*** war and social upheaval: World War II approaching the Rhine








World War II: Western Allies Approach the Rhine (January-February 1945)

World war II Rhine
Figure 1.--This AP Wirephoto shows a boy among Germn POWs captured by Americans forces approaching the Rhine. Another boy is in the background to the left. The photograph was taken near Krefeld. The town was located southwest of the Ruhr area, a few kilometres to the west of the River Rhine near Düsseldorf. This photogrph was taken March 11, at the time American units were already pouring across the Rhine at Remagen. Neither the man or boy are properly uniformed. CuriousLy the soldier at the right has a uniform that looks more Russian than German.

The Rhine was the last important barrier to the Western Allies. The Germans knew that once the Allies crossed the Rhine, the Reich was indefensible. The Western Allies reducded the Bulge. Eisenhower decided that Allied armies should first advance to the Rhine on a broad front before any further efforts were made to cross the River. It was a conservative approach and military experts today debate Eisenhower's broad front tactics. This approach to shorten Allied lines and provided Eisenhower the reserves needed to deal with any further German offensives. It also made it impossible for the Germans to concentrate forces in any one area to oppose an Allied crossing--this was in fact a comprise aimed at minimizing conflicting views from British and American commanders. Probably Eisenhower's need to maintain the alliance was a factor in his decession to persue a broad front policy. Important elements of the Wehrmacht were destroyed west of the Rhine as Hitler insisted on defending the territory of the Reich. Eisenhower approach was to launch concentric attacks from the north by the British 21st Army Group and the U.S. Ninth Army and from the south by the U.S. First Army. Patton's Third Army would cut straight across central Germany. The Seventh Army would vere southward into Bavaria and Austria. After the Bulge, the Allied needed to take Colmar, a French city. to approach the Rhine in the south. A Franco-American attack was launched (January 20). The Canadian First Army pushed into the area between the Maas and Rhine Rivers. The First Army seized the key Rohr River dams, but were unable to prevent the Germans from floodingb the Rohr Valley. These floods delayed the American Ninth Army's advance. The Ninth Army finally linked up with the Canadians (late February). This cut off Wehrmact units facing the British. The American First Army pressed the drive for the Rhine. The Ninth Army reached the Rhine dear D�sseldorf (March 3), but Montgomery ordered them not to attempt a Rhine crossing. [Chalfont, p. 272.]

The Rhine

The Rhine was the last important geographic barrier to the Western Allies. It extended from Switzerland to the North Sea and was thus a formidable barrier -- if defended by a substabntial force. The width of the Rhine meant that the Allies would have to mount an amphibious operation. The Germans knew that once the Allies crossed the Rhine, the Reich was indefensible. Rather than use the Rhine as a bulwark in the West, however, Hitler decided to use Germany's last remaining reserves to attack the Allies west of the Rhine ithrough the Ardennes in an effort to seize the strategic port of Antwerp and cut the Allied armies in two.

Supplies

Hitler and the Wehrmacht were keenly aware of supply issues. Heavily mecganized American units required more supplies than comprable German units. Fuel was a particular problem because of the consumption by armored and other units. Shipping supplies overvbeaches was a limiting factor. Mulberries at Normandy helped, but the American Mulberry was destroyed in a Channel storm. And even after the Allied advance across France, isolated Gerjan garrisons held out in ports. Antwerp was a paticularly important port and seized in relatively good condition, but German grrisons in estuary forts prevented use from the Allies. The German had not anticipted the American ability to move supplies by truck. (The Wehrmacht primarily used railroads.) The Red Ball Express supplied rapidly advancing American armies. (American trucks supplied the Soviets through Lend Lease also played a major role in the rapid Red Army advance in the East.) This kept the American units supplied, but not sufficently to support a major offensive all along the front line. Supply problems meant that after the failure of Market Garden, Allied armies did not have the supplies needed for another effort to cross the Rhine. The supply constraints and then the Bulge impeded Allied operations. The Allies finally resolved their supply contraints (February 1945).

