Figure 1.-- |
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The German senior officer corps was made up almost entirely to a man of World War I veterans. These men knew the impact of America on the War. And this was just the role of the American Expeditionary Force in the fighting on the estern Front. American industry unlike World War II did not play a decisive role in the War. These men with the Wehrmacht mired in the snow of the Soviet Union could not have conceived of going to war with America again. But Hitler did not ask their opinion. Hitler of course had served on the Western Front during World War I, but not in an area where the Americans were active. Hitler never commissioned a study of America's military potential. For the Germans there was no real study, it was simply a decesion Hitler made in his own mind. It was an act of pent-up vengence without any thought to the consequences. Hitler had never traveled beyond Austria, Germany, and occupied areas of Belgium and France. He was, however, an intelligent person and had a vague idea about America's industrial capacity. You see that in Mein Kampf (1924). Hitler did not go into specifics, but he saw America was the rising world power leaving Britain in its wake. What impressed him the most was that Ameriuca was a continental power, but he also mntioned in large Germanic population. He wrote, "Today many European states are like pyramids stood on their heads. Their European area is absurdly small in comparison to their weight of colonies, foreign trade, etc. We may say: summit in Europe, base in the whole world; contrasting with the American Union which possesses its base in its own continent and touches the rest of the earth only with its summit. And from this comes the immense inner strength of this state and the weakness of most European colonial powers. [Hitler, p.139.] Later describes America as 'the new master' [Hitler, p. 638.] and he refers to the Gernmanic origins of most of the population. By his second book he changes his opinion on American etnicity, but continues to see America as a danger. As far as ee know, there was no important adviser ir interest group promoting war with America. Adm. Dönitz was complaing about U.S. destoyers protecting Bfitish convohys. President Roosevelt hadordered an undeclared naval war in the North Atlantic. No one else had th stomache for war with America. Göring's stock had fallen since the Luftwaffe's failure over Britain. As chief of the Luftwaff, Göring was paryticularly concerned about American air craft construction potential. [Göring]
The German senior officer corps was made up almost entirely to a man of World War I veterans. These men knew the impact of America on the War. And this was just the role of the American Expeditionary Force in the fighting on the Western Front. American industry unlike World War II did not play a decisive role in the War. These men with the Wehrmacht mired in the snow of the Soviet Union could not have conceived of going to war with America again. But Hitler did not ask their opinion.
Hitler of course had served on the Western Front during World War I, but not in an area where the Americans were active. Hitler never commissioned a study of America's military potential. For the Germans there was no real study, it was simly a decesion Hitler made in his own mind. It was an act of pent-up vengence without any thought to the consequences. Hitler had never traveled beyond Austria, Germany, and occupied areas of Belgium and France. He was, however, an intelligent person and had a vague idea about America's industrial capacity. You see that in Mein Kampf (1924). Hitler did not go into specifics, but he saw America was the rising world power leaving Britain in its wake. What impressed him the most was that Ameriuca was a continental power, but he also mntioned in large Germanic population. He wrote, "Today many European states are like pyramids stood on their heads. Their European area is absurdly small in comparison to their weight of colonies, foreign trade, etc. We may say: summit in Europe, base in the whole world; contrasting with the American Union which possesses its base in its own continent and touches the rest of the earth only with its summit. And from this comes the immense inner strength of this state and the weakness of most European colonial powers. [Hitler, p.139.] Later describes America as 'the new master' [Hitler, p. 638.] and he refers to the Gernmanic origins of most of the population. By his second book he changes his opinion on American etnicity, but continues to see America as a danger. As far as ee know, there was no important adviser ir interest group promoting war with America.
Adm. Dönitz was complaing about U.S. destoyers protecting Bfitish convohys. President Roosevelt hadordered an undeclared naval war in the North Atlantic. No one else had th stomache for war with America, especially as the reports of the Red Army offensive before Moscow reached Berlin.
Göring's stock with Hitler had fallen since the Luftwaffe's failure over Britain. As chief of the Luftwaff, Göring was paryticularly concerned about American air craft construction potential. [Göring] We have detailed information on what he thought of America, but it is somewjat contradictory. He said during the War, dunoissing merican weaponry, "All the Americans know how to make is razor blades." We are not sure how frakly he spoke to Hitler. The people cloest to Hitler learned to sus out wht the Führer though was important and agree with him. Göring was perhaps Hitler's cloest supporter. Hitler saw the Luftwaffe as his war winning force. Anmd this proved to be the case until gthe Bttle iof Btitain (July-December 1940). This and the Dunkirk failure harmd the relationship. Hitlr trusted him, hiowever, enough to put him in charge of the Holocust. We have an interview of Göring immediately following the War. He tlks nbout America. We are not entirely sure what he actually thought during the War and what he told Hitler, but his respomses to Major Kenneth W. Hechler, U.S. Army Major Kenneth W. Hechler re revealing:
Hechler: What was the German estimate of American war potential? Did Germany hope to complete its European campaigns before the United States would be strong enough to intervene? Göring: As a break neared and it seemed that the matter had to be decided by war, I told Hitler, I consider it a duty to prevent America going to war with us. I believed the economic and technical potential of the United States to be unusually great, particularly the air force. Although at the time not too many new inventions had been developed to the extent we might have anticipated, and airplane production was significant but not outstandingly large. I always answered Hitler that it would be comparatively easy to convert factories to war production. In particular, the mighty automobile industry could be resorted to. Hitler was of the opinion that America would not intervene because of its unpleasant experiences in World War I.
