Figure 1.--After securing the Nomandy beachead, this is what the American First Army would face as they moved inland. And within this maze were well entrenched and camouflaged German infantry, tanks, and artillery. Many more Allied soldiers would be killed in the Bocage than on than on the Normandy baeches. It would take the Allies 8 weeks to break out from Normandy. The Bocage and the experienced and well led German infantry entrenched there was the major reason. Notice the road. It could not be used. The Gerjnans had all the roads covered by artillery. The Americans had to go straight through the hedgerows. And there was something like 15 of them per kilometer.

The Germans were unable to prevent the Allied lodgement, but held the much larger Allied forces in Normandy for several weeks. In the American sector, after the Allies landed, they fell back to the Bocage Country and effectively used the dence complex of hedgerows to thwart the American advance. Many nore Allied soldiers would die fightinging in the heddhge rows than on the D-Day beaches. Neither the Germans or the Allies had recognized the military significance of the Bocage before the invasion. But the German commanders in the field quickly recognized it and took advantae of it. After the fall of Cherbourg (June 27), the Normandy Bridgehead was complete. The adverse weather conditioins and the Allies need to secure the beachead gave the Germans time to prepare a defense which in the American sector meant the Bocage Country. This left Caen the only D-Day objective not achieved. The Germans held at Caen with a powerful Panzer force. This blocked the Allies direct route to Paris. With British and Canadians stopped at Caen, the Americans began to focus on breaking out at the western end of the bridgehead on a line between Carentan and Portbail. Bradley launched his offensive at the beginning of July with torrential rain in the middle of the Bocage country. Allied planners had failed to appreciate the potential tactical use of the fortress-like hedgerows in Normandy. The Germans had akso iugnoired the hedgeriws, but as the Allies worked on deeloping their bridhehead, had time to take advantage of the defensive potenial of the hedgerows. The American offensive soon bogged down in the Bockage country. The Germans with the Americans concentrating on Cherbourg had reinforced and resupplied their forces and had had orgnized entrenched positions within the hedgerows. Grounded parachutists and elements of the Das Reich and Götz von Berlichingen SS Divisions were deployed. These were all experienced, highly motivated units. Normandy's Bocage country was a maze of small fields enclosed by fortress-like hedgerows and sunken lanes. Here American advantages (mobility, numerical superiority, artillery and air power) were lrgely negated. The artillery and airpower were not effective unless German targets could be located and because they were hidden in the dense hedgerows vegetation, this was difficult. A relatively small German force using snipers and panzerschrecks were able to hold back vastly superior American forces. American advances were meaured in meters at terrible cost. Gradually the American infantry learned how to fught in the hedgerows. An imortant step was that an American seargeant devised a serated front attachment to Sherman tanks to help them break through the hedgerows.

Bocage Hedgerows

General Bradley only 2 daus after the Normandy landings called the Bocage the 'damndest country I've seen.' Now the term hedgerows to the Britiish means tidy little prevet around a church or oither building. Or for Americans an attractive landscaping device around their suburban yards. This is not what the Allied solduers moving inland from the D-Day beaches ran into. Normandy's Bocage Country was a huge maze of small fields enclosed by fortress-like earthen banks and sunken lanes. There was dense foliage, deep drainage ditches, sunkren farm roads, and vityually inpentrable earthen workscreated ocer the centurides by heavy land cultivation. The pastures/fields (cleared land) was bordered by a range of hedges. Norman farmers for centuries adopted the practice of enclosing theirvsmall plots (cultivated fields, pastures, and orchards, with hedgerows. The term Bocage Normandy refers to the area around Saint-Lô and Vire -- essentially the area inland from the American D-Day landing beaches during D-Day. There were some behind the British and Canaduan beaches, but the fret bulk were inlnd from the American beaches. The hedgerow country or Bocage began about 10 miles inland from the Normandy invasioin beaches and extended in a wide swath from Caumont on the American left to the western coast of the Cotentin Peninsula. The word bocage forms part of the name for several towns in Lower Normandy. The hedges varied. Some were merely tree or brush lines of no real mlitary significance, but many were massive, hardened earth mounds created by trees and tangled root systems which had been developed for over a millenium in which the area had been farmed. They were not reinforced concrete like the Atlantic Wall, but they were still formidable an inpentrable to soldiers armed only with dnbtrnching tools. At the time of the Normandy fighting there were something like 15 hedgerows per kilometer to be overcome. Not all of these were the formidable type, but many were. Some were as high as 2.5 meters. Between the planted mounds were many sunken lanes. These had not been constructed, but worn down over a millenia by farrmers on foot and by their carts and farm animals.

