* World War II : Operation Barbarossa campaign July 1941








Operation Barbarossa: Campaign (July 1941)


Figure 1.--Soviet children living in quiet rural villages were suddenly subjected to the thundeous arrival of the German forces driving east. The children are watching the steady flow of Germans crossing the stream. There was still in July only limited resistance in many areas. Notice here the village is untouched, both by the retreating Red Army and the advancing Germans. We are not sure just where this snapshot by a German soldier was taken, we suspect eastern Poland (modern Bylorussia). German soldiers took photographs like this as if they were tourists. Many wanted to document their participation in one of the the great campaigns of history. Few understood that the SS and NAZI Party through Generalplan Ost and the Hunger Plan was preparing to kill, starve, or enslave most of these children, what would have surely been the most terrible crime in human history. Jews were being killed immediately by the Einsatzgruppen. Slavs including women and children were to be dealt with after the Red Army was destroyed which at the time appeared within the Whermacht's grasp.

Stalin was at first stunned with the Germans struck (June 22, 1941) and did not even speak on Radio to the Soviet people. Stalin announced a scorched earth policy to confront the NAZIs in a radio broadcast (July 3). The Germans cross the Dnieper River (July 10). The most important of the German Panzer comanders, General Guderian, presses the attack of Army Group Center. General Kluge attempted to restrain him. Kluge is concerned about deep Panzer penetrations without infantry support. Guderian convinced Kluge to allow him to press the attack. Kluge told him, 'your operations always hang by a thread'. The NAZI attack was devestaing, but despite massive losses the Soviets continued to resist. Army Group South in particular experienced difficulties. The Soviets had anticipated a German strike into the Ukraine, rather than a massive assault all along the border and had much of their armour in the south to protect the Ukraine. The successes of Army Group central were spectacular. Driving toward Moscow, they seized Smolensk (July 15). Another 300,000 Soviet soldiers were taken prisioner--over 40 Soviet divisions. Army Group Center's advances brought Moscow within range of the Luftwaffe. Hitler was anxious to get on with the job of destroying the Soviet capital and ordered Luftwaffe Chief Göring to begin bombing the city (July 8). The first raid was staged (July 21). The Germans temporarily halted their advance to allow the infantry and supplies to catch up to the Panzers (July 22). Smolensk opened the way to Moscow. It was at this time, however, that Hitler made the key decession which would doom Barbarossa. Wehrmacht Commanders after Smolensk wanted to drive on directly to the Soviet capital--Moscow. At the time Soviets forces defending the city were relatively unprepared. The Soviet Union was a highly centralized state and Moscow was its nerve center. Communications and transportation was centralized on Moscow. In addition, the Wehrmact offensive had up to this point seized the Baltics, Eastern Poland, and Belorussia. The advance into Russia proper has still been limited. Seizing Moscow would have had a huge impact. Hitler disappointed with the lack of progress by Army Group South, however, ordered elements of Army Group Center needed to drive on Moscow be diverted south. Hitler ordered Guderian's Panzers to turn south, away from Moscow (July 27). At the time, there is little doubt that Guderian's Panzers could have seized Moscow. Hitler had, however, been disappointed by the lack of progress of Army Group South. He was also attracted by the riches of the Ukraine. This was the productive agricultural lands that he coveted for Germany's Lebensraum. Hitler took control of Barbarossa away from the generals. He is convinced that he understands tactics and strategy better than the generals. He ordered Guderian to drive south toward Kiev. He remamed Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army ArmeeGruppe Guderian to honor the Panzer general's startling syccesses. Hitler also gives Guderian independence from Kluge, he now is directly under the command of Bock, Commander of Army Group Center. Despite the promotion, Guderian disagrees with the orders to divert his Army froim Moscow.

Stalin's Reaction

Stalin was at first stunned with the Germans struck (June 22, 1941). He was sure Hitler would not invade. Not because he trusted Hitler, but because he was sure the Germans would not strike until the British has been defeated in the West. He withdrew to his dacha. He did not even speak on Radio to the Soviet people for an amazing 2 weeks while the Germas achieved great victories. Stalin finally announced a scorched earth policy to confront the NAZIs in a radio broadcast (July 3).

