Figure 1.--

More than a million well-trained and by now very experienced Grman troops took position along the frontline facing Moscow (late-September). They were now only 180-mile west of the Soviet capital. [Zetterling and Frankson] This was to be the defining engagement of the War--the great turning point. Hitler ordered the resumption of the attack on Moscow (October 2). After their great victory at Kiev, the Wehrmacht resumed the drive of Army Group Center to Moscow. There was was juggling of unwits. Panzer Groups were renamed Panzer Armies. The 2nd Panzer Army took Orel (October 7). The initial engagemnents did not go ell for the Red Army. Guderian reached Orel so quickly that his Panzers ran into trams still operating normally. Here there was a paved road. The 2nd Panzer Army used it push forward to the Oka river at Plavskoye. The 4th Panzer Army (transferred from Army Group) and the 3rd Panzer Army managed to trap Red Army forces in two huge pockets at Vyazma and Bryansk. Army Group North was unable to storm the city, but struck east and cut the rail link at Tikhvin. Lenningrad was cut off and this began the terrible 900-day siege. Lenningrad's resistance tied up substantial German forces that could not be used in the drive east. In the far north, a joint German-Finnish force drove east in an attempt to take the vital port of Murmansk. The Soviets stopped them at the Litsa river. The battles were the largest ever fought north of the Arrctic Circle. The Germans were still, however, advancing toward Moscow. German commanders reported that Soviet resistance was notably stiffening. The Red Army was also becoming more skillful. This is a basic maxim of warfare. The longer you fight an opponent, the more he learns about you and learns to counter your moves. The French had been defeated bore this happened. The Soviets and British had not. Large numbers of Red Army soldiers had surrendered in the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets, but mamy fought tenaceously. Others had managed to fight their way out and regroup. The Wehrmacht was now reporting substantail losess of its own. Also the Russian weather was worsening. In October the rains came. There were no autobauns in Russia and few paved roads. The dirt roads became quamires. The movement of trucks, tanks, personnel carrier, and artillery slowed considerably. Unlike the campaign in the west, in the east the distances were emense and the roads dreadful unpaved tracks. Logistical problems increased becoming chromic. There is only limited time before the harsh Russian winter "General January" assisted the Red Army. Some argue the delay in attacking Moscow cost Germany the war. With the Wehrmact renewing the drive on Moscow, Stalin ordered Zhukov, who has successful stopped the Germans at Leningrad, to assume command of Moscow's defenses (October 21). Despite the weather and stiffening Soviet resistance, the Wehrmact moved steadily closer to Moscow. The Wehrmacht took Krakov and with it another entire Soviet Army Group (October 24).

Resuming the Drive Toward Moscow

Hitler after the diversion south to Kieve decided to resume the advance toward Moscow, renaming the Panzer Groups to Panzer Armies for the occasion. Operation Typhoon, which was set in motion (September30). More than a million well-trained and by now very experienced Grman troops took position along the frontline facing Moscow (late-September). They were now only 180-mile west of the Soviet capital. [Zetterling and Frankson] This was to be the defining engagement of the War--the great turning point. After their great victory at Kiev, the Wehrmacht resumed the drive of Army Group Center to Moscow. There was was juggling of units. Panzer Groups were renamed Panzer Armies. The plan was to encircle six RedArmt armies.

Orel (October 7)

The 2nd Panzer Army took Orel (October 7). The initial engagemnents did not go well for the Red Army. Guderian reached Orel so quickly that his Panzers ran into trams still operating normally. Here there was a paved road. The 2nd Panzer Army used it push forward to the Oka river at Plavskoye.

Vyazma and Bryansk Pockets

The 4th Panzer Army (transferred from Army Group South?) and the 3rd Panzer Army managed to trap Red Army forces in two huge pockets at fotces standing between Vyazma and Bryansk. Army Group North was unable to storm the city, but struck east and cut the rail link at Tikhvin.

Red Army Situation

The Germans had smashed or encirled the Red Army forces standing before Moscow. All that was left was amall number of rifle divisions, tank brigades with a few T-34s, and poorly trained militis been hastily assembled.

Lenningrad

Lenningrad was cut off and this began the terrible 900-day siege. Lenningrad's resistance tied up substantial German forces that could not be used in the drive east.

