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World economic data gives us the ability to compare the economies of the belligerant nations. This gives us a rough idea of the ability of each country to wage war. The data has to be treated with some caution. The American and most of the European data seems reasonably straight forward, especially the countries with freely convertable currencies. These countries had statistical systems tht were not controlled by totalitarian political parties determined to generate propaganda and economic performance was part of their legitimacy. So impressive economic data was a prpaganda tool. In addition, how to evlauate the value of output so as to compare the value of output when the currency is not freely convertable. This means that the Soviet and the German data has to be treated with some caution. another problem in using value data is labor cost. Soviet and Japanese labor costs, for example, were minimal while American labor costs were substantial. Assessing the economic contribution of occupied countries is also a problem-although Italy and France are accounted for. Even so, the availble data is probably good enough to make rough comparisons and is more or less born out by living standardsa and production data like steel tonnage and numbrs of actual weaons (artillery, olnes ships, tanks, etc.) produced. Several countries had a desire to go to War and fundamentally alter the interntional system (Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union). None of these countries, however, had the ability to wage a world war, especially a prolonged war of attrition. The only country that had that capability was the United States. America had an economy twice the size of even a 1939 enlarged Germany and about six times larger than Japan (1939). And that differential was even greater as the War progressed, despite German increases as a result of their stunning military conquests (1940). While production within the Reich increased, German often barbaric occupation policies actually reduced the productivity of occupied countries, a major flaw in German war policies. Note Frencg GDP before and after German occupation (figure 1). Thus the German Großraum despite controlling much of Europe could not compete with the Soviets and Allies.
In addition to gross production, America had within its border or through trade access to all the strategic materials and a unparalled industril capacity to produce the implements of war. In particular it was the world's major producer of petroleum. In addition its had an agricultural capacity to not only feed itself, but its Allies as well. Thus it had the capability to not only wage a two-front war, but war on world-wide basis on multiple battlefields. And once American production was combined with Bitish technology as well as and Soviet production, Hitler and his evil empire were doomed. Germany might have won a short war if Britain and the Soviets capitulated, but once he failed to defeat the RAF (September 1940) and the Red Army (December 1941), the war was lost for the NAZIs just as the stnd of the French Army on the Marne doomed the Germans in World War I. It would take over 3 years and the tragedy of millions of lives, but inevitably the massive industrial power of the enemies he made would leave German cities masive piles of rubble and Hitler dead and unmourned in his dank, dreary bunker.
This data has to be treated with some caution. The American and most of the European data seems reasonably straight forward, especially the countries with freely convertable currencies. These countries had statistical systems tht were not controlled by totalitarian political parties determined to generate propaganda and economic performance was part of their legitimacy. So impressive economic data was a prpaganda tool. In addition, how to evlauate the value of output so as to compare the value of output when the currency is not freely convertable. This means that the Soviet and the German data has to be treated with some caution. another problem in using value data is labor cost. Soviet and Japanese labor costs, for example, were minimal while American labor costs were substantial. Assessing the economic contribution of occupied countries is also a problem-although Italy and France are accounted for. Even so, the availble data is probably good enough to make rough comparisons and is more or less born out by living standardsa and production data like steel tonnage and numbrs of actual weaons (artillery, olnes ships, tanks, etc.) produced. We welcome reader contribution as to other statitical estimates that may be more accurate.
World War II was essentially settled in the East with the titanic struggle between the world's two great totalitarian powers. The enormous damage the German Barbarossa invasion wreaked on the Soviet Union can be seen here. Soviet production fell from $417 billionn in 1940 to only $274 bnillion in 1942 or by a massive 35 percent. The Germans occupied most of the westen Soviet Union, inclusing nuch of the country best black-soil agriculturl area. Combined with the even greater losses in men and equipment during Barbarossa (June-December 1941). The huge numbers of Soviet POWs is another indictor of the damage done. The extent to which the Soviet Union was damaged can clearly be seen. This should give pause to the legion of commentors who insist that NAZI Germany could never have defeated the Soviet Union. Fortunately for the Soviet people, Hitler's wreckless interfearence in Barbarossa left the Wehrmacht deep in the Soviet Union unprepared for the winter and on the outer limits of the logistical train. The result was the Red Army Winter offensive which badly damaged the Wehrmacht, restored the Red Army numerical advantage, and gave the Soviets time to recover. Germany might have won a short war if Britain and the Soviets had capitulated, but once he failed to defeat the RAF (September 1940) and the Red Army (December 1941), the war was lost for the NAZIs just as the stand of the French Army on the Marne doomed the Germans in World War I.
Several countries had a desire to go to War in 1939, at least their leadership. The gol ws to fundamentally alter the interntional system (Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union). None of these countries, however, had the ability to wage a world war, especially a prolonged war of attrition. The compilers of the data here made a serious error in how they treated the Soviet Union. The French and Italian data which were adjusted for when Italy quit the Axis and the French were conquered by the Germans. The authors treat the Soviet Union as if it was always associated with the Western Allies. In fact, The Soviet Union became an Axis ally (August 1939) and strongly supported the German war economy until Germany invased (June 1941). If this adustment is made for 1940, it can be seen that the totalitarian powers had an economic base comparable to that of the Allies.
The only country that had that capability was the United States. America had an economy twice the size of even a 1939 enlarged Germany and about six times larger than Japan (1939). And that differential was even greater as the War progressed, despite German increases as a result of their stunning military conquests (1940).
In addition to gross production, America had within its border or through trade access to all the strategic materials and a unparalled industril capacity to produce the implements of war. In particular it was the world's major producer of petroleum. In addition its had an agricultural capacity to not only feed itself, but its Allies as well. Thus it had the capability to not only wage a two-front war, but war on world-wide basis on multiple battlefields. And once American production was combined with Bitish technology as well as and Soviet production, Hitler and his evil empire were doomed.
While production within the Reich increased, German often barbaric occupation policies actually reduced the productivity of occupied countries, a major flaw in German war policies. Note French GDP before and after German occupation, Grench production fell from $199 billion in 1939 to only $110 billion in 1943 or by 45 percent (figure 1). This was the situation throughout German occupied Europe and the declines in the ast were even greater. If Germany had been able to maintai pre-War production levels in the countries they conquered, the war may have turned out very differently. Thus the German Großraum despite controlling much of Europe could not compete with the Soviets and Allies. It would take over 3 years and the tragedy of millions of lives, but inevitably the massive industrial power of the enemies Hitler made nd his disaterous occupation policies would leave German cities massive piles of rubble and Hitler dead and unmourned in his dank, dreary bunker.
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