Figure 1.--

Germany had considerable successes in breaking into the secure traffic of several countries, although World War I historians focus primarily on British efforts to crack the German Enigma Machines. Shortly after World War II, the German military launched a new, expanded crypto-analysis capability. The Reichswehr code unit was especially interested in the British Government’s telegraph code. This code was used to advise the British Admiralty about the location and movement of non-British naval shipping. As a result of this effort, the Germans before the NAZIs seized power had broken into British, French and Italian naval communications. Even after the NAZI seizure of power and the formation of the Pact of Steel with Italy, the Germans did not advised the Italian Navy that their secure transmissions had been cracked. The German began working informally with the Finnish Intelligence Service to break into Soviet secure communications (at least by 1934). After the Spanish Civil War, Generalissimo Francisco Franco permitted Germany which had supported the Nationalists during the War, to set up wireless surveillance posts in Spain. Their primary purpose was to intercept Royal Navy communications in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Beginning before the War, the Germans exchanged information with the Italian Servizio Informazione Militare on French secure naval communications. Germany, Hungary and Romania exchanged information on Soviet secure communications efforts. The NAZIs had perhaps the most disorganized war effort of all the major combatant countries. There was a great deal of duplication and overlapping jurisdiction in security, research and development, industrial manufacturing, and other areas. Code breaking was another example. One study identified nine different NAZI units involved in cryptology and there may have been more. These units not only wasted scarce resources, but they rarely cooperated fully with each other. Germany’s Naval B-Dienst (Beobachtungsdienst - Surveillance Service) was primarily interested in the British Royal Navy. The Germans had some success in reading coded American naval messages through early 1942. This was a factor in the considerable success achieved by the German U-boats off the coast of America in the first few months of the War. This ended abruptly with the American military intoduced the SIGABA system (April 1942). SIGANA was similar to Enigma in many ways, but infinitely more complex. The Deutsche Reichspost broke the scrambled voice transmission of the American-British transatlantic telephone system. German technicians built a de-scrambling device and after the Western Offensive (May-June 1940), operated an intercept faciliy at Noordwijk in the occupied Netherlands (1940-41). As a result the Germans were able to regularly listen to classified telephone conversations between U.S. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. After D-Day and the Allied push into Belgium and the Netherlands (September 1944), the Germans located the telephone intercept facility from the Netherlands to Bavaria. This severely compromised the intercept capability. B-Dienst was also successful in breaking into Royal Navy’s secure communications for much of the War. They cracked the 5-digit Royal Navy code. The British 4 digit naval code proved more difficult to crack, but the Germans did break into it.

Pre-War Code Breaking Efforts

After World War I, Germnany was forced to essentially demilitarize. The Germans proceeded to secretly develop a a new crypto-analysis capability. The major priority of the Reichswehr’s expanded code breaking unit was to break the British Government’s telegraph code. This code advised the British Admiralty what every non-British warship around the world was doing, where it was located, etc. Just before Hitler and the NAZIs seized powerthe Germans were reading British, French and Italian naval communications (1932). We are not sure about U.S. Navy communications at this early stage, but by the outbreak of World War II, BpDienst was reasing some U.S. Navy communications. . Germany began working with the Finnish Intelligence Service to crack Soviet secure communications (1934). After helping Generalissimo Franco previla in the Spanish Civil War, Franco permitted the Germans to establish a number of wireless surveillance posts along the Atkanyic and Mediterranean coasts (late-1930s). This gave the Germans access to Atalntuic radio transmissions for the first time. Their major target was British Royal Navy transmissions. By the outbreak of the War, the Germans were exchanginhg informnation with Italy’s Servizio Informazione Militare. The Italians at the time were reading British and Yugoslavian naval traffic. To the East, Germany, Hungary,and Romania were exchanging information they had collected on Soviet secure communications.

