German World War II Economics: Exploitation of the Captive Nations

NAZI World War II economic strategy
Figure 1.--For the NAZIs, their whole plan of conquest backfired on them. Hitler's war plan was to seize the resources of the East (essetially the Soviet Union) and use those resources to turn Germany into an unassailable continental power. This was the whole poit og going to war--seizing Lebensraum and the vast resources of the East. But this did not occur. The resources of the East proved chimeral for Hitler. Stalin was shipping greater quantities of oil and other critical msaterials to Germany before the NAZI invasion than the Germans were able to obtain after the invasion.

A major question that has not been asequately addressed in the copius scholarship in World War II is how effectively the NAZIs exploited the resources and economic potential of the occupied nations. Germany proceeded to loot the national banks of the conquered nations. Obtaining the gold from the treasuries was critical for the NAZI war effort. The NAZIs oriented the economy toward war production and meeting domestic demand, not internation commerce. Thus critical raw materials from countries they did not conquer (Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey) had to be purchased with gold. The NAZI success in exploiting the economies is a complicated question. Of course the policies they pursued wee morally reperhensible. This virtually goes without saying. But a very different question is the effectiueness of NAZI policies. Here the record is mixed and the comclusioin dependent on what indices the reader estanlishes. It is undeniable that the NAZIs finnces Hitler's War on the backs of the peoples of the occupied countries. They managed to keep the privations felt in other countries until the last full year of the War, 1944. It was in that year that the Germsan people began to experience the consequences of the War their leadership launched pn their behalf. By this time the stratehic bobing campign reached its intensitiy and the advancing Allied armies meant that the despoiling of the wealth of the occupied countries was no longer possible. For the NAZIs, their whole plan of conquest backfired on them. Hitler's war plan was to seize the resources of the East (essetially the Soviet Union) and use those resources to turn Germany into an unassailable continental power. But this did not occur. Stalin was shipping greater quantities of oil and other critical msaterials to Germany before the NAZI invasion than the Germans were able to obtain after the invasion. The Germans were never able to bring Soviet mine and factory production back on line to any great extent. And most of the agricultural resources of the East were used to feed the Whermacht rather than returned to feed Germany. Germany did nore effectively utilize the resources of occupied Western Europe--especially France. But here too the picture is mixed. While the Germns did exploit the wealth of the capotive nations in the West, what they exploited was the existing wealth and producive csapacity at the samne time that America, Britain, and the Soviet Union were massvely expanding arms production. Germany also did not effectively used the economies and industries of the captive nations, especially the countries occupied in Western Europe. Germany did use the captive nations as a source of raw materials. Romania in particular was a critical source of petroleum. (Romania was a NAZI ally, but coersion was an important factor in forming alliances with coutries like Romania.) Germany did not, however, prove very effective in fully utilizing the indutries of captive nations. France in particular had a large, sophisticated armaments industry. This industry was not converted to support the German armed forces. The economies of France and the Low Countries could have made a major contribution to the NAZI-war effort. The NAZIs in 1940 seemed more concerned in making sure that France would never again be a threat in the West. As a result, therwas not effort to gear up French armaments production. By the time the NAZIs realized that the War was not already won, it was to late to take full advantage of French industrial capacity. Thus planes, tanks, artillery, and other key weapons were not constructed in France for the Germans. Given the industrial forces being marshalled against Germany in America, Britain, and the Soviet Union, the Germans needed tofully utilize the industrial capoacity of the conquered nations. They failed to do so. In part this was because a goal of the NAZIs was to turn neighboiring countries into subservient agricultural countries that would feed agricultural harvests and raw materials to Germany. In the end the criminality of the NAZI world view sewed the seeds of its own production.

Gold Reserves

Germany proceeded to loot the national banks of the conquered nations. Obtaining the gold from the treasuries was critical for the NAZI war effort. The NAZIs oriented the economy toward war production and meeting domestic demand, not internation commerce. Thus critical raw materials from countries they did not conquer (Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey) had to be purchased with gold. Very little German production was available for export, especially as the War contnued.

Basic Question

The NAZI success in exploiting the economies is a complicated question. Of course the policies they pursued wee morally reperhensible. This virtually goes without saying. But a very different question is the effectiueness of NAZI policies. Here the record is mixed and the comclusioin dependent on what indices the reader estanlishes. It is undeniable that the NAZIs finncecHitler's War on the backs of the peoples of the occupied countries.

