Figure 1.-- |
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The NAZI invasion came as a huge shock to Stalin. This was not because he was not warned or the German preparations detected. Warnings came from multiple sources. Never before in history did a country have such detailed infprmation and so many creditable warnings about an impending invasion. Barbarossa was a massive undertaking. Given the dimmensions of Barbarossa, it was impossible to hide. The Soviet did ask, but the Germans claimed that they were moving forces east out of range of British bombing, an absurd response. Soviet intelligence was the best intelligence operation in the world, both the NKVD as well as military intellience (GRU). They obtained substantial information on NAZI intensions and preparations. They made these reports at great personal risk. Stalin had no illusions about Hitler's intenions and character. He knew the attack was coming eventually. And he was feeverisly attempting to prepare for it. He convinced himself, however, that it was not imminent because Hitler had insisted that a two-front war was why Germany had lost World War I and a two-front-war must be avoided at all cost. Stalin was thus positive Hitler would not attack with Britain still in the war. Stalin maintained this view even though a torrent of warnings reached him in Moscow.
Barbarossa was a massive undertaking. It was the klargest invasion force in history. Huge numners of maemn and equipment as well as horses. Supply dumpos had to be establish. Air fields prepared. Given the dimmensions of Barbarossa and the time it took to prepare, it was impossible to hide or even attemot to hide what the Germabs were doing. Huge firces were moved to the border--some 3 million men and their equipment. This simply could not be hidden or dusguisued. And the Germans made no zttempot to do dso. Stalin did questioned was Hitlers's intentions. Soviet diplomats inquired, but the Germans laimed that they were moving forces east out of range of British bombing or to distrct the British from the plsnned croiss0Channel invasion, both absurd responses.
Stalin had no illusions about Hitler's intenions and character. He knew the attack was coming eventually. And he was feeverisly attempting to prepare for it. He convinced himself, however, that it was not imminent because Hitler had insisted that a two-front war was why Germany had lost World War I and a two-front-war must be avoided at all cost. Stalin was thus positive Hitler would not attack with Britain still in the war. Stalin maintained this view even though a torrent of warnings reached him in Moscow. Stalin became enraged as more and more warnings reached him. And his rage was directed not at the Germans, but at any one who dared submit warnings, accusing the people involved of being spyies and German and or British agents. So many warnings arrived that Stalin threatened to arrest those submitting them. Beria issued orders not no to submit these warnings. Some very brave, patriotic people continued to submit the reports anyway. Beria toddy that he was stopped delivering them to Stalin. The failure was not the military or the intelligence services, it was entirely at the top--Joseph Stalin. The Red Army reported on the German build up, The NKVD and GRU both reported on the build-up and the plans to invade. Stalin was so sure of his infallibility that he convinced himself that the reports reaching him were British disinformation designed to create a rift between him and Hitler.
Soviet intelligence was the best intelligence operation in the world, both the NKVD as well as military intellience (GRU). They obtained substantial information on NAZI intensions and preparations. They made these reports at great personal risk because thggey irritated Stalin. Because he was so convinced that Hitkler would nit attack, he considered them dusinforamtion.
he Soviet commanders on the border were so frightened of their own side, but they couldn't push the issue because they feared being arrested by the NKVD on Stalin's orders. Ther memory of the Red Army purges were still very fresh on the minds of every officer. Stalin so teroruzed the military to stop reporting on German preparations that one Red Army commander famously called his headquarters saying, "We are being attacked! Do we have permission to return fire?" Stalin orderd the Red Air Force not to conduct reconisance flights over German positions. He also ordered the Red Air Force not to oppose Luftwaffe reconisance flights over Soviet territiy. He wanted the Germns to see that the Red Army were in defensive positions.
Soviet spy in Tokyo, Richard Sorge, gave the Soviets the exact timing and strength of the German invasion. Sorge was born in Gernany to German and Russian parents. He spoke both German and Russian. Sorge fought in the German Army during World War I. He joined the German Communist Party (1919). At the the Communists were involved in failed attemps to seize control of the country. He earned his doctorate in political science at the University of Hamburg. He traveled to the Soviet Union and cgot involved in Soviet intellkigence (1924).. His first major assignment followed with a mission to China to organize a spy ring (1928). After returning to Germany, he joined the NAZI Party to create the appearabce of a reliable, loyal German (1933). He developed a reputation as a respected journalist working for the Frankfurter Zeitung. He convinced the editors to send him to Tokyo as a foreign correspondent (mid-1930s). In Japan, Sorge recruited a spy ring, which included an adviser to the Japanese cabinet and an American communist, who was also working for Soviet intelligence as Sorge’s interpreter. He developed close relatioins with German diplomats and German military personnekl at the Embassy. He reported on both Germany and Japan to the Soviets. Sorge reported that Hitler was planning to attack the Soviet Union with 170 divisions on June 20 (May 1941). After the invasion, Sorge also reported that the Jaoabese were preparing a Pacific War (August 1941). This facilitated the repositioning of Manchurian border troops west. The Sorge's report can be overestimated. Such reports can not be taken at aface vaklue. Whike Sorge was accurate, nany suchg reports or not. And Soviet intelligence could not know foir sure hiw accurate he was. But fiven the moiuntain of evidence on the German build up along the border, there was good reason to give the Sorge reoorts some degree of credence. He was eventually arrested by the Japanese and hanged (November 7, 1944).