Code Breaking Units

The NAZIs despite their formidable reputation had perhaps the most disorganized war effort of all the major combatant countries. There was a great deal of duplication and ioverlapping jurisdiction in security, research and development, industrial manufacturing, and other areas. Code breaking was another example. One study identified nine different NAZI units involved in cryptology and there may have been more. These units not only wasted scarce resources, but they rarely cooperated fully with each other.B-Dienst was the most successful of all the German cryptographic units. in breaking into Royal Navy’s secure communications for much of the War. They cracked the 5-digit Royal Navy code. The British 4 digit naval code proved more difficult to crack, but the Germans did break into it. Thr\ey also had some success with American codes. A major problem for B-Dienst was the speed of decryption. Most of the decrypts, espedcially those of interest to the U-boats, were not completed in time to be vuseful. B-Dienst despite it successes was unable to deal with upgrade to Allied secure communications. This was exactly the opposite of the Allied experience which as the War progressed were able to read more and more Axis secure communications and evebntually in real time. B-Dienst never developed the proto-computers the Allies built to speed the decryption pricess. The Deutsche Reichspost broke the scrambled voice transmission of the American-British transatlantic telephone system. German technicians built a de-scrambling device and after the Western nOffensdive (May-June 1940), operated an intercept faciliy at Noordwijk in the occupied Netherlands (1940-41). As a result the Germans were able to regularly listen to classified telephone conversations between U.S. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. After D-Day and the Allied push into Belgium and the Netherlands (September 1944), the Germans relocated the telephone intercept facility from the Netherlands to Bavaria. This severely compromised the intercept capability.

Country Targets

Shortly after World War I, the German military launched a new, expanded crypto-analysis capability. As a result of this effort, the Germans before the NAZIs seized power had broken into British, French and Italian naval communications. Germany launched World war II by inading Poland (September 1939). Britain and France declared war and thus became the principal target of German intelligence. With the defeat of France, Britain became the principal target (June 1940). Maritime messages to support the U-boat fleet was a high priority. Here the Germans had considerable success. German interests soon shifted East with invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941). This was especially true after Barbarossa failed to destroy the Red Army. The United States was an important target even before Hitler declared war (December 1941). Here too the Germans had some success until the United States inroduced a new communication system (1941-42).

Britain

The British had several different codes of interest to the various code breaking units. Their major successes came with maritime codes and greatly aided the U-boat eg\ffort to cut the vital sea lanes on which the British war effort depended. The Reichswehr code unit was especially interested in the British Government’s telegraph code. This code was used to advise the British Admiralty about the location and movement of non-British naval shipping. After the Spanish Civil War, Generalissimo Francisco Franco permitted Germany which had supported the Nationalists during the War, to set up wireless surveillance posts in Spain. Their primary purpose was to intercept Royal Navy communications in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Germany’s Naval B-Dienst (Beobachtungsdienst - Surveillance Service) was primarily interested in the British Royal Navy. B-Dienst was by 1941 using German city names as designations for the different British naval codes. “Köln” was one cover name; “München-Blau” and “München-Braun” were two other names. A four-digit American-British naval communications system was codenamed “Frankfurt”. Germany was, however, never able to break secure British diplomatic communications.

Denmark

OKM B-Dienst broke three Danish codes before the outbreak of the War.

France

Beginning before the War, the Germans exchanged information with the Italian Servizio Informazione Militare on French secure naval communications. OKM B-Dienst broke into five French naval codes before the War began. The French Anglp code was one which the Germans were often able to read.

Italy

Even after the NAZI seizure of power and the formation of the Pact of Steel with Italy, the Germans did not advised the Italian Navy that their secure transmissions had been cracked.

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union was a major German target. The German began working informally with the Finnish Intelligence Service to break into Soviet secure communications (at least by 1934). Germany, Hungary and Romania exchanged information on Soviet secure communications efforts. German efforts continued even after signing the Non-Aggression Pact (1939). OKM B-Dienst broke four Soviet codes, but none of the German cryptogists managed to crack the Soviet diplomatic code. Despite the successes, the Germans never were able to learn about the major Red Army offenses that battered the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front beginning with the Red Srmy offensdive in front of Moscow (December 1941).

