Figure 1.-- |
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The German victories in the early phase of the War can be explained by their superior weapons and tactical doctrine. Less understable is the dogged German defense in the later years of the War. The Germans invaded many small countries, but aftr they invaded the Soviet Union the Germans always faced superior numbers of increasingly well-supplied adversaries. The Germans by 1943, faced staggering numbers of opponents who were well armmed and with much larger populations, greater industrial ouput, and access to nthe raw materials that HGermany lacked. During the War, the only defeat the Germans suffered at the hands of a numerically weaker adversary was the Battle of Britain. As mentioned above, superior weaponry and even more imoprtant tactical doctrine was the rinary reason fir thge German victories. Another part was the fighting spirit of the German soldier. The War was lost for Germany once it became a War of attrition agter the Red Army counbter offensive before Moscow (Secember 1941). Germany obce it failed to destri the Red Army in Barbarossa with its more limited resourceswas not going to win a wae with a coalition of the Societ Uniin, British Empiremabd tge United States. It was the spirit and comptence of the German military that enabled Germany to continue the War. German veterans complain that in American movies that the Germans are commonly portrayed as stupid. The Germams military, as compared to their commande, were never stupid. They were highly competent and professional. The Germans were outnumbered and over powered, not defeated through superior battlefield tactics. The strategic decisins that brought defeat were imposed by the political leadership--the German FührerAdolf Hitler. The German soldier continued figting even against staggering odds. One rason was that after 1942 they wee fighting to protect Germany. Many believed in the NAZI cause. Many also realized what Germany had done in the occupied countries and fully expected the Allies to do the same when they reached the borders of the Reich. Another factor ws the bond developed in the Wehrmacht and Wafen-SS, Luftwaffe, and Kiegsmarine among individual soldiers, airmen, and sailors. Given the odds, the Germen servicemen knew that their only chance of surviving was to depend on their Komrads. There was a community esprit de corps that was more typical of elite formations in the Allied armies. This was a spirit that had been enculcated in the Hitler Youth. Most German soldiers under 28 had been Hitler Youth boys. German soldiers were convince they had a duty to Germany and each other. This in itself ws not unique, but the strength of the bond was the a key factor in the abilitiy of Hitler and the NAZIs to continue a dogged resisance in 1944 and early 1945. They fought more for each other than their Führer. The Wehrmacht offuicee corps is a special matter to comider.
The Germans invaded many small countries, but aftr they invaded the Soviet Union the Germans always faced superior numbers of increasingly well-supplied adversaries.
The German victories in the early phase of the War can be explained by some excellennt weapons, but more important ntly their superiior tactical doctrine. They outclasses anbd outnumbered the Poles, but the French actually had excellent tanks and planes. It was the German tactical doctrinr that gained them the victory-Blitzkrieg. During the entire War, the only defeat the Germans suffered at the hands of a numerically weaker adversary was the Battle of Britain. The Grrman victories were over smaller coutries which could not hope to stand gainst Germany. The one great victory was against France. And it permanent changed the ballamc of power in Europe. German propaganda triumphed superior weaponry, The Germans had some good weapons which Goebbel's propaganda triumpled, but it was the tactical doctrine that achieved thei early vuctory. And against coutries that wanted no part of another war. Britain and France has been traumatized by World War I. British policy had been appeasement, not to confont the NAZIs. French defense policy was based on a failed military doctrine--static defense built around the Maginot Line.
Hitkler flushed by success/ especially the victory over France, decided to proceed with what he has only wanted from the very beginning--the conquest of the East. Page aftervoage of Mein Kampf show this fixation on the East. This of course meant the invasion and distruction of the Soviet Union.Hitler did not ask OKW for a military assessment., he asked for an invasion plan. And OKW provbifed him one. It was a huhe ganle. He was still at war with Britain. Th Sovirt bUniion had a massive military establishment. And America haf a huge military potential. If he could destrioy the Red Army he would have accss to the Soviet Union's huge repository of natural resources, everything Germany lacked. But if he failed, Germany as in World War I risked facing a coalition of adversaries with a military npotential Germany could not begin to match. Operatiom Barbarossa would be Germany's best if not only chance of winning the War. The camapign unleashed by Hitler on the Soviet Union was the most massive miliitary assault in all of history (June 1941). It began with a seies of spectacular military victories unparalleded in all of history. Hitler and the German Genrrals after onky a few weeks were sure they had won the War.
Within days of each other at opposite end of earth, two unconnected Axis military bactiins suddenly changed the course pf World War II amd world history. First the Rd Army stahed a massive winter counter offendive, centered on the defense of Moscow. Agter the Red Army and winter had stopped Ppperatiomn Typhonn, Zukov unleashed a massibe attack with reserves hev had beenn building (December 5, 1941). It would lead to huge German losses in men and material. Hitler who blanched at 6,000 casialties on Crete mow faced 1 million casualties. Across the globe from the snow and ice surrounding Moscow, the Japanese believing that the Germans had defeated the Soviet Uniion, struck at the palm fringed Hawaian Islands--attacking he American naval mbase of Pearl Harbor. Within in hours, these two actions meant that the Germans had not destriyed the Red Army and the Japoanese had brought America with its vast industrial and military power into the War. The War was lost for Germany once as in World War I it became a War of attrition. Germany once it failed to destroy the Red Army in Barbarossa with its more limited resourceswas not going to win a wae with a coalition of the Soviet Uniin, British Empire and the United States. Japan suceeded in sinking obsolete American battleships, but like the Germans had no way of striking at America's vast industrial capacity.