German Home Front

The NAZIs managed to keep the privations felt in other countries until the last full year of the war, 1944. This was a priority of Hiler who recalled how privations on the homne front undermined German morale in World War I. It was in 1944 that the Germsan people began to experience the consequences of the War their leadership launched pn their behalf. By this time the stratehic bobing campign reached its intensitiy and the advancing Allied armies meant that the despoiling of the wealth of the occupied countries was no longer possible.

Hitler's Economic Strategy: The East

For the NAZIs, their whole plan of conquest backfired on them. Hitler's war plan was to seize the resources of the East (essetially the Soviet Union) and use those resources to turn Germany into an unassailable continental power. This was the whole poit og going to war--seizing Lebensraum and the vast resources of the East. But this did not occur. The resources of the East proved chimeral for Hitler. Stalin was shipping greater quantities of oil and other critical msaterials to Germany before the NAZI invasion than the Germans were able to obtain after the invasion. The Germans were never able to bring Soviet mine and factory production back on line to any great extent. This was in part due to Soviet efforts to destroy or render facilitids unuable. But genocidal NAZI policies such as attacks on civilians, rounding up civilisans for war wirkn in Germny, and cutting off food supplies to cities destabilized efforts to restart productive activities. And of course the Soviet Union did not collapse like "a house of cards" as Hitler expected. And most of the agricultural resources of the East were used to feed the Whermacht rather than returned to feed Germany.

Exploiting Occupied Europe

Germany did nore effectively utilize the resources of occupied Western Europe--especially France. But here too the picture is mixed. While the Germans did exploit the wealth of the capotive nations in the West, what they exploited was the existing wealth and producive csapacity at the samne time that America, Britain, and the Soviet Union were massvely expanding arms production. Germany also did not effectively used the economies and industries of the captive nations, especially the countries occupied in Western Europe. Germany did use the captive nations as a source of raw materials. Romania in particular was a critical source of petroleum. (Romania was a NAZI ally, but coersion was an important factor in forming alliances with coutries like Romania.)

Inability to Expand Production

Germany did not prove very effective in fully utilizing the indutries of captive nations. France in particular had a large, sophisticated armaments industry. This industry was not converted to support the German armed forces. The economies of France and the Low Countries could have made a major contribution to the NAZI-war effort. The NAZIs in 1940 seemed more concerned in making sure that France would never again be a threat in the West. As a result, therwas not effort to gear up French armaments production. By the time the NAZIs realized that the War was not already won, it was to late to take full advantage of French industrial capacity. Thus planes, tanks, artillery, and other key weapons were not constructed in France for the Germans. Given the industrial forces being marshalled against Germany in America, Britain, and the Soviet Union, the Germans needed to fully utilize the industrial capoacity of the conquered nations. They failed to do so. By the time that Goebbels began talking about "total war" it was too late for the NAZIs. Speer did suceed in raising German production. He was unable to increase production in France and the other captive ntions. In part this was because a goal of the NAZIs was to turn neighboiring countries into subservient agricultural countries that would feed agricultural harvests and raw materials to Germany. In the end the criminality of the NAZI world view sewed the seeds of its own production.

Specific Countries

NAZI policies and economic capabilities varied from country to country, thus a complete view of the NAZI exploitatiom of the captive nation requires a look at each individual country. Many of the countries had relatively small economies. The most important country by far was France. Hitler believes that he could support the German war economy through conquests in the East. This proved a huge miscalculation. The explotation of the East barely covered the needs of the Wehrmacht forces deployeed there with little shipped back to the Reich. Before Barbarossa, the Soviers had been supplying the Germans vast quantities of food and strategic materials. Most of the economic support for the German war economy came from the West, especially France. Belgium, the Nethelands, and Denmark were also important in percpita terms, but less so in absolute terms because they were relatively small countries.

