Figure 1.-- |
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Italy faced several World War II countries in its largely Mediterranean operations, all countries it attacked. They included France, Greece, and Yugoslavia. These countries were all defeated and occupied by the Germans, leaving Britain as Italy's major adversary. The Italians also joined the Germans in their Barbarossa invasion of the Soviet Union. The United States which was aiding Britain was also a target even before Pearl Harbor and Italy's declaration of war aginst America--at Hitler's prompting. As a result America and Britain became Italy primary intelligence targets. Italy was also fighting in the Soviet Union, but the Italian intelligence agencies did not significantlt target the Soviets. Italy made no major codebreaking achievements, but did score some sucesss, primary through traditional spy scraft. Namely the work a special undercover squad that broke into foreign embassies and copied their code books. The Servizio Informazioni Militari (SIM--Italian Military Intelligence) placed its agent working as servants in Rome embasies--all except the Soviet Embassy which had their own servants. Thus the SIM had virtually unrestricted access to the foreign embassies. Thus the Italian General Cesare Ame, in charge of breakins recalled after the War, 'The operation wasn’t so difficult. All I had to do was reach for the American Embassy key from my office wall.' There was also cooperation with other country inteligence agenncies (Finland, Hungary, and Germany). There were two Italian crytology agencies. The Italian Army and Navy both had separate units. And they managed to read some foreign crypto-systems. The Army's codebreakers could read the codes of several foreign countries, including the communications of U.S. military attaches. This resulted in Italy's most important World War II code coup. SIM bag men stole the State Bepartment's Black code book. And the U.S. miliary attché in Cairo, Col. Bonner Fellers, used the code to send detailed repors on British operations. Thanks to the SIM, dcrypts were quickly in Rommel's hands-at least some of them. He called them 'die gute Quelle'—'“the Good Source'. The Italians did not share the Black code with the Germans, although they did provide some decoded Black messages. The Germans, from a listening post at Lauf, near Nuremburg in southern Germany, also monitored transmissions from Cairo and were soon cracked the Black code themselves. The Italian Navy's cryptogits also achieved sone success with Royal Navy codes and cyphers.
Italy faced several World War II countries in its largely Mediterranean operations, all countries it attacked. They included France, Greece, and Yugoslavia. These countries were all defeated and occupied by the Germans, leaving Britain as Italy's major adversary. The Italians also joined the Germans in their Barbarossa invasion of the Soviet Union. The United States which was aiding Britain was also a target even before Pearl Harbor and Italy's declaration of war aginst America--at Hitler's prompting. As a result America and Britain became Italy primary intelligence targets. Italy was also fighting in the Soviet Union, but the Italian intelligence agencies did not significantlt target the Soviets.
Italy made no major codebreaking achievements, but did score some sucesss, primary through traditional spy scraft. Namely the work a special undercover squad that broke into foreign embassies and copied their code books. The Servizio Informazioni Militari (SIM--Italian Military Intelligence) placed its agent working as servants in Rome embasies--all except the Soviet Embassy which had their own servants. Thus the SIM had virtually unrestricted access to the foreign embassies. Thus the Italian General Cesare Ame, in charge of breakins recalled after the War, 'The operation wasn’t so difficult. All I had to do was reach for the American Embassy key from my office wall.
The Italians also cooperation with other country inteligence agenncies (Finland, Hungary, and Germany). Of course their principal reltiinship was with their Axis ally, the Germans. But in sharp contrast to the virtually conjoined Allied Anglo-Americn relationship, the German-Italian cryptology reltionhip was wht might be called stand-offish. The Germns did not trust the Italians andd the Italians responded by with holding some of what they achieved. General Vittorio Gamba, head of the Army's Servizio Informazioni Militari (SIM) turned up unannounced at Amtsgruppe Wehrmachtnachrichtenverbindungen, Abteilung Chiffrierwesen (OKW/Chi), OKW's cipher department (1938). Gamba requested cooperation in cryptology. [Christos T.] The Germans shared some information on French diplomatic and military code systems which was of some imoprtance at the time because of the large French fleet operating in he Mediterranean. The Italins shaed information on Y.S. diplomatict codes--the Black code. They provided some decrpts, but not the actual codes.
Wilhelm Fenner head of the cryptanalysis department of OKW/Chi, complained that the Italians took too long to respond to requests or did not send the agreed upon material. Fenner also saw the Italian codes were weak and they resisted what he saw as needed changes. As the War progressed, relations became increasingly strained since the Germans came to distrust the Italians. Cooperation with the OKH's signal intelligence agency (OKH/In 7/VI )seems to have been even worse as the Germans saw Italian cipher security as incompetent. There was also some coopration ith Axis ally Hungry, but we have no details. A U.S. Army repprt states, "Liaison with the Italians on cryptanalytic matters appears to have been very good. The Hungarians maintained liaison officers in Rome and made the results of their work available to the Italians. [U.S. Army, p. 21.] The Italians sent mome intercepted traffic to the Finnish cryptologic service, but we have no derails. Finland was not an Axis ally, but they were a co-belligerant in the invaion of the Soviet Union.
