Figure 1.--

Col. Puller asked a wounded Japanese officer who had been captured through an interperter why they had not changed tactics when the casualties were mounting up and they were noyt breaking through. He replied, "That is not the Japanese way. The plan had been made. No one would have dared to change it. It must go as it is written."

Japanese officer captured because he was too wounded to resist.

After the disaster at Edson's/Bloody Ridge, the Marines who then took the initiative in a series of engagements along the Matanikau River (September-October). The climatic assault was again fought south of Henderson Field. The Imperial Japanese Army's highly rspected 2nd Infantry Division, known as the Sendai Division, played a major role in the Guadalcanal Campaign. It was commanded by Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama, and tasked with leading the decisive assault on Henderson Field. Again the Japanese continued to believe in Yamato-damashii -- that their fighting spirit could and would overcome material disadvantages. Lt. Gen Harukichi Hyakutake also believed that the previous attempts failed because of inadequate force. and that with his larger force Yamato-damashii would prevail. The Japaneses believed that the battleship bombardments of Henderson Field (October 13–14, 1942) by the battleships Kongō and Haruna had severel weakened the Marine position. The Marines referred to it as 'The Bombardment'. It was the most devastating Japanese naval bombardment of the War. It had disrupted air operations, but thanks to Marston matting and the Seebees, the airfield was quickly repaired. This was something he Japanese did not think was possible. And new aircraft were flown in. Hyakutake decided because of the Marine actions around the mouth of the Matanikau River to again strike with his reinforcements south of Henderson Field. This was the decisive action of the campaign and was to be coordinated with the air strikes from Rabaul and a major naval action--what has become known as the naval battle of the Santa Cruz Islands (October 25-27). The costly battle prevented Japanese naval aviation from supporting the land campaign. The Japanese planned to coordinate a jungle and coastal attack. But they again encountered problems moving though the Guadalcanal jungle. Because of communications problems instead of launching a full scale attack, launched a series of uncoordinated attacks (October 23-26). They suffered heavy losses while the well-entrenched Marines experienced only light losses. Edson's/Bloody Ridge was again defended by heavily entrenched Marines supported by artillery. At the center of these defenses was a section led by machine gunner Sgt. John Basilone--a machine gun expert. Japanese corpses piled up in front of his section, making it difficult to aim the fire. When the guns jammed, he repaired the red hot equipment burning his hands. When reinforcements arrived, he was one of the few Marines still on his feet at his position. He would be awarded the Medal of Honor. This was last major Japanese land assault on the Marine beachhead and Henderson Field, although the Japanese did not yet give up. The Japanese who had begun telling their men that the Marines were being recruited from mental hospitals finally began revising their opinion about the U.S. Marine Corps and what they faced in the Pacific.

Sources

Davis, Burke. Marine! The Life of Chesty Puller (Bantam:19910, 4000p.

Created: 1:37 PM 8/17/2026
Last updated: 1:38 PM 8/17/2026