United States

The Germans had some success in reading with American codes and cyphers through 1941. This was of course the period while America was neutral and thus not of immediate concern to the German military. This began tyo change in mid-1941 when President Roosevelt committed the U.S, Navy to convoy protection and an undeclared war in the North Atlantic began. The Germans cracked the the U,S. Hagelin field cipher machine. B-Dienst in addition broke into several American codes. The Germans were reading coded American naval messages through early 1942. As far as we know, the Germans never shared this breakthrough with the Japanese, their Axis ally, which could have helped the Japanese finish off the shattered Pacific fleet in the narrow opportunity they had during which the Imperial Navy had a commandaning advantage. The German ability to read American message traffic contributed to the success of Operation Paukenschlag (Drumbeat) the highly successful U-boat attacks off the American Atlantic coast launched after Hitler declared war on America (December 1942). The U-boats scored considerable successes. The U.S. Navy was not yet convoying shipos and coastal lights were still burning bright, helping to spot ships even at night. This ended abruptly with the American military intoduced the SIGABA system. It was fully implemented (April 1942). SIGABA was similar to Enigma in many ways, but infinitely more complex. Another important success was achuieved by OKW/Chi cryptanalysis of the Black code used by American diplomats (1941). To capitalize on this break through, the Germans built an extensive interception facility in Lauf, Bavaria. Here they were able to receive and decrypt communication between U.S. diplomats all over Europe and Washington DC. Of course when America entering the War, many American embassies as they were located in Axis countries (Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Romania) were closed. The Germans were especually interested in messages to and from the U.S. Embassy in London. The cryptologists in Lauf were ordered to concentrated on the messages relating to tghe North African which the Germans entered (March 1941). Information about Allied plans were supplied to Feldmarschall Erwin Rommel. Interestingly, the Italians also provided the Germans the Black code. Italian agents managed to photograph the code tables in the U.S. Embassy in Rome (September 1941). The Germans never told the Itslians that they were already reading the U.S. Black code.

Assessments

Despite the successes, the extensive German code breaking effort failed in its major efforts. The Germans lost the “cipher” and “code” war to the Allies and Soviets. The Germans were shut out of the British Naval codes that brought early successes in the North Atlantic while at the same time the Allies gained access to the Kriegsmsrine naval Enigma transmissiins through Ultra. And the German effort on the Eastern Front did not prepare them for the many Red Army offensives. Nor did the German effort turn up any indication of the successful Ultra program. It is not altogether clear why the German effort failed so disaterously. Most assessments pointto the overwealming German arrogance as to their own superority and thst of their cryotology program. Certsinly the disorganized system wgich wasted resources and created competitive rather than coordinated efforts is a major factor. This was not absent among the Allies, but mist more pronounced in the NAZI system.

German arrogance

Turn of the 20th century Germans have beem depicted as avery arrogant people. After unificatioin (1870s), Germanmy was a very sucessful mation. It develped the largest population in Western Europe and the largest industrial and technological base. Once the Nobel Prise was established, it was the Germans who out pased every other country. German industry did noit out [ace America, but it did every other European country. So the Gernans had a lot to be arrogant about. Now wether it is true or not that the Germans were arrogant, tha=t is an open question. Here we would be interested in reader comment. But the NAZIs settled the issue. NAZI racial theory, made the World War II NAZis an extroduarilt=y arroganr people. This led to defeat in the Nattle of Britain. Not oinly did thdey just assiume their aircraft were superior, but they just ihnired the British Chian Home network which prived to be the most ppowerful weapn on the British arsenal. And as part of the same arrogant outlook. The Germans just assumned that their technological creatiuins, like Enigma and Lorenz could not be vracked. It was the ame arrogance that cinvinced then that tghey could invade the Siviet Uniion and fed=feat the Red Army nin a swift summer campaign.

Vulnerability

The Germans basically developed modern warfare--Blitzkrieg. This nmeans all arms warfare. This was not possible in Wotld War I. Geberals at the time might launch major offebnsives, but they soon lost contact with advance elements. Radio sets in World War I were not oprtable. They could be carried on war shpos, but not by rapidly advancing army units at the timr. This had changed by the onset of Wotld War II. One of the secrets of the German World War II German Panzers was that they had radio sets. British and French tanks did not. This gave the German Panzers a great advantage. It also meant that military communicatiins had to be broadcasted. And that made them vulnrrable to ber compromosed. The German secure commubicatiins were bprotected by Enigma. And once the Allies cracked first Enigma and then Lorenz, the Germans wmilitary communications were available to the Allies.