Igonored Before D-Day

Neither the Germans or the Allies had recognized the military significance of the Bocage before the invasion. It is not that they had not been observed. The Germany were in Normandy for 4 years. The hedgerows show up in the countless aerial reconisance photographs the Allies took before D-Day. The Germans, however ignored them. Rommel was fixed on stoppkng the Allies on the beaches, not fiughting them begind the beaches. Von Rundstedt who disagreed with Rommnel was fixated on the Oas de Calis and destroying the Allies with his Panzer reserve. The Allies were fixated on the klanding ab=nd gave less attention to the following campaign. And the aerial photography did not give a indication of yhe nature of the hedgerows. There was nothing like them in England that would have tipped the British off as to the problem. D-Day Planners believed that by June 20 (D+14), the Ameriucan First Army would be 'far inland occupying the line Lessay-St. Lo-Caumont.' [Doubler, p. 21] The reasoin for this delay was the Bocage hedgerows which made possible a tenacious German defense againsr ober whrealming Allied superority. It would take an entire extra month and substantial losses to reach this line. No commonly noted in the voluninous D-Day historiogrphy is that many more Allied soldiers would die in the Bocage hedgerows than on the D-Day beaches.

German Response

The Germans were unable to prevent the Allied lodgement, but held the much larger Allied forces in Normandy for several weeks. In the American sector, after the Allies landed, they fell back to the Bocage Country whivh they immrefiustely rcognized as a defebders psraduse. Threy effectively used the dence complex of hedgerows to thwart the American advance. But the German commanders in the field quickly recognized it and took advantage of it. A historian tells us, "The bocage defense was not pre-prepared. The terrain rested inland of Rommel's beach defenses. This being said, it is almost perfect defensive terrain. [Hospodor, 2020.] The Germans pushed back from the beaches quickly recognized this and began preparing improvised defenses. The adverse weather conditioins and the Allies need to secure the beachead gave the Germans time to prepare a defense which in the American sector meant the Bocage Country. One historian explains, "For the Germans, planning the tactical defense primarily fell to the local commander. Rundstedt and Rommel were operational-level commanders and thus were rarely, if ever, involved with the "getting in the weeds" of planning local defenses. The effect of the bocage on their level of command, however, was to prioritize the use of mechanized forces against Monty around Caen where there is better terrain for maneuver. The units sent to defend in the American sector were generally infantry-heavy. So, the terrain did affect the operational-level disposition of German forces in Normandy, but operational commanders rarely got involved in the tactical defense of a sector of front." [Hospodor, 2020.]

Weather

Weather was a factor. The Normandy Coast was battered by secere stirms (June). This almost prevented the D-Day landings and after the landings destroyed the American Mulberry harbor. All of this affected logistics and the Allies build up. The July proved to be wettest and windiest in 50 years. This affected boith air support and mobility--two of the Allies greatest advantages and a considerable help to the defending Germans. The rain and mud furhere affected logistics.

Cherbourg

The primary impediment to Allies operations in France was logistics, meaning the lack of a major port through which supolies could be landed. For this reason the primary American objective after organizing a a chherent connected lodgement was not to oush inland but rather to move into the Cotentin Peninsulka and seizr Cherbourg, This was accomolished (June 27). As it turned out, the Germans had throughly wrecked the port. And the lack of ports would contrain Allied operations throughout 1944. And the Amerucan drive on Cherbourg gave the Germans over 2 weeks to organize a coherrent defense in the Biocage.