Allied Strategic Plans: Broad Front Advance

The Western Allies reducded the Bulge. Eisenhower decided that Allied armies should first advance to the Rhine on a broad front before any further efforts were made to cross the River. It was a conservative approach and military experts today debate Eisenhower's broad front tactics. This approach to shorten Allied lines and provided Eisenhower the reserves needed to deal with any further German offensives. Eisenhower realized that the Germans could not prevail in a war of attrition. The only hope the Germans had was to concentrate forces and deal a defeat to an Allied force that advanced to far into the Reich. Eisenhower's broad-front campaign also made it impossible for the Germans to concentrate forces in any one area to oppose an Allied crossing--this was in fact a comprise aimed at minimizing conflicting views from British and American commanders. Probably Eisenhower's need to maintain the alliance was a factor in his decession to persue a broad front policy. Eisenhower approach was to launch concentric attacks from the north by the British 21st Army Group and the U.S. Ninth Army and from the south by the U.S. First Army. Patton's Third Army would cut straight across central Germany. The Seventh Army would vere southward into Bavaria and Austria were the NAZIs were believed to be building a strategic reserve. .

The Rhineland: Fighting West of the Rhine (September 1944-January 1945)

The Rhineland is the area of Germany east and west of the Rhine Ruiver. Hitler after the liberation of Fance had two optionns. Make a stand in he westermn Rhineland using the West Wall defenses. The other was fall back behind the Rhine, an even gretr obstacle. Hitler insisted on defending the territory of the Reich despite the military logic of using the Rhine barrier. He decided not only to defend the Rhineland, but ultimately come out from behind the West Wall defenses amd launch a major offensie. The Rhineland campaign was thus fought west of the Rhine. West of the Rhine still offered the Germams two advantages. First the Allies supply lines were becoming stretched. They still did not have a an opratioinal port and wereb still landing their supplies on the Normandy beaches. And what supplies that were available were priortized for Montgomrery and Market Garden. Second, the West Wall offered important defensibe fortifications. Important elements of the Wehrmacht would be destroyed in the Rhineland west of the Rhine. The Allies also lost men, especially in Hürtgen Forest where all the Allied advantages were negated by the terraine. But the Allies could afford tomlose men, the Germans couod not. And the losses meant that the Germans no longer had the forces needed to defend the Rhine. The approach to the Rhine might be develooped into three area. In the far north, the British and Canadians had reached the Rhine, but failed to cross it as a result of Market Garden (October 1944). This left two areas west of the Rhine to be seized. In the central area, there was the Rhineland, the area of Germany east of Belgium and west of the Rhine. In the south the Germans still held areras of France that bordered on the Rhine. The Allies began reaching the Rhineland (September 1944). The Allied plan to outflank the Siegfried Line (Operation Market Garden) failed (October 1944). This meant that the Allies would have to attack the Siegfried Line which the Germans called the West Wall. The defenses had been weakened with guns were shifted to the Atlantic Wall in 1943-44. Even so the Sieffried KLine defenses were still formidable. The Bulge Offensive delayed the assault on the Siegfried Line, but as the Bulge was reduced and the supply problems resolved, tht assayult could be renewed. And the Allies drove to the Rhine. Then unexpectedly, American armored units captured an intact Rhine River bridge at Remagen (March 7). .

Hürtgen Forest (September 1944-February 1945)

Allied forces first contacted the Siegfried border fortifications (mid-September 1944). Other U.S. units attempted to reach the crucial Roer River dams. They wanted the dams to keep the Germans from flooding areas to the north which would delay the final war-winning advance into the Reich. The shorted route to the dams lay through the Hürtgen Forest. This was a man-made forest preserve consisting of densely packed fir trees in rough terrain including deep gorges. It was part of the Siegfried Line and an area also an area that the Germans had heavily fortified. The First United States Army fought a costly battle in the Hürtgen Forest. This was a rerrible mistake by American commanders. The heavily forested and ravined terrain of the Hürtgen negated Allied combined arms advantages (mobility, air support, armor, and artillery). It thus and favoured the German defenders. The critical enggement was fought by the Second Rangers D (Dog) Company, which launched a desperate bayonet charge across an open field on the slopes of Hill 400. [O'Donnell] The U.S. Army lost 24,000 troops in the Hürtgen Forest. It is one of the most heavily criticized American campaigns of World War II.