The Axis reported major victories in 1942. Despite the huge losses in the Red Army Winter Counter offensives (Decenber 1941) the Germans were able to recover and score major victories in mid-1942, most notably in the Crimea and in the Don Bas, leading to the offensive into the Cauacuses and Stalingrad. But this only laid the seeds of a huge failure. Hitker seeing hinself as a military genius. actually launched four offensives. Firsr he vorder an renewedoffensuve toward Leningrad. Than twin Opperation Blue offensives out if the Don Bas into the cuacauses and toward Stalingrad. Not to mention and offensive in North Africa toward Egyot and the Suez Canal. Four offendoves bordered on insanity. The Gernans could have suceeded in one offensive, but certainly not four. The Wehrmabcht has been severely weakened by the Red Army Winter Counter Offensive (1941-42). It had neither the men or equiopment to sustain four offensives. They partially delt with the huge losses by demanding their allies (Hungaey, Italy, and Romania) to sipply men to support the Stalingrad offensice. The Germans did not, however, have the ability to repalce the lost eqyuoment. They could not fully supply their own forces--panzer units had only a raction nof their aithorriuzed arorored strength. They certainly could not equipo that of their allies. As a result the Romnankiam, Hungarian, ad Italian forces on the flanks of the Stalingrad kessel were only lightly armed without modern tanks or heavy artillery. The Leningrad offensuve failed and in a fissaterous 3 weeks the Soviets launched Operayion Uruanus surroundedte Red Army in Stalingrad (November). And now the Western Allies were vmaking their superior resources felt. The British began the strategic bombing campaoaign, meaning aircraft, artillery, and ordinance had to ne committed to thevdefebse of German ncuties. The Brituish with Amnerica support snashed the Afrika Korps at El Alemain (October 1942). The British and Anericans launched Operaytion Torch. lamding in French North Afuca (November). Hitler had assured his generaks that it woukd be years before an American army would appear in the field. In the Pacific the Japanese ran wild, carving out a huge enopote in the Southern Resource Zone. Like vHitler vthey bsid not expect a an Amnerivan response in 1942. The Haoanese offensive was stopped cold when the American Pacific Fleet destroyed the Kido Butai at Midway (June 1942). And even before Operation Torch the Ameriav Marines launched the first American offensive at Guadalcanal (August 1942). It was now just what Hitler had wanted to avioid--a draining war of attriution.
Less understable is the dogged German defense in the later years of the War. The Germans by 1943, faced staggering numbers of opponents who were well armmed and with much larger populations, greater industrial ouput, and access to the raw materials that Germany lacked. Oil was the most imprtant stratrgic materilal Germany lacked, but hardly the only one. Superior weaponry and even more imoprtant tactical doctrine was the primary reason f0r the German victories. Another part was the fighting spirit of the German soldier. It was the spirit and comptence of the German military that enabled Germany to continue the War. German veterans complain that in American movies that the Germans are commonly portrayed as stupid. The Germams military, as compared to their commande, were never stupid. They were highly competent and professional. The Germans were outnumbered and over powered, not defeated through superior battlefield tactics. The strategic decisins that brought defeat were imposed by the political leadership--the German Führer Adolf Hitler. The German soldier continued figting even against staggering odds. One rason was that after 1942 they wee fighting to protect Germany. Many believed in the NAZI cause. Many also realized what Germany had done in the occupied countries and fully expected the Allies to do the same when they reached the borders of the Reich. Another factor ws the bond developed in the Wehrmacht and Wafen-SS, Luftwaffe, and Kiegsmarine among individual soldiers, airmen, and sailors. Given the odds, the Germen servicemen knew that their only chance of surviving was to depend on their Komrads. There was a community esprit de corps that was more typical of elite formations in the Allied armies. This was a spirit that had been enculcated in the Hitler Youth. Most German soldiers under age 28 had been Hitler Youth boys. German soldiers were convince they had a duty to Germany and each other. This in itself ws not unique, but the strength of the bond was the a key factor in the abilitiy of Hitler and the NAZIs to continue a dogged resisance in 1944 and early 1945. They fought more for each other than their Führer.
The Wehrmacht offuicee corps is a special matter to comider. It should be understood, that there was bno difference between the German Wehrmacht officer corps amd the young men who did their fighting. Both fought to the bitter end way beyond which there was any hope of nit just a German victory, but any hope of avoiding a devestating defeat. And it should be understood that most of the damage to Germany was done in the final year of the War. It was also the nost deadly 12 months of the war for German soldiers and civilians. And this was at a time that there no real hope of victory. Even a child can read a mapm klet alone competent miklitary professionals. For the young men that made up the bulk of the combat soldiers contunuing to fight for theReich this can be largely understood as the result of NAZI controlled schools and the Hitler Youth. But what about the officer corps, especilly the senior leadership? They were educated before the rise of the NAZIs and mamy were well read and not particularl impressed with Hitler. This varied of course but many saw the disaster where Hitler's leadershio was headed. Why did they continue to fight, knowing it was hopeless and seeing Germany being destroyed before their eyes. this is a issue that has caught the attention of World War II historians and which they continue to wrestle vith. We can offer a range of possivke factors. As to how imprtant they are will probably continue to be a never ending discusion, probably impossible to answer with any real surity. Some of the factors were the same that influenced the general public, others were especially important to the Wehrmacht officer corps.
Citino, Robert M. The German Way of War: From the Thirty Year's War to the Third Reich (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, 2005), 428p.
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