Figure 1.--This is a good edxample if a pre-War Japznese highway. For the most part they were narrow, poorly surfaced, dusty, and not adequate for fast travel. Here a truck driver has stoppoed to give the children a lift to school.

"Datsun is the car. The Rising Sun is the flag."

Datsun advertuising slogan for its new Model 70, 1937

Almost all modern transport in Japan before World War II was pubic transport because virtually no Japanese people owned cars--they were beyond the purchasing power of Japanese workers as well as most of the middle-class. Actually they were beyond the wildest imagination of poorly paid Japanese workers. Albeit urban industrialist workers were better off than farm laborers in the country. Most of the land was owned by a small number of wealthy landlords. (Land reform would only come as part of the American military occupation following the War. ) Most cars were imported because Japan was not yet manufacturing quality cars and other motor vehicles in any number. Ford and GM setup assembly plants (1920s). The Ford Yokohama assembly plant was opened (March 1925) and GM opened its factory at Osaka (April 1927). Ford and GM controlled most of the Japanese automobile market, producing some 28,000 vehicles (1929). Production plummeted as a result of the Depression, but had recovered by 1934. 【Toyota】 Both Datsun and Toyota were established and hired many talented from the American operations. The dominance of Ford and GM created difficult market conditions for Japanese entrepreneurs, but it also meant that there were now quite a number of Japanese individuals with technical know how that could be hired. 【Shishin Susetsu 】Both Datsun and Toyota hired individualists from the Ford and GM operations. (1930s). They began manufacturing small numbers of cars, largely based on knock off American parts (1936-37). Early cars were the Toyota Model AA and the Datsun Model 70. Before the War there were hopes of exporting and Australia seemed a potential market. During the War, the Japanese automobile companies would produce trucks for the Japanese military, but the numbers of vehicles were woefully small for modem war and minuscule compared to America. And there was the omnipresent problem--where to get the oil needed to run them. Car manufacturing may not seem of great importance in a war, until you realize that American automotive companies began churning out a dizzying quantity of aircraft, tanks, other military vehicles, and vehicle/aircraft engines after only a little over a year of a conversion process. In addition, Blitzkrieg (modern mobile warfare) not only required tanks, but massive numbers of trucks. The lack of motor vehicles is major reason the Imperial Javanese Army failed to complete its conquest of China. Japanese analysts were aware, or at least partially aware, of American industrial power. They had, however, no idea how quickly American industry could convert to a war foot8ing. Their assessment was that America could be quickly defeated in a short Pacific War. Many officers were sure that a martial people like Japan could easily defeat the fun-loving Americans. The Imperial Army had a lot of confidence in the fighting spirit of the Japanese soldier. Japan had a fledgling motorcycle industry--basically motorized bicycles. It was not yet of great importance. (Honda Motors was a post-War phenomenon.) Japan produced about 3,000 motorcycles in 1940, mostly for the military, but a number were used for delivery vehicles. Not very many were for personal use. Of course the issue with motor vehicles was not just that Japanese workers could not afford them, but that Japan did not have domestic sources of the oil that was needed to run them. And to make matters even worse, the United States which would be Japan's principal obstacle in any Pacific War, was the country's major supplier of oil. This had enormous strategic consequences. The highway system was virtually nonexistent, but considerable development occurred in the lare-1920s and 1930s. Roads were inadequate outside the cities and many were not surfaced, but rudimentary local bus service radiated out from the cities and in the 1930s began to develop service between the principal cities. Rail service was still much more important,. The busses mostly serviced the surrounding ares of major cities. Busses tended to be much smaller than American buses. They were a major factor in the development of Japanese highways, in contrast to America where private cars were the principal driving force. Earlier there were no high-speed surfaced roads outside the main cities. By the time of World War II, modern highways ran up and down the east and west coast of Honshu, the largest of Japan's four main islands. For the most part, however, Japan's highways were narrow, poorly or not surceased at all, dusty, and generally inadequate for fast travel (figure 1). 【War Department 】

Sources

Shishin Susetsu. Nippon Kiogyo Soran (March 1937).

Toyota Corporation. "Assembly Production by Ford and General Motors," History of Toyota.

War Department--United States. "Japanese transportation and communication system" Film 23705 Misc 1061 (Army Pictorial Service). The restricted film is undated, but was probably compiled about 1945-46. It was assembled from Japanese films and used in the Civil Affairs Training Schools conducted by the Provost Marshal General. Its main purpose was to inform the viewers -- presumably U.S. servicemen and officers -- of how Japan’s transportation and communication systems were organized.

Created: 1:51 AM 8/11/2021
Last updated: 3:04 AM 6/7/2024