Figure 1.--The British miscalculated badly in Malaya and Singapore. Their forces in both in Malaya and Songapore were a garrison force trained and equipped for colonial policing rather than combat aginst a motivated and well-armed eneny. The British were poorly equipped because they were so hard pressed in Europe and North Africa, but that did not prevent then from combat trainung. Gen. Percival made no real effort to train hus substantial force in 1940 and 41 for combat operation. Part of that miscalculation was also in assuming the support of colonial peoples, although this had only a limited part in the Japanese success. The caption here read, "Young Malaysians and their heroes: Somewhere in Malaya. Young natives of the Malay Peninsula are shown trotting alongside a company of Australian troops on the march. These same Aussies, adored by the native youngsters are today putting up a desperate resistance against invading Japanese. Latest reports indicate the Japs are still held in northern Malaya, about 350 miles from the great base of Singapore which is their main objective." The photograph was dated December 15, 1941. American newspapers were equally clueless here as the caption illustrates. In fact, the colonial people of Southeast Asia did not view the European colonizers as their protectors or the Japanese as brutal invaders. (An exception here was Filipino attitudes toward the Americans.) Attitudes toward the Japanese would change as the local people began to experience the brutal nature of Japanese rule. Here the Malays were an exception because the Japanese were more favorably disposed toward them than other ethnic groups.

One part of the Japanese offensive following Pearl Harbor was the invasion of Malaya. The principal objective was Singapore, a formidable vastion, but whose defenses were based on a sea assault, not a land attack from Malaya. While Singporte was the main objective, Malaya also has important natural resources, especially tin and rubber. The Japanese 25th army commanded by Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita launched the invasion of Malaya immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack (December 8, 1941). Yamashita's 25th Army was smaller than the defending British force. Yamashita commanded only 30,000-60,000 men [accounts vary], but they were a fighting force with combat experience from the fighting in China. he had a well thoughout campaign, an adequate air cover, and naval support. The III Air Group had 459 aircraft. The Imperial Navy’s Southern Command included a battle cruiser, ten destroyers and five submarines. Yamashita attacked immediately after Pearl Harbor (December 8, 1941). Yamashita landed a small force in the north. English commander General Arthur Percival when notified of the landings was advised to set up a defensive line and famously is said to have worried about the effect on morale. A staff office is said to have replied, "It would be bad for morale when the Japanese start running all over the island." Yamahita moved down the Peninsula in a stunning 8-week campaign. The Japanese proved adept at jungle warfare, adjusting to the environment in a way the British were unwilling to do. This is not fully unnderstood. Because of the Pacific War, it is commonly thought that the Japanese were experienced jungle fighters. Nothing could be further from the case. There are no jungles in Japan, nor was the war in China fought in jungles. The Malay campaign was Japan's first jungle campaign. Ironicall, the Brirish Empire included many jungle areas, including Malaya, but they had no idea how to fight in the jungle. A major British effort to bolster the defenses of Singpore was to move HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales to the Pacific to bolster the defense of Singapore. The vessels without aircover attempted to intercept Japanese landing forces, but were found by Japanese land-based bombers and sunk off Malaya (December 10, 1941). This was the only creditable Royal Navy force defending Singapore. It would also prove to be the only Royal Navy effort to play an important role in the Pacific War. This action is a sobering indication of what might have happened to the U.S. Pacific fleet had there ben a major fleet action at sea. After this disaster off Malaya, the Pacific War would be primarily fought by the U.S. Navy. Japanese infantry used bicycles to move through areas without developed roads. The British organized opposition using III Corps of the Indian Army, the Australian 8th Division and various British units. There were no developed defensive positions and Japanese air and sea superority allowed them to rapidly move down the Peninsula. The Japanese moved so rapidly that the British were never able to establish asolid defensive line. Command of the sea enabled Yamashita to make amphibious landings to undo British efforts to organize a denensive line.

Objective

One part of the Japanese offensive following Pearl Harbor was the invasion of Malaya. The principal objective was Singapore, a formidable vastion, but whose defenses were based on a sea assault, not a land attack from Malaya. Singapoere in 1941 was a naval base without a fleet to protect it. The Royal Navy was of course fihting it out with the Italians in the Medieterranran and the Germans in the Atalntic. The defense of Singapoere was bsed on coastal defenses tonhold off the Japanese until a relief fleet could be dispatched. While Singpore was the main objective, Malaya also has important natural resources, especially tin and rubber. And the major Japanese objective in launching the Pacific War was Japan's effort to obtain the riches of what they called the Southern Resource Zone (SRZ). The main goak was the oil rich Dutch East Indies, but the in and rubber of Malaya was all part of he SRZ.

Japanese Forces

The Japanese 25th army commanded by Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita launched the invasion of Malaya immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack (December 8, 1941). Yamashita's 25th Army was smaller than the defending British force. Yamashita commanded only 30,000-60,000 men [accounts vary], but they were a fighting force with combat experience from the fighting in China. Yamashita had a well thoughout campaign and would become known as the Tiger of Malaya. He had adequate air cover, and naval support. The III Air Group had 459 aircraft. The Imperial Navy’s Southern Command included a battle cruiser, ten destroyers and five submarines.

