Figure 1.-- Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Minister Halifax traveled to Rome to meet with Mussolini in Rome (January 6, 1939). Here Italian Balilla boys prepare for the Chamberlain visit. The press photo was headed, "Fascist boys greet premier. The caption read, "The scenr outside the station in Rome when the Premier arrived from England. Members of the Balilla the Fascist organization were waiting to welcome him."

Mussolini gradually moved Italy toward Hitler and Germany. The two allies, unlike Hitler and Stalin, did not plan launching World War II together. And Mussolini did not commit Italy to war in 1939. There is no doubt that he coveted Mediterranean terrirory held or under the influence of Britain and France. Italian Libya was bordered by Egypt to the east and Tunisia to the west. Britain still had military forces in Egypt to protect Suez. And many Italians felt that Tunisia should be their colony. Mussolini also coveted neihboring Greece which had links to the British. Any effort to expand significantly in the Mediterranean, however, would require war with either Britain and France or both. So Mussolini kept his options open. Chamberliain had hoped that Mussolini would be a moderating force on Hitler. This proved to be an illusion, both with Austria and at Munich. Chamberlain did not, however, let that deter him and still attempted to disuade Mussolini from war. For Mussolini's part, war with the Allies was a huge risk. Not only did Italy not have Germany's industrial base, but its geography as a peninsula exposed Italy to Britain's greatest assett, the Royal Navy, in a way that Germany was not. Mussolini appears to have no realistic assessment of the potential of his military, but still he hesitated and maintained his options open with the British.

Italian National Interests

Mussolini's thought processes in the road to war are not altogether clear. There were benefits that could be achieved through the Axis Alliance. It would allow him to pursue his dreams of a Mediterranean empire. But from a purely strategic perspective, it was not in Italy's interest to assist the Germans in gaining control of Europe. Mussolini mighthave his differences with the British and French, but they were not going to invade Italy. Hitler on the other hand had made it clear that he was prepared to use military power to achieve Germany's goals. No independent country would want such a man to dominate the continent. Just what did Mussolini think would be Italy's position in a German-dominated Europe. As best we can determine, he did not accurarely assess German military strength and Italian military weakness. And by the time this becamne apparent, he was tied to the hip with Hitler and thus had limited his and Italy's options. The end result of assisting in the German rise would be a German invasion and occupation of Italy (1943).

Mussolin and Hitler

The relationship between Mussolini and Hitler is an interesting one. Mussolini took power several years before Hitler. And Hitler as fledgling politican idealized Hitler. He attempted to contact Mussolini who rebuffed him. Mussolini was unimpressed with Mein Kampf and never thought Hitler would actually seized power in Germany. When he did, Mussolini was concerned about the South Tyrol (part of Italy's territorial gain in World War I) and the security implications of an Anschluss (German annexation of Austria). Hitler gradually won Mussolini over. Mussolini gradually moved Italy toward Hitler and Germany. There is no indication, however, that the two planned war together. Hitler's decission to invade Poland (1939) and the Soviet Union (1941) were taken without consulting Mussolini. Likewise, Mussolini's decession to invase Albania (1939) and Greece (1940) were taken without consulting Hitler. Mussolini did not commit Italy to war with the Allies in 1939. Like most observers at the time, he had no idea how significantly the Germans had shifted the military balance. Hitler for his part while not involving Mussolini in his decesion making, would remain loyal to Mussolini to the end. Only in his Berlin bunker in the final days of the War did he voice regrets about Mussolini (April 1945).

Goals

There is no doubt that Mussolini coveted Mediterranean terrirory held or under the influence of Britain and France. Italian Libya was bordered by Egypt to the east and Tunisia yo the west. Britain still had military forces in Egypt to protect Suez. And many Italians felt that Tunisia should be their colony. Mussolini also coveted neihboring Greece which had links to the British. Any effort to expand significantly in the Mediterranean, however, would require war with either Britain and France or both. So Mussokini kept his options open.

