World War II Spying and Counter-intelligence: The British Double-Cross System


Figure 1.--.

MI5 was responsible for domestic counter-intelligence operations. The Germans had before the out-break of the War placed a few agents in Britain as well as recruited British symphstizers. It was not a major effort as the Abwehr had other priorities. There were a small number of German spies and saboteurs that the Germans had inserted or recruited among the many foreigners in Britain, including refugees from the NAZIs. A few more were hasity inserted during the War. At the sme time the SS began compiling lists of Brits for special treatment. The operations were run by MI-5's Twenty Committee chaired by John Cecil Masterman. MI-5 after the outbreak of the War quickly rounded up the German agents it what was called the Double Cross System. The British MI-5 very quickly rounded up the German agents early in the War. We do not have details on how the British questioned the German agents. Perhaps some of our readers will know something about this. We would guess that they were not treated like POWs with all the rights guaranteed by the Geneva Convention. We do know there were a number of executions which was acceptable under internsaional law. The Brtish used he Tower of London during both World Wars for executions. Captured German spies were shot there. German Corporal Josef Jakobs was shot for espionage (August 15, 1941). MI-5 appears to have apprehended all of the German agents placed during the War, possibly with the exception of one who committed suiside, although they did not know this until after the War. The Twenty Committee was named after the Roman numerals "XX". The Double Cross System was also called the XX System. It was MI-5s primary World War II anti-espionage and deception operation. Double Cross involved more than just finding the German agents. Threatened with execution, MI-5 managed to turn several of the agents who were useful in transmitting disinformation to the Abwehr. The initial MI-5 objective policy of MI5 during the war was initially to use the system for counter-espionage, tracking down foreign spies. Only as the War developed did MI-5 realize the possibility for deception. This was primarily after the British with American aid had begun to launch offensive operations. MI5 ran the "Double-cross" system to confuse and mislead the Germans. It was the most effective double operation of its kind during the War. One of the most important double-cross operatives was a Barcelona chicken farmer who walked in off the street. Juan Pujol was safe from the War in Spain, but decided to do what he could to opose the NAZIs. He had no training in espionage, but proved remarly able to tell lies and convince experienced inteligence agent. The Germans came to see him as one of their most valuable agents. The British at first did not take him seriously and then did not trust him. His code name was Garbo and he played a key role in comvincing the Germans that there as a million-man army in Kent preoparing to invade at the Pas de Calais. And as part of that deception he convinced the Germans that he ran a network of spies in Britain. [Talty] This was all part of the greatest Allied deception of the War, misleading the the Germans about the location of the D-Day landings. As the landings were launched from England, this was primarily, but not entirely a British achievement. Garbo was part of this and amazingly he managed to sustain the deception even after the Allies landed in Normandt (June 1944). As result, powerful German armored divisions remained north of the Seine while the dcisive battle for Normandy unfolded.

Abwehr Efforts in Britain

The Abwehr was the Wehrmacht intelligence agency. It was less imaginative than MI5, but efficent and backed by a fearsome military. In proved to be thelkeat effective of the bajor combatant intelligence arms. The Germans had before the out-break of the War placed a few agents in Britain as well as recruited British symphstizers. It was not a major effort as the Abwehr had other priorities. There were a small number of German spies and saboteurs that the Germans had inserted or recruited among the many foreigners in Britain, including refugees from the NAZIs. A few more were hasity inserted during the War. The Abwehr was caught off guard by the massive success of Case Yellow and the fall of France (June 1940). They rushed to insert agents into what was obviously the net target--Britain. The Germans widely assumed that Britain would make peace and were surprised when Churchill rejected German peace iniatives. The German military hastily began to devise plans for Operation Sea Lion. The Germans were desperate for information about Britain. Anyone who has read even superficially about D-Day will be aware of the meticulous planning that went into the invasion over mire than 2-years. The Germans did not havec time for that. The abwehr as a esult moved very quickly to insert a mumber of poorly trained agents who proved exceedingly inept. Interestingly, at the same time the SS began compiling lists of Brits for special during the anticipated NAZI occupation.

MI5

MI5 was responsible for domestic counter-intelligence operations. The operations were run by MI-5's Twenty Committee chaired by John Cecil Masterman.