German Advances

The Germans pressed their June victories to devestaing impact. Sviet towns and cities fell in rapid sucession. The first victories reported werre in non-Russian areas on the wester perifery of the Soviet Union (southern Finland (Karelia), the Baltics, eastern Poland, eastern Romania, and Ukraine). Some of the people in these areas saw the Germans as linerators and remembered reasonably correct behavior in World War I. As July progressed the weather was favoravke and the invaders covered great distances, alrgough the Red Army resistance stiffened and the ditances covered gradually slowed. agter crossing the Deniper, the Germans began to encounter more ethnic Russians. Resistance in the south was slower because Stalin had positioned much of the Red Army armor there. This would result in a serious problem by the end of July. Resistance in Ukraine meant that Army Group Center's flank was seriously exposed because by the time it prepared for the drive on Moscow. The German advances were notable because they were conducted with no reserve formations. This was part of the Barbarossa plan ordered by Hitler, but there seems to have been no serious objections raised by the senior Barbarossa commanders. [DRuZW, 4: p. 269-70.] The assumtion was there would be not Soviet counter offences. This would not only be the case when the Germans reached Moscow (December 1941), it would be the case after the initial frontier engagemens at the omset of Barbarossa. And after the onset there would be no replacements of men and equioment. Barbarossa was a huge gamble. Hitler as part of the Barbarossa plan threw virtually every thing he had at the Soviets. And becuse the 2,000-mile front was so xpansive. There just were not enough men to form reserve formatioins. And Hitler assured his genrals that the Red Army and Soviet controled by incomptent commanders and venal Jewish commisars with one hard blow would collapse like a house of cards. It would all be over in a short summer campaign.

Army Group North

The great prize for Army Group North was Leningrad. They finished the conquest of Latvia and drove into Estoinia, reaching the outer defenss of Leningrad.

Army Group Center

The Germans crossed the Dnieper River (July 10). The Dnieper is of major significance. It is one of the major rivers of Europe, rising in the Valdai Hills near Smolensk, Russia, before flowing through Belarus and Ukraine to the Black Sea. It is fourth-longest river in Europe. It is a major ethnic bounary. West of the river are Poles and Beylorussianms. In the northern streach of the river Poles and Bylorusians are found to the west. East of the river, ethnic Russians begin to dominate. The most important of the German Panzer comanders, General Guderian, pressed the Army Group Centerattack. General Kluge attempted to restrain him. Kluge was concerned about deep Panzer penetrations without infantry support. Guderian convincedd Kluge to allow him to press the attack. Kluge told him, 'your operations always hang by a thread'. The successes of Army Group central were spectacular. Driving toward Moscow, they seized Smolensk (July 15). Another 300,000 Soviet soldiers were taken prisioner--over 40 Soviet divisions. The Germans took Orsha and Smolensk on the direct route to Moscow and began to drive east of Smolemsk. Army Group Center's advances brought Moscow within range of the Luftwaffe. Hitler was anxious to get on with the job of destroying the Soviet capital and ordered Luftwaffe Chief Göring to begin bombing the city (July 8). The first raid was staged (July 21). The Germans temporarily halted their advance to allow the infantry and supplies to catch up to the Panzers (July 22). Smolensk opened the way to Moscow. It was at this time, however, that Hitler made the key decession which would doom Barbarossa. Wehrmacht Commanders after Smolensk wanted to drive on directly to the Soviet capital--Moscow. At the time Soviets forces defending the city were relatively unprepared. The Soviet Union was a highly centralized state and Moscow was its nerve center. Communications and transportation was centralized on Moscow. In addition, the Wehrmact offensive had up to this point seized the Baltics, Eastern Poland, and Belorussia. The advance into Russia proper has still been limited, but to the east of Smolensk was the ethnic Russian hearland. And seizing Moscow would have had a huge impact.