Saarland Campaign (September 1944-January 1945)

The Saarland like neighboing Alsace was a historically disputed border region beween France and Geramny loccated west of the Rhine. It is adjacnt to Luxembourg in the extrene south of the Rhineland. It was occupied by France after World War I. The French were hopeful that they could convince the population to exit Germany and unite with France or t lat turn in into nother Luxembourg. The Saarlanders in a free referendum enphsgtically sanserd that question. Theyh voted massivly to join with NAZI Germany (1935). The freely chose dictatorship. By the time of the referendum, Saarlanders were aware of what was going on in Germany. (They were not the only Germans to voluntasrily chose NAZI rule. Danzig, the Sudetens in Czechsolovakia, and Austraia also voted for union with NAZI Germany.) The West Wall the Germans built extebded along the western boundary of the Saar (1936-39). The West Wall was German version of the French Msaginot Line and bette known in the Wast as the Siegfried Line. After Hitler launched World War II (1939), the Saar was untouched by the ground war until the final year. The Saar had become a target in the Allied Strategic bombing campaign (1942-45). After the Normandy and retreating from France, Gerrman forces regrouped behind th West Wall defenses in the Rhineland, including the Saar wehich became the front-line of the War. The German defndrs benefitted from some of the strongest defenses in the West Wall. The rapid Allied advances stopped at the West Wall. The Allies took heavy losses and made only limited progress into the Saar. At the time Gen. Patton was preparing a major drive into the Saar, the Germans struk in the Ardennes (Dcmber 1944).

Colmar

Colmar is a city in southern Alsace (northeast France) a few kiloneters west of the Rhine mort of Switzrlnd. . The Germans after occupying France annexed it (1940). The Germans expelled French citizens. For 4 years Colmar was a quiet corner of the Reich. German forcesfell back into Colmar after retreating from France (September 1944) . The German 19th Army set up defenses (November 1944). Unlike other German stroing points, it was not behind the West Wall. It faced the U.S. 6th Army Group. The 6th AG liberated southern and northern Alsace and adjacent eastern Lorraine, but was unable to clear central Alsace. American and French units reached Alsace (November 1944). They liberted substantial areas and surrounded the German 19th Army on three sides. The Germans maintained contsact wuth the Rhine. Rather than retreating across the Rhine, the Germans stood and fought it out. The German redoubt became known as the Colmar Pocket. It was a rough semi-circle -- the Rhine in the east and an arc extending from the south of Strasbourg to the north of Mulhouse in the west. The 160km Grman line proved difficult to pierce. The 19th Army was reinforced by somer fresh German troops (December). The Allies were also handicapped by a shortage of supplies, making offensive opertionsd difficult to sustain. It became for time a mtter of natiinl pride. The Germans pointed to it as as German terruitory west of ther Rhine. The Free French Army saw it as the last French territory to be liberated. The Germand unexprctedly struck to the north in the Ardenes (Decenber 16). This lead to the Battle of the Bulge. The 19th Army in support of th Bulge offensive, attacked north out of the Pocket--Opertion Norwind (December 31). They were supported by other German forces sttckin south from the Saar into northern Alsace. The Allies comsidered pulling back, but the French forces refused.