Fifth Column

Fifth Columists became a major concern in Britain and aneruca in the early years of Woirkd war II. It was widely believed at the time Britain braced for an expected German invasion that the stunning German victories in Poland, Norway, and the West were due at least in part to Fifth Columinits that had sabotoged defense efforts. The term Fifth Column was thus in wide use in the earlky years of the War. It was a term coined by Spainard Emilio Mola Vidal, a Nationalist general in the Spanish Civil War He commanded four army columns attacking Loyalist held Madrid. In a public statement he referred to Nationalist supporters in Madrid as his "fifth column" which would attack the Republic's defenses from within. The term thus became used to describe secret sympathizers of Fascist armies intent on sabotaging a country's defenses fom within. We now know tht suh sympthizers were a fctor in the enuing German occupation, but not the actual military campigns. The German victories were the result of the rapid NAZI Rearmament and the skill of the Wehrmact based on the adoption of Blitzkrieg tactics. It took some time for the allies to apprecite how good the Germans were at making war and the importance if their tactiucal doctrine. There were domestic groups which did prove useful to the NAZIS--the Pacifists and Isolationists. These individuals, however, were not Fifth Colunists because they for the most part were not German symphathizers. These groups were supported by the Germans and also the Soviets who for 2 years were German allies. Interestingly, it woukd not be Fascist Fifth Columnists that wiuld be afactor in the War, but the Resistance in NAZI-occupied Europe.

Rounding up the German Spies

MI-5 after the outbreak of the War quickly rounded up the German agents it what was called the Double Cross System. The British were iterntbon this in part because if all the press attention given to Fift Colunists and lack of full understanding as to why the Germans had been so successful. The British MI-5 very quickly rounded up the German agents early in the War. We do not have details on how the British questioned the German agents. Perhaps some of our readers will know something about this. We would guess that they were not treated like POWs with all the rights guaranteed by the Geneva Convention. We do know there were a number of executions which was acceptable under internsaional law. The Brtish used he Tower of London during both World Wars for executions. Captured German spies were shot there. German Corporal Josef Jakobs was shot for espionage (August 15, 1941). MI-5 appears to have apprehended all of the German agents placed during the War, possibly with the exception of one who committed suiside, although they could not be sure of this until after the War. [Masterman]

Genesis of the Program

Thomas Argylle Robertson (known as Tar because of his initials) was key to the Doubke Cross program. He was Scottish and known as a playboy. He like the others that became involved with Double Cross had no training or experience with turing gents. Robertson was, however, a quick learner. He was assigned to work with Arthur Owens (code name Snow) before the War. Owens was an unknown. Robertson came to realize that he was being played by Owens who was playing the Germans and British off against each other. Robertson never learned just why. The experince was not successful, but Robertson and MI5 learned critical lessons about how the Abwehr operated as well as just how valuable double agents could be. [Macintyre, pp. 34–37.] MI-5 decided to create Section B1A, a unit of B section, directed by Guy Liddell. Robertson eas selected to oversee the program and control the turned agents. [Macintyre, pp. 38–39.]

Turning the German Agents

Double Cross involved more than just finding the German agents. MI-5 selected individuals from the German agents arrested. Threatened with execution, MI-5 managed to turn several of the agents who were useful in transmitting disinformation to the Abwehr. Many of the German agents were not committed NAZIs and thus amenable to working for the British.

Objective

The initial MI-5 objective policy of MI5 during the war was initially to use the system for counter-espionage, tracking down foreign spies. Robertson became a strong advocate of developing a program of to turn German agents. He saw arange of benefits for the Allied war effort. There were great benefits in knowing what the Abwehr wantedto find out. It was a strong clue as what German intensions were. A turned agent could also be used to mislead the Germans which could be cimbined with aange of on the groujnd deceptions. And thinking that they had productive espionage networks in place would discourage the Abwehr from sending additional agents. As the War developed, MI-5 incresingly realized the possibility for deception. This was particularly important after the British with American aid had begun to launch offensive operations. MI5 ran the "Double-cross" system to confuse and mislead the Germans. It was the most effective double operation of its kind during the War and played an important role in the sucess of operations like the Sicily and D-Day invasions.