Army Group South

The Soviets had anticipated a German strike into the Ukraine, rather than a massive assault all along the border and had much of their armour in the south to protect the Ukraine. A major tank battle fought between the 1st Panzer Group's III Army Corps and XLVIII Army Corps (Motorized) and five mechanized corps of the Soviet 5th Army and 6th Army was fought at the onset of Barbarossa--the Bloody Triange. The Germnan force of 750 tanks smashed the Soviet forcce of 3,500 tanks. It would be largest tank battle of the War until Kursk (July 1943). The German victory oppened the way into Ukraine, but great tank battlre slowed the advance of Armny Group South. The Grermans headed for Kiev and the great bend of the Denerprr, a rich agricultural and industrial area. The fighting at the frontier was vostly, but gave the Soviets time to evacuate industrial equipment and skilled labor.

Hitler Intervenes (July 27)

Hitler disappointed with the lack of progress by Army Group South ordered elements of Army Group Center needed for the drive on Moscow be diverted south. Hitler ordered Guderian's Panzers to turn south, away from Moscow (July 27). At the time, there is little doubt that Guderian's Panzers could have seized Moscow. Hitler had, however, been disappointed by the lack of progress of Army Group South. He was also attracted by the riches of the Ukraine. This was the productive agricultural lands that he coveted for Germany's Lebensraum. Hitler took control of Barbarossa away from the generals. He is convinced that he understands tactics and strategy better than the generals. He ordered Guderian to drive south toward Kiev. He remamed Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army ArmeeGruppe Guderian to honor the Panzer general's startling syccesses. Hitler also gives Guderian independence from Kluge, he now is directly under the command of Bock, Commander of Army Group Center. Despite the promotion, Guderian disagrees with the orders to divert his Army from Moscow.

OKW Assessment: Victory Achieved

The German Barbarossa concept seem to be working, especially with Guderian's Army Group Center's drive toward Moscow. The Germans executed flawless Blitzkrieg pincer movements capturing or destroying whole Soviet armies. The Red Army's losses in men, equipment, and transport were huge. No army in all of history has ever suffered such losses. Long lines of Red Army POWs snaked across the Soviet Steppe on one unbroken line from one horizon to another. They truged back to holding areas where the process of murdering them through starvation and exposure began. Jews were separated out and executed immediately. These barbarous actiions were not commited by the SS, but by the Whermacht. These sights at the front and reports to OKW convinced the German generals that they had won the War. Hitler agreed. They seemed to have actuall-y accomplised what thgey had set out to do--destroy the Red Army and Soviet state in one massive, hard blow. This wa not just the opinion of Hitler and his toadies like Keitel in OKW. It was the opinion of compent, military mibds at the highest level. The German Army Chief of Staff wrote, "On the whole, onne can saythat the assignment of samshing the mass of the Russian Army before the Dvina and Dneper [western Soviet Union] fulfilled .... It is proabaly not too much to say when I assert that the campaign against Russia has been won two weeks." [Hadler] And he wrote this only after the June battles on the frontier. And the further great victories following in July only hightened the German conviction that victory had been achived. Hitler and OKW by July were convinced that their great gamble had paid off and Europe was theirs.

View of the Troops

Army Group South in particular experienced difficulties because of the frontier fighting at the Bloody Triange. The German tankers scored a great victory, byt at a cost. From an early point a dichotomy emerged between the commanders and the men doing the fighting on the ground. The commanders were obsessed by the great victories. The combat soldiers at the front, jowever, had a much more limited perspective. Anf he saw that no mayetter how great the victory, new units appeared at the front whoch continued to resist the advamce in whay seemed like an enfless battle field. The Germans were taking loses. Not the massive losses like the Russians, but losses unlike the fifghrung in the West which was over in weeks. And by the end of July they seemed to be no closer to victory than at the onslaught of Barbarossa. We are not sure if this failyre of the experience of fron-line cpombat forces to reach the high command was emlemamatic of Barbarossa or the normal way the German military operated. Of course many militaries suffered from similar defect, but in the case of the Whermacht had disaterous results. The men at the dront were aware of serious problems, casulaties that were not being replaced, new Red Army formations that alwaus appeared to resist the drive east, and wear and tear on their vhicles which were not replaced when they broke down. Perhaps more than anyrging, unlike French soldierts, the Russians contined to resist no matter how poorly led by their officers. They saw no evidence that the Soviey Union was collpasing like a house of cards. None of this, howevr. seem to have percolated to the commanders in charrge of operations. Nor was it what Hitler wanted to hear. Hitler even ignored report of Soviet heavy tanks and refused to permit replacement tanks be sent east. He was preparing new formations for the planned follow up Middle Eastern campaign. [DruZW 4, 975.]