There were two Italian crytology agencies. The Italian Army and Navy both had separate units. And they managed to read some foreign crypto-systems. The Italians military had few successes in World War II. Military historians debate just why that was. Italian sources tend to stress the lack of modern weapons. Clearly more was involved because the Italian Army even failed against the pootly armned Greeks. But the Italian cryotology agencies achieved some successes, imressive given their limited resources.
The Army's dmall cryptanalytic department was the Servizio Informazioni Militari (SIM) which attacked adversary codes. The director was General Vittorio Gamba. It only had a staff of 50 people. Half were cryptanalysts. Th other half were linguists and clerks. he minisule staff, the achievements were extrodinary.
The cryptanalytic department was divided into three sub-sections: 1) Diplomatic, 2) Military and Research, and
3) Commercial.'
SIM averages about 8,000 intercepts every month. Some 6,000 were studied and about 3,500 actually translated. The codes of several countries were attacked: Britain, France, Romania (an Axis ally) , Turkey, the United States, the Vatican, and Yugoslavia. SIM's operations were limited by the lack of foreign language personnel and limited funding. They used IBM equipment for statistical work, but what they had was inadequate. They had a small number of IBM punch card machines for cryptanalysis. IBM machines were initially used at the offices of the Watson Corporation in Rome. In th final months greater use of the machines occured before the German invasion (September 1943). The Intercept Section provided messages for cryptanalysis which commonly meant only translation of messags for which SIM had code books. SIM had 4 stationary intercept stations in Italy and 7 mobile units in Italy, the colonies and the occupied territories.
The Sezione Prelevamento unit was especially important to SIM. Sezione P enabled SIM to read foreign codes without the painstaking and difficult job of cryptanalysis which give the staff abd resources as just not posible.
Sezione P was a higly talented burgalry team. They entered foreign embassies at night, opened safes, and copied the codes and ciphers. This was Sezione Prelevamento (Extraction Section) commnnded by Colonel Manfredi Talamo of the Carabinieri (Military Police). Sezione P operatives were skilled in entering guarded areas and opening locks, even safes.
The Italian naval intelligence agency was the Servizio informazioni Speciali della Royal Marina (SIS). It was divided into four branches. Branch Beta (B) was responsible for signals intelligence. It was subdivided into cryptanalysis, interception and direction finding, security, and clandestine radio intercepts. The director was Commander Mario De Monte. Before the War in the 1930s they managed to solve several French naval systems. During the war with the fall of France, the focus shifted to British naval and naval aviation codes. SIS quickly solved low level British naval codes. The Italians also managed to read the Royal Navy’s Administrative Code (1934-August 1940), the Naval Code No. 1 and No. 2 (August ‘40 till March ’43) and the Naval Cypher No. 1 and No. 2 (1934 till January ‘42). The Germans oprovided Naval Cypher No. 3. This was the Anglo-American Cypher (June ’41 till June ‘43). SIS was able to manage the encipherment. Timliness of course made the decrypts specialy valuable. To speed up the process, they used punch card equipment (1942). It may have been IBM equipment, but we are not sure. SIS Branch Beta
operated seven main interception and direction finding stations in Italy and its possessions. The intercept network covered much of the Meduiterranean with statiuns in Italy, Sardinia, Libya, and Rhodes.
The Germans o=provide additional material. SIS processed about 3,000 message daily. Special intercept units were also installed based aboard nval vessels so that the intercepted messages could be provided naval commnders at sea.
The Servizio Informazioni Aeronautica (SIA--Italian Air Force Intelligence Service) did not have their own crytological agency. The deopended on the Navy for both interception and cryptanalysis. The Airforce established its own intercept station (1941). The sent the messages to the Navy SIS for assessment.
Italy made no major codebreaking achievements, but did score some sucesss, primary through traditional spy scraft. Namely the work a special undercover squad that broke into foreign embassies and copied their code books. The Servizio Informazioni Militari (SIM--Italian Military Intelligence) placed its agent working as servants in Rome embasies--all except the Soviet Embassy which had their own servants. Thus the SIM had virtually unrestricted access to the foreign embassies. Thus the Italian General Cesare Ame, in charge of breakins recalled after the War, 'The operation wasn’t so difficult. All I had to do was reach for the American Embassy key from my office wall.
