanks. The problem for the Germans is that the Shermans could be replaced, while the German losses not being replaced. Allied air power and naval artillery meant that the Germans could not mass for a major armored attack. The power of the German tanks and anti-tank defenses (especially the German 88) and skill of the more experienced panzer commanders eviscerated British armored thrusts. The British came up with the Firefly to match the German tank fire power. Only with the American Cobra Breakout did the German position become untenable. The cost had been very high, but as result of the action, the British and Canadians held the major German forces in place while the Americans drove through the bocage country to the west. The Germans were steadily weakened by the attrition and received no meaningful replacements. Meanwhile the Americans amassed an immense force in the west--a massive coiled spring as Bradley prepared the breakout.
Caen was the key objective for 3rd British Division, landing on Sword Beach, the eastern flank of the D-Day invasion. The Germans deployed substantial forces to hold Caen. The Allies were unable to capture the strategically important city on D-Day. Montgomery with the 3rd British Infantry Division from Sword Beach was tasked with taking Cane on Day 1, but fell short. They ran into the teeth of armored counter-attacks from 12th SS Hitler Youth Panzer Division equipped with heavy panzers. Without armor support, the British were driven back from Caen. [Trew] Te the 21st Panzer Division attacked between Sword and Juno and approached the Channel, but a single Panzer division could not overwhelm the Allied force with air cover and naval artillery support. It was stopped by the British 3rd Division and was ordered back to defend Caen and Bayeux. [Ford and Zaloga] With Caen still in German hands, General Bernard Montgomery, chose to meet with the commanders of the U.S. First Army and British Second Army, Lieutenant Generals Omar Bradley and Miles Dempsey to work out a revised plan to take Caen which led to Operation Perch.
Operation Perch was launched immediately after the landings and was an attempt to take Caen, which was target to be taken on D-Day. The plan was to encircle the city first rather than drive into it. The First Corps was to move east of the city while the Thirtieth Corps was to seize the villages and high points to the west. This meant attacking strong German formation to the west of the city.
The Thirtieth Corps included the 50th Northumbrian Infantry Division was ordered to seize Bayeux and the Tilly-sur-Seulles road. The 7th Armored Division, supported by the 8th Armored Brigade had the job of taking Mount Pincon. To the east, the First Corps' the 3rd Canadian infantry division was go advance up the Orne River and reach the southeastern approaches to Caen. The renewed attacks by 3rd Canadian Division (June 7-8) were foiled by 12th SS Panzer Division as were 7th British Armoured Division's thrusts towards the city (June 11-14).
The British launched Operation Epsom to take Caen (June 26-30). Further British and Canadian assaults
supported by RAF Bomber Command attacks stalled (July 4) leaving the city mostly in German hands..
Operation Windsor was the Canadian attempt to take the Carpiquet airfield salient held by 12. SS-Panzer (July 4). Preceded by an intense artillery barrage, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division supported by 2nd Canadian Armored Brigade commenced two-pronged attack on Carpiquet and the airfield there. The Germans could no longer used the airfields, but the RAF wanted it. Close combat eruptyed in the town, taking the airfield with its open runway proved more of a problem. Two Canadian battalions managed to take the town using British 'Funnies' (specialized tanks) and held against German counter-attacks. The Canadian tanks moving unto the airfield were hammered by well-placed German 88s. The hangers were taken but other parts of the base and part of the salient remained in German hands.
Rather than realistically understanding the military situation, Hitler changed commanders. Hitler appointed Günther von Kluge OB West -- Commander of the German Army in the West (July ??). (Von Rundstedt, was fired for remarking that the war was lost.) [Barnett, p. 405.] Von Kluge warned Hitler that the German left flank had disintegrated as a result of the American breakout. "The choice was between holding at Caen and abandoning western France, or dividing German forces between two battles, and risking collapse in both." Hitler as usual decided on a compromise. Rommel while returning a conference at the I SS Panzer Corps headquarters was strafed by a RCAF fighter (July 17). He was badly injured and not expected to live. [Marshall, p. 137.]
Operation Charwood finally enabled the British to enter Caen. It was preceeded by a massive bombing raid (July 7). Some 467 Lancaster and Halifax heavy bombers attacked the city in preparation for the infantry attack. This was a huge raid given the relatively small size of the city. There was massive damage to the city center. Delayed-action bombs were aimed at the northern edge of Caen where the German were regrouping. The Germans finally withdrew from Caen north of the Orne, blowing the last bridge (July 9). The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division moved into the southern part of the city. The attack cost the British abnd Canadian some 80 tanks. The German losses are not well established, but were only a fraction of the British losses.
Operation Jupiter lasunched by thv Brutish VIII Corps has been calld the 'fight for the key to Normandy' meaning Hill 112. The German commander, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel insisted Hill 112 was the key to all of Normandy. The Odon valley and western approaches to Caen were dominsted by Hill 112. It was a prometasry from which much of Normndy could be view and artillery directed. Without it, German artillery fire into the Allied beachhead would be much less effective and an attasck into it virtually impossible. Hill 112 was thus thee the scene of one of the fiercest battles in Normandy. The Brutish got to the tyop of the hill and nearby villages. (July 10). The inevitsble German counter attacks by the 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen, 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg and the schwere-SS Panzer Bataillon 102 with heavy PANZERS DROVE the British off the top of Hill 112, but thry held positions on the north-facing slope. [3] As aesult, The operation was a tactical failure as a they duid not secute Hill 112. It did, however, play an importasnt role in the Normandy campaign, The fighting reduced the II SS Panzer Corps to a fraction of its former strength. The 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division occupied Hill 112 nearly unopposed (August 4) eith the American Operation Cobra to the West.