The Twenty Committee

MI-5 agennt John Masterman chaired the Twenty Committee which ran Double Cross Project. He was an Oxford history don obsssed with cricket. His boss was Thomas Argyll Robertson known as Tar. Few people were more naturally suited for the intelligence game. Robertson according to one author 'knew better than anyone ekse in British intelligece how to spot a lie, and therefore how to tell one." [Macintyre] He would show up at parties in his Army tartan trouswers. A third man at the heart of the British opetation was Cpt. Robin Stephens was was call Tin-Eye because he wore a monacle. They would fin in perfectly in a Monty Python scene. The Twenty Comittee was named after the Roman numerals "XX". The Double Cross System was also called the XX System. It was MI5s primary World War II anti-espionage and deception operation.

Learning Pains


Crafting the Messages

MI-5 with Double-Cross with imigination, skill, efficent organization, and not a little luck had dominated the human inteligence (humint) struggle with the Abwehr. Masterman wrote, :By means of the double-cross system we actively ran and controlled the German espionage systemin this country." [Masterman] The Twenty Committee faced a danting task. While the Twenty Committee would set the objectives of Double Cross, the reports sent to the Germans had to be different. They could not sound as if there was a common authorship. The trickiest part was thst that they had to be of value to the Germans and be realidtic. This meant there had to be an element of truth in the reports, but not provide information thst would damage the Allied war effort or compromise Allied intelligence work. Perhaps the key to the success of Double Cross was that it sought to confirm Abwehr thinking rather than try to lead them to unlikely concludions. An above all Double Cross sought to confirm the initial German asessment tht the Allied cross-channel invasion would come at the Pas de Calais. The British not only carefully crafted the mesages to lead the Germans where they wanted. They mixed oin all kinds of P.G. Woodhouise-like material that they knew would appeal to the Germans. There was reports on drunk lords, Welsh and Scotts who disliked the English, British officers feuding with eavh other, and guliable Americans. There were many references to both Montgomery and Patton, especially Ptton because of FUSAG.

Turned Agents


Snow

Snow was MI-5s code name for Arthur Ownes. He was turned by MI-5 before the War. He was British, but as a Welsh nationalist hadno loyalty to Britain. He played the British and Germans off on each other. His prime unterest was money, although he also liked the women that the Germans provided. MI-5 did not trust him and eventually locked him up in a hospitl wing, but before this he helped to identify many German agents who were parchuted in or dropped off by U-boats nd other boats. THe Gernans strongly trusted him. We are entirely sure why. They were told by their Abwehr handlers to report to Owens to get ration books and other documents. Despite his unreliability he helped identify more German agents than all the other turned agents. After the War he sued for unjust arrest threatening to publish his memoirs. MI-5 paid him off to keep him uiet.

Walk In Agents

The Double-Cross agents were not only turned German agents. There was also a fascinating group of walk-in agents. They proved to be key to success for MI-5. And these sgents given exotic mames were cast of chsracteristics that even Hollywood could not have come up with. The walk-in took Double Cross beyonfd the narrow confines of Britain. Even so, the primary aim was to conduse the Germanhs about D-Day, the Allies intentions and capabilities. One has to wonder why te Abwehr hanflers had such confidence in this colorful sirtment of foreigners, some fom countries where theitr country was committiung terrible tricities.

Artist

Johnny Jebsen was Artist. His captutre by the Gestapo a few weeks before D-Day threatened the whole Double Cross ediface (1944). Jebsen wa Popov's best friend and fellow socvialite. He was an Abwehr officer turned by the British.,

Bronx

Elvira de la Fuete Chaudoir was Bronx and a society temptress. Interestingly she was a Peruvian raised in France. She was a Lesbian bored with the social swirl. She reported to the Germans on conversations she oveheard in dreawing rooms and clubs. [Macintyre]

Brutus

Brutus was Roman Czerniawski, a fervent Polish patriot who became a counter inteligence officer. He was a French partisan, a German agent, ahd finally a British double agent, but through all of this his only real loyalty was to Poland. Although he knew thay Popov had been turned by the British, he never informed.

