Figure 1.--The Japanese Zero shocked the Allies. They had not envisioned facing such an advanced Japanese airplane. The real Japanese secret weapon, however, was not the Zero, but the finest corps of pilots of World War II, especially the naval aviators. Japanese boys weere selected at age 13 years for the rigorus and dextended training. They were not only throughly trained, but experienced because of the war in China. Their only weakness was that there were so few of them. The Japanese training priogram was designed to prepare a small number of marvelously trained aviators. They only graduate some one hundred new pilots a year. As part of their planning for war, the Japanese military gave no thought to creating an effective training program for the much larger number of pilots that would be needed to fight an extended war with America. Here Japanese pilots get final instructions for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Western Allies discounted Japanese aviation in the run up to the Asian-Pacific War. This proved to be a serious mistake. The Asia-Pacific air war began with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931). From the beginning the Jaanese began bombing Chinese cities, including Sahnghai. There was little or no Chinese air opposition. Japanese air attacks on China began on a wider scsle when the Japanese invased China proper (1937). The small Chinese air force was quickly destroyed. Japan had total sir control. Unlike the Luftwaffe there was no close air support, but the Japanese woukd attack Chinese ground positions. And they extensively bombed Chinese cities. The attacks on cities werev terrorv raids with no actual targets in mind. The hinese had very little indutry tio bomb. The goal was to break the willmof thev Chinese people. America resonding to the humanitarian crisis began to help China build an air fiorce. What China needed was air defense fighters. Mafam Chinag was put in charge of the Chinese Air Fiorce and she hired Claire Chenault. The Army Air Corps was dominated by the Bo,mberr Boys and Chenault focus on fihters meant that he had little opportunity. The unopposed Japanese bombing of Chinese cities This continued until the Chenault's Flying Tigers reached China (December 1941). They provided the first air defense for Chunking and other Chinese cities. The Flying Tigers was converted to the 14th Air Fiorce, but oprations would be limited by the necsity of flying supplies in over the Hump. The Flying Tigers were folded un to the 14th Air Firce which began bombing Japnese inatalations in China. The Pacific War was lunched by the Japanese caaier attack on Pearl Harbor (December 1941). Initial Japanese air superiority would olay a major role in the 6-month offensive fillowing Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Zero was fast and nmanuerable with enormous range, but very vulnerable because of its light construction. The major Japanese advantage was the core of enensley skilled Joanese carrier aviators. The probkem for Japan was the small nummbrr of these avaitors and the failure to create an effectuive trainng program for larger numberrs. The focus on carrier battles ended with the Battle of the Philippines Sea (June 1944) and the disaterous Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The Japanese turned tomland-based Kamakaze attacks. But the war-winning air campaign would b the strategic bombing camopaign from the Marianas. The Japanese like the Germans began the War with thev belieft that they could bomb other countries, but no one could bomb them. It proved to be avery bad bet.

China (1931-45)

Pacific War (1941-45)

The Western Allies discounted Japanese aviation in the run up to the Asian-Pacific War. This proved to be a serious mistake. The Pacific War was lunched by the Japanese carrr attack on Pearl Harbor (December 1941). Initial Japanese air superiority would olay a major role in the 6-month offensive following Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Zero was fast and nmanuerable with enormous range, but very vulnerable because of its light construction. The major Japanese advantage was the core of enensley skilled Joanese carrier aviators. The probkem for Japan was the small nummbrr of these avaitors and the failure to create an effectuive trainng program for larger numberrs. The focus on carrier battles ended with the Battle of the Philippines Sea (June 1944) and the disaterous Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The Japanese turned tomland-based Kamakaze attacks. But the war-winning air campaign would be the Strategic Bombing Campaign from the Marianas. The Japanese like the Germans began the War with thev belieft that theybcould bomb other countries, but no one could bomb them. It proved to be a very bad bet. The vastness of the Pacific Ocean was daunting, but the American B-29 Superfortress was able to reach the Home Islands from the newly acquired Mariana Islands (June 1944). It would take a few months to perfect, but the insanity of a country wih wood and paper houses to wage a war involving bombing other countries was soon manifest. By the end of the war, Jpan's industrial cities would be reduced to mounds of glowing embers even before the two atomic bombs were dropped.

Created: 9:07 AM 12/24/2023
Last updated: 9:07 AM 12/24/2023