German Casualties

Most World War II histories focus on the massive Soviet casualties and prisoners taken. The numbers were the largest ever reported in the history of warfare. The Germans can perhaps be forgive for thinking they had defeated the Soviets. But the Soviet Union had a much larger population with huge numbers of semi-trained reserves. The Gernmans in contrast were throwing most of what they had into Barbarossa. And they began sustaining really significant casualties for the first time. The casualties were small in comparison to the Soviets, but they were the largest of the War for the Germans. A Barbarossa expert writes, "Barbarossa exacted a huge toll on the Gernan army with more men killed than in any other month of the wae until December 1942 [Stalingrad]. [Stahel, p. 304] And unlike the Red Arny, these would be men that the Germans would be unable to fully replace.

Consequences

There were enormous consequences resulting from the great German victories at the onset of Barbarossa (June-August 1941). The Gernan generals and Hitler concluded that they had won the War. This meant that disreharded any caution. This proved to be a huge mistake fiven that the Barbarossa planners conciously decided because of manpower shortages that there would be no provision for reserve formations--there was just not enough men. This violated basis military planningh. But th planners had to assume that the offensive would be so overpowerung that the Red Army would be incapable of organizing a counterr offensive and in any case they would ber degeated in a short summer camapign. This lrfy the Germans vulnerable wheb vy Decemjber they were exhausted, outrun their logitics change and having only light suumer clothes when winter hit. The best chance for a German victory was in 1941, but tht chance was lost with the Red Army counter offensive before Moscow (December 1941). This would eventually cost them the War. But other consequences of the German victory feaver would lead to the death of millions. The belief of Hitler, other NAZI officials, and Wehrmacht commanders that they had won, the war removed any remaining restraints on their conduct. The Germans believed that the\y could do whatever they wanted in Europe and the inhabitants of the Continent. And this meant redrawing the ethnic map of Europe. This process was altrady underway before Barbarossa, but the early successes of Barbarossa and the Einsatzgruppenn intensified the process. The murder of tens of millions of people was set in motion. Plans for killing operations were laid before Barbarossa. Hitler made it clear that this was to be a war of anialation. This was, however, not fully understod at the time. Not all Einsatzgruppe commanders understood at first that they were to kill all Jews, including women and children. By the end of July, they fully understood what they were to do. And this was done by fixed formations that inclued both police and Waffen-SS. It was with Barbarossa that mass murder began. The Holocaust by bullet was initiated by the Einsatzgruppen. The captured Red Army soldiers were the next victimms. Jews and comisars were separated and killed early on. The rest were marched without food and little aater to holding areas where they would be starved and exposed to to the wreater to kill them in large numbers. This was done by the Whermnacht, not the SS, but Hitler's econimic advisers were in agreement. Hitler expanded on this in one of his countless momologues July 5-6, 1941). [Jochmann, p. 39.] The Outlines of Geberalplan Ost were in place. Hitler explained his vision for the East to key officilas (July 16). They included: Alfred Rosenberg ((Minister for Iccupied Eastern Territories), Hans Lammers (State Chancellry), Field Mrshal Keitel (OKW), Göring, and Martin Bormann (NZI Party Chancellry). He explained what he o\ planned for the East. The urban population would be destouyed and the ruralmpopulatioin would also be destoyed are turned into slaves for German colonists. They would have no rights and receive no education. ADAP, D p. 13, No. 114]. It is notable that but large-scale killing operations only began with Brbrossa, mostly by July.

Sources

ADAP.

Hadler, Franz. Dairy (entry July 3, 1941).

Jochmann, Werner. Adolf Hitler: Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941-1944. (2000). .

Military History Reserch Office. German Federal Republic. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweuite Weltkreich (DRuZW).

Stahel, David. Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories: 2011).







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Created: 12:22 AM 5/11/2014
Last updated: 2:52 AM 10/7/2020