World War II: Operation Barbarossa Planning -- Hitler's Military Concepts


Figure 1.--As incredible as it may seem, Hitler thought that the Soviet Union could be defeated in a short summer campaign like the one waged in the West. Barbarossa planners were ordered to ignore aong list of potentially important issues. One of those was the pimitive infrastructure of the Soviet Union. It was something the German soldiers notive from the earliest stahe of Barbarossa. German soldiers brought their Leica's and other cameras with them as aourist might do to record their heoic adventires. And there are thus countless images of the primitive conditions recorded by the Germans as they eastward into the vastness of the Soviet Union. The snapshot here is but one example. Almost all of these snapshots were taken in the first few months of Barbarossa. Once the gighting intensified, the Germans began to realize that it was no longer an exercize in tourism. The open area in the foreground is what passed or a road in the Soviet Union.

Hitler in concepualizing Barbarossa was strongly influenced by a series of spectacular military victories: Poland (September 1940), Scandanavia (April 1940), the West (May-June 1940), and finally the Balkans (April 1941). Rommel's victories in the Western Desert (March-June 1941) only confirmed his opinions. The fall of France was especially important in Hitler's mind. He was a soldier on the Western Front during World War. This formed Hitler's mind set. He winessed Germany throw its young men against the Allied trenches for 4 years in a futile effort to break through. Now he was in possession of a military that could do the imposible, crack France wide open in a month. And because of the disaterous Winter War, he saw the French Army as a much more powerful force than the Red Army. He was thus concinced that the hole Soviet Union would as he put it 'collapse like a house of cards' in another brief summer campaign. Like Stalin he refused to listen to any advise to the contrary. To plan Barbaosa, only officers that accepted this senario were accepted. Anyone who asked awkward questions was reassigned. Hitler's concept of the campaign was based on a long list of optimistic, but deeply flawed assumptions.

Hitler's Mind-set

Hitler in concepualizing Barbarossa was strongly influenced by a series of spectacular military victories: Poland (September 1940), Scandanavia (April 1940), the West (May-June 1940), and finally the Balkans (April 1941). Rommel's victories in the Western Desert (March-June 1941) only confirmed his opinions. The fall of France was especially important in Hitler's mind. He was a soldier on the Western Front during World War. This formed Hitler's mind set. He winessed Germany throw its young men against the Allied trenches for 4 years in a futile effort to break through. Now he was in possession of a military that could do the imposible, crack France wide open in a month. And because of the disasterous Soviet Winter War in Finland, he saw the French Army as a much more powerful force than the Red Army. He was thus convinced that the whole Soviet Union would as he put it 'collapse like a house of cards' in another brief summer campaign. Foremost in Hitler's mind was that his Wehrmacht had defeated France in weeks andFrance was the bulwark of the Allied opposition in World War I. Germany defeated Russia, but it was France that had denied them victory in World War I. Logically with France so easily defeated in World War II, the Soviets would be eaily defeated.