German Preparations

The Germand had 4 years to build the Atlantc Wall whuch held the Allies back 6 hours. Ironically, it was the Bocage defenses pieced together in onlky a few weeks that would delay the Allies more than a month. One historuan explains, "The hefgerows divided Normandy into a series of rectangular boxes. With limited entances and exits thriough the hedgerows, the Germans established strong defensive positions and utilized snipoers to increase the number of enemy casualties." [Barber, p. 403.] It was not all snipers. The Germans set up mptar teams and heavy machine gun positions in the hedge rows, mapped the terraine, and ranged their mortars. Further bsck they had field artilery which had also been ranged. And in the suken lanes they could move tanks without fear of air attack.

Allied Advantages Negated

The Bocage Country was ideal for German troops to set up their defense. It provided already constructed defensive emnpolacements. And could not be easily detected by air or advancing infantry. The hedgerows were thick enough to hide not only infantry units, but tanks and artillery pieces. Some were essentially preexisting fortresses. All of thus would impair the direction of Allied operations, reduce speed, adversly affect observation, all key military factors. This negated the Allied poerful air firces as well as greater mobility. It also negated the Allied advantage in field artillery. As the American and German infantry were in close contact, American infantry units were hesitant to call in artillery bombardment or air strikes. It would take the Allies 8 weeks of heavy fighting to breakout of the bocage into open country.

German Tactics

The hedgerows were largely rectangukar enclosures--albeit rectangkles loosely stated. The Germans would set up in yhe hedgerows and camofaughe theijr posutioins. Oten there would be haevy machine guns in the two far corners wuth rifle and light machine guns within the three sides of the hedgerows to be penetrated. All of this created interlocking fields of fire. They were backed up with mortars and field artillery futher back--all of which had been pre-ranged. The mortars would the real killer and the Germans had a lot of them. [Hospodor, 2015] This meant that it could be safely used wihout hitting their own troops. The Germans especially zeroed in on the few pre existing entrances. The coupling of direct and indirect fire was highly effective. This was standard military dictrine. According to the Germans, "Coupling for flat trajectory and high-angle fire results in the strongest fire effect. The flat trajectory weaopons hit the enemy who shows himself outside cover, the high-angle weapons grab the enenmy inside and behind cover." {Kruse, p. 136.] Rarely was the terraine so perfect for such effect. And this is just what thet did. A historian writes, "... the Germans organized each field as a defensive strongpoint and confronted the attacking Americans with a deadly mixture of direct and inducrect fire .... The Germssnbs employed their direct fire weapkons to trap American infantrymen in a deadly hail of cross fire and grazing fires coming from all sides." [Doubler, pp. 22-23.]

German Infantry

Too often German success in holding the American down in Normandy is attributed largely to combat ebvironment, namely the hedgerows. Hollywood prrpetuates the idea that the Germans were automans and poor soldiers. Too many historians focus mainly on the hedgerows. But the major factor was the German infantry. Although after being gutted in the East, the German Army was still a formidable fighting force. Man for man and unit for unit, the Germans deployed the most competent army of the War. The Germany Army was bever defeated unless it faced far superior enemy forces. And even when defeated, especially in the East, they genrrally suffered far fewer casualties than the victorious force--a record unparreled in warfare. The Germans were outnumbered in the Bocage, but one asset they had was experienced officers and NCOs. The American infantry (both officers and men) in the Bocage was except for a few divisions, was green, with only basic training and little combat experience. One historian writes, "Even though the hedgerows were serious impediments to offensive operations, the primary obstacle holding up the American advance was the German defense." [Doubler, p.22.] The German assessmenment of American infantry was 'cautious'. That said the Americans gave a much as they got. And the Germans also suffered casualties in the Bocage--casualties they could not replace.