The Army's codebreakers could read the codes of several foreign countries, including the communications of U.S. military attaches. On average 8.000 messages were intercepted each month, 6.000 were studied and out of these 3.500 translated. The codes of several countries were read including France, Turkey, Rumania, USA, Britain, Yugoslavia and the Vatican. According to post-war reports there was a serious shortage of foreign speaking personnel and a lack of funds. There was also lack of IBM equipment for statistical work. The Italians used a small number of IBM punch card machines for cryptanalysis. Initially IBM machines were used only at the offices of the Watson Corporation in Rome. However it was only in the last stages of the war that these machines were used regularly.
Intercept section
The intercept section of SIM was the one that provided messages for cryptanalysis. It had 4 stationary intercept stations in Italy and 7 mobile units in Italy, the colonies and the occupied territories.
This resulted in Italy's most important World War II code coup. SIM bag men stole the State Bepartment's Black code book. And the U.S. miliary attché in Cairo, Col. Bonner Fellers, used the code to send detailed repors on British operations and strength in the Western Desert.
Thanks to the SIM, some decrypts were quickly in Rommel's hands. he Germans called them 'die gute Quelle'—'“the Good Source'. Rommel used the expression,'the little fellow'. The Italians did not share the Black code with the Germans, although they did provide some decoded Black messages. The Germans, from a listening post at Lauf, near Nuremburg in southern Germany, also monitored transmissions from Cairo and were soon cracked the Black code themselves. [Christos T.] Another success was in sendng false messages when the Axis invaded Yugoslavia. The Italians ere concerned about heir Army tht the Greeks had driven bck into Albania. [Christos T.]
The Italian Navy's cryptogits also achieved sone success with Royal Navy codes and cyphers. SIS fter the fall of France and balles with he Royal Navy began, the Royal Navy codes becme of primary importance. SIS analized the codes and ciphers of the Royal Navy. The call signs, messages and volume of traffic of British ship were carefully
analyzed to create the British order of battle they faced. And they worked on the movemnt of he British ships. Branch Beta summarized the available information in a daily bulletin trnsmitted to all naval commands. The Naval High Command recognized the importance of signals intelligence and there was Branch Beta and Naval Commnders. The value of codebreaking and signals intelligence was recognized by the Navy’s high command and there was close cooperation between Branch Beta and the operational command of the Italian Navy thrioughout the intense Mediterranean naval battles with the Royal Navy. . According to a major naval figure, "The departure of an enemy naval force or a convoy from East or West never escaped the SIS, and it was almost always possible to establish within a few hours its composition and even its objectives; which permitted immediate counter measures on the part of our naval command, and the most Important naval encounters (Battle of Punta Stile, of Cape Tulada, of Cape Matapan, the two actions off Sirte, and that of Pantellaria) originated through information from the SIS’. [Maugeri] Even if the Italian Navy could not defeat the Royal Navy at sea, if the Afrika Korps approched Suez, the Royal Navy would have to to exist the eastern Meduterannean leaving it an Italian lake.
And the key to this was the Italian convoys wiyh brought reinfircements and supplies to Libya. The British from Ultra acquired needed infiormtion on the convoys and exacted a substantial toll on them. SIS for its part by reading reading British naval codes learned of plans to attack the convoys. Messages from British naval aircraft (Fleet Air Arm) could be decoded very quickly and provided insight into British operations. This to some extent, however, plyed to the Britih advantge. The British before acting on Ultra decrypts made sure a flight or naval sighting occurred so the Italians and Gernmns would ot deduce their codes had been broken. SIS on many provided warning and the convoys were sent top priority messages -- Precedenza Assoluta sulla Precedenza Assoluta (PAPA) allowing the convoys to alter course. SIM work also aided the Navy. The critical battle for Malta was reching vritical point (Mid-1942). The British on Malta were nder contatant air attack. hey wre being staeved out abd even more crituically, fuel for the British fighters protecting thge island was running periouly low. The British decidd to sail two supply convoys simultaneously to Malta. The hope was that if one was discovered, attacks upon it would distract the Axis from the other. Code-named Operation Vigorous and Harpoon, and sailing from Alexandria in the east and Gibraltar in the west respectively, their sailing was timed with an effort by special forces teams to neutralize Axis ships and aircraft. being used to strve out the British. The American military attaché in Cairo reported all of this and it was read because the Italians had veacked th American Blck diplomatic code. [U.S. Embassy, Cairo]
Fellers efficiently reported all of thiswas intercepted in both Rome and by the German Military High Command Cipher Branch (OKW Chiffrierabteilung). .
Maugeri, Admiral Franco. Admiral Franco Maugeri was the head of the SIS during the War and a future Chief of General Staff of the Italian Navy.
T., Christos. "Italian codebreakers of WWII," Christos military and intelligence corner (August 29, 2012).
U.S. Army Security Agency. European Axis Signal Intelligence in World War II Vol. 18 (1946). These were reports compiled immediately after the War, but only declassified in 2009.
U.S. Embassy, Cairo. No. 11119 (June 11, 1942). Col. Fellers reported the Allied plan in detail.
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