Figure 1.--The Wehramcht following Hitler's orders planned Barbarossa has a quick summer campaign. As a result, theWehrmcht foujnd itself deep in Russia with some of the coldest weather experienced in years. And not only did did the men not have winter clothing, but the undefeated Red Army launched perhaps the most important offensive of the War (Decenmber 10, 1941). That was apparently the day this snapshot was taken. Gobbels within days was on the radio appealing for furs, coats, gloves, sweaters (pullovers, woolen underwear, and other warm clothing. As far as we can tell, the large untity of clothing collected never reached the troops in any quantity.

The Wehrmact as Operation Typhoon to take Moscow ground to a hault in the snow and ice, desperately rushed available supplies of warm clothing and winter lubricants to the front, but they proved inadequate and hard to deliver. The Wehrmacht was at the extreme limit of its supply routes and the winter weather proved to be an insurmountable problem. The Sovoet offenive further complicated the logistical problem. It was not that the Germans did not have stocks winter clothing. There were piles of winter clothing in warehouses in the Reich. And the Germans had several million captive Jews in ghettoes that could have been set to work producung more. Instead the SS began killing operations in the Lodz ghetto where the Jews were producing a range of products to support the war effort. The problem with the warm clithing is that arms and amunition was given priority in a failing effort to seize Moscow and destroy the Red army. The Germans did not have the logictical capabilikty to move both arms and clothing as needed by the troops. Despite the fact that the availability of winter clothing was not the pronem. Goebbels decided to launch a collection of winter clothing as pat of the annual Winter Relief effort. Goebbels issued an appeal in which he explained,"At home everybody has a roof over his head and a bed to sleep in. The nutrition is admittedly limited, but compared with that of all other European nations it is still sufficient. At home one is still in a position to get such relaxation as newspapers, theatres, concerts, visits to movies, radio-the relaxation which the population needs pressingly in consideration of the strain it bears during its process of work. Almost all this does not hold good for our soldiers on the Eastern Front. That cannot be changed. But in one thing the hinterland can help. It can give to its sons and fathers protection against the wrath of the wintry climate. As long as a single object of Winter clothing remains in the fatherland, it must go to the front. I know that also in the homeland the individual can spare such equipment only with great difficulty. He is not in a position to replace it. But a thousand times more urgently do our soldiers need such equipment, which they cannot replace either." [Goebbels] What he did not explain was why the great war leader, Adolf Hitler, had the German Army drive deep into Russia wihout warm clothing in near Arctic conditions. Of course you could not say this aloud, but surely it must have crossed the minds of many. Also not explained was the extent of the Red Army offensive before Moscow and the fact that the Germans were retreating on all fronts. The Hitler Youth children participated in the collections. It was successful in the sence that large amounts of winter clothing was collected. It was not, however, rushed to the front. The German logistical network did not have that capability and the success of the Red Army offensive made it even more diificult. Many units did not get warm clothing untiul the approach of Spring the following year.

Operation Typhoon (October 1941)

The final German offensive to seize Moscow was named Operation Typhoon. It consisted of a classic panzer pincer movement to cut off Moscow. The northern pincer offensiv by the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups attacked the Kalinin Front, severing the Moscow-Leningrad railway. The southern pinzer consisted of the 2nd Panzer Army attaclked the Western Front, south of Tula/ The 4th Army advanced attacked Moscow ditectly from the west. A separate operational plan, codenamed Operation Wotan, was the final phase of the German offensive. Operation Typhoon gradually round to a hault in the snow and ice.

Logistical Sitution

The Wehrmacht struggled to get supplies of warm clothing and winter lubricants to the front, but they proved inadequate and hard to deliver. The Wehrmacht was at the extreme limit of its supply routes and the winter weather proved to be an insurmountable problem.

Red Army Offensive (December 10)

The Soviet offenive further complicated the logistical problem. The German offensive was grounding to a hault even before Zuhkov launched the Red Army offensive. The Red Army offensive before Moscow was the first Allied offensive to regain territory lost to the NAZIs. Reports had been received of NAZI attrocities in occupied cpuntries, especially in the East. These had been impossible to confirm. There was some skepticism among the American public because World War I reports of German attroicities had been widely overstated. And the Russians had been invaded by the Germans in World war I and the Germans had behaved sternly, but not barbarically. As the Red Army advanced, however, the hideous, auful truth emerged. They found burned villages and butchered populations. In some cases the Germans killed civilians as reprisals to guerilla actiins. The Soviets, however, found whole villages destroyed and the inhbitants shot for no apparent reason. The Wafen SS was not yet a major factor. Many of these attrocities appear to have been committed by Wehrmacht units. We do not yet know just who was responsible or why the Whrmacht begaved so barbarically. I do not yet know if any historian had addressed this. The subject of killing Jews has been addressed in details, but the Red Army duscovered wide-spread attrocities aimed at non-Jewish civilians. Much of this seems to have done by retreating Germans, but we can not yet confirm this. As the war swung back and forth on the Eastern Front, Hitler and the NAZIs had what they wanted, a war of anialation. Neither side would give the other any quarter and German soldiers feared more than anything falling into Russian hands. While the Red Army was used to supress the occupied countries and there was widespread rape and looting, the Soviets never committed the attrocities routinely committed by the Germans.