The North

In the far north, a joint German-Finnish force drove east in an attempt to take the vital port of Murmansk. The Soviets stopped them at the Litsa river. The battles were the largest ever fought north of the Arrctic Circle.

Stiffening Resistance

The Germans were still, however, advancing toward Moscow. German commanders reported that Soviet resistance was notably stiffening. The Red Army was also becoming more skillful. This is a basic maxim of warfare. The longer you fight an opponent, the more he learns about you and learns to counter your moves. The French had been defeated before this happened. The Soviets and British had not. Large numbers of Red Army soldiers had surrendered in the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets, but mamy fought tenaceously. Others had managed to fight their way out and regroup.

Whermacht Losses

The Wehrmacht was now reporting substantail losess of its own.

The Rains

The Russian Winter is also credited with stopping the Wehrmacht drive on Moscow. It was undoubtedly a major factor, but in fact the German drive was slowed before Winter set in. Hitler's changing priorities had delayed the push on Moscow wahile the weather was still good. By the times Hitler ordered the final push on Moscow, the weather began changing. The Autumn rains and resulting mud turned Russian roads into quagmires. The Soviet Union had a very primitive road system. Few roads were paved. The Wehrmact found itself in a sea of mud. The Germans were advancing about 10 miles per day. The fall rains began in early Septmber. The resulting quagmireslowed the German advance to about 5 miles a day. The Germans, however, were only 150 miles from Moscow which was still in their grasp. The Red Army faced similar conditions, but the impact was most severe on the Wehrmacht. It was the Wehrmacht which had to move forward. More importantly the advantage the Germans held in mastery of Blitzkrieg was based on mobility. Without mobility the Wehrmacht's superiority over the Red Army was much reduced. Part of the rerason that the Red Army's resistance stiffened at this time was that the Wehrmacht's mobility was so reduced. There were many ramifications to the mud. It did not just slow the Wehrmacht, but had a huge impact on German equipment, wearing out motors, breaking drive trains and suspensions of motorized vehicles. While such details are not as dramatic as pitched battles, logistics are hugely important in warfare and this was especially true for German blitzkrieg operations. The impact on German vehicles is important because Germany did not have industrial base to rapidly replace the equipment in the long run and in the short run the adverse impact on motor vehicles further reduced German mobility.

Kiev

Some argue the delay in attacking Moscow cost Germany the War. The postponement of the drive east to strike south and encircle Kiev was one of the great German victories, but it delayed the drive on Moscow. >br>

Zukov (October 21)

With the Wehrmact renewing the drive on Moscow, Stalin ordered Zhukov, who has successful stopped the Germans at Leningrad to assume command of Moscow's defenses (October 21). It was an assignment of breathtaking proprtions. The drive on Moscow had been delayed but now was the focus of the invading Wehrmacht. All available units were thrown into the drive on Moscow. Zukov hasd to slow the advance withonly miniml forces available and assemble the force needed to prepare a massive counter offensive.

Krakov (October 24)

Despite the weather and stiffening Soviet resistance, the Wehrmact moved steadily closer to Moscow. The Wehrmacht took Krakov and with it another entire Soviet Army Group (October 24). a

Assessment

Much of the western work on Barbarossa reles heavily on the accounts of Whermach generals after the War. They were anxious to prove that they had not been out generaled by the Red Army. Thus they blame the failure of Barbarossa primarily on the Dyssia weather (mud and snow) as well as Hitler interference. This was difficult to assess because Soviet archives were closed to Western scholars and Soviet accounts were lacking in academic standards, designed more to promote the propaganda image of the Communist Party than historical accuracy. Some authors now believe that the German spearheads were not stopped by mud, but the Red army resistance and faulty German planning. [Radey and Sharp] This is not to say there is one single cause of the German failure. It is to say that the relative importance of these various factors is still to be worked out. And it will probably be difficult to do so until Russian histriography begins to approaxh Western standards.

Sources

Radey, Jack and Charles Sharp. The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank *2012), 320p.

Zetterling, Niklas and Anders Frankson. The Drive on Moscow, 1941 (202), 321p.

Created: 9:23 PM 12/28/2012
Last updated: 9:23 PM 12/28/2012