Planning

Hitler, like Stalin, refused to listen to any advise contrary to his strongly held beliefs. And this attitude became much more strident after the success of Case Yellow,the Western Offensive (May-June 1940). Hitler had rejected the adice of OKH and chosen ba much more radival plan presented by Gen. Hans Guderian. The fact that it worked so well convinced him that he knew more about mjiklitary matters than the generals. [Seaton, pp. 32-36.] As the planning began for Barbarossa, only officers that accepted the victory senario were allowed gtop participate. Anyone who asked awkward questions was reassigned. There were three versions of Barbarossa. The first version of the plan was prepared by Gen. Erich Marcks (August 1940). OKH Chief Gen. Franz Halder ordered Marcks to draft an initial operational plan. He understood that this was onHitler's mind. At the time the Heer was massing in Channel ports awauiting a Luftwaffe victoru over Britain. Marcks made Moiscow his primary target and envisaged a massive attack aimed at Moscow. He also suggested a secondary attack on Kiev and two masking attacks in the Baltic towards Leningrad and in Moldavia in the south. Once Moscow fell, Marcks suggested a drive south to link up with the forces investing Kiev. Hadler took the Marcks blue print and made changes (December 1940). He agreed that the principal thrust should be toward Miscow. He also retained a seciondary attack toward Kiev. He gave more emphasis on the attack toward Leningrad. After taking Moscow and Leningrad, he eanted to move north to Archangel to close off any Allies supply efforts. Hitlker is often blamed for disregarding the Russian Winter. This suggests that Hadler was also not to concerned about the weather. After takinbg Kiev, he wanted to drive to the Donbas/Volga region. The third and final variant was Hitler’s revision of the Hadler Plan which he codenamed Barbarossa (December 1940). Hitler envisioned the primary military activity in the north with a drive toward Leningrad and Moscow anf the primary objective to destroy the Red Army. The southern drive was to be confined to the occupation of the Ukraine west of Kiev. This was the basis for Führer Directive 21.

The Plan: Führer Directive 21 (December 1940)

With the failure of the Luftwaffe air campaihgn against Britain, Hitler was left with a massive army and no way to attack Britain, the only country at war with Germany at the time, because of the Channel. Hitler was faced with a stark option. Armny's are expendive. He could not aford to permsnrly stay on a war footing. He could demobilize, buit this would give oyher countries the chanve to close the military advatage Germsnybhad. Asaresult,he decided to strike the Soviet Union, his primary goal from the very beginning. You can see that in Mein Kampf. It went against another long held belief that the Kaiser's grave error was to wage a two-frint war. He justified this by insisting that victory in the East would force Britain to mske peace. He laid down the basic guidelines for Barbarossa in Führer Directive 21 (December 18, 1940). At the time the Blitz had set Lomdon burning, confirming to Hitler the correctness of his strategy. The plan was to launch the full fury of Blitzkrieg on the Soviet Union. The Red Army was to be defeated in less than 3 months in another quick summer campaign. The Herr (Army) ground troops and panzers were to play the main role in the campaign. The Navy would have a modern role in the Baltic. The Luftwaffe would offer support as a key element of Blitzkrieg. Hitlker had not yet conceived of the the three Barbarosa groups (North, Center, and South), but he factor in the Finish and Romanian armies. He ensisioned two massive fronts separatee by the POripet Marshes. He established the task of the forces massed in the center, "... the task of breaking out the area around and to the north of Warsaw with exceptionally strong armor and motorized formations and of destroying the enemy forces in White Russia. This will create a situation which will enable strong formations of mobile troops to swing north; such formations will then cooperate with the northern army group - advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad - in destroying the enemy forces in the area of the Baltic states. Only after the accomplishment of these offensive operations, which must be followed by the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, are further offensive operations to be initiates with the objective of occupying the important center of communications and of armament production, Moscow.". The forces in the south (Ukraine) "... will make its point of main effort from the Lublin area in the general direction of Kiev, with the object of driving into the deep flank and rear of the Russian forces with strong armored formations and of then rolling up the enemy along the Dnieper. The German-Romanian group on the right flank will have the task of protecting Romanian territory and thus of covering the southern flank of the whole operation; in coordination with the attack by the northern of Army Group south of tying up the enemy forces on its sector of the front; then, as the situation develops, of launching a second thrust and thus, in conjunction with the air force, of preventing an orderly enemy withdrawal beyond the Dniester. Once the battle south or north of the Pripet Marshes have been fought, the pursuit is to be undertaken with the following objectives: In the south the rapid occupation of the economically important Donetz Basin, in the north the speedy capture of Moscow. This city is a political and economical center, and is a main railway junction point."