Garbo

One of the most important double-cross operatives and the best known was a Barcelona chicken farmer who walked in off the street and the British at first wanted nothing to do with him. Juan Pujol (Agent Garbo) was safe from the War in Spain, but decided to do what he could to opose the NAZIs. He fought in the Civil war, on both sides, and came to despise both. While he had no formal intelligence training, his Cicil War experiences were on the job training for his key role in the greatest deceotion of the War. Pujol had no training in espionage, but proved remarly able to tell lies and convince experienced inteligence agent. The Germans came to see him as one of their most valuable agents. Incredibky he began aisinformtion campaign on his own. He sold the Germans repoorts that he concoted in Lisbon using only maps and a travel guide. The British at first did not take him seriously and then did not trust him. His code name was Garbo and he played a key role in comvincing the Germans that FUSAG, a million man army under Gen Geotge Patton, was massing in Kent preparing to invade at the Pas de Calais. [Talty] He convinced the Germans that he had a network of 24 agents and the Germans sent him moneyt for each one. All told he firwarded his Anwehr handlers 315 secret-ink lettewrs and 1,200 electrinic transmissions. Garbo at first put en emphasis on the Pas de Calais in his reports. When he sensed that the Germans were giving more attntion to Normandy he concoted the story tht there would be a feint in Normndy to draw German forces south from the Pas de Calais. The Germans were so plesed with Garbo that they awarded him the Iron Cross.

Treasure

Lily Sergeyev was Treasure and the nost volitile of the Double Cross sagents. She was French, but born in Russia. She was devoted to her toy poodle, Babs. Its untimely death threatened to unravel Doubble Cross at a critical point.

Tricycle

Tricycle was Duskov Popov, a playboy but fervent Serb patriot. Popov was from a wealthy Serbian family. He was born in Titel, then part of Austro-Hungary. Given that he led a playboy life while carrying out deadly dangerous espionage assignments, he has been called the real James Bond. He spoke flawless German and had highly placed German friend. As aSerb patriot, however, he despised the Germans. He was recruited as an agebt by anti-Hitler Abwehr agents before the German invasuin of Yugoslavia. He immeduiately contacted the British Embassy in Belgrade where he was recruited as a double-agent. He was both proifligate and brave. He met with the Abwehr in Spain countless times. His Abwehr code namne was Ivan. This would have meant arrest and torture if the Germans had been the least subspicious. One author sees him as the key to Double-Cross's success. And constantly meeting with his German handlers undoubteddly was a factor in the German confidence in him. [Mcintyre] The Abwehr dispatched him to the United States eith a list of assigned topics. He immediately contacted the FBI and met with FBI Director Hoover. One of his primary assigned targets was Pearl Harbor

Accomplishments

McIntryre writes of Double Cross, "The main thrust of the decepotionwas an undisputed, unalloyed, world-chasnging triumph." [Mcintyre] Double-Cross helped to both drain and dustract Gernman intelligence rsources. This helped to unbalance the German intelligence efforts. It directed German interest in areas of no real value and distracted them from areas of critical importance. And because the Abwehr was so pleased with the inteligence the Double-Cross agents were sending they did not dispatch additinal agents to Britain. This freed up resources for the British and mneant that there were not Gernmn agents ioerating that coukd have turned upo reakly ccurate information for the Germans. It would have been a fairly easy matter for agents on the fround to figure out, for example, tt FUSAG was a fiction. The questiins thast the bwehr sent their agents in Britain were useful in assessing German interests and intentions. A question about Scotland suggest thge Germans were concerned about an Allied invasion of Norway from Scotland. As a result, the Fortitude planners played up on this by adding Norway to the Pas de Calasis deception. Interestingly the whole operation was entirely funanced by the Germans who paid well. They not onlt paid the Double-Cross agents, but also whole fictional spy rings they ceeated. Churchill was convinced that Doubble Cross was an impoprtant part of the D-Day success. He followed the operation closely, but during his lifetime was not able to release details. He actually wrote one of thesr descriptions before the War. "Tangle within tangle, plot and counter-plot, ruse and treachery, cross and double-cross [HBC note: notice he used the term 'double-cross, but did not elaborate] , true agent, false agent, double agent, gold and steel, the bomb, the dagger and the firing party were interwoven in many a texture so intricate as to be incredible and yet true." [Churchill]

