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World War II European Theater -- Soviet intelligence
World War II: Soviet Intelligence
Figure 1.--The NAZIs appear to have gained some useful information from their intelligence operations in the early phase of the War. They had some intelligence coups such as breaking British naval codes used for merchant ships. Overall the NAZIs intelligence effort, however, was an unmittigated disaster. Western historians discuss Ultra and the failure of the NAZIs to correctly assess the Normandy D-Day landings. The situation on the Eastern Front was even worse. NAZI intelligence time and again failed to correctly assess Soviet intentions and even massive offensive buildups. Perhaps the gratest failure of NAZI intelligence on the Eastern Front was the inability to assess the Soviet ability to create and deploy new divisions.
The intelligence operations in the West have been reported on in some detail, especially the Ultra code breaking operation. We also have some information about the incredibly unsuccessful NAZI operations on the Eastern Front. This operation was conducted beginning in 1942 by Reinhard Galen who the the American employed after the War. Much less, however, is known about the very successful Soviet operations. This has been obscured by the surprise achieved by the NAZIs in the opening phase of Barbarossa. This was, however, not a failure of Soviet intelligemnce. Soviet agents as well as the Allies gave Stalin ample warning. He simply refused to believe that Hitler would attack him. Subsequently each of the major Soviet offenses (Moscoe 1941, Stalingrad 1942, and Bagration 1944) achieved almost total surprise with devestating results. Some have speculated that the success of the Soviet intelligence operation was such that there must have been a very high-placed traitor in the German high command or security services. Soviet sources have never identified this individual if he existed. Another unanswered question is the extent and success of Soviet code breaking operations. While Soviet intelligence operations on the Eastern Front are not well documented, a great deal is known about Soviet operations in the West. Here the Soviets during and after the War obtainedcritical information which proved of great assistance in building the atomic bomb as well as other military secrets.
Western Intelligence Operations
The intelligence operations in the West have been reported on in some detail, especially the Ultra code breaking operation. The succes of the Allies in keeping the D-Day secrets and confusing the Germans is one of the great intelligence successes of the War.
NAZI Intelligence Operations
While we know a great deal about Allied intelligence during the War, we know less about NAZI operations. The NAZI operations in the West are fairly well known. We do have some information about NAZI operastion also know a great deal about the incredibly unsuccessful NAZI operations on the Eastern Front and historians are working on the subject. The NAZIs were consistently unable during the War to learn of Soviet buildups and offense planning. The NAZI failures began very early in the War. The huge number of Soviet prisoners taken during Barbarossa convinced Wehrmacht analysts that the Soviet Union was a defeated country. Perhaps the gratest failure of NAZI intelligence on the Eastern Front was the inability to assess the Soviet ability to create and deploy new divisions. [Stephan] NAZI intelligemnce operations were conducted beginning in 1942 by Reinhard Galen who the the American employed after the War. His opertations were arguably some of the least effective efforts of the War. Galen was not reponsible for the failure to assess the Soviet Winter offensive before Moscow (December 1941), bit he was in command as the Soviets assemmbled huge forces preparing for Stalingrad (November 1942), Kursk (July 1943), and Bagration (June 1944).
Soviet Intelligence Operations on the Eastern Front
Much less is known about the very successful Soviet operations. This has been obscured by the surprise achieved by the NAZIs in the opening phase of Barbarossa. This was, however, not a failure of Soviet intelligemnce. Soviet agents as well as the Allies gave Stalin ample warning. He simply refused to believe that Hitler would attack him. Subsequently each of the major Soviet offenses (Moscow 1941, Stalingrad 1942, and Bagration 1944) achieved almost total surprise with devestating results. Some have speculated that the success of the Soviet intelligence operation was such that there must have been a very high-placed traitor in the German high command or security services. Soviet sources have never identified this individual if he existed.
Soviet Code Breaking Operations
Another unanswered question is the extent and success of Soviet code breaking operations. One of the great unanswered questions of World War II is Soviet code breaking operations. Without a doubt the Soviets must have worked on German and Japanese codes as well as Allied codes. As far as we know, the Soviets and now the Russians have never released information on their code breaking operations. Nor do we know of a historian that has gained any significan insights into their operations.
Soviet Intelligence Operations in the West
While Soviet intelligence operations on the Eastern Front are not well documented, a great deal is known about Soviet operations in the West. Here the Soviets during and after the War obtained critical information which proved of great assistance in building the atomic bomb as well as other military secrets. The Soviets ran iportant soy rings in thevnajor countries, including Britain, France, Geramny, Italy, France, and the United States. There were smaller operations in other countries. The Communist parries in these countries were a ready mafe source of persinnel and support for these ooerations.
Lieutenant General Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov (Пáвел Aнатóльевич CудоплáтовP was born in XXXXX (1907 ). He is a major source on Soviet intelligebce because he wrote a book on his experiences. He ran away from ar age 12 years (1919), joined the Red Army and fought in the Russian Civil War. He served with the intelligence services of the Soviet Union, including the Cheka, OGPU, NKVD, anf KGB. He rose to the rank of lieutenant general. He was involved with several pre-World ar II, World War II, and Cold War. He describes in detail the extentStalin went to to dismiss reports of Gernan preparations for Barvarossa--the invasion of the Soviet Union (1941). Military abd intelligence officers who reported on these preapartiins were putting not inky their careers, but their lives in jepordy. As a resukt when the Germans struckm Sobiet units were a first afraid to shoot back. His assifnments included political assainations personally ordered by Stalin. He descSome of his most notable actions were the assassination of Leon Trotsky (1940), Operation Monastery and Scherhorn, Soviet military deception operation against the Germans (1942-44), and the Soviet penetration of the American Manhattan Project (1940s). The Soviets conducted a massive intellgence operation in the United States and Sudiplatov was part of it. Thus was possivle because so many Soviet personnel were involved in the American Lend Lease program during World War II. This was necessary because the Soviets were allowed to inspect American wat plants and pick and choose what they wanted. Many of his associates were purged and narrowly escaped that fate because of his close assocition with Beria. He was not shot, but spent 15 years in Soviet prisons. Sudoplatov published his autobiography after the implosion of the Soviet Union (1994). It brought him to the attention of Western historians who did not have lot to go on when assessing Soviet inteligence. His book provided a rare look into Soviet intelligence and Soviet internal politics during World War II and the Cold War. Some of it has been quetioned and autobiographies commonly inflate the role of authors or try to inrerpret historical events to make themselves look good or important. We know that some of his book his book is factual because there are independent sources that confirm his activiities. Tere are a variety of factual error, understnadable becuse it cover his longblifevand was largely written from memory. One charge that has been questioned was accusing Manahattann Prohect Scientific Director Robert Opoenheimer of passing informatiin to Soviet agents.
Sources
Stephan, Robert. Stalin's Secret War: Soviet Counter-Intelligence Against the NAZIs (University of Kabsas Press).