The Bulge (December 1944-January 1945)

Hitler launched the last important German offensive of the War--Operation Norwind (December 16). The Germans for again strike in the Ardennes. The Wehrmacht launched a carefully planned attack against weak Anerican ynits in the Ardennes (December 16, 1944). The offensive was commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. The NAZI panzers stormed westward along a 60-mile front stretching from Saint Vith in Belgium south to Echternach in Luxembourg. The German goal was to break through the American lines, sweep through the Ardennes, and seize Antwerp. The port of Antwerp was essential to the Allied offensive. The major limiting factor to the Allie was supplies and the Allies were beginning to repair the Antwerp port facilities. With Antwerp the British and Canadians in northern Belgium could be cut off and encircled. The Allied thought the Wehrmacht was esentially defeated and incapable of mounting amajor offensive. The Germans were also careful to avoid sending messages bout the offensive electronically. Thus Ultra did not have a clear picture, although Allied commanders were given some warnings. The Germans forced the U.S. 28th Division to retreat from Wiltz (December 19). Eisenhower ordered the 101st Airborne Division to defend the vital crossroads town of Bastonge in Belgium. The German panzers pushed west. German Panther and Tiger tanks in many ways were superior to the American panzers, but they were slower and the Tigers could not cross many Belgian bridges, limited possible crossings. They also guzzled huge quantities of fuel and fuel ws the principal limiting facor to the Germand offensive. The German plans were contingent on capturing American fuel depots. When the German offensive began, George S. Patton's 3rd Army to the south was about to launch an invasion into the German Saar. In a brilliant movement, within 2 days, he turned the offensive on a 90° axis and struck northward into the German flank to relieve the 101st Airborne in Bastogne. The 3rd Army liberated Ettlebruck on Christmas Eve and broke through the German lines to relieve Bastogne (December 26). The U.S. 5th Armored Division conducted a surprise night crossing of the River Sure and liberated Diekirch (January 18, 1945). The Germans were pushed back to the positions they held at the start of the battle (January 28). The Whrmacht offensive in the Ardennes delayed the Allied offensive toward the Rhine by about 6 weeks. The Allies in the campaign, however, destroyed virtually all of the Wehrmacht reserves and important panzer units as well as futher depleting the Luftwffe. This meant that the ability of the Germans to defend the Rhine and Berlin was significantly reduced.

Breakthrough: Race to the Rhine (February 1945)

The Bulge changed the strategic ballance in the Rhineland. German losses in rgw Bukfe were huge. They came out beyonf the rstWall defensdes and were exposed to to the massive superiority of Allied fire powr. The Germans had the bettr tnks, but not very many of them or much fuel to operate them. The Allies not only had many more tanbks, but a decided superiority in air powr and artillery. And now the Germans no longer had a stratergic reserve. Supplies from the Reich were momlonger avilable. The Allies now had ports, especially Antwerp, and theor forces were being fully supplied. Losses were rbeing eplaced. Advanves were limited in the closing months of 1944, but important objectives were taken and they were now ready for a race to the Rhine. Clearing the Rhineland west of the Rhine was part of Eisenhower's Broad Front strategy. And finally after the Bulge with the supply problem solved and the Germans, fatally weakened, real progress could be made in cracking the West Wall wide open. Defensive enplacments are one thing, but withiythout adequate forces to man them and supplies, they lose their value. After months battering away at the West Wall, now real advances were schieved. It should not be thought that it was an easy slog. Making war on the Germans, even a defeted Germn army is no easy undertaking. Serious losses continued to be taken even as the Reich began to collspse. But for the first time German forces and civilan refugess began streaming acoss the Rhine before authiorities blew the bridges. Allied forces racing forward aginst declining German reistance dreamed about capturing an intact bridge. Few thought that they would find one. German forces west of the Rhine during operations Veritable, Blockbuster and Grenade lost soame 90,000 men (more than 50,000 wre gaken as POWs), a sihn that the Germans were finally convinced hec War was finished. The Allies sustained sone 23,000 casualties.