Continued Disagreement

There were disagreements among the generals as Barbarossa was being planned as to wear the foicus of the German attack should be placed. And this was the main issue when Hitler becanme involved in the planning. It even continued after Barbarossa was launched. Hitler and his generals disagreed on where Germany should focus its energy. [Megargee, pp. 131–34.] Hitler's initial concept even bbefore detailed planning began was "Leningrad first, the Donbass second, Moscow third". [Higgins, pp. 11–59.] He repeated this in many sessions with his generals. He also condstantly demanded the the destruction of the Red Army over the achievement of specific territiorial objectives. [Glantz, Vol. I, p. 18.] Hitler told the generals that Moscow was of 'no great importance' in destroying the Soviert Union. He saw the key to the campaign was the the destruction of the Red Army which e saw as importanht to be achieved west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers and this became the fcus of the final Barbarossa Plan.[Glantz, Vol. II, pp. 19 and 60.] Here Stalin coperated by moving important elements of the Red Army west to occupy the areas seized as a result of the NAZI-Soviet Non-Aggressioin Pact (the Baltics, eastern Poland. and northeastern Romania). The disagreenment over focus, primarily the importabnce of Moscow, would lead to heated disagreements between Hitler and his most important generals, especially Hans Guderian, Gerhard Engel, Fedor von Bock, and Franz Halder. They believed that victory could only be achieved by seizing Moscow. [Glantz, Vol. II, pp. 55–60.]

Dates

The attack was to begin on May 15, 1941, but was delayed due to the situation created by Mussolinin in the Balkans. Mussolini's invasion of Greece and anti-Axis feelings in Yugoslavia upset Hitlers careful Balkans diplomacy. He had to intervene to secure vghe southern flank of Barbrossa (Aopril-Msy 1941). The new start date was June 22, 1941.

Basic Concepts

The Barbarossa operation plan than emerged from the Wehrmacht planning staff reflected Hitler's orders for an invasionnolan without any realistic assessment of what was possible. Hitler made that decision. The Wehtrmach planners had to plsn a campsign based on the forces availsble. It was based on a long list of optimistic, but deeply flawed assumptions. Barbarossa was not a realistic assessment of what awaited the Wehrmacht in the East, but a plan for attacking the Soiviet Union regardless of the Soviet military capsbility. Notably little attention was given to weather. Given the history of Napoleon's invasion and the recent Germsn experience in Russia this strainshuman credulity. The reason was that assessing weather would have delsayed Germsn novements. And Hitler in aniother quick summer campsign before the weather turned bad.

Barbarossa Assumptions

As Hitler and the generals argued about the focus of Bsrbarossa, orders begsn to go out to individuals German units being moved east to the Soviet frontier. Barbarossa abnd gthe orders being issued were based on a number of assumptions about the Soviet Government, the Red Army, and the Soviet people. Whilke the generals assigned gto lead the Wehrmacht east were extrordinarily competent in military science, theirvmnoralk compas had klong dince been lost with their willingness to serve Hitler and the NAZIs. This in the end would doom their finely honed army. Because with Hitler and the NAZIs came a series of deeply flawed assumptions that would doom the entire enterprise. Not all the German generals were ardent NAZIs. Some were. Others were German nationalists who sinmply supported the NAZIs because of their devotion to military might and labish bappripriations for the military. The genberals had made a deal with Hitler in 1934. He supressed the SA. They cionfirmed him in power. Now they were stuck with him in what would be a life and death struggle in the East.

Sources

Glantz, David. Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk Vols. I and II (Helion & Company: 2010).

Higgins, Trumbull. Hitler and Russia: The Third Reich in a Two-Front War, 1937–1943 (Macmillan Publishing: 1966)..

Hitler, Adolf. 'Führer Directive 21,' (Devember 18, 1940)

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf (1925).

Megargee, Geoffrey. Inside Hitler's High Command (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000).

Seaton, Albert (1982). The German Army, 1933–1945 (New York: Meridian, 1982).

Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breking of the Nazi Economy (Penguin: New York, 2006), 800p.






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Created: 5:17 AM 9/20/2016
Last updated: 5:32 AM 5/14/2018