Hechler: What unpleasant experiences? Loss of life? Göring: The United States helped everybody and got nothing for it the last time, Hitler felt. Things had not been carried out the way the United States had planned. [President Woodrow] Wilson’s 14 Points had not been observed. Hitler was also thinking of the difficulties of shipping an army to Europe and keeping it supplied.
Hechler: What did you feel personally about our war potential? Göring: While I, personally, was of the opinion that the United States could build an air force quicker than an army, I constantly warned of the possibilities of the U.S. with its great technical advances and economic resources.
Hechler: If you thought the United States would become so powerful, how did this relate to your own plans for waging war? Göring: The decisive factor in 1938 was the consideration that it would take the United States several years to prepare. Its shipping tonnage at the time was not too large. I wanted Hitler to conclude the war in Europe as rapidly as possible and not get involved in Russia. Yet, on the question of whether America could build up an army on a big scale, opinions were divided.
Hechler: What were the divided opinions? What did other people think? National Archives Göring: I don’t know the views of other influential people. I cannot say that other people had given different advice.
Hechler: What opinion was held by OKW [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or German Armed Forces High Command] and OKH [Oberkommando des Heeres, or German Army High Command]? Göring: I don’t know the opinion of OKW or OKH. I used to tell Hitler that everything depended on our not bringing the U.S. over to Europe again. I said during the Polish campaign that we must not let the United States get involved. In 1941 the issue became real, and the general opinion was that it was better to bear unpleasant incidents with the U.S. and strive to keep it out of the struggle than allow a deterioration of relations between the United States and Germany. This was our unrelenting effort.
Hechler: What specifically indicated to you that [President Franklin D.] Roosevelt was preparing for war? Göring: A mass of details. It was all published in a White Book. [Note: This was an intelligence assessment, perhsps prepared by the Abwehr.]. I don’t know if the entire text was published or only extracts. It made a deep impression.
Hechler: Did Germany expect to bring its campaign in Europe to a successful conclusion before we could build up our war potential sufficiently to intervene there? Göring: Hitler believed that he could bring matters to such a point that it would be very difficult for you to invade or intervene.
Hechler: In December 1941, what was Germany’s estimate of our shipbuilding capability, which could influence the European campaign? Göring: It was our opinion that it was on a very large scale. Roosevelt spoke of bridges of ships across the Atlantic and a constant stream of planes. We fully believed him and were convinced that it was true. We also had this opinion from reports by observers in the United States. We understood your potential. On the other hand, the tempo of your shipbuilding, for example, Henry Kaiser’s program, surprised and upset us. We had rather minimized the apparently exaggerated claims in this field. One spoke of these floating coffins, Kaisersärge, that would be finished by a single torpedo. We believed most of your published production figures, but not all of them, as some seem inflated. However, since the United States had all the necessary raw materials except rubber, and many technical experts, our engineers could estimate United States production quite accurately. At first, however, we could not believe the speed with which your Merchant Marine was growing. Claims of eight to 10 days to launch a ship seemed fantastic. Even when we realized it referred to the assembly of prefabricated parts, a mere 10 days to put it together was still unthinkable. Our shipbuilding industry was very thorough and painstaking, but very slow, disturbingly slow, in comparison. It took nine months to build a Danube vessel.
Hechler: Why did Germany declare war on the United States? Göring: I was astonished when Germany declared war on the United States. We should rather have accepted a certain amount of unpleasant incidents. It was clear to us that if Roosevelt were reelected, the U.S. would inevitably make war against us. This conviction was strongly held, especially with Hitler. After Pearl Harbor, although we were not bound under our treaty with Japan to come to its aid since Japan had been the aggressor, Hitler said we were in effect at war already, with ships having been sunk or fired upon, and must soothe the Japanese. For this reason, a step was taken which we always regretted. It was unnecessary for us to accept responsibility for striking the first blow. For the same reason, we had been the butt of propaganda in 1914, when we started to fight, although we knew that within 48 hours Russia would have attacked us. I believe Hitler was convinced that as a result of the Japanese attack, the main brunt of the United States force would be brought to bear on the Far East and would not constitute such a danger for Germany. Although he never expressed it in words, it was perhaps inexpressibly bitter to him that the main force of the United States was in fact turned against Europe. [Göring]
Göring, Herman. In Gilberto Villahermosa. World War II Magazine (September 2006). Göring was interogated immeduiately after the War in Prisoner of War Camp No. 32 (July 25, 1945). Major Kenneth W. Hechler of the U.S. Army Europe’s Historical Division asked the questions. Captain Herbert R. Sensenig served as the translator.
Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf Tran. Ralph Manheim (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1971), 694p.
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