Crossing the Rhine (March 1945)

A company of armored infantry of the U.S. 9th Armored Division executed what proved to be the climax of the campaign in the Rhineland. When the lightly armed company entered Remagen, a Rhine River town, to their surprise they found the Hindenberg railway bridge still intact. A German attempt to blow it failed and after a fire fight the Americans seized the bridge (March 7). The Americans rushed forces across the damaged bridge to secure the first Allied bridgehead on the east bank. The Remgen crossing was a surprise for both the Germans and Allies. The Germans by this time lacked the mobility to rapidly move forces to Remagen to stop the crossing. The Allies were preparing to cross the Rhine in force, the Remagen crossing came 2 weeks before the planned crossings. The Remagen crossing was followed by the much larger Allied Operations that had long been planned to cross the Rhine. Montgomery's 21st Army Group (First Canadian Army and the British Second Army) prepared Operation Plunder and Operation Varsity. The American crossing was to be south of Remage and was given lower priority. Mongomdery's Varsity and Plunder opertion weere to be the main crossing. Gen. George Patton's Third U.S. Army mnansagedf to crossed the Rhine to the south of Remagen (March 22). This was the day before the massive assault that General had meticulously prepred. Montgomery's crossing began (March 23). Operations Varsity was a massive airborne operation in conjunction with Operation Plunder, the amphibious crossings. By early April, the Rhine had been crossed by all the Allied armies operating west of the river,. The battles for the Rhineland was over and the Bsttle forv Germany begsn. .

Battle for Germany (April 1945)

The Rhine was the last major geographic barrier faced by the Allies. After crossing the Rhine, the major fight was for the Ruhr. This was where Germny's major formation in the West was located--Army Group B with some 0.6 million men. Within days of crossing the Rhine, German Army Group B commanded by Field Marshal Model was surrounded in the Ruhr by the the highly mobile U.S. First and Ninth Armies (April 1). [MacDonald, p. 359.] By this point in th War, the Germns were a basically a static force. Hitler declare the Ruhr a fortress and orderd Model to to stand and fight to the death. (The creation of foirtress reas was Hitler's strategy for defending Germny.) This was the same orders he had given Pulus at Stalingrad. He also ordered that what was left physical infrastructure be destroyed to deny it to the Allies. The Ruhr was Germany's industrial heartland. Model ignored these orders. [Newton, pp. 352–53.] After surrounding the Ruhr pocket, the Amricancut split the Ruhr Pocket. Major-General Matthew Ridgway commanding the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps called upon Model to surrender rather than uselessly scrifice his soldiers (Aprul 15). Model believed tht Field Marshals do not surrender. Instead, he ordered Army Group B's dissolution. The oldest and youngest soldiers were discharged. The rest og his commnd were given permission to either surrender or attempt to break out at their own discretion. [MacDonald, pp. 369–70.] The Fifth Panzer Army had already durrndrd. Joseph Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry in Berlin publicly denounced Army Group B as traitors to the Reich (April 20). Model had been one of Hitler's most loyal commanders. Knowing that the Soviets had indited him for actions he had ordered in the East, Model shot himself (April 21). The Allies not only surrounded the Ruhr, but also raced into Germany. Too often it is thought that this was the end of the War. For the Allied soliders it was not. The Western Allies like the Soviet took substabtial casualties durung the fight for Germany. Many German soldiers beggn surrendering, but many did not. The Allis are often ctiticized for not relnting on the attscks on Germny. Often ignored are the casusalties Allied soldiers were still taken and the even lrger casualties the Red Army was taking in the East.

Sources

Chalfont, Alun. Montgomery of Alamein (Atheneum: New York, 1976), 365p.

MacDonald, Charles B. The Battle of the Huertgen Forest (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963). .

Newton, Steven H. (2006). Hitler's Commander: Field Marshal Walther Model – Hitler's Favorite General (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Da Capo, 2006).

O'Donnell, Patrick K. Dog Company: The Boys of Pointe du Hoc--The Rangers Who Accomplished D-Day's Toughest Missionand Led the Way Across Europe (2012), 288p.






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Created: 8:17 PM 2/29/2008
Last updated: 11:08 PM 2/10/2022