Fighting in the Bocage (July 1944)

After the fall of Cherbourg (June 27), the Normandy Bridgehead was complete. This left Caen the only D-Day objective not achieved. The Germans held at Caen with a powerful Panzer force. This blocked the Allies direct route to Paris. With British and Canadians stopped at Caen, the Americans began to focus on breaking out at the western end of the bridgehead on a line between Carentan and Portbail. Bradley launched his offensive at the beginning of July with torrential rain in the middle of the Bocage country. Allied planners had failed to appreciate the potential tactical use of the fortress-like hedgerows in Normandy. The Germans had also ignored the hedgerows, but as the Allies worked on devloping their bridhehead, had time to take advantage of the defensive potenial of the hedgerows. The American offensive soon bogged down in the Bocage country. The Germans with the Americans concentrating on Cherbourg had reinforced and resupplied their forces and had had orgnized entrenched positions within the hedgerows. Grounded parachutists and elements of the Das Reich and Götz von Berlichingen SS Divisions were deployed. These were all experienced, highly motivated units. Here American advantages (mobility, numerical superiority, artillery and air power) were lrgely negated. The artillery and airpower were not effective unless German targets could be located and because they were hidden in the dense hedgerows vegetation, this was difficult. A relatively small German force using snipers and panzerschrecks were able to hold back vastly superior American forces. American advances were meaured in meters and at terrible cost.

Overcoming the Bocage

Gradually the American infantry learned how to fught in the hedgerows. The basic sollutiin was to open up the hedge row creating more and wider entrances. This could not be done by hig exposives. Gucen the numbrrt of hedgerows and the number of oopenings that had ti be created, the exposives needed were far greater than the Americans had or could be brught in even if this aopopriach was attempted. It ws detrrmined that just ine tabk compny would require 17 t of explosives to move just 1 mile. [Hospodor, 2015.] The sollution was especially fitted Sherman tanks: the Rino, Dozer, Bumper, and Pipe fitted. The Rhino was a Sherman fitted witha serated front blade which allowed into push through the hedgerows, cutting through the root sytems. This was devised by an Ameraican sergeant (Sgt. Curtis Grubb Culin III, using the metal salvaged from German beach obstacles. The Dozer concered the Shermnan into a fighting bulldozer. The pipes created holes where explosive charges could be polaced for maxium effect. With the opening, the Shermans could enter the interior arnd provide fire support for the infantry. White phospreous rounds wuold be fired into the corners to eliminate the heavy machine guns. Firing from the hedgerow would suppress German infantry fire. Mortar teams eould fire behind the hedgegge rows. Than the infantry armed with rifles and hand grenades advanced unto the interior pasture area. Armored units with infntry support had somewhat different tactics It should be notedthat at this stage of the War, as strange as it may seem to the modern reader tank-infantry coordination was just beginning. Even coounication mechanisms were still inadequate. Before D- Day, the American infantry and tank units had very litte training together. [Hospodor, 2015] The Bocage was a learning experience for both. A historian summarized the result. "The American experience in Normandy supports Michael Howard's assertion that the ability of armies to adapt in combatis a key ingredient in their success. In the seven weeks between D-Day and 31 July 1944, despite shortcomings in combat experience and the difficult Normandy terrain, the U.S. First Army defeated the Germans in a series of battles that placed a premium on leadership and ingenuity at the small-unit level. New tactics and technical innovations allowed First Army units to close with and destroy a well-prepared defender. By early August, the Americans had restored mobility to the battlefield,and the Allies began to push the Germans back in operations designed to carry the Allied armies to Paris and beyond." [Doubler, p. 2.] And it is important to note that they did it without two of their greatest assetts--air power and mobility.

Source

Barber, Mary Kathryn. "The War in the West, 1943-45," in Cambridge History of the Second Woirld War Vol 1 Fighting the War (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2015).

Doubler, Michael. Busting the Bocage: Amnerican Combined Arms Opoerations in France, 6 June-31 July 1944 Combat Studies Instutute. U.S. Army Command and Genrtal Staff College: Fort Leavenwoirth, Kansas, ). This is an excellenbt account of the Bocage battle and is available on line.

Hospodor, Gregory S. "Tactical change in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations," presentation at the Dole Institute (October 1, 2015).

Hospodor, Gregory S. Personal commuication, October 17, 2020.

Kruse, Kurt. Artillerististcher Ratgeber auf dem Gefechtsfeld 8. neubearbeitete Auflage (Barbara-Vertag Hugo Weiler: München, 1942).

Created: 10:08 AM 10/18/2020
Last updated: 10:08 AM 10/18/2020