Belgium

A German military government under General Alexander von Falkenhausen and Eggert Reeder administered Belgium during most of the German occupation (until July 1944). After D-Day Reichskommissar Josef Grohé was responsible, although much of the country was liberated (September 1944). The Germans imposed heavy costs on the Belgiums as a way of exploiting the country's economy. The German government required thevBelgians to pay for the costs of occupation through taxes. They also levied 'external occupation costs' which after the invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941) was called the Anti-Bolshevik charge which supported the German war economy. [37] Economists estimate that Belgium was forced to pay something like two-thirds of its national income to the Germans, roughly 5.7 billion Reichsmarks. And as in France, the Germans controlled the exchange rate. The Germans structly rationed food, fuel, and clothing were strictly rationed. Fuel shortages adversely affected the functioning of the economy. There was also war damage, both during the fighting and as a result of Allied bombing, but this was less than experienced by many other countries. Some estimate that about 10 percent of the productive capabilty was damaged by the War. As the War progressed, authorities were increasingly pressed to provide the rationed allocations. [Jacquemyns and Struye, p. 307.] A black market developed, but only aided people with assetts. [Nefors, pp. 256–257.] As in World War I, Belgians were conscripted for war work, but unlike World War I mostly in the Reich. Some 375,000 Belgins were involved. [Chiari, Echternkamp, et al., p. 669.] Some 180,000 mostly unemployed Belgians signed up volutarily before conscription began (1941). These conscripted workers worked as forced labor against their will. Some 200,000 Belgian POWs captured in 1940 were also transported to Germany. They were used as forced labor, but paid and paid only a nominal sum. About 80,000 of the POWs were reptriated to Belgium (late-1940-41). The Germans primarily selected the Flemish for repatriation. This was dome for racial rasons and out of belief that the Flemish were less hostile than the Franophone Waloons. Many of the other POWs remained in German custody until the end of the War. The ones in POW camps endured poor conditons, but not the virtually genocidal cnditions of the Eastern (Polish nd Soviet POWs). Some 2,000 Belgian POWs died in Germany custody.

Czechoslovakia


Denmark

Of all the captive nations, the German political touch was the lightest in Denmark. This is not to say the Germans were not oppressive and brutal, but only that in relative terms they were less brutal in Denmark than in other countries. Here race was a factor. Denmark had the Germans won the War is one of the countrues, like the rest of Scandanavia, is one of the countries that would hve been annexed to the Geater Reich because of wht the NAZIs saw as valuable genetic material. This is all notable because of all the occupied countries, the Danish economy did not collapse as much as the rest of the captive nations in the German Großraum. Generally speaking the more repressive the German occupation regime, the more the local econmy collapsed and the less the Germans were able to exploit.

France

One subject that we have not yet been able to properly assess is the extent to which Vichy France economically supported the NAZI war effort. We know that Vichy supported the German war-effort. We do not know just how effective that support was. Pétain on October 24, 1940 met with Hitler at Montoire. At that meeting Pétain and Laval discussed Franco-German cooperation. They were unable, however, to get any commitment from Hitler on key issues such as the post-War border of France and the return of the French POWs. Hitler had not yet made up his mind on these issues. The fact was that Hitler had little respect for France or the potential benefits of a French ally. He had convinced himself that the War was already won. The ally he really wanted was Britain. Vichy did make an important economic contribution to the German war effort, but it seems limited in terms of the potential economic potential of France. Of course the issue of economic collaboration merges into the subject of NAZI exploitation.

Greece


Netherlands


Norway


Poland


Soviet Union


Yugoslavia


Axis Allies

Not all the countries that came under German control were captive nations. Several countries joined or were forced into the Axis and the War. These counties were also exploited economically, except for Finland which was a cobelgerant. Finland was such a valuable fighting partner that the Germans actually supported the Fimmish economy. Finland was in a bad sevomic state because of the loss of much of its most valuable economic land as aresult of the sviet invasion (1939-40).

Neutrals

Several neutral countries played a major role in the German war ecomony. Here of course we are talking bout the neuteals that the NAZIs did not unvade. The Germans could not exploit these countries like the countries where tey seized control. But they did have incluence, especially in Sweden and Switzerland which they surrounded and Portugal, Spain, and Turkey which had to be concerned about a possible German invasion. The fact that the Germans were not in control actuall permitted the neutrals to strike a reasonable deal with the Germans. And the neurtrals not surrounded by the Germas could engage in internatinal trade.

Sources

Chiari, Bernhard, Jörg Echternkamp, et al. (2010).Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Vol. 10, No. 2 (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt: 2010).

Jacquemyns, Guillaume and Paul Struye, Paul. La Belgique sous l'occupation allemande: 1940–1944 (Brussels: Éd. Complexe, 2002).

Nefors, Patrick. La collaboration industrielle en Belgique, 1940–1945 (Brussels: Racine, 2006).







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Created: 2:16 AM 10/18/2008
Last updated: 8:54 PM 1/18/2018