Both President Rooevelt and Prime-Minister Churchill warned Stalin. America Magic intercepts of Japanese diplomatic traffic revealed details on NAZI intentions and preparations. Japan's Ambassador in Berlin (Oshima Hoiroshi) was close to Hitler and other NAZI luninaries and his reports to Japan were decoded by the Americans. Göring briefed Ambassador Oshima on the NAZI plans and provided him details on the number of planes as well as the divisions being readied. [Boyd, p. 21.] British Ultra also picked up numerous messages to and from the Gemn units massing along the Soviet frontier. Churchill like Roosevelt also ordered that Stalin be informed from sanitized Ultra-decrypts. Stlalin who dismissed them as efforts to draw the Soviet Union into a war with Germany.
Marshals Zhukov, Chief of Staff, and Timoishenko, Commisar for Defense, were so dispondent after Stalkin dimissed theur evidence of a Soviet-buildup on the border that they challenged Stalin--few men lived who ndius this. ZHukov prepared a plan for a prementive attack (May 14). [Zhukov] It weas summarily rejected by Stalin who even prevenbted Zhukov from preoarung units along the border. A month later with growing German strength on the border, Zhukov and Timoshenko they took the unprcedented step of demanding a meeting of the Politboro to present their vevidence (June 12). [Gorodetsky] In normal times this would hve cost them therir lives. Stalin contiunued to be defiant. He asked, "What are you up to? Supposing to carry out mobilizations? Increasing our forces now and move them to the western border? Thst meeans war. Do you two understand this? And what have you come to do? Scare us with war or do you want a war? Are you not suffucently decorated? Or is your rank not high enough?" [Stalin] While leaving Stalin injected, "What younhave to realize the Gerrmans on their own will never strike Russia. You must credit this." Then Stalin began to leave, but stuck is head back through the door and said, "If you are going to provoke the germans by moving troops at the border without my permission, then mark my words, head will roll!." [Timoshenko]
The last of Stalin's warmings came a day before the launch of Opperation Barbarossa. The warning came from a German soldier -- Alfred Liskow (1910-42). He was a furniture maker at a furniture factory in Kohlberg, Bavaria. He like many German workers were Socialists or Communidts. In hois case he was a committed Communist. He had been a menber of the Roter Frontkämpferbund. He was drafted into the German Arny (1939). He served in Infantry Regiment 222 of the 75th Infantry Division which like most of the Army has been moved to the new Soviet border. He was stationed on the eve of Barbarossa just north of the town Sokal (near Lwow). After learning about the German invasion and bein given combat rations, he deserted and swam across the Bug River (June 21). He surrendered to the Soviet border patrol soldiers of the 90th Border Unit ((:00 PM). He was questioned and revealed that at dawn on June 22, the German Army would attack. [Bellamy, pp. 156-57] The Soviet authorities used him for propaganda purposes for several months. In one briadcast he said, "I am from a family of workers, from Kolberg. My parents and I hate Hitler and his regime. For us, the USSR is a friendly country, and we don’t want to fight with the Soviet people. There are many such families in Germany. They don’t want a war with you." His story was inconvenient for Stalin. He was arrested and detained with other Germann POWs (January 1942). He was rehabilitated for unknown reasons (July 16, 1942). After that he disappers from history. His fate is no known with any certainity. It is known that Stalin later ordered the execution of a 'German deserter' for providing 'misinformation'. It is not known if this was Liskow, but it is likely.
The Germans struck at 3:15 AM on June 22. The front-line Soviet troops were completely surprised. The were assaulted by the greatest invasion force in all of history. And because they had been repeatedly told not to provoke the Germans and were terrified of Stalin, many were actually afraid to return fire. Countless meessages flowwd into headquarters. "We are under fire, what should we do?" They were told, "You must be mad. And why is your message not in code." Resistance at the border depended on the iniative of local border commanders, few of whom dared exercise old action. The initial instructions from headquarters was not to use artillery and to limit air attacks. Bridges were not blown or had even been rigged with explosives. Russians south flowing rivers were major lines of potential defense. They were captured intact. The German well-coordinated ground and air attack completely destroyed the Soviet organizational border command and control within the first few hours. This parslized every level of command from the border infantry platoon up to the Soviet High Command in Moscow. [Glantz, pp. 31–33.] The stunned High Command failed to grasp the apocalyptic magnitude of the German onslaught launched at them. Stalin's first reaction was utter disbelief thsat Hitler would invade. [Roberts, p.156.] Stalin was incredibly perhaps the only European leader left that actually gave any credence to Hitler's assuances.
Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War.
Boyd, Carl. Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelligence, 1941-1945 (Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 1993), 271p.
Zhukov, Georgy. Hand written memo to Stalin and Timoshenko (May 14, 1941).
Glantz, David. Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's invasion of Russia 1941 (The History Press: 2012).
Gorodetsky, Gabriel. "The Russian Imperial Legacy: Stalin and the Outbreak of the War in the East: Barbarossa," Wilson Center Lecture (March 21, 2011).
Roberts, Andrew. The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War (Harper Collins: New York, 2011, 712p.
Stalin, Josef.
Timoshenko, Semyon. We know what Stalin said because Timoshenko provided a detailed account to his aide de camp.
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