Necessity

Perhaps the most oft-quoted saying in history, is that necesity os the mother of invention. And it coulod not be more true. In World War II terms it mean that the Germans did not need to give much attention to code breaking. When your mikitary swept away the might French Army in a few weeks, why make much an effort to crack theo=ir codes. The Germans were winning on all fronts. In the first 2 years of the War, the ionlky Herman setback was the Battle of Britain--a failure Hitler did not think umportant bdcause ot did not affect the all popwerful Heer--the Germam Army. The French who were vvery good at code breaking were knocked cout of the War. The Soviets did not at first confront an opponent with a modern army. After the fall of France , only Britain still confrinted the Germans. And they ebcountered on deferat ad=fter another, hacing to withf=draw fronm the Continent six imes (Noeway--1940, Dunkirk--1940, Brest--1940, Greece--1941, Crete--1941, and finally Diappe--1942). So the British were grasping for every advantage they could find, the Germans werre not. They assumed that that they had already won the War.

Cultural trends

The British had a cukture which tolerated nonconfirmity. The Germans and Japanese did not. A classic Japanese folk saying is th-at the nail which stands out gets hammared down. Yet is just these non-conformists that can generate the kind of insights that lead to code-breaking insights.

Resources

One reason that the British were so successful is the resources ddevoted cide breakinhg. This is the same reason that the Germans developed so many excellent reasons. The NAZI Reamramaent effort devoted huge resources to the military while the democracoieswere devoting their ressources primarily to relief abd Depression fighting programs. Once Hitler and Stalin launched the War, the British devoted substanial resources to code breaking. The size of Germany's B-Diestnt and resources were a small fraction of those lavished on Bletchly Park. And once America entered the War, far greater resources were devoted to Arlington Hall and other American codebreaking resources. Not only did the Germans devote only limited resources to code breaking, but their efforts were dibided among many small, competing efforts. These agencies in the Byzantine NAZI system were often more concerned with beaureacratic political infighting and suceess in Byzantine political structure than in actual code breaking. And in MNAZI Germa, commonly the route to success was by telling the individuals in power what they wanted to hear. As a result, amongst all the massive spending on arms, the NAZI leadership failed to invest in a modern signals intelligence capability. Actually given the resources available B-Dienst has some imoressive results.

Tradition

Britain had a history of codebreaking fating back to Elezibethan times. Grance had an evedn longer tradition. Midern diplomacy was virtually iknvengted by the French and secure communicatiins were an esential mpart of diplomacy. Prussia had no such tradition. The important Prussian tradition was offensive warfare, established by the Great Elector and Frederick the Great. Modern diplomacy was essentially invented by the French. And thus coded messages became very important to the French. And it was the English that seesbtially invented a secret intelligence arm. Queen Elizxabeth I's spymaster was Francis Wallsingham. Elizabeth had manu enemoes, especially among her Catholic sunjects and the most poweful monarch in Europe--Soain's Phillip II. Elizabeth's survival was in large measure due to Wallsingham and his secret network. And an important part of his operation besides a well appointed torture chamber was skilled code breaking. The British alnost won the Revolutiinary War because of their sopy master in America, Major John André. At the same time, spying played an important role of the British success in India. Germany had no such tradition.

Technology

The Germans used technology to build their codes sustems, most priminently Enigma and Lorenz. And they were sure that their advanced Teutonic technology was unbreaable by the slow-witted British and racially inferior Russian adversaries. nd as they their armoes were conquering all begfore tyem, they were not all that jnterested in cracking enemy codes. Actually they has some success with tradional word manipulation efforts. But they never employed technology am=nd nathemnatics to crack Allied coses like the British and Americans did. This it would be the British who would invent the modern electrinic computer--Colossus.

Literature and Matematics

Navies

Codes and code breaking took on new urgenhcy whem Giovanni Marconi virtually sinflke handedly invented long-distance radio transmission--wireless telegraph (1890s). And of course he headed to England becuase he found no interesrt in Italy for his inventiin. The first military service to adopt the system was the world's navies--led by the Royal Navy which was very interested in Marconi's invention (1896). Britain had a huge far-flung fleet. This they gave more attention to radio than any other service. It would be a Marconi set that would save the RMS Titanic survivors (1912). The Royal Navy's involvement with radio included code breaking. It was the British Afmitalty's famed Room 40 that would decypher the Zimmermann Telrgraph that played a role in America's entry into World War I. In America, the U.S. Navy would also palay a key role in code brealinh, =first the Japanese Purle fiplomatic code and than JN25--the Imperial Navy's top naval code. It is no accident that the German top code-breaking effort was B-Dienst, a Kriegs marine operation.

Created: 1:03 AM 3/12/2011
Last updated: 5:47 PM 3/28/2011