Pearl Harbor

One of the Abwehr's concerns in the nonths before Amnerica enbtered the war was about American anchorages, docks, and defenses at Peal Harbor. At the time Pearl was a little known American Pacific port. President Roosevelt had moved the Pacific fleet forward from San Diego to Pearl as one of many steps to pressure the Japanese to end the war in China (early Summer 1940). This question must have come as a result of cooperation with the Japanese. MI-5 informed the Americans. MI5 transferred one of their agents to the FBI who badly handled him. That agent was Ppoov (Tricycle). The Abwehr ordered Popov who was in Spain to priceed to the United states and help set up an intelligence network. [MI-5] The Abwehr provided him with both cash and a extensive list of intelligence targets. [Abwehr document] Popov upon landing in America contacted the FBI and explained his assignment (August 12, 1941). Popov was apparently convinced that this mean that the Japanese were planning to attack Pearl Harbor. As far as we know, the FBI did not report this to the milkitary. Several years after the war, Popov appeared on television and claimed that FBI Director Hoover was suspicious of him. Apparently when Hoover discovered Popov had accompanied a woman from New York to Florida, threatened to have him arrested under the Mann Act unless he immediately left the United States. [Wood] We have never seen any FBI account on their interaction with Popov.

Ultra

One of the added benefits of arresting the German agents was the haul of wireless sets and codebooks found which were essential in tramsmitting disinfirmstion bavk to the Abwehr. They also proved useful to the Bletchly Park codebreakers who were hard at work on the German ciphers. [Masterman] In return, the Ultra decrypts were invaluable to the Double Cross group. The could assess the success of their deception as well as come up with ideas to play off of based on actual German strategic thinking.

Operation Fortitude

The most important Allied misinformtion oroject was the crucial effort misdirect German attemtion from Normandy in the run-up to D-Day. And as part of that deception, Pujol he comvinced the Germans that he ran a network of spies in Britain. [Talty] This was all part of the greatest Allied deception of the War, misleading the the Germans about the location of the D-Day landings. As the landings were launched from England, this was primarily, but not entirely a British achievement. The Germanswere not easily fooled. Like all competent intelligence services, they wanted to see confirmation from various sources. This the allies created the First army Group (FUSAG). The temporarily out of favor General George Pattonm was put in commnd. Eisenhower vknew that the Germans respected Patton. Thuis FUSAG wa given indstant creditability to the Anwehr. Dummy tanks and teucks as well as a creshendo of fake radio messages added to the deception. Garbo was part of this and amazingly he managed to sustain the deception even after the Allies landed in Normandy (June 1944). As result, powerful German armored divisions remained north of the Seine while the dcisive battle for Normandy unfolded.

Soviet Espionage

We note a lot of congragularory asrticles in the British press about their success in wouwiy=tting the Germans as part of Double Cross, Ultra, and othr intelligence oprtations. This was indeed an impressive achievenent that saved lives and shortened the War. Much less discussed in Britain is how at the samr time that Sovier intelligence wa effectgively penetrating MI5 and MI6. The British funnelked misinformation into the Abwehr, but never actually penetrated it. American and British jornlists today go on and on about McCarthyism. Rarely do they bother to mention the extent and success of the Soiviet espiopage effort. Some even priclain the innosenmce of procent Sovietr spies.

Sources

Abwehr document. The Abwehr inteligence targets were published in a appendix of the Masterman book. One of the three pages deals entirely with Pearl Harbor. Hoover as far as we know did not pass this information on to the military.

Churchill. Winston. Thoughts and Adventures: Churchill Reflects on Spies, Cartoons, Flying, and the Future.

MI-5. Double agent files. Duskov Popov/KV 2/847 British National Archives.

Macintyre, Ben. Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies (2012)

Masterman. John. The Doubler-Cross System (1972). Masterman was thge MI5 agent who mastermined Double-Cross. His book was based on a secret report he wrote at the end of the War. Hec defied British censors to publish the book.

Talty, Stephan. Agent Garbo: The Brilliant, Eccentric Secret Agent Who Triked Hitler & Saved D-Day (2012).

Wood, William.







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Created: 3:29 AM 8/5/2012
Last updated: 2:04 AM 12/21/2012