British Forces

Japanese Plan

The Japanese High commanded debted to plan of attack. The Navy wanted a preliminary naval bombardment of known British defences along Malaya’s eastern coast with air attacks on known British air bases. Naval commanders were concerned anout possible British air attcks. They were concerned tht the invasion fleey would be 'sitting ducks'. The Army oposed this cautious approch and wanted to attack with the element of surprise. They were preoared to land without any prior naval bombardment. The Army was supported by Vice-Admiral Ozawa, commander of th Southern Naval Command. He disagreed with the Naval Staff in Tokyo. At a joint army/navy conference, he insisted, “I say that the navy should accept the army’s proposals, even at the risk of annihilation.” Ozawa would be the final commander of the Imperial Fleet, although by the time he took command, he faced a vastly superiot U.S. Pacific Fleet. And his carriers were annialted in both the Battle of the Philippines Sea and Leyte Gulf.

Naval Action: Force Z (December 10, 1941)

American and Japanese code breakers has cracked the Japnese diplomatic purpple code. They knew the Japanese were preparing to strike, but did not know where. The American response was to keeo the Pacific Fleet battle ships safe at Pearl Harbor, reasy for action. The British response was to move two capital ships the brand new battleship Prince of Wales (repaired after its encounter with Biamarck and the battlecruiser Repulseto the Pacific to bolster the defenses of Singapore. At the time battleships were still seen a the most powerful naval vessels. The ships and four escorting destroyer were designated Force Z, but deploye without aircover. It attempted to intercept the Japanese landing forces. At this point in the War, the capoability of airpower was still not fully understood. They were found by Japanese land-based bombers off the eastern coast of the peninsula, and subjected to multiple attacks. The third attack left both ships sinking (December 10, 1941). This was a notable result as moving ships at sea are not easy targets, especially highly aaneuverable highspeed war ships. The Luftwaffe found this out even with merchant shipping targeted in the Channel by very accurate Stuka dive bombers in the lead up to the Battle of Britain. We note that the U.S. B-7s operating out of Midway a few nonth later failed to hit a single Japanese bomber, a much more difficult target than a battleship. They had to attack at high altitude because of the carrier air cover. A reader tells us, "The Japanese attacked from much lower altitudes then the B-17s at Midway. The British only 3 day after Pearl Harbor demonstrated the vulnerability of surface units to air attack. The British battleships, unlike theJapanese carriers at Midway had no air cover and the British main naval AA gun was a multi barrel 1.1 inch machine cannon (any thing larger then 20mm is considered a mc and not a machine gun) with a slow rate of fire and not very accurate. It was easy for the Japanese to know that by watching newsreels of German bombing of coastal convoys near Britain." This was the only creditable Royal Navy force defending Singapore. It would also prove to be the only Royal Navy effort to play an important role in the Pacific War. This action is a sobering indication of what might have happened to the U.S. Pacific fleet had there ben a major fleet action at sea. After this disaster off Malaya, Singapore was nit only cut off, but the Pacific War would be largely fought by the U.S. Navy.

Japanese Campaign

Yamashita attacked immediately after Pearl Harbor (December 8, 1941). He landed a small force in the north. Yamahita moved down the Peninsula in a stunning 8-week campaign. The Japanese proved adept at jungle warfare, adjusting to the environment in a way the British were unwilling to do. This is not fully unnderstood. Because of the Pacific War, it is commonly thought that the Japanese were experienced jungle fighters. Nothing could be further from the case. There are no jungles in Japan, nor was the war in China fought in jungles. The Malay campaign was Japan's first jungle campaign. Ironically, the British Empire included many jungle areas, including Malaya, but they had no idea how to fight in the jungle. Japanese infantry used bicycles to move through areas without developed roads.

British Response

English commander General Arthur Percival when notified of the landings was advised to set up a defensive line and famously is said to have worried about the effect on morale. A staff office is said to have replied, "It would be bad for morale when the Japanese start running all over the island." The British organized opposition using III Corps of the Indian Army, the Australian 8th Division and various British units. There were no developed defensive positions and Japanese air and sea superority allowed them to rapidly move down the Peninsula. The Japanese moved so rapidly that the British were never able to establish a solid defensive line. Command of the sea enabled Yamashita to make amphibious landings to undo British efforts to organize a denensive line.

British Civilians

The English Channel stopped the Panzers meaning that the British except for the Channel Islanders were spared the horrors of a NAZI occupation. British and Australiam subjects in Asia were not so fortunate. The first to be seized by the Japanese were in Shanghai and Hong Kong, days after Pearl Harbor. Some had left before the Japanese struck, knowing that the Japanese Army was just outside the gates of the Shanghai Shanhai International Settlement and the Hong Kong Crown Colony. Many did not leave and were interned by the Japanese. In Hing Komg immediately, in Shanghai later. The British in Malaya felt more secure. They were not surrounded by the Japanese and there were subtantial British and Empire forces both in Malaya a well a the 'impregnanle' Singapore bastion. We are not entitrely sure just what the civilians were involved with. we think most of the Peninsula were operating rubber plantations. On Singapore itself, their functions were more diverse. Few civilians on the Peninsula or on Singapore knew knew how badly prepared or equipped the British forces in Malaya and Singapore were to face the Japanese. The lack of seriouness among the British can be seen of the British lack of seriousness was that 2 years into the War and the despite the fact that it was know that the Japanese were preparing to go to war, the authorities not only made few defensive preparatyions, but did not even begin preparing the civilians. There was not even any food rationing. Like the British in Homng Kong, the British civilians in Malaya and Singapore were interned immediately. The civilians in Malaya mostly escaped to Singapore and with the fall of thecity were interned there. We are not sure about the numbers, but seem to be about 4,000 men, women, and children, not including, however, the much larger numbers of POWs. I think this number includes Australians, but am not positive. Non-European civilians brought the total to over 4,500 civilians.

Sources

Bridge, Roy. "British civilians interned by the Japanese."

Created: 7:12 AM 4/20/2015
Last updated: 11:34 PM 1/8/2017