Winter Uniforms

It was not that the Germans did not have stocks winter clothing. There were plerntiful piles of winter clothing in warehouses in the Reich. And the Germans had several million captive Jews in ghettoes that could have been set to work producung more. Instead the SS began killing operations in the Lodz ghetto where the Jews were producing a range of products to support the war effort. The problem with the warm clothing is that arms and amunition was given priority in a failing effort to seize Moscow and destroy the Red army. The GGGerman logigtical system could not deliver everything needed and priority was given to the arms and amunition. The Germans did not have the logictical capabilikty to move both arms and clothing as needed by the troops. Hitler gambled that victory could be achieved before winter set in. He and the German soldiers lost and lost big. Front-line units were on their own. Some divisions improvised by organizing workshops using Russian civilians in occupied cities. Working for the Germans was the only way of getting food rations. Using what ever stocks of fabric that were available as well as blankets and old clothing, the workers fashioned flannel waistbands, earmuffs, waistcoats, footcloths and mittens with the standard separate thumbs but an added index (triger) finger. Sheep wwre slaughtered for sheepskins used for coats thst could be used interchangeably for sentries. Some felt boots were also produced. Clothing was also taken from civilians or dead Soviet soldiers. The clothing produced or otherwise acquired was far short of what was needed, but it did provide at least some winter clothing.

Winter Relief Campaign (December 19)

Despite the fact that the availability of winter clothing was not the pronem. Goebbels decided to launch a collection of winter clothing as pat of the annual Winter Relief effort. Goebbels issued an appeal in which he explained,"At home everybody has a roof over his head and a bed to sleep in. The nutrition is admittedly limited, but compared with that of all other European nations it is still sufficient. At home one is still in a position to get such relaxation as newspapers, theatres, concerts, visits to movies, radio-the relaxation which the population needs pressingly in consideration of the strain it bears during its process of work. Almost all this does not hold good for our soldiers on the Eastern Front. That cannot be changed. But in one thing the hinterland can help. It can give to its sons and fathers protection against the wrath of the wintry climate. As long as a single object of Winter clothing remains in the fatherland, it must go to the front. I know that also in the homeland the individual can spare such equipment only with great difficulty. He is not in a position to replace it. But a thousand times more urgently do our soldiers need such equipment, which they cannot replace either." [Goebbels] The Hitler Youth children participated in the collections. A German newreel reported, "The collection of wool, fur and winter articles for our troops in the east signifies the recognition of the bond between the front and the homeland. The collection in both towns and countryside has already exceeded expectations in the first few days. Here the collection is conducted in a village in Upper Silesia. Even the best clothing is being offered for our troops. It is urged that donations to the collection be delivered to the reception centers over the next few days. Already, in the collection centers the individual items are categorized and packed for transport. Thus could already a few days after the collection the first wagons with warm clothing were rolling eastwards. They brought in the first seven and a half days more than 32 million various articles, including over 500,000 furs, fur vests and other fur articles, over 3 million coats, pullovers and wool vests and 4 million scarfs, almost 2 and a quarter million pairs of gloves, some 4 million foot-warmers and 2 and a half million pairs of hose and socks. In various major points on the eastern front, the articles are distributed to the troops." [Deutsche Wochenschau No. 592.] This was propaganda. Very little of the garments reached the front during the Winter. The collection was was successful in the sence that large amounts of winter clothing was collected. The collected clothing was not, however, rushed to the front. The German logistical network did not have that capability and the success of the Red Army offensive made it even more diificult. Many units did not get warm clothing untiul the approach of Spring the following year.

Unanswered Questions

What Goebbels did not explain was why the great war leader, Adolf Hitler, had the German Army drive deep into Russia wihout warm clothing in near Arctic conditions. And at the same time declasre war on the United States. The enormity of all this almost boggles the mind. Goebbels of course controlled the nespapers and radio and thus all war reporting. But it did not take a sophisticated milirary amalyst to know that commiting the German rmy to a winter campaign without war clothing was an absurdity. And just as undefeated Red Army launched a massive offensive to declare war on America with its large population and huge industrial capability could only be seen by any dispasionate observer can only be seen as the height of folly. But of course many Germans wre not dispassionate any fully committed to Hitler and the NAZIs. Of course you could not ask these awkwatrd questions aloud, but surely it must have crossed the minds of many. Also not reveealed to the German public he extent of the Red Army offensive before Moscow and the fact that the Germans were taking enormous losses and retreating on all fronts.

Sources

Deutsche Wochenschau No. 592, January 7, 1942.

Goebbels, Josef. We believe this was part of a radio broadcast on December 19, 1941. The complete text was printed in the America media. "Goebbels' plea for clothing for troops on the Russian front & Hitler's proclamation," New York Times (December 20, 1941).

Created: 3:08 AM 9/13/2011
Last updated: 3:17 AM 9/15/2011