British Diplomacy

Chamberliain hoped that Mussolini would be a moderating force on Hitler. This was a policy that Chamberlain persued with considerable vigor from the very beginning of her premiership. He moved to end the scantions on Italy applied as a result of Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia. Chamberlain formed his cabinent (May 1937). Appeasing Mussolini was important from the very beginning. War. Chamberlain approved concessions in the Sudan, allowing flights between Italian controlled Libya and Italuan East Affrica, including Ethiopia. Chamberlian open direct communications with Mussolini without informing Foreign Secretary Eden. Eden eventually resigned in protest over Chamberlin's policy of appeaement. Chamberlain replaced him with Lord Halifax. Chamberlain suggested a formal treaty with Italy. The result was the Perth-Ciano Pact (April 16, 1938). Chamberlain met Mussolini during the signing ceremonies. Britain recognizing the Italian conquest of Ethiopia with the condition that Italy withdraw from the Spanish Civil War. There were also provisions about the Nile. [Tvedt, p. 175.] Chamberlain's hopes proved to be an illusion, both with Austria and at Munich. Chamberlain did not, however, let these failures of his policy deter him. In fact he intensified his efforts to disuade Mussolini from his association with Hitler and war. Britain ratified the Perth-Ciano Pact (November 16, 1938). Mussolini blustering over Tunis, Djibouti, and Corsica angered the French (November 1938). The Chamberlain Government backed the French, but sought to defuse the situation. Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Minister Halifax traveled to Rome to meet with Mussolini in Rome (January 6, 1939). Nothing came from the meeting. [Doerr, p. 241.]

Mussolini's Calculations

For Mussolini's part, war with the Allies was a huge risk. Not only did Italy not have Germany's industrial base, but its geography as a peninsula exposed Italy to Britain's greatest assett, the Royal Navy, in a way that Germany was not. Mussolini appears to have no realistic assessment of the potential of his military, but still he hesitated and maintained his options open with the British. He had to makw two decessions. First not to join Hitler when he launched World War II by invading Poland (September 1939). The second was to finally enter the War by declaring war on Britain and France (June 1940). The Axis was a defensive alliance. Italy was not compeled to join Germany when the country invaded Poland. We know that Mussolini at the time had grave doubts about what he had done in linking Italy so closely with Germany. Not only was he concerned about the Allies if he led Italy to war, but he was concerned about Germany if he did not. Blustering about warwas one thing, actually waging war was a very different matter. He saw fighting the British and French as very different than the Ethiopians and Albanians. He vascilated, at times proclaiming his unity with Hitler and the next day expressing fear of the Germans. In a pattern that would be repeated throughout the War, there was no joint planning, but rather Itay following decesions made in Berlin. Count Ciano writes, "I went to Attolilico [Italian ambassador to Germany who was in Rome] with the Duce. For a moment the fires of the old scruples of loyalty return to the Duce, and he wanted Attolico to confirm to Ribbentrop that, in spite of everything, Italy will march with Germany if thge democracies throw themselves into the furnace of war." [Ciano, August 17, 1939] The very next day, Ciano informs us, "A conversation with the Duce in the morning; his usual shifting feelings. He still thinks it possible that the democracies will not march, and that Germany might do business chaply [mening aggression], from which business he does not wish to be excluded. Then, too, he fears Hitler's rage. He believes that a denunciation of the [Axis] pact or something like itmight induce Hitler to abandon the Polish question in order to square accounts with italy. [Ciano, August 18, 1939.] Ten months later the situation was very different. The Germans had smashed the French Army. The dangers of going to war were dignificantly reduced. And from Mussolini's point of view, the rapid Germany victories were making it impossible for him to share in the booty of war. There was no longer any thought of withdrawing from the Axis. His concern was how to gain some of the booty and now that the danger had passed to be a great militarry commander. Ciano writes, ""Today at eleven at the Palazzo Venezia the High Command was born! Rarely have I seen Mussolini so happy. He has realized his dream: that vof becoming the military Condottiero [leader] of the country at war." [Ciano, May 29, 1040]

Sources

Ciano, Count Galeazzo. The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943 (Garden City Publishing Co: Garden City, New York, 1946). 582, p.

Doerr, Paul W. British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (Manchester University Press: Studies in Modern History).

Tvedt, Terje. The River Nile in the Age of the British: Political Ecology and the Quest for Economic Power (IB Tauris).

Created: 7:37 PM 3/29/2008
Last updated: 3:36 AM 1/9/2019