Both sides experienced serious casualties. It took 10n weeks of fierce combat at the cost 10,000 men, but taking Hill 112 was a major factor leading to the British finslly taking Casen.
The British were suposed to take Caen on D-Day, but as this was the most direct route to Paris, the Germans concentrated their forces and held Caen despite a series of British and Canaduan attacks. The Germans held on to Caen vir several weeks, but the building Allied forces severly streached the German forces who were not receiving replacenments and reinforcements. Finally the Allies prepared a breakout attack, one in the east and aniother un the West. General Montgomery was frustrated with weeks of failed and very costly attempts to break out of the British invasion beaches and take Caen so they could move inland. Montgomery conceived of a massive armored onslaught that would end the stalemate in Normandy. He was aware of the impending American Operation Cobra and hoped to break out of Normandy with the Americans. An even heavier air bombardment opened Operation Goodwood (July 18). It proved to be a costly battle. The British and Canadians had entered Caen after a major air attack and Operation Charwood (July 9). They were unable to break the German lines, however, in part because the rubble created by the air attack in Caen slowed the advance and the Germans were able to regroup west of the city. The Germans were able to hold in the Caen area by concentrated around Caen which weakened their perimeter facing the Americans to the West. The Canadians after heavy fighting finally managed to liberate the rest of Caen. The city, however, was no longer recognizable, largely demolished after five weeks of intensive fighting. The fighting now moved to the ridges south of thev the city wich the Germans had heavily fortified. Attempts to take Verrières Ridge during Goodwood were thwarted by the I SS Panzer Corps (General Sepp Dietrich). [Van der Vat, p. 155.] The Brirtish and Canadians lost nearly 220 tabks. The German losses were a fraction, biut not unimoortabnt, an estimatred 75-100.
The II Canadian Corps (Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds) launched Operation Atlantic and succeeded in capturing the southern suburbs of Caen along the Orne. It was launched in conjunction with Operation Goodwood to seize Caen. There were gains on flanks of the Orne River near Saint-André-sur-Orne. The 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division attavking strogly defended Verrières Ridge proved ciostly snf failed. The inevitable German Counter-attacks by Dietrich's Panzer Divisions stopped the Canadian in front of th Ridge. [Copp]
This was the big one--the American breakout from the Normandy beachhead. What all the other Normandy offenses were leading up to. The British and Canadians kept hammering the German positions around , forcing the Germans to concentrating their forces in the eastern part of the Normandy lodgement, and attriting German forces. This was not the initial D-Day plan, but evolved as the battle for Normandy developed. Like some of the British operations, it commenced with a massive bombing attack. The Cobra assault finally broke through the badly stretched German lines and into the flat French country side where they could put their superiority in numbers and mobility to full use. A concentrated carpet bombing shattered the vaunted Panzer Lehr Division. The American air strikes left upturned Panzer tanks in their wake. The Americans then pierced the German lines with armoured thrusts near St. Lô and then rapidly fanned out behind German lines. Patton's highly mobile Third Army was activated the same day Avranches was taken (August 1). Cobra played to the strengths of the American M-4 Sherman, fast and highly mobile and vastly more numerous. Rather than duke it out with the panzers, with the breakout, the Shermans enable the Americans to move into the rear and cut off the less mobile German forces.. They could not slug it out with the Germans one-to one, but they were perfect for a rapid advance behind enemy lines. This was ideal for rapid maneuver in the open terrain beyond the Normandy bocage country. Combined with Allied air power this made it impossible for the Germans to plug the gap and contain the American offensive. s
With the American Cobra offensive underway to the West, the British hoped to benefit by the disintegrating German positions. With Caen taken, the British Canadian Corps want to add to the pressure on the German lines. The objective was the heavily fortified Verrières Ridge and the villages on the south slope. [Jarymowycz, pp. 75–87.] The Ridge was located about 8 km south of Caen, and blocked the direct approach to Falaise which would become increasingly important as the American Cobra breakout developed.
The well entrenched German defense of the ridge backed by well-placed 88s, again contained the Canadian offensive on the first day and inflicted many casualties, especially on the tankers. The Canadians at great cost made progress, but were repulsed from many of the positions gained by fierce German counter attacks. The real importance of Spring was that it was launched on the same time as the American Cobra attack. As a result, the Germans were unsure which at first which was the main operation. For 2 days they decided that Spring was the main effort, probably because there had been so many British offenses toward Caen and their mindset about holding Caen. Only after 2 days did they realize that Cobra was the principal effort and began moving forces west. [Buckley, pp. 149–150.] Although the gains were limited, the Canadians helped hold German forces around Caen as the Americans blasted through the German lines.
The British and Canadians launched more attacks in August. They took more ground against less, but still serious opposition as the battle for the Falise pocket shaped up. [Zuehlke]
Buckley, J. Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe (2nd ed.). (London: Yale University Press, 2014).
Copp, T. "The Toll of Verrières Ridge". Legion Magazine. Ottawa: Canvet Publications (May/June 1999).
Jarymowycz, R. Tank Tactics; from Normandy to Lorraine (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
Marshall, Charles F. The Rommel Murder: The Life and Death of the Desert Fox (Stackpole Marshall Books: 1994).
Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won: Explaining Victory in World War II (Pimlico: 1996).
Trew, Simon. Battle for Caen (Sutton Publisjing: 2005).
Van der Vat, D. (2003). D-Day: The Greatest Invasion, A People's History. (Toronto: Madison Press, 2003).
Zuehlke, M. (2001). The Canadian Military Atlas (